State v. Mendoza

2025 UT App 46

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
ALEX CHRISTOPHER MENDOZA JR.,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20230471-CA
Filed April 3, 2025

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Elizabeth A. Hruby-Mills
No. 211900573

Emily Adams, Freyja Johnson, and Hannah
Leavitt-Howell, Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Ginger Jarvis,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

ORME, Judge:

¶1 Alex Christopher Mendoza Jr. was convicted of murder,
felony discharge of a firearm, and possession or use of a firearm
by a restricted person after he fatally shot Emilio Salazar at a
party. Mendoza appeals, arguing the district court should have
granted his pretrial motion to dismiss the charges against him
based on the State’s failure to preserve the gloves Salazar wore
when he was shot. Mendoza also argues the court abused its
discretion in denying his motion for a new trial based on alleged
juror misconduct. We disagree with Mendoza on both fronts and
affirm his convictions.
State v. Mendoza

BACKGROUND 1

¶2 Several people, including Salazar, were gathered at the
home of Tiffany and Marco 2 one night when Mendoza arrived.
Mendoza began arguing and “going back and forth” with Salazar,
and Marco eventually pushed Mendoza out the door. Mendoza
taunted Salazar, goading him to come outside. Eventually Salazar
did go outside. He was wearing gardening gloves at the time.
Witnesses saw Salazar raise his arms in a fighting stance and pull
at his waistband. But they did not see him holding a gun. Marco,
who was then standing between Salazar and Mendoza, later
testified that Mendoza stepped to the side and pulled out a gun.
Three shots were fired, and Salazar fell to the ground with
gunshot wounds to the back of his head, his neck, back, shoulder,
and left hand. 3

¶3 Mendoza immediately left the scene. Marco handed
Tiffany a .380 caliber gun and told her to get rid of it. She took the
gun to a nearby church and threw it in the bushes. Police later
recovered that gun and also found a full .40 caliber magazine and
.40 caliber ammunition in Tiffany and Marco’s home.

¶4 Officers and EMTs arrived and began administering first
aid to Salazar, who was in critical condition. Salazar was still
wearing his gloves when he was loaded into an ambulance. His
clothes were removed to treat his injuries while he was

1. “We review the record facts in a light most favorable to the
jury’s verdict and recite the facts accordingly,” presenting
“conflicting evidence only as necessary to understand issues
raised on appeal.” State v. Herrera, 2025 UT App 1, n.2, 563 P.3d
416 (quotation simplified).

2. Tiffany and Marco are pseudonyms.

3. One of the shots appeared to have struck Salazar twice—
entering his back and exiting through his shoulder before also
entering the back of his head.

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State v. Mendoza

transported to the hospital. After Salazar was taken into the
hospital, one of the EMTs took a photo of the back of the
ambulance that showed one of the gloves on the floor. But the
gloves were not collected or taken into evidence. Salazar later died
at the hospital, and a .40 caliber bullet was recovered from his
head.

¶5 Tiffany and Marco were interviewed at the police station.
Although they initially stated it had been a drive-by shooting,
they later told police that Mendoza had shot Salazar. Police
discovered that earlier that night, Marco had received a video
message from Mendoza that showed Mendoza pointing what
appeared to be a .40 caliber gun at the camera.

¶6 Mendoza was charged with murder, two counts of
discharge of a firearm—one with serious bodily injury and the
other with bodily injury—and possession or use of a firearm by a
restricted person. 4 Mendoza filed a motion to dismiss these
charges, arguing the State’s failure to preserve Salazar’s gloves
violated Mendoza’s right to due process under the Utah
Constitution. After a hearing, the district court denied the motion,
concluding the “evidence was lost or destroyed, but not by an act
of the State” as there was “no evidence at all that law enforcement
ever had had possession of the gloves.” Further, the court
reasoned that Mendoza could not establish a reasonable
probability that the missing evidence would have been
exculpatory” because he had “a theory as to what the gloves
might have shown, but that theory is speculative.”

¶7 The State provided notice that it did not intend to
introduce evidence of Mendoza’s gang affiliation unless he
opened the door by introducing evidence of Salazar’s own gang
affiliation. At the beginning of trial, the district court imposed a
decorum order, which limited court attendees to 10 people on
behalf of Mendoza and 10 on behalf of Salazar. The order also

4. An additional charge for obstruction of justice was later
dismissed.

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State v. Mendoza

prevented anyone present in the courtroom from engaging in
“provocative, disruptive, distracting uncivil behavior of any
kind” and instructed attendees not to “display gang hand signals”
or wear “any . . . color which might be interpreted to signify
support of any gang.”

