State v. Smith

2025 UT App 159

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
KYLE JOSEPH SMITH,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20240235-CA
Filed October 30, 2025

Third District Court, Silver Summit Department
The Honorable Richard E. Mrazik
No. 221500148

Patricia Geary Glenn, Attorney for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Jeffrey D. Mann,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN
FORSTER concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 A man on probation (tenant) rented an upstairs room of a
house. Kyle Joseph Smith lived in the basement. The tenant
suspected Smith was using marijuana. Fearing the use might
jeopardize his probation status, the tenant informed his probation
officer about the situation. The probation officer suggested that
the tenant record a video of the activity. When the tenant tried
recording the activity, a confrontation ensued and the police were
called. A police officer (deputy) arrived to investigate, and the
tenant told him that Smith was getting rid of marijuana plants by
moving them to the yard of the residence. Without obtaining a
search warrant, and over Smith yelling “[w]hoa,” the deputy
walked into the yard and found some discarded marijuana plants.
State v. Smith

Consequently, Smith was arrested and charged with operating a
clandestine laboratory for the production of a controlled
substance. He challenged the warrantless search, but the district
court ruled that it was justified by the exigent-circumstances
exception. Smith subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea,
and he now appeals, arguing that the search was unconstitutional.
We reject this assertion and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Smith lived in the basement of a house owned by his
mother. The tenant rented a room on the upstairs level of the
house. While the tenant’s lease agreement did not specifically
grant him permission to use other areas of the land on which the
house sat, Smith’s mother conceded that nothing in the lease
agreement “technically” prevented the tenant from walking on
the common areas of the property, including—as is relevant to
this case—a non-fenced part of the yard.

¶3 The tenant called his probation officer to express a concern
that “he’d seen marijuana around the house and things like that.”
Specifically, the tenant was “concerned about the odor of
marijuana on his clothes and complained about the use of
marijuana in the home he was staying in and not wanting to
jeopardize his probation agreement or his employment situation.”
The tenant’s probation officer told him to “take a picture” or a
“video” to document the activity.

¶4 The tenant subsequently tried to record the marijuana-
related activity, but while doing so, he encountered Smith. Smith
asked the tenant, “[W]hat the fuck are you doing? Are you going
to call the fucking cops?” and said, “You fucking piece of shit. I’ll
beat your ass.” The encounter ended at that point, but the tenant
believed that Smith began to move marijuana plants out of the
home shortly thereafter. The tenant then called his probation
officer and reported that “things had escalated between him and

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State v. Smith

. . . Smith.” The probation officer called his sergeant to let him
know the situation was “kind of getting out of hand.” Based on
the probation officer’s report, the deputy was sent to the scene to
investigate a possible domestic disturbance.

¶5 The tenant told the deputy that he and Smith “had gotten
in a fight” and that Smith “was in the process of destroying a
marijuana growth that was inside the house.” More specifically,
the tenant told the deputy that Smith was “growing pot” and was
trying to “get rid of” the plants before the police arrived based on
Smith’s fear that the tenant had already called the police. The
tenant proceeded to tell the deputy that he was “pretty sure
there’s a pile of plants in the backyard.” The tenant then led the
deputy to the plants.

¶6 As the deputy and the tenant walked toward the yard to
see the plants, Smith appeared, and the following conversation
ensued:

Smith: Sir! Whoa, what’s going on?
Deputy: Just stay there, I’ll talk with you in a minute.
Smith: Excuse me?
Deputy: Just stay there, I’ll talk with you in a minute. He’s
showing me something. . . . He lives here too.
Smith: He doesn’t live here, sir.
Deputy: He doesn’t?
Smith: No.
Deputy: Well, he’s telling me he does.
Smith: Excuse me?
Deputy: So he’s telling me he does. So his word is just as
good as yours at this point. What’s that?
Smith: I’m telling you he doesn’t. I’m telling you as a
property owner, he does not.

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State v. Smith

Deputy: Ok, he’s got access to a common area, yeah, and
he rents from you, so yeah, he does.
Smith: Have you seen the paperwork already?
Deputy: I don’t need to see that at this point. You stay
there, I’ll come talk to you.

Smith waved his hand toward the deputy and turned around.

