State v. Chase

2025 UT App 158

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
JAYSON CHASE,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20230201-CA
Filed October 30, 2025

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Todd M. Shaughnessy
No. 191907626

Emily Adams, Rachel Phillips Ainscough, and Jessica
Hyde Holzer, Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Natalie M. Edmundson,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES JOHN D. LUTHY and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 Jayson Chase was riding in the backseat of a car when he
shot Zoey, Brenda, and Garrett 1—three of the car’s other
occupants. Zoey was killed, but Brenda and Garrett both
survived. At trial, Chase’s defense attempted to paint Garrett as
the shooter. The jury rejected Chase’s version of events and
convicted him on one count of aggravated murder, two counts of
attempted aggravated murder, and two lesser counts.

1. We use pseudonyms when referring to the non-parties in this
Opinion.
State v. Chase

¶2 On appeal, Chase argues that the district court abused its
discretion when it admitted six photos from Zoey’s autopsy and
one photo of Chase’s leg tattoos that said the words “Live By The
Gun, Die By The Gun.” He also asserts that his attorney (Counsel)
was ineffective in (1) failing to object to the State’s reference
during closing argument to his drug use and (2) not requesting a
jury instruction on self-defense. We disagree with each of Chase’s
arguments and affirm his convictions.

BACKGROUND 2

The Shootings

¶3 One night in July 2019, Chase took Garrett—his girlfriend’s
fifteen-year-old son—to an auto shop where people would “hang
out and do drugs.” After spending a few hours at the shop, Chase
and Garrett decided to go home but needed a ride. Brenda, who
was also at the shop that night, agreed to drive them home in her
friend’s sedan.

¶4 Brenda, Garrett, and Chase went to pick up two women,
Alice and Zoey, who also needed a ride. Alice and Zoey were
friends, and Garrett lived with Chase. Otherwise, the car’s
occupants did not know each other or had only very recently been
introduced.

¶5 After picking up Alice and Zoey, Brenda stopped for gas.
When the car got back on the road, Garrett was sitting in the back
seat behind Brenda, Alice was sitting in the front seat, Chase was
sitting behind Alice, and Zoey was sitting between Garrett and

2. “On appeal from a jury verdict, we view the evidence in a light
most favorable to that verdict and recite the facts accordingly. We
present conflicting evidence only as necessary to understand
issues raised on appeal.” State v. Dunne, 2020 UT App 56, n.1, 463
P.3d 100 (cleaned up).

20230201-CA 2 2025 UT App 158
State v. Chase

Chase. At some point, Garrett and Zoey heard a “rattling” sound.
Zoey tried to determine what was causing the noise, and Garrett
turned the other way to ash his cigarette out the window. About
fifteen seconds later, at least four gunshots were fired. Garrett
heard “[a]bout seven” “loud pops.” Alice “hear[d] at least four”
“really loud . . . boom noises” coming from behind her.

¶6 Two bullets struck Zoey, one in the right side of her head
and the other in her right shoulder. One of the rounds hit Brenda
in the back of her right shoulder. Upon hearing the gunshots,
Garrett tried to shield himself by ducking and covering his head
with both of his arms, and a bullet struck him, also in the back of
his right shoulder. Believing that the shots had been fired from
outside of the car, Brenda began driving “aggressively.” Chase
started screaming and kicking toward the front seat, apparently
to get Brenda to stop the car. Although Brenda and Alice initially
pushed Chase back, Brenda eventually stopped the car, and
Garrett and Chase got out. After leaving the car, Chase threw the
gun into what he described as a “corner lot.” At first, Garrett tried
to follow him. But when Chase aggressively asked him what he
was “trying to do,” Garrett turned and ran to a nearby gas station
for help. The attendant called the police.

¶7 Having tossed the gun and scared Garrett off, Chase “just
took off running.” Realizing that he “was covered in blood,”
Chase “pulled [his] shirt[s] off, threw [them] right there on the
ground, and just kept running.” At some point, he dialed 911 and
tried to tell the dispatcher his version of the events. He said that
someone “started shooting at [him]” while he and others “were
just driving home.” Chase eventually stated that Garrett was the
shooter. Chase also said that he had picked up the gun after
Garrett “dumped” it. 3 Nevertheless, he told the dispatcher that he

3. Chase initially suggested that it was Zoey who had fired the
shots: “There was a girl sitting in the middle seat. She took a lean
(continued…)

20230201-CA 3 2025 UT App 158
State v. Chase

did not have the gun anymore. He said that he would be waiting
at a nearby “gas station with [his] hands up until the police”
arrived.

