Orem City v. Jakeman

2025 UT App 187

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

OREM CITY,
Appellee,
v.
DAVID AMMON JAKEMAN,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20241042-CA
Filed December 18, 2025

Fourth District Court, Spanish Fork Department
The Honorable Jared Eldridge
No. 221300408

David Ammon Jakeman, Appellant Pro Se
Aliisa N. Leon, Attorney for Appellee

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES RYAN D. TENNEY and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 In this consolidated appeal, David Ammon Jakeman
challenges multiple continuous protective orders entered
following his conviction on eight charges in several cases. 1
Jakeman raises arguments that he did not set forth in the
proceedings before the district court, instead claiming that the
court plainly erred in not anticipating the arguments he now
raises on appeal. We affirm, concluding that Jakeman either
invited the claimed error or otherwise fails to meet the
requirements of a plain error claim.

1. Five cases involving repeated violations of protective orders
were consolidated in this appeal.
Orem City v. Jakeman

BACKGROUND

¶2 In August 2023, Jakeman was convicted on eight domestic
violence and violation of protective order charges in several
different cases. Later, five sentencing protective orders (SPOs)—
one for each case in which Jakeman was charged—were issued at
the request of Orem City. 2

¶3 In July 2024, Jakeman, acting pro se, filed a motion
requesting modification of the SPOs. At a hearing in September,
Orem City moved for five continuous protective orders (CPOs) to
replace the SPOs, arguing that they should have been entered at
the time of sentencing under the relevant statute.

¶4 The court denied Jakeman’s requested modification to the
existing SPOs. Instead, the district court replaced the SPOs by
issuing five CPOs as requested by Orem City. The court noted that
section 78B-7-804(3)(b) of the Utah Code indicates that “if a
perpetrator is convicted of a domestic violence offense resulting
in a sentence of imprisonment, including jail, that is to be served
after conviction, the court shall issue a continuous protective
order at the time of the conviction or sentencing.” Given this
statutory framework, the court agreed “that a continuous
protective order could have and probably should have been

2. A sentencing protective order refers to “a written order of the
court as part of sentencing in a domestic violence case that limits
the contact an individual who is convicted or adjudicated of a
domestic violence offense may have with a victim or other
specified individuals under Section 78B-7-804.” Utah Code § 77-
36-1(12). While the statute does not explicitly state that a
sentencing protective order may be continuous, there is no reason
that a sentencing protective order cannot be continuous in nature.
Indeed, it appears that there is generally no other option for
protective orders issued in domestic violence cases that result in
incarceration. See id. § 78B-7-804(3)(b).

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Orem City v. Jakeman

issued at sentencing in this case, and it wasn’t.” The court
concluded, “It’s now being requested, and it appears . . . that a
continuous protective order should issue . . . .” Jakeman now
appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶5 Jakeman first argues that the district court erred in issuing
the CPOs without complying with section 78B-7-804(5)
(Subsection (5)) of the Utah Code. Because this issue was not
preserved, we review it under the rubric of plain error. A claim of
plain error presents a question of law that we address in the first
instance. State v. Samora, 2022 UT App 7, ¶ 16, 504 P.3d 195; accord
State v. Popp, 2019 UT App 173, ¶ 19, 453 P.3d 657.

¶6 Jakeman next asserts that Subsection (5) is unconstitutional
as applied to his case because the CPOs “resulted in the de facto
termination of [his] parental rights without due process.” Because
this issue was not preserved, we again review it under the plain
error doctrine.

ANALYSIS

I. The Applicability of Subsection (5)

¶7 Jakeman argues that the district court did not comply with
the requirements of Subsection (5), which states,

[A] district court may issue a continuous protective
order at any time if the victim files a petition with
the court, and after notice and hearing the court
finds that a continuous protective order is necessary
to protect the victim.

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Utah Code § 78B-7-804(5). Jakeman asserts that “the district court
issued CPOs even though none of the requirements [identified in
Subsection (5)] for doing so had been met.”

