Staszkiewicz v. Thomas

2024 UT App 183

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MADISON STASZKIEWICZ,
Appellee,
v.
TIFFANY N. THOMAS,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20230229-CA
Filed December 12, 2024

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Robert P. Faust
No. 230900048

Lillian M. Reedy, Attorney for Appellant
Kimberley L. Hansen and Amy L. Herrington,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE AMY J. OLIVER authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred.

OLIVER, Judge:

¶1 The district court entered a civil stalking injunction against
Tiffany N. Thomas at Madison Staszkiewicz’s request. After a
hearing on Thomas’s objection to the injunction, the district court
kept the stalking injunction in place. Thomas now appeals. For the
reasons outlined below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Staszkiewicz is married to the father (Father) of Thomas’s
daughter (Daughter). Thomas and Father have had a contentious
relationship and have been involved in legal disputes over parent-
time and child support for Daughter. In January 2023,
Staszkiewicz v. Thomas

Staszkiewicz filed a petition for a civil stalking injunction against
Thomas, alleging that Thomas had (1) abducted her and Father’s
five-year-old son (Son) from elementary school in August 2022
(the School Incident) and (2) two months later, attempted to hit
her car near the elementary school before pulling alongside it and
yelling, “Fuck you fuck you, you’re dead!!!” (the Driving
Incident). The court denied the request.

¶3 The following day, Staszkiewicz filed an amended request
for a civil stalking injunction, alleging additional incidents of
harassment: “multiple disturbing and harassing texts and emails”
from 2015 and an incident in February 2019 when Thomas came
to Staszkiewicz’s house “unannounced and attempted to break
into [the] home” (the Porch Incident). The district court granted
the amended request and entered a temporary civil stalking
injunction.

¶4 Thomas requested a hearing to challenge the injunction. At
the hearing in February 2023, the district court heard testimony
from Thomas and Staszkiewicz and received documentary
evidence, including text messages, photographs, and a Google
map of the streets surrounding the school.

¶5 Regarding the School Incident, Thomas testified she had
simply given Son a ride home when it appeared to her that he had
been forgotten after school. According to Thomas, she had arrived
to pick up Daughter, who was with Son, “waited and waited, and
no one showed up to pick him up,” so Thomas called Father, who
“calmly” told her, “Please drop him off at home, if you don’t
mind.” When the court asked for corroborating evidence of
Father’s permission, Thomas could produce only a screenshot
showing a thirty-four-second phone call to Father. Staszkiewicz,
on the other hand, produced texts between Father and Thomas
from later that same day in which he told Thomas, “I don’t ever
want [Son] in your car ever[;] . . . you are not approved to take
him from school.” Staszkiewicz testified that her neighbor

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(Neighbor) who was driving the carpool that day called her
“panicking[] because she couldn’t find” Son. In a signed
statement filed with the court, Neighbor testified that Thomas’s
claim that she took Son “because she was the ‘last car in the
parking lot’ and ‘there were not any kids left at all before’ [Son]
got in her car . . . was false.” Neighbor testified she had been
“waiting in [the] regular pick-up area, when class dismissed for
the day.”

¶6 Regarding the Driving Incident, Thomas denied that it
occurred. Thomas testified that although she drove past
Staszkiewicz’s car during school pickup, she did not veer her car
toward Staszkiewicz’s in a menacing manner or say anything to
her. Staszkiewicz, for her part, testified that Thomas swerved her
car out of its lane, accelerated, and came within “[t]hree or four
inches” of Staszkiewicz’s car before she “backed up to pull
directly up to [Staszkiewicz’s] window,” “screaming profusely”
and “threatening [her] life.” Staszkiewicz testified that she
immediately called the police. The police report, which was
attached to the request for the injunction, indicated Staszkiewicz
“was crying, at times uncontrollably,” while describing the event
and “was clearly scared due to the encounter.”

¶7 And regarding the Porch Incident, Thomas testified she
had received permission from Father to drop off Daughter’s
valentines but when she knocked on the door, Staszkiewicz
“slammed the door in [her] face.” For her part, Staszkiewicz
clarified she did not know Thomas was coming over and when
Staszkiewicz tried to close the door, Thomas “put her foot in the
door and pushed the door open.”

¶8 At one point in the hearing, the court explained it was
“trying to understand what the dynamics may be between [the]
parties . . . to see what sparks are lighting the fire between the
conduct between these two.” The court also clarified it would
consider the information from the amended request for a civil

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stalking injunction as evidence because it “was signed and
delivered under oath.” This included what Staszkiewicz
described as “multiple disturbing and harassing texts and emails”
she received from Thomas in 2015.