¶8 Police officers arrived at the gas station and found a
shirtless Chase, who had no observable wounds or injuries but
had dried blood “on the back of his head” and “on his arms.”
Chase said he had “grabb[ed] a gun and then toss[ed] it,” but he
would not say where, and the officers never found it. He also told
the officers that two individuals “tried to attack him.” The officers
took him into custody.

¶9 After Chase and Garrett left the car, Alice noticed that Zoey
was lying face down in the back seat and needed help. Instead of
going to the hospital, however, Brenda drove back to the auto
shop in a panic. When they arrived, Brenda got out of the car and
asked a friend to “take everybody to get help.” Alice also left the
car to find someone to drive Zoey to the hospital. A man at the
shop “came to the car, looked in the car, said ‘Oh, my God,’ got in
the driver seat, turned the car around[,] and took off down the
street.”

¶10 Alice walked to her house, which was not far away from
the shop. Later, Brenda also went to Alice’s house. Alice went out
to ask Brenda “what the hell [was] going on” but noticed that she
was bleeding profusely. The two went into the home, where Alice
attempted to bandage Brenda’s wounds and apparently gave her
a change of clothes. Alice also called the police, and two police
officers came to the home to interview her. Alice gave her clothes
and Brenda’s clothes to the officers to be taken into evidence.

forward and reached over, and she started to shoot me.” (Emphasis
added.) His story instantaneously shifted, however, because the
next words he said were, “I pushed her hand back. I pushed her
back up, and he took a shot at both.” (Emphasis added.)

20230201-CA 4 2025 UT App 158
State v. Chase

¶11 Before the officers arrived, Brenda had left the house. She
was eventually stopped by other officers in Cottonwood Heights
who saw her wounds and took her to the hospital.

¶12 Finally, the man who drove Zoey to find help was also
stopped by a police officer. When the officer approached the car,
the driver told him that a woman in the back seat had been shot
and needed help. The officer pulled Zoey out of the car and
started performing chest compressions on her, but he realized
quickly that she was dead.

The Investigation

¶13 Officers investigating the shootings soon ruled out the
possibility of a drive-by shooting because the exterior of the car
had not been damaged by gunfire and because at least two shell
casings were clearly visible inside the car. Based on his 911 call,
Chase “[i]mmediately . . . became a person of interest in the
investigation.” Officers found it suspicious that Chase had called
to report an attack “with a handgun in the area at the same time
frame as the shooting” and that he’d had a gun and gotten rid of
it.

¶14 As the investigation progressed, the mounting evidence
confirmed the officers’ initial suspicion that Chase was the
shooter. Investigators observed blood spatter—what one witness
described as “bodily fluids blown back in the direction of the blow
that causes the injury” 4—in the back seat of the car that began in

4. In the proceedings below, the parties and witnesses referred to
this as “splatter” evidence. The parties use the term again on
appeal. While the appellate caselaw in this state overwhelmingly
refers to such evidence as “spatter,” it has used both terms.
Compare State v. Henfling, 2020 UT App 129, ¶ 22, 474 P.3d 994
(spatter), with Met v. State, 2016 UT 51, ¶ 78, 388 P.3d 447 (splatter).
See generally Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage
(continued…)

20230201-CA 5 2025 UT App 158
State v. Chase

the middle, where Zoey was sitting, and progressed to the right
side, where Chase was sitting. This was consistent with Zoey’s
autopsy, which revealed that the shooter had pressed the gun
against the right side of Zoey’s head and pulled the trigger. And
forensic testing confirmed that the blood on Chase and on his
discarded shirts belonged to Zoey.

¶15 Investigators also determined that Chase fired the shots
that struck Garrett and Brenda. The bullets had been fired from
the back seat, and Chase was the only person sitting in the back
who had not been wounded. Brenda and Garrett were both struck
in the back of the right shoulder. Garrett also had stippling—
“gunshot residue deposited on and in the skin near an entrance
wound when a person is shot at close range,” State v. Henfling,
2020 UT App 129, ¶ 22, 474 P.3d 994—on his right hand.