¶8 Jakeman claims the issue was preserved when he objected
to Orem City’s request for the CPOs as being “procedurally
defective.” We disagree. This generalized grievance provided no
indication of Jakeman’s claim on appeal that the requirements of
Subsection (5) were not followed in issuing the CPOs. And in our
reading of the record, we find no suggestion that Jakeman ever
mentioned Subsection (5) or its requirements to the district court.
“An issue is preserved for appeal when it has been presented to
the district court in such a way that the court has an opportunity
to rule on it.” Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ¶ 12, 266 P.3d 828
(cleaned up). But “[w]hen a party fails to raise and argue an issue
in the trial court, it has failed to preserve the issue, and an
appellate court will not typically reach that issue absent a valid
exception to preservation.” State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 15, 416
P.3d 443. Accordingly, we review this claim under a plain error
rubric. See State v. Flora, 2020 UT 2, ¶ 9, 459 P.3d 975 (recognizing
plain error as an exception to the preservation requirement).

¶9 Utah Code section 78B-7-804(3)(b) (Subsection (3)), which
was the statute the district court invoked when it converted the
SPOs to CPOs, provides,

[I]f a perpetrator is convicted of a domestic violence
offense resulting in a sentence of imprisonment,
including jail, that is to be served after conviction,
the court shall issue a continuous protective order at
the time of the conviction or sentencing limiting the
contact between the perpetrator and the victim
unless: (i) the court determines by clear and
convincing evidence that the victim does not . . .
have a reasonable fear of future harm or abuse; and
(ii) the court conducts a hearing.

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Orem City v. Jakeman

Utah Code § 78B-7-804(3)(b). Jakeman himself recognized that
Subsection (3) controlled the matter when he appeared in court on
his motion to modify the SPOs. Indeed, he explicitly stated that
the court had already issued CPOs as provided in Subsection (3):

So [Orem] City has asked the Court to issue a
continuous protective order. I just want to point out
that that is totally ridiculous, because this Court has
already done so. In fact, the proof that the Court has
already done so is that the Court had no option . . . .
It had to issue a continuing protective order, which
you could also call a continuous sentencing
protective order or a sentencing protective order
that is continuous.

And later at the same hearing, he doubled down:

You don’t need to issue another protective order.
Modify this one if you need; and here’s why you
don’t need to [issue another protective order].
Because what you issue[d], though it says
“Sentencing Protective Order,” . . . you had no choice
but to issue a continuous protective order, okay? The
truth is they’re the same. . . . The continuous
protective order never expires, and this does not
expire. It is a continuous sentencing protective
order. So it’s a subset of a sentencing order. It’s just
one that doesn’t end.

(Emphasis added.) Jakeman was correct: the court had no choice
but to enter a continuous protective order at the time of
sentencing pursuant to Subsection (3). So, whatever the court or
Orem City may have originally called the protective order, it was
a continuous protective order. Indeed, after hearing Jakeman’s
explanation, the court agreed that Subsection (3) controlled the
matter, stating that a continuous protective order was
“appropriate under the statute” and that “a continuous protective

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order could have and probably should have been issued at
sentencing in this case.”

¶10 Moreover, Jakeman’s repeated assertions that CPOs were
already in place supports our conclusion that the issue related to
Subsection (5) was not preserved. Because Subsection (5) provides
for the issuance of a continuous protective order, it is logically
inconsistent to say that Jakeman raised the matter such that the
court had the opportunity to rule on it when he insisted that a
continuous protective order was already in place. Simply put,
Subsection (5) does not appear to have been on Jakeman’s radar
below, and if it wasn’t on his radar, he couldn’t have expressed its
applicability to the district court and thereby preserved it.

¶11 Because this issue wasn’t preserved, the plain error
doctrine is the only avenue available to Jakeman to challenge the
court’s ruling. To establish plain error, Jakeman “must show that
(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the
trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful.” State v. McNeil, 2013 UT
App 134, ¶ 24, 302 P.3d 844 (cleaned up), aff’d, 2016 UT 3, 365 P.3d
699. Given Jakeman’s full-throated assertion before the district
court that any protective order issued at the time of sentencing
was continuous, we cannot say that the district court plainly erred
in concluding that it was proper to issue a continuous protective
order under the provisions set forth in Subsection (3). Thus, any
error here was invited by Jakeman’s insistence that the existing
protective orders were continuous. See Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41,
¶ 17, 164 P.3d 366 (“Our invited error doctrine arises from the
principle that a party cannot take advantage of an error
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into
committing the error. By precluding appellate review, the
doctrine furthers this principle by discouraging parties from
intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden
ground for reversal on appeal.” (cleaned up)); see also State v. Moa,
2012 UT 28, ¶ 27, 282 P.3d 985 (“Where a party makes an
affirmative representation encouraging the court to proceed

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Orem City v. Jakeman

without further consideration of an issue, an appellate court need
not consider the party’s objection to that action on appeal. The
doctrine of invited error therefore can preclude even plain error
review.” (cleaned up)); McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, ¶ 24 (stating
that “invited error precludes appellate review of an issue,” even
under plain error review). And inviting the error—inasmuch as
there was error—is exactly what Jakeman did here.