¶7 The deputy then took a few more steps into the yard and
noticed “a shallow cardboard box full of what appeared to be
marijuana plants” toward the corner of the yard. The deputy
believed that “somebody had been trying to stash” the box near a
“little rise that was around some sage brush.” The deputy noticed
that the box had “some blood” on it, and he radioed for assistance.
About thirty seconds later, two other officers arrived at the scene.

¶8 During their conversation, the deputy had noticed that
Smith’s hand was bleeding. The deputy arrested Smith based on
his possession of marijuana plants. Two days later, the probation
officer obtained a search warrant for Smith’s basement apartment.
Officers searching the apartment found marijuana,
methamphetamine, counterfeit prescription labels, scales,
packaging equipment, and apparent client lists. The State charged
Smith with operating a clandestine laboratory for the production
of a controlled substance.

¶9 Smith moved to suppress “any and all evidence obtained
as a result of the warrantless search of the property and the
subsequent search of his home,” arguing the initial search “was
illegal because it was not conducted pursuant to any of the well-
delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” The district
court held an evidentiary hearing related to the motion, where it
heard testimony consistent with the facts recited above. The
district court later ordered additional briefing to address, among
other issues, whether “exigent circumstances” allowed the deputy

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State v. Smith

to follow the tenant for three seconds “to observe the marijuana
plants” in the yard.

¶10 After the additional briefing, the district court denied the
motion to suppress. First, the court concluded that it was
objectively reasonable for the deputy to determine that the tenant
had access to the yard. But the court concluded that the tenant’s
consent was “affected and made ambiguous” by Smith’s assertion
that the tenant did not live there and Smith’s use of “[w]hoa.”
These statements, the court concluded, constituted an “explicit
objection” to the deputy proceeding into the yard to “look for
something.” However, the court also determined that exigent
circumstances warranted the deputy’s decision to enter the yard
where he observed the marijuana plants because (1) it wasn’t clear
that the deputy had probable cause to detain or arrest Smith at
that moment and (2) he reasonably surmised that Smith knew
why he was there, given that Smith’s altercation with the tenant
stemmed from the tenant’s attempt to record the marijuana-
related activity. Had the deputy retreated when Smith objected to
the search, the court concluded that it was “reasonably likely that
the evidence in the . . . yard would have been destroyed.” The
court concluded that given the exigent circumstances supporting
the warrantless search, “no Fourth Amendment violation
occurred in this case.”

¶11 Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Smith
entered a conditional guilty plea to a reduced charge of attempted
possession of 100 pounds or more of marijuana, reserving his
right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶12 Smith contends that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress, arguing that there were no exigent
circumstances justifying a warrantless search. “We review a
district court’s decision to . . . deny a motion to suppress for an

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State v. Smith

alleged Fourth Amendment violation as a mixed question of law
and fact. While the court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear
error, its legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, including
its application of law to the facts of the case.” State v. Roberts, 2018
UT App 92, ¶ 7, 427 P.3d 416 (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

¶13 “The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This
constitutional right “generally requires the obtaining of a judicial
warrant before a law enforcement officer can enter a home
without permission. But not always: The warrant requirement is
subject to certain exceptions.” Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295, 301
(2021) (cleaned up). “One important exception is for exigent
circumstances. It applies when the exigencies of the situation
make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a
warrantless search is objectively reasonable.” Id. (cleaned up). In
the face of an exigent circumstance, “the delay required to obtain
a warrant would bring about some real immediate and serious
consequences—and so the absence of a warrant is excused.” Id. at
302 (cleaned up). Given an exigency, “a warrantless search is
reasonable, and thus does not run afoul of the Fourth
Amendment, because the legitimate state interest served by the
intrusion outweighs individual interests shielded by the Fourth
Amendment.” State v. Tran, 2024 UT 7, ¶ 24, 545 P.3d 248 (cleaned
up); see also Lange, 594 U.S. at 301 (“As [the] text makes clear, the
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness.” (cleaned up)).