¶16 Based on this evidence, Chase was eventually charged with
one count of aggravated murder, two counts of attempted
aggravated murder, one count of obstruction of justice, and one
count of purchase, transfer, possession, or use of a firearm by a
restricted person. After a preliminary hearing, Chase was bound
over for trial on all counts.

The Trial

¶17 Prior to trial, Chase filed a motion in limine to bar the State
from asserting that he was under the influence of drugs on the
day of the shootings. Appended to the motion was a document
with the results of a drug test, taken two days after the shootings,
purporting to show that Chase tested negative for multiple
substances, including amphetamines and opioids. While the
prosecutor indicated that Garrett would potentially testify about

114 (3d ed. 2011) (noting that the use of term “splatter” was “rare
until the 1990s” but that it is now used about half as frequently as
“spatter”). We use the term “spatter” because it is the term
employed more frequently by Utah’s courts.

20230201-CA 6 2025 UT App 158
State v. Chase

Chase’s “paranoid behavior,” he said that the State would not
elicit testimony about Chase’s use of illegal substances. Based on
the State’s representation, the district court determined that the
motion in limine was effectively moot.

¶18 Counsel also objected when the State indicated that it
would, during its opening statement, show the jury a photo of
Chase’s leg tattoos with the words “Live By The Gun, Die By The
Gun.” Specifically, Counsel expressed concern that the jury
would see the tattoos and believe they were “somehow probative
of [Chase’s] guilt.” The district court asked Counsel if he was
objecting specifically on character-evidence grounds. In response,
Counsel argued that the tattoos were irrelevant and prejudicial,
explaining that just because “people have all kinds of weird
tattoos, it doesn’t mean they’re murderers.” The district court
found that the photo was “not necessarily unfairly prejudicial
under the circumstances” and overruled the objection. The
prosecutor thus began his opening statement by showing the jury
a photo of Chase’s tattoos and saying, “‘Live by the gun, die by
the gun,’ it’s on the back of Jayson Chase’s legs, tattooed. Jayson
did exactly what he tattooed on the back of his legs, he lived by
the gun and he shot and killed [Zoey] . . . .” 5

¶19 Finally, Chase objected to the introduction of several
photos taken during Zoey’s autopsy, arguing that they were
unfairly prejudicial, gruesome, or duplicative. The district court
overruled the objection as to six photos—three without
explanation, two to allow the State “to demonstrate the location
of the bullet core and the jacket,” and one to show “the recovery
of the slug from the shot . . . and where it was found” in Zoey’s
skull.

¶20 During its case in chief, the State called Garrett, Brenda,
Alice, and numerous other witnesses. The witnesses testified to

5. The State also introduced the photo as an exhibit during trial.

20230201-CA 7 2025 UT App 158
State v. Chase

the facts described above. Garrett also testified that Chase had
been paranoid on the day of the shootings.

¶21 Chase testified in his own defense. He agreed that he and
Garrett had gone to the auto shop and left with Brenda, that they
picked up Alice and Zoey, and that they stopped for gas. He also
testified that he heard the “rattling” noise described above.

¶22 At this point, however, Chase’s version of events diverged
from that of the other witnesses. He claimed that after he heard
the rattling sound, he saw Garrett “reach[] down,” come “back up
with the gun,” and point it in his direction. Chase testified that he
reached past Zoey to grab the gun, “turned” the gun, and “tried
to pull it out of [Garrett’s] hand.” But, he stated, the gun
discharged, which caused Chase to fall “back into the seat” and
caused Zoey to fall “straight over on top of [him].”

¶23 Chase testified that he pushed Zoey away and grabbed the
gun from Garrett again. But he said that the gun went off at least
two more times and that Zoey fell on top of him again. Chase
stated he then started kicking toward the front seat and screamed
to Brenda to “[s]top the effing car.” He testified that Brenda
“slammed on the brakes” and that he and Garrett exited the car
through the window of the door on Garrett’s side of the car.

¶24 Chase testified that up until a little over a week prior to the
shootings, he had been using heroin and methamphetamine—the
former “pretty much on a daily basis.” He stated he had then been
in jail for a week and was released two or three days before the
shootings. He testified that he didn’t use any “legal or illegal
substance[s]” while he was in jail or after his release. He
suggested that he was suffering from heroin withdrawal at points
during this time, an experience he described as “a nightmare.”