¶12 Given the unavailability of plain error review in this
matter, Jakeman’s first claim—that the district court failed to
comply with Subsection (5)—necessarily misses the mark.

II. The Constitutionality of Subsection (5)

¶13 Jakeman next claims that Subsection (5) “is
unconstitutional as applied” because it “resulted in the de facto
termination of [his] parental rights without due process.” As
addressed above, Jakeman’s Subsection (5) argument was not
preserved. Even clearer is that Jakeman never raised the
constitutionality of Subsection (5) before the district court.3
“[U]npreserved federal constitutional claims are not subject to a
heightened review standard but are to be reviewed under our
plain error doctrine.” State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, ¶ 44, 361 P.3d 104.
Similarly, “for unpreserved state constitutional questions, the

3. In his reply brief, Jakeman argues for the first time that
Subsection (3) is “facially unconstitutional under both the due
process and equal protection doctrines of the Utah Constitution
and of the United States Constitution.” This will not do.
“Appellants are not permitted to raise matters for the first time in
a reply brief. Indeed, when a party fails to raise and argue an issue
on appeal, or raises it for the first time in a reply brief, that issue
is waived and will typically not be addressed by the appellate
court.” Chard v. Chard, 2019 UT App 209, ¶ 34, 456 P.3d 776
(cleaned up). Accordingly, we decline to entertain this new
assertion.

20241042-CA 7 2025 UT App 187
Orem City v. Jakeman

burden to prove plain error does not change: a defendant must
demonstrate that an obvious and prejudicial error occurred.” Id.
¶ 41 n.14.

¶14 We are hard pressed to see how any error in this regard—
assuming one exists—would have been obvious to the district
court because the law in this matter is far from settled. “Relief is
not available via the plain-error doctrine unless defendants
persuade us that the error they allege is supported on the basis of
settled law.” State v. Robertson, 2018 UT App 91, ¶ 24, 427 P.3d 361
(emphasis added) (cleaned up); see also id. (“The complexity of this
analysis alone indicates that [the defendant] cannot meet the
burden of showing plain error, because any alleged error would
not have been obvious to the trial court.”). Put simply, “to
establish that the error should have been obvious to the trial court,
the appellant must show that the law governing the error was
clear at the time the alleged error was made.” State v. Roman, 2015
UT App 183, ¶ 9, 356 P.3d 185 (cleaned up). “Thus, an error is not
obvious if there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial
court.” Id. (cleaned up). That is precisely the case here—Jakeman
has not pointed to any settled law to support his contention that
an error was made. 4

¶15 Given the absence of settled law on this point, the district
court did not plainly err in failing to recognize the alleged

4. Jakeman points to a recent case from Texas holding that
protective orders banning all communication between a parent
and child for more than two years require meeting a standard of
clear and convincing evidence because such orders impinge on
fundamental rights of parents. See Stary v. Ethridge, 712 S.W.3d
584, 595–96 (Tex. 2025). This non-binding caselaw cannot support
a conclusion of plain error since it does not create a condition
where the alleged error Jakeman now raises would have been
obvious to the district court.

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Orem City v. Jakeman

unconstitutionality of Subsection (5) that Jakeman attempts to
identify on appeal. 5

CONCLUSION

¶16 We affirm, concluding that Jakeman either invited the
claimed error or otherwise fails to meet the requirements of a
plain error claim.

5. Jakeman requests attorney fees “in the amount” Orem City
“would have paid to hire counsel for [Jakeman] if he had not
represented himself.” There are at least two problems with this
request. First, Jakeman is the losing party in this matter and,
second, “pro se litigants may not recover attorney fees, even if the
pro se litigant is [an] attorney,” as was the case here. See Griffin v.
Cutler, 2014 UT App 251, ¶ 38, 339 P.3d 100.

20241042-CA 9 2025 UT App 187