¶8 At the outset of trial, the court stated that it was “very, very
important” that the jurors not do any “independent research
whatsoever regarding this case” and that they “keep an open
mind.” The jurors were instructed regarding Mendoza’s
presumption of innocence, and they were told not to speak “about
this case with anyone, not family, not friends, not even each
other” during court recesses. The court also instructed the jurors
that it was a violation of their oaths to conduct their “own
investigations or communicate about this trial with others” or to
use “electronic devices in any way connected to the case” and that
they might “face serious consequences” for doing so. The court
emphasized this point, stating, “Let me be clear. Do not Google
the parties, witnesses, issues, or counsel. Do not tweet or text
about the trial. Do not use your smartphones or iPhones to gather
or send information on the case.”

¶9 The trial then proceeded over four days, with witnesses
testifying about the events recounted above. Several of the
witnesses identified Mendoza in court, one of whom described
him as having “tattoos on his . . . face.” The State’s evidence
included a photo of Salazar, Marco, Tiffany, and other friends
who had been present during the shooting—two of whom were
displaying hand gestures.

¶10 At the close of trial, the court read the final jury instructions
in which it admonished the jurors not to “let any bias, sympathy,
or prejudice . . . influence [their] decision in any way.” The jury
had been deliberating for nearly six hours when several of
Mendoza’s friends and family gathered outside the courthouse,
awaiting the verdict. An unidentified man approached the group
at 8:52 p.m., according to security footage obtained by Mendoza’s
defense counsel. Several of the people in the group later

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State v. Mendoza

submitted affidavits recounting the interaction. They said the man
had guns—one affiant claiming he had shown them three. The
man allegedly told the group that his “wife was on a murder trial”
as a juror and he was worried for her safety because he “wasn’t
sure why it was taking so long.” He also allegedly made allusions
to gangs. One affiant stated that the juror’s husband 5 said that his
wife had told him that she was “terrified” because “she was a
juror for a . . . ‘big gang case.’” The juror’s husband never entered
the courthouse, and he went on his way. The verdict was returned
shortly after.

¶11 The jury found Mendoza guilty of murder, discharge of a
firearm with serious bodily injury, and discharge of a firearm with
bodily injury. The possession of a firearm charge was tried to the
bench, and based on the jury’s finding that Mendoza had used a
firearm on the night of the shooting, the court found him guilty.

¶12 After learning what had transpired outside the courthouse
while the jury deliberated, Mendoza filed a motion for a new trial,
contending that the juror’s husband’s conduct indicated that the
juror had relied on extraneous prejudicial information to conclude
that this was a gang case and that she had improper
communications with her husband regarding the verdict.
Mendoza submitted the aforementioned affidavits from his
friends, family, and defense counsel in support of the motion.

¶13 In its ruling denying Mendoza’s motion, the court found
that the “highly circumstantial” allegations in the affidavits
required “a huge inferential leap to even suggest that a juror was
exposed to extra record facts.” The court found there was “a lack
of evidence to suggest that the juror’s conclusion (if a juror did so
conclude) that [Mendoza] had a gang association arose from any
outside research or investigation” or that “any such perception
was in any way shared or discussed with any other members of

5. The affidavits vary in describing the juror as the man’s “wife”
or “girlfriend.” For ease, we refer to the man outside the
courthouse as the juror’s “husband.”

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State v. Mendoza

the jury.” The court also found “no evidence to suggest there was
any improper communication with a juror” and that even if there
was, the communication was “not unduly prejudicial” as there
was no evidence that such a communication “influenced the jury
or the verdict in any way.” Accordingly, the court also concluded
“that an evidentiary hearing would not be helpful or necessary”
to determine whether such juror misconduct occurred.

¶14 Mendoza appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶15 Mendoza argues the district court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss based on the State’s failure to preserve Salazar’s
gloves. “Whether the State’s destruction of potentially
exculpatory evidence violates due process is a question of law that
we review for correctness, though we incorporate a clearly
erroneous standard for the necessary subsidiary factual
determinations.” State v. DeJesus, 2017 UT 22, ¶ 18, 395 P.3d 111
(quotation simplified).

¶16 Mendoza also argues the court should have granted his
motion for a new trial based on the alleged juror misconduct. “It
is well settled that, as a general matter, the trial court has broad
discretion to grant or deny a motion for a new trial,” and “we will
reverse only if there is no reasonable basis for the decision.” State
v. Redding, 2007 UT App 350, ¶ 8, 172 P.3d 319 (quotation
simplified).