¶25 Finally, Chase acknowledged that he had spent more than
six years in federal prison for armed bank robbery and that, in a

20230201-CA 8 2025 UT App 158
State v. Chase

later case, he pled guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm.
Chase called no other witnesses.

¶26 During its closing argument, the State asserted that Chase
was paranoid and “either going through withdrawals from not
doing drugs or . . . under the influence of the drugs he smoked
that day at the shop that he went to.” Counsel did not object to the
State’s reference to Chase’s alleged drug use. The State continued,
arguing that Zoey’s attempt to stop the rattling sound startled
Chase and caused him to believe that he was “being attacked.”
Chase’s response, the State argued, was to shoot Zoey, Garrett,
and Brenda.

¶27 Counsel argued in closing that the shootings were
accidental and that Chase lacked the motive to hurt Garrett, Zoey,
or Brenda. Specifically, Counsel claimed that Garrett “was like a
son to” Chase and that Chase didn’t know Zoey or Brenda.
According to Counsel, the most likely explanation for the
shootings was that Zoey had a gun in her bag, Garrett saw the gun
and picked it up, and Chase ultimately did “what most any adult
would try to do under those circumstances, he immediately
trie[d] to take it away.” Counsel argued that the gun likely went
off during a physical struggle between Chase and Garrett.
Counsel concluded by stating that Chase’s version of events was
“reasonably consistent with the evidence” and asking the jury to
acquit on all counts.

¶28 Before the case was submitted to the jury, both sides
requested instructions on lesser included offenses. The State
requested instructions for murder on the aggravated murder
charge and for attempted murder on each of the attempted
aggravated murder charges. Chase requested instructions for
manslaughter and negligent homicide on the aggravated murder
charge. The district court gave each of the requested instructions.

¶29 The jury convicted Chase on all counts as charged. He
timely appeals.

20230201-CA 9 2025 UT App 158
State v. Chase

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶30 Chase argues that the district court abused its discretion
under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence in admitting the six
photos from Zoey’s autopsy and the photo of his tattoos. “In
reviewing a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence under rule
403, we will not reverse that decision absent an abuse of
discretion.” State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ¶ 21, 973 P.2d 404 (cleaned
up). And “like any other evidentiary ruling, an erroneous decision
to admit or exclude evidence based on rule 403 cannot result in
reversible error unless the error is harmful.” State v. Williams, 2014
UT App 198, ¶ 10, 333 P.3d 1287 (cleaned up).

¶31 Chase also asserts two ineffective-assistance claims based
on Counsel’s failure to (1) object to the State’s reference to his drug
use during closing arguments and (2) request an instruction on
self-defense. When a defendant raises an ineffective-assistance
claim “for the first time on appeal,” as Chase does here, “there is
no lower court ruling to review and we must decide whether the
defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as a
matter of law.” State v. Gonzalez, 2021 UT App 135, ¶ 6, 501 P.3d
1205 (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

I. Evidentiary Rulings

¶32 Citing rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Chase argues
that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the six
photos from Zoey’s autopsy and the photo of Chase’s tattoos. We
discern no error in the court’s admission of the autopsy photos.
We assume, without deciding, that the court abused its discretion
in admitting the photo of Chase’s tattoos but conclude that the
admission of that photo was ultimately harmless.

20230201-CA 10 2025 UT App 158
State v. Chase

A. Autopsy Photos

¶33 Chase maintains that the district court abused its discretion
under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence by admitting the
photos taken during Zoey’s autopsy on the basis that they “were
either (1) unnecessary or (2) unfairly prejudicial because they
were gruesome and likely to encourage the jury to make a
decision based on emotion rather than the evidence.” We
disagree.

¶34 As is relevant here, rule 403 enables a court to “exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice . . . or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.” Utah R. Evid. 403. Our supreme
court has made clear that “gruesome[]” photos, assuming they are
relevant, “are subject to the balancing test set out in rule 403.” Met
v. State, 2016 UT 51, ¶ 89, 388 P.3d 447. “Whether the risk of unfair
prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the
evidence typically turns on the nature of the evidence, including
the number of photographs, the extent of detail depicted, and the
gruesomeness of the injuries.” State v. Holm, 2020 UT App 96, ¶ 25,
467 P.3d 934. And “[t]he burden rests on the shoulders of the party
seeking to exclude the photograph to prove that its potential for
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.”
Met, 2016 UT 51, ¶ 89.