¶9 After the hearing, the court denied Thomas’s objection to
the stalking injunction in a written ruling. In its entirety, the
court’s ruling states as follows:

The objection to the stalking injunction came
on for hearing on February 16, 2023. Both parties
were represented by counsel and both parties
admitted exhibits. . . . The [c]ourt determined the
testimony [of Staszkiewicz] was credible and that
the actions of [Thomas] in taking her minor child
from school without her knowledge would cause
distress/fear. In addition an attempt to enter into
[Staszkiewicz’s] home would cause her to fear for
her safety, particular[ly] after the incident at the
school of driving next to or so close to the car and
making the statements listed in the Request. The
[c]ourt denies the objection to the stalking
injunction, which shall remain in place. No further
Order required.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶10 Thomas now appeals, challenging the district court’s entry
of the civil stalking injunction against her. First, she contends the
court erred in concluding her alleged acts constitute a course of
conduct as required by the statute. “Whether someone has
engaged in a course of conduct under the stalking statute is a
question of law, which we review for correctness.” Hardy v. Hardy,
2020 UT App 88, ¶ 4, 467 P.3d 931.

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Staszkiewicz v. Thomas

¶11 Second, she contends the district court erred in finding that
her conduct would cause a reasonable person to suffer fear or
emotional distress. “Whether the course of conduct would cause
a reasonable person in a petitioner’s circumstances to suffer fear
or emotional distress is a question of fact that we review for clear
error,” but “we review the district court’s interpretation of the
underlying legal standard for correctness.” Richins v. Weldon, 2023
UT App 147, ¶ 42, 541 P.3d 274 (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

¶12 Under Utah law, stalking occurs when an individual

intentionally or knowingly . . . engages in a course
of conduct directed at a specific individual and
knows or should know that the course of conduct
would cause a reasonable person (i) to fear for the
individual’s own safety or the safety of a third
individual; or (ii) to suffer emotional distress.

Utah Code § 76-5-106.5(2)(a) (2022). 1 In other words, “the crime of
stalking consists of two elements. First, a person must
intentionally or knowingly engage in a course of conduct directed
at a specific person.” Ragsdale v. Fishler, 2021 UT 29, ¶ 25, 491 P.3d
835 (cleaned up). “Second, that person must know or should
know that the course of conduct would cause a reasonable person
to fear for the person’s own safety or suffer other emotional
distress.” Id. (cleaned up).

1. This statute was amended, effective May 2024. Compare Utah
Code § 76-5-106.5 (2024) with id. (2022). “We therefore cite the
version of the statute in effect at the time of the actions giving rise
to this appeal.” Calder v. State, 2022 UT App 67, ¶ 7 n.4, 512 P.3d
485.

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Staszkiewicz v. Thomas

I. Course of Conduct Directed at a Specific Individual

¶13 Thomas argues the trial court erred in concluding that the
three incidents forming the basis for the injunction amounted to a
“[c]ourse of conduct” as defined by Utah Code section 76-5-
106.5(1)(a)(i), which requires “two or more acts directed at or
toward a specific individual.” Thomas’s challenge rests on two
grounds that are both legally incorrect under Utah law.

¶14 First, Thomas contends that the trial court erred by not
analyzing each of the alleged incidents separately. “In
determining whether a person’s acts constitute a course of
conduct, we do not consider individual acts in a vacuum but,
rather, we consider the acts cumulatively in light of all the facts
and circumstances.” Harris v. Hunt, 2024 UT App 117, ¶ 10, 557
P.3d 228 (cleaned up). Thus, “a district court should not consider
each act in isolation” but “should consider the course of conduct
cumulatively.” Richins v. Weldon, 2023 UT App 147, ¶ 66, 541 P.3d
274 (cleaned up); accord Anderson v. Deem, 2023 UT App 48, ¶ 27,
530 P.3d 945.

¶15 Second, Thomas argues the court erred in finding that her
acts amounted to a course of conduct because “[n]one of these
occurrences evoke outrage or revulsion.” Again, this argument
runs counter to Utah law because it fails to distinguish whether
Thomas’s acts amounted to a course of conduct from whether that
course of conduct caused emotional distress. As noted,
establishing a course of conduct is the first step in the stalking
analysis. See Ragsdale v. Fishler, 2021 UT 29, ¶ 25, 491 P.3d 835.
“This step should not be conflated or combined with the second
part of the analysis, which involves a determination as to whether
the course of conduct would cause a reasonable person fear or
emotional distress.” Anderson, 2023 UT App 48, ¶ 26. In other
words, “a course of conduct does not necessarily involve
threatening behavior . . . . Rather, a course of conduct merely

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requires two or more acts directed at or toward a specific
individual.” Id. ¶ 25 (cleaned up).