ANALYSIS

I. The Motion to Dismiss

¶17 Mendoza argues the district court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss based on the State’s failure to preserve Salazar’s
gloves, which Mendoza views as a violation of his right to due
process under the Utah Constitution. We disagree.

20230471-CA 6 2025 UT App 46
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¶18 “To determine whether the State’s [loss or] destruction of
potentially exculpatory evidence violates due process, the Utah
Supreme Court has established a threshold requirement that is
followed by a balancing test.” State v. Steele, 2019 UT App 71, ¶ 15,
442 P.3d 1204 (quotation simplified). First, under State v.
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 162 P.3d 1106, a defendant must “establish
as a threshold matter a reasonable probability that the lost or
destroyed evidence would have been exculpatory.” State v.
DeJesus, 2017 UT 22, ¶ 19, 395 P.3d 111 (emphasis added). “Only
after the defendant has established this point—and accordingly
established that there was a due process violation resulting from
the loss of evidence—should a court” move on to “balance the
culpability of the State and the prejudice to the defendant in order
to gauge the seriousness of the due process violation and to
determine an appropriate remedy.” Id. ¶¶ 27, 29.

¶19 Mendoza cannot demonstrate that Tiedemann is applicable
here. He urges that the police or the EMTs who tended to Salazar
in the ambulance should have collected the gloves. He asserts that
EMTs “are government actors who understand the State’s duty to
preserve useful evidence.” But beyond calling the failure to collect
the gloves “negligence,” Mendoza points to no authority
imposing a duty on the police or EMTs to collect and preserve the
gloves. In State v. Dew, 2025 UT App 22, cert. filed, March 19, 2025
(No. 20250288), we recently determined that Tiedemann did not
apply where a defendant claimed that the police should have
preserved a copy of his wife’s text messages. Id. ¶ 34. We reached
this conclusion, in part, because the defendant had not “directed
us to any authority suggesting that Tiedemann and its progeny
may be read to impose on law enforcement agents an obligation
to retain every item they may be authorized by warrant to seize
even if such items have no apparent inculpatory or exculpatory
value at the time the warrant is executed.” Id. And “as stated in
Tiedemann, criminal defendants are entitled to information
possessed by the State to aid in their defense.” State v. Powell, 2020
UT App 63, ¶ 51, 463 P.3d 705 (emphasis in original, quotation
otherwise simplified). Here, the gloves were never possessed by
the State and, thus, their loss is not a violation of due process.

20230471-CA 7 2025 UT App 46
State v. Mendoza

¶20 Furthermore, under Tiedemann, Mendoza cannot meet the
threshold requirement of showing a reasonable probability that
the gloves would have been exculpatory. While this bar is “quite
low,” the showing cannot be “pure speculation or wholly
incredible.” State v. Mohamud, 2017 UT 23, ¶ 20, 395 P.3d 133
(quotation simplified). Mendoza claims that the gloves would
have provided forensic evidence indicating that Salazar himself
had a gun on the night of the shooting and that the wounds to his
hand were self-inflicted. But no witness testified to seeing Salazar
with a gun. And Mendoza has “proffered only speculation as to
what” forensic evidence might have been found on the gloves. Id.
¶ 19. “This does not rise to the level of reasonable probability.” Id.

¶21 Thus, the district court properly denied Mendoza’s motion
to dismiss.

II. The Motion for a New Trial

¶22 Mendoza also argues the district court should have
granted him a new trial or at least convened an evidentiary
hearing on his motion because the incident involving the juror’s
husband indicated that the juror had both relied on extraneous
prejudicial information and engaged in improper communication
regarding the case. Again, we disagree with Mendoza.

¶23 Under rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
a district court “may, upon motion of a party or upon its own
initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any
error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon
the rights of a party.” The district court declined Mendoza’s
invitation to do so here because it determined that, even
considering the affidavits—which the court noted contained
inadmissible hearsay and were submitted by Mendoza’s own
family and friends—the allegations therein were “highly
circumstantial” and required “a huge inferential leap to even
suggest that a juror was exposed to extra record facts.” The court
also determined there was “no evidence to suggest there was any
improper communication with a juror” and that even if there

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were, the communication was “not unduly prejudicial, as there is
no evidence whatsoever that the juror communicating this with
her significant other influenced the jury or the verdict in any
way.” We see no abuse of discretion here.