¶35 Chase argues that the photos risked “inflam[ing]” the jury
because they showed Zoey’s naked body “with her skull cut open
and her brain exposed.” According to Chase, the photos posed a
substantial danger of unfair prejudice because they could have
caused the jury “to make an emotional decision rather than one
based on the evidence presented.” Chase contrasts this potential
for unfair prejudice with what he claims is the low probative
value of the autopsy photos. He asserts that the medical examiner
could have testified that the shootings were intentional without
presenting the photos because the “only dispute” at trial was

20230201-CA 11 2025 UT App 158
State v. Chase

whether Chase was the shooter. For this reason, Chase also asserts
that the photos were unnecessary.

¶36 We are not persuaded. We note as an initial matter that
“the State has the right to prove its case up to the hilt in whatever
manner it chooses, subject only to the rules of evidence and
standards of fair play.” State v. Stapley, 2011 UT App 54, ¶ 13, 249
P.3d 572 (cleaned up); see also State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1125
(Utah 1989) (“[T]he fact that the same evidence could have been
provided by purely testimonial means does not necessarily make
a photograph inadmissible.”). Moreover, at trial, Chase argued
that the gun inadvertently discharged when he tried to take it
from Garrett. Consequently, there were at least two issues: the
identity of the shooter and whether the shooter acted
intentionally. In State v. Bluff, the supreme court explained that
while “[e]xperts certainly could have testified that [the victim’s]
injuries were not accidental, and in fact the experts did [so] testify,
. . . the photographic illustrations of the nature of the injuries were
still highly probative of the State’s contention that [the defendant]
knew about [the victim’s] injuries and that the injuries did not
result from an accidental fall down the stairs.” 2002 UT 66, ¶ 53,
52 P.3d 1210, abrogated on other grounds by Met, 2016 UT 51.

¶37 Similarly, the photos here were probative of the State’s
contention that Chase intentionally fired the shot that killed Zoey.
At least two of the photos showed that the gun had been pressed
against the right side of Zoey’s head when it was fired. See State v.
Todd, 2007 UT App 349, ¶¶ 36–37, 173 P.3d 170 (explaining that a
“‘hard contact’ wound near [the victim’s] left ear” was
“compelling direct evidence” that the victim in that case had not
accidentally been shot). As noted, Chase had been sitting to
Zoey’s right. See Cobb, 774 P.2d at 1125 (holding that the district
court properly admitted autopsy photos to refute the
“defendant’s accidental death theory and illustrate the probable
position of [the] defendant in relation to the victim at the time of
the shooting”). The State also argued that if there had been a

20230201-CA 12 2025 UT App 158
State v. Chase

struggle over the gun—as Chase had claimed—the bullet likely
would have followed an upward or downward trajectory. The
other photos helped to demonstrate that the bullet traveled
straight across Zoey’s skull, not at an “angled” trajectory.

¶38 On the other side of the balancing test, the danger of unfair
prejudice was low because the court admitted just six of the
photos to which Chase objected. Holm, 2020 UT App 96, ¶ 25
(noting that the number of photos is a factor for courts to consider
when assessing unfair prejudice under rule 403). And although
the photos are unpleasant, “we do not perceive” them “as unfairly
gruesome or disturbing.” State v. Cabututan, 2022 UT App 41,
¶ 19, 508 P.3d 1003. For these reasons, we are not convinced that
the probative value of the photos was substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice.

¶39 Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting the autopsy photos.

B. Photo of Chase’s Tattoos

¶40 Chase argues next that the district court should have
excluded the photo of his “Live By The Gun, Die By The Gun”
tattoos under rule 403. He maintains that the photo was irrelevant
and that its probative value, if any, was substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice. For the purpose of our analysis,
we assume without deciding that the district court exceeded its
discretion when it admitted the photo.

¶41 Nonetheless, we conclude that the asserted error was
harmless because the jury heard other evidence that Chase had a
history of committing gun-related offenses. In one instance, Chase
pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm. In another, he was
convicted of armed bank robbery. From this evidence—the
admission of which Chase does not challenge on appeal—the jury
could have understood even without the tattoo evidence that
Chase was willing to live by the gun, even if that meant serving a

20230201-CA 13 2025 UT App 158
State v. Chase

lengthy prison sentence as a result. 6 For these reasons, the district
court’s admission of the tattoo photo does not undermine our
confidence in the verdict. See State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, ¶ 35, 20
P.3d 342 (“An error is harmful if it undermines our confidence in
the verdict . . . .”).