¶14 Preventing “the imminent destruction of evidence” is
among the exigencies that allow a warrantless search. Brigham
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). The Utah Supreme Court
has “sustained warrantless entries where the circumstances
indicated that evidence might be destroyed or removed if entry

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State v. Smith

was delayed until a warrant could be obtained.” State v. Duran,
2007 UT 23, ¶ 8, 156 P.3d 795 (cleaned up). But there must be more
than “the mere possibility that evidence may be destroyed.” Id.
(cleaned up). “Rather, police officers must have a reasonable
belief that the destruction of evidence is sufficiently certain as to
justify a warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances.” Id.;
see also State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 18 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (“The
existence of exigent circumstances must be based on the
reasonable belief of the police officer.”). This reasonable belief
“does not require certainty.” Tran, 2024 UT 7, ¶ 36. Instead, the
exigent-circumstances exception “is most naturally considered by
looking to the totality of circumstances confronting the officer as
he decides to make a warrantless entry.” Lange, 594 U.S. at 302
(emphasis added) (cleaned up). Thus, courts “determine the
existence of exigent circumstances by considering the totality of
the circumstances, viewed at the moment the police” decide to
proceed with a warrantless entry. United States v. Villagomez-
Castillo, No. 89-50688, 1990 WL 212603, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 20,
1990) (cleaned up); accord United States v. George, 883 F.2d 1407,
1415 (9th Cir. 1989). “Accordingly, all that the Fourth Amendment
requires is that the totality of the circumstances supports an
objectively reasonable belief that an emergency exists.” Tran, 2024
UT 7, ¶ 36. Simply put, the belief that exigent circumstances exist
must not be based on speculation but on the facts before an officer
and the reasonable inferences drawn from those facts.

¶15 The circumstances in this case establish that the exigency
of preventing the destruction of evidence justified the deputy’s
warrantless entry into the yard where the marijuana plants were
located.

¶16 First, the deputy had probable cause to believe that Smith
was growing marijuana plants based on the tenant’s report to his
probation officer as well as the tenant’s explicit assertion that
Smith was “growing pot.” “It is well-established in this state that
the articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion may come

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State v. Smith

from an officer’s own observations as well as external information
such as an informant’s tip via police dispatch, or information,
bulletins or flyers received from other law enforcement sources.”
State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ¶ 13, 999 P.2d 7. Moreover, the fact that
the tenant was on probation and made the report to his probation
officer to avoid additional legal trouble supports the conclusion
that he was a trustworthy informant. See State v. Lee, 863 P.2d 49,
56 n.12 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (“[T]hat such information would find
its way to a probation officer and be reliable is much more
understandable when one learns the source of the information is
himself on probation.”). After all, lying about the matter would
have exposed the tenant to criminal prosecution, and additional
legal trouble was something he very much wanted to avoid while
on probation—in fact, it was the express reason he made the
report. See State v. Roybal, 2010 UT 34, ¶ 16, 232 P.3d 1016
(“Because the informant is exposed to possible criminal and civil
prosecution if the report is false, a tip from an identified citizen-
informant is generally considered highly reliable.” (cleaned up)).
In other words, the tenant’s report of Smith’s marijuana-related
activity was reliable because lying about it would have run
counter to the tenant’s own interests. He was highly motivated to
tell the truth, and the deputy acted reasonably in believing that
his assertion was truthful.

¶17 Second, the circumstances supported a reasonable belief on
the deputy’s part that Smith was in the process of destroying
evidence, giving rise to an exigency. A court “looks to the totality
of circumstances,” Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013), to
determine whether “an exigency arises from the possibility that
persons, alerted to the presence of law enforcement officials . . .
might understandably rid themselves of any trace of contraband,”
Duran, 2007 UT 23, ¶ 9. And here, the totality of the circumstances
provided a reasonable basis for the deputy to conclude that Smith

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State v. Smith

would destroy the marijuana plants if the deputy left to obtain a
warrant. 1

¶18 The tenant told the deputy a few minutes after his arrival
that Smith was trying to “get rid of” the plants before the police
arrived because Smith suspected that the tenant had called the
police about his marijuana-related activity. Smith’s prior
interaction with the tenant alerted him to the possibility that the
tenant was going to call the police about his marijuana-related
activity. Indeed, the tenant’s efforts to record Smith’s marijuana-
related activity had resulted in a confrontation between the two
and provided the impetus for the probation officer to request that
his sergeant send a deputy to investigate. When Smith saw that
his fears of police involvement were realized, he had every reason
to continue getting rid of the plants. Aware of these
circumstances, the deputy was reasonable in concluding that
Smith would attempt to destroy the evidence if he left to get a
warrant.