¶24 First, there is no evidence suggesting the juror learned
extraneous prejudicial information linking the case to gang
activity. The district court imposed a decorum order during trial
that warned attendees not to wear colors or display hand gestures
alluding to gangs. And gang evidence was not presented during
trial—at least not directly. But, as Mendoza himself points out, he
has a “small tattoo on his temple and his cheek bone” and a photo
introduced at trial of Salazar, Marco, Tiffany, and other friends on
the night of the shooting shows two people “making signs with
their hands.” Moreover, the jurors were able to observe dynamics
between Mendoza and trial attendees, and among the trial
attendees, that are not apparent from the record. The jury was also
reminded several times to refrain from researching the case. And
“jurors are presumed to have followed a trial court’s
instructions.” State v. Suhail, 2023 UT App 15, ¶ 142, 525 P.3d 550
(quotation simplified), cert. denied, 531 P.3d 730 (Utah 2023).

¶25 It is likewise unclear that the juror had improper
communication with her husband regarding the case. The jury
had been instructed not to use “electronic devices in any way
connected to the case,” and again, we presume the jurors followed
such instructions. See id. The jury had been deliberating for nearly
six hours by the time the juror’s husband arrived outside the
courthouse, which was well past the court’s regular business
hours. He told one of the affiants that he “wasn’t sure why it was
taking so long,” suggesting he had not, in fact, heard from his wife
about the verdict. It would be natural for him to worry about her
not returning home at the usual time. And even overlooking the
hearsay problems with the statement, the juror could have
expressed that she was “terrified” about the verdict just from
picking up on the gang-related aspects of the case from
observations in the courtroom. This does not necessarily suggest
that she shared the particulars of what she thought that verdict

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would be with her husband before the jury had even begun its
deliberations. And given her impressions of the trial and its
attendees, whom the court felt it had to restrict in its decorum
order, she could well have been “terrified” about rendering a
verdict, whichever way the verdict went. A conviction would not
sit well with Mendoza’s supporters; an acquittal would leave
Salazar’s family and friends distraught. It should also be noted
that the juror’s husband could easily have learned that the case
involved gang activity on his own. 6 It is not clear that he did so
through the juror. 7

6. See, e.g., Pat Reavy, South Jordan Man, 19, Charged with Murder is
Suspected in ‘Multiple Shootings,’ Police Say, KSL.com (Jan. 15,
2021), https://www.ksl.com/article/50088600/south-jordan-man-
19-charged-with-murder-is-suspected-in-multiple-shootings-poli
ce-say [https://perma.cc/44VN-TQ8Y] (“A documented gang
member was charged Friday with murder for allegedly shooting
a man multiple times after the two of them got into an argument.
Even though he is only 19, Alex Christopher Mendoza Jr. is ‘well
known to law enforcement and the gang community’ and has had
‘84 involvements with law enforcement between 2013 and 2020,’
according to court documents, which also say he is a suspect in
‘multiple shootings and more than one homicide.’”).

7. Mendoza also argues the district court should have presumed
that any communication between the juror and her husband was
prejudicial under State v. Soto, 2022 UT 26, 513 P.3d 684. But courts
should consider Soto’s rebuttable presumption only “[o]nce an
improper jury contact is shown.” Id. ¶ 32. And the “presumption
only applies when the contact is between a juror and other court
participants, not jurors and third parties unrelated to the
proceedings.” State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, ¶ 51, 108 P.3d 730
(emphasis in original). The district court saw no evidence of
improper communication between the juror and her husband
regarding the verdict. And even if there were, the husband was a
third party to the case and prejudice would thus not be presumed.
Soto, 2022 UT 26, ¶ 53.

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State v. Mendoza

¶26 It is entirely speculative as to whether the juror’s husband’s
alleged behavior was prompted by any misconduct on the part of
the juror herself. Thus, the district court did not err in denying
Mendoza’s motion for a new trial. 8

CONCLUSION

¶27 The State’s failure to preserve Salazar’s gloves did not
violate due process, and thus, the district court correctly denied
Mendoza’s pretrial motion to dismiss the charges against him.
Because there was no evidence that a juror engaged in
misconduct, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Mendoza’s motion for a new trial. Accordingly, we
affirm.

8. Mendoza alternatively contends that the district court should
have at least held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether
the juror engaged in misconduct. But the court found there was
“no evidence whatsoever” of misconduct based on the affidavits.
Given this, the hearing would have been largely an inquiry into
“evidence of discussions among jurors or instances where a juror
brings [her] personal experiences to bear on the matter at hand”—
which is prohibited by rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 114, 299 P.3d 892 (quotation
simplified). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that “an evidentiary hearing would not be helpful or
necessary.”

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