¶42 We therefore determine that, to the extent the district court
abused its discretion in admitting the photo of the tattoos, the
error was harmless. 7

II. Ineffective-Assistance Claims

¶43 Finally, Chase asserts that Counsel was ineffective in (1)
failing to object to the State’s reference to his drug use during
closing argument and (2) failing to request a jury instruction on
self-defense. A defendant asserting ineffective assistance of
counsel “must meet the two-prong Strickland test: (1) counsel’s
performance was objectively deficient and (2) the deficient
performance resulted in prejudice.” State v. Fleming, 2019 UT App
181, ¶ 9, 454 P.3d 862 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687–88 (1984)). And we need not address both Strickland prongs
where we can dispose of the claim on one of the prongs. Id.

6. In fact, Chase acknowledged at trial that he was convicted of
the gun-related offenses and spent more than six years in federal
prison for one of them.

7. Although he makes a passing reference to State v. Hood, 2018 UT
App 236, 438 P.3d 54, Chase specifically disavows any notion that
he is “making a rule 404 character or propensity evidence
argument.” The Hood court conducted a rule 403 balancing test in
the broader context of assessing whether the district court had
properly admitted other-acts evidence under rule 404. Id. ¶¶ 34,
44–52. Here, the district court was not assessing the photo’s
admissibility under rule 404. Therefore, Hood does not help
Chase’s argument.

20230201-CA 14 2025 UT App 158
State v. Chase

¶44 To establish deficient performance, Chase must show that
Counsel’s representation was not “within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.” State v. Wilkes, 2020 UT App
175, ¶ 24, 479 P.3d 1142 (cleaned up). This requires us to assess
“whether the strategy Counsel employed was that of a reasonable,
competent lawyer in the real-time context of a trial.” State v. Arce,
2024 UT App 43, ¶ 34, 547 P.3d 235 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 554
P.3d 924 (Utah 2024). Ultimately, the question we must answer is
“whether, considering all the circumstances, [C]ounsel’s acts or
omissions were objectively unreasonable.” State v. Scott, 2020 UT
13, ¶ 36, 462 P.3d 350.

¶45 To establish prejudice, Chase “must show . . . a reasonable
probability that, but for Counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” State v.
Gonzalez, 2021 UT App 135, ¶ 8, 501 P.3d 1205 (cleaned up). To do
so, Chase must demonstrate that those errors affected the
proceedings in a way that “undermine[s] our confidence in the
outcome.” Arce, 2024 UT App 43, ¶ 34 (cleaned up).

¶46 We disagree with both of Chase’s arguments. His first
claim falls short because he hasn’t demonstrated that Counsel’s
failure to object was deficient. His second claim also founders
because he has not shown how the lack of a jury instruction on
self-defense prejudiced his case.

A. Failure to Object to the State’s Reference to Chase’s Drug
Use

¶47 During its closing argument, the State contended, “[Chase]
is paranoid. He’s either going through withdrawals from not
doing drugs or he is under the influence of the drugs he smoked
that day at the shop that he went to.” Chase argues that Counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to this
statement. We disagree.

20230201-CA 15 2025 UT App 158
State v. Chase

¶48 The jury heard evidence that Chase was paranoid on the
day of the shootings. And he put his drug use on that day at issue
when he testified that (1) he had not used drugs on the day of—
or the days preceding—the shootings; (2) he had frequently been
using illegal drugs until a little over a week before the shootings;
and (3) he and Garrett had been at the auto shop, a place where
people frequently used drugs, just before the shootings. And
while the State effectively agreed that it would not refer to Chase’s
drug use on that day, it did not agree to do so with respect to his
drug-related withdrawal.