¶19 These facts, considered together, gave the deputy objective
reason to believe that the destruction of the plants was more than
a mere possibility. Indeed, the circumstances indicated that it was
reasonable to infer that Smith was actively engaged in destroying
the plants. And the deputy, aware of these circumstances, could
have reasonably concluded that Smith would continue trying to
destroy the plants if left to his own devices.

¶20 Smith resists this conclusion on several grounds. First, he
argues that the proximity of the other officers suggests that the
deputy should have taken a less intrusive approach than entering
the yard. He asserts that the deputy could have simply waited for

1. While the deputy could have quickly obtained an e-warrant, see
State v. Smith, 2022 UT 13, ¶ 36 n.7, 513 P.3d 629, his doing so
would have still required him to leave the scene, which would
have provided an opportunity for Smith to dispose of the plants.

20240235-CA 9 2025 UT App 159
State v. Smith

the other officers to arrive to secure the scene and ensure that the
evidence would not be destroyed, which would have provided
the deputy with the opportunity to secure a search warrant. This
assertion is misguided and unsupported by the factual record.
Here, the deputy had no other officers with him when he arrived.
It was only after he saw the marijuana plants that he called for
assistance. There is no indication in the record that the deputy
knew whether the other officers could respond in thirty seconds.
The relevant inquiry involved whether there was “the existence
of exigent circumstances . . . at the moment” the deputy proceeded
with the warrantless entry. United States v. Villagomez-Castillo, No.
89-50688, 1990 WL 212603, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 20, 1990) (cleaned
up); see also State v. Anderson, 2013 UT App 272, ¶ 12, 316 P.3d 949
(“It is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective
standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of
the seizure or the search [lead a reasonably cautious person to
believe] that the intrusion the officer plans is justified in order to
investigate criminal activity?” (cleaned up)). The after-the-search
revelation that other officers were nearby simply is not relevant
to what the deputy knew at the time of the search. In other words,
hindsight does not supplant the knowledge that informed the
deputy’s decision that exigent circumstances justified the
warrantless search at the time of the search.

¶21 Second, Smith argues that the destruction-of-evidence
exception does not apply to marijuana possession because
possession of marijuana is not a serious crime. See United States v.
Mongold, 528 F. App’x 944, 950 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[I]f marijuana
possession is the only crime for which the officers in this case had
probable cause, the exigency exception for destruction of evidence
should not apply because marijuana possession is not a serious
crime.”). But Smith’s potential possession of some marijuana is not
what gave rise to the deputy’s suspicions here. Rather, it was the
tenant’s report that Smith was “growing pot” and was trying to
“get rid of” marijuana plants. There’s obviously a substantial
difference between possessing marijuana for personal use and

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State v. Smith

growing multiple plants. Here, Smith’s mere possession of
marijuana did not figure into the deputy’s calculus of deciding to
proceed with a warrantless search. Rather, his decision was based
on the credible information that Smith was trying to rid himself
of the contraband—as it turns out, over 100 pounds according to
Smith’s plea—by moving marijuana plants to the yard. Indeed,
the tenant reported that he was “pretty sure” that “a pile of
plants” had been moved to the yard. Cf. Duran, 2007 UT 23, ¶ 8
(“The aroma of burning marijuana must be accompanied by some
evidence that the suspects are disposing of the evidence, as
opposed to casually consuming it, before law enforcement
officials may be lawfully justified in claiming the benefit of the
exigent circumstances exception.”).

¶22 In sum, upon hearing from the tenant that Smith had
started destroying or moving the marijuana plants after he
learned of police involvement, the deputy “might reasonably
have believed—based on practical considerations of everyday
life—that [Smith] could and would destroy the” plants. See State
v. Maxwell, 2011 UT 81, ¶ 16, 275 P.3d 220 (cleaned up).
Accordingly, the deputy’s reasonable inference of the imminent
destruction of the plants created an exigent circumstance to justify
the warrantless search. Thus, the search did not violate Smith’s
Fourth Amendment rights.

CONCLUSION

¶23 The totality of the circumstances indicated that Smith was
destroying marijuana plants when the deputy arrived. This
attempt to rid himself of evidence of the contraband created an
exigency that justified the warrantless search. Accordingly, the
district court properly denied Smith’s motion to suppress.

¶24 Affirmed.

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