¶49 Against this backdrop, Counsel could reasonably have
forgone objecting to the State’s comment. Specifically, given
Chase’s testimony on his drug use and his insistence that he did
not use drugs on the day of the shootings, Counsel would have
been reasonable in concluding that Chase’s testimony provided
the State with the necessary latitude to discuss Chase’s potential
drug use on that day. See State v. Reid, 2018 UT App 146, ¶ 49, 427
P.3d 1261 (“In closing argument, attorneys have considerable
latitude concerning the issues they raise and have the right to fully
discuss from their perspectives the evidence and all inferences
and deductions it supports. And the law recognizes the
prerogative of opposing counsel to swallow their tongue instead
of making an objection that might have the risk of highlighting
problematic evidence or even just annoying the jury. When we
review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims in this context, the
question is not whether the prosecutor’s comments were proper,
but whether they were so improper that counsel’s only defensible
choice was to interrupt those comments with an objection.”
(emphasis added) (cleaned up)).

¶50 At the very least, we cannot say that objection would have
been Counsel’s “only defensible choice” in this situation. The jury
could have readily disbelieved Chase’s testimony and inferred
that he had in fact been using drugs on the day of the shootings.
Counsel could therefore have reasonably concluded that objection

20230201-CA 16 2025 UT App 158
State v. Chase

risked highlighting the drug evidence and its problematic
inferences. Based on his briefing, Chase would likely argue that
he “was not prepared to call a witness to lay foundation for” his
negative drug test at trial because the State represented that it
would not refer to his drug use on the day of the shootings. The
problem is that Chase brought the issue into play with his own
testimony.

¶51 Under these circumstances, Chase has not established that
Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to object to the
State’s comment about his drug use. Therefore, Chase’s first
ineffective-assistance claim falls short.

B. Failure to Request a Jury Instruction on Self-Defense

¶52 Chase argues next that Counsel was ineffective in failing to
request a jury instruction on self-defense. We need not address
whether Counsel’s failure to request the instruction constituted
deficient performance because Chase has not demonstrated a
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been
different had the jury been instructed on self-defense.

¶53 For one thing, the jury heard the 911 call in which Chase
told the dispatcher that somebody “started shooting at” him.
During this call, he said nothing to suggest that the gun had been
inadvertently discharged during a struggle.

¶54 And, despite Chase’s argument to the contrary, there was
overwhelming evidence that he intentionally fired the shots that
killed Zoey and wounded Garrett and Brenda. The contact wound
to the right side of Zoey’s head and the resulting blood spatter
indicated that the gun was intentionally fired from the right side
of the car, where Chase was sitting. See State v. Todd, 2007 UT App
349, ¶ 38, 173 P.3d 170 (rejecting as “implausible” the defendant’s
argument on appeal that, during a struggle, the gun had
“accidentally” been pressed against the victim’s head before it
was fired); State v. Reece, 2015 UT 45, ¶ 42, 349 P.3d 712 (explaining

20230201-CA 17 2025 UT App 158
State v. Chase

that “evidence of an intentional murder overwhelmed . . .
testimony that [the defendant] accidentally shot the victim during
a brief struggle,” when, among other things, “all of the victim’s
blood was concentrated in one area right on the love seat where
they found her body . . . and the bullet that killed her was fired at
a downward trajectory about one foot away from her head”
(cleaned up)). Garrett was also sitting in the back seat and had
been shot from close range (as evidenced by the stippling on his
hand) in the back of his right shoulder. It is difficult to see how he
could have shot himself in that location, even during a supposed
struggle between him and Chase over the gun. Finally, Chase was
the only passenger in the back seat who was not wounded, and
the jury heard evidence that he tried to cover up his crimes by
getting rid of the gun and removing his blood-stained shirts.

¶55 Under these circumstances, we do not perceive any
reasonable probability that a different result would have occurred
if the jury had been instructed on self-defense, and Counsel’s
failure to request such an instruction does not undermine our
confidence in the verdict. Therefore, Chase’s second ineffective-
assistance claim falls short for lack of prejudice.

CONCLUSION

¶56 Chase has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting the photos from Zoey’s autopsy. And even
when we assume that the district court abused its discretion in
admitting the photo of his tattoos, Chase has not established that
the error was harmful. His first ineffective-assistance claim
founders because, under the circumstances, Counsel’s failure to
object to the State’s reference to his drug use was not
unreasonable. Chase’s second ineffective-assistance claim falls
short because he has not demonstrated that Counsel’s failure to
request a self-defense instruction prejudiced his defense. We
therefore affirm Chase’s convictions.

20230201-CA 18 2025 UT App 158