¶16 Here, the district court’s ruling referenced Thomas’s three
acts directed at Staszkiewicz—the Porch Incident, the School
Incident, and the Driving Incident—and correctly considered the
incidents cumulatively, rather than in isolation. Thus, the district
court properly conducted the first step of the analysis when it
found that a course of conduct as defined by the stalking statute
existed here.

II. A Reasonable Person in the Petitioner’s Circumstances
Fearing for Her Own Safety or Suffering Emotional Distress

¶17 Under the second prong of the stalking statute, we must
consider whether the conduct at issue “would cause emotional
distress [or fear] to a reasonable person in the petitioner’s
circumstances.” Richins v. Weldon, 2023 UT App 147, ¶ 67, 541 P.3d
274 (cleaned up). “To properly apply the stalking statute’s
objective standard, the district court” “must consider the entire
context surrounding [a respondent’s] conduct,” analyzing the
conduct “in light of the specific facts and circumstances of the
petitioner’s individual case.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶18 Thomas takes issue with the court’s analysis on this second
prong by arguing the evidence is insufficient to support the
court’s findings that Staszkiewicz “was credible” and Thomas’s
actions “would cause distress/fear.” 2 We disagree.

2. Thomas also asserts the court should have used a “‘sufficiently
outrageous and intolerable’ . . . standard for emotional distress,”
but she anchors this argument to a case that applied an outdated
stalking statute. See Allen v. Anger, 2011 UT App 19, ¶ 16, 248 P.3d
1001, superseded by statute as stated in State v. Miller, 2023 UT 3, 527
P.3d 1087. Furthermore, our supreme court has stated that the
(continued…)

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Staszkiewicz v. Thomas

¶19 First, “a trial court’s factual determinations are clearly
erroneous only if they are in conflict with the clear weight of the
evidence, or if this court has a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.” Id. ¶ 64 (cleaned up). Accordingly, “we
give great deference to the trial court and do not lightly disturb its
factual findings.” Henshaw v. Henshaw, 2012 UT App 56, ¶ 10, 271
P.3d 837 (cleaned up). Furthermore, a “reviewing court must give
due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility
of the witnesses.” Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)(4). Such deference is
warranted because “trial courts have the benefit of viewing the
witnesses firsthand, to assess their demeanor and to consider their
testimonies in the context of the proceedings as a whole, making
them much better equipped to make credibility determinations.”
Richins, 2023 UT App 147, ¶ 65 (cleaned up).

¶20 Here, the district court found Staszkiewicz more
credible than Thomas after it had assessed each party’s demeanor
and considered their respective testimony in light of the
proceedings as a whole. For example, Thomas’s testimony
about the School Incident was contradicted in two ways. First,
she claimed Father gave her permission to drive Son to his
house, but the text exchange entered into evidence showed the
opposite: Father stated, “I don’t ever want my son in your car
ever[;] . . . you are not approved to take him from school.”
Second, Thomas claimed “no one showed up to pick [Son] up,”
but Neighbor stated she was there in their routine pickup
area, waiting for Son. And regarding the Driving
Incident, Staszkiewicz’s account was supported by the police
report in which the officer stated Staszkiewicz “was crying, at
times uncontrollably,” and “was clearly scared due to the

2008 amendment to the stalking statute “supplants” the
“statutory standard to require proof of outrageous and intolerable
stalking,” making it no longer valid. Baird v. Baird, 2014 UT 8,
¶¶ 38–39, 322 P.3d 728. Thus, Thomas’s argument in this regard
fails.

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encounter.” Because the district court’s credibility finding was not
“in conflict with the clear weight of the evidence,” id. ¶ 64 (cleaned
up), we conclude the court’s credibility finding was not clearly
erroneous.

¶21 Second, we likewise conclude the court did not err in
finding that Thomas’s course of conduct satisfied the second
element of stalking. As noted above, Thomas’s conduct must be
analyzed “in light of the specific facts and circumstances of [the
petitioner’s] individual case.” Id. ¶ 67 (cleaned up). Courts apply
this “individualized objective standard” by considering “such
factors as the victim’s background, the victim’s knowledge of and
relationship with the [respondent], any history of abuse between
the parties, the location of the alleged stalking, and the cumulative
effect” of the respondent’s conduct. Id. (cleaned up). “When
assessing these and other relevant factors, however, courts must
avoid succumbing to a purely subjective analysis, which is
inconsistent with the objective standard’s intent to protect against
criminalizing conduct that only an unreasonably sensitive or
paranoid victim would find harassing.” Baird v. Baird, 2014 UT 8,
¶ 27, 322 P.3d 728 (cleaned up).

¶22 Here, the district court appropriately analyzed Thomas’s
conduct in light of the specific facts and circumstances at hand.
The court expressly sought “to understand what the dynamics
may be between [the] parties . . . to see what sparks are lighting
the fire between the conduct between these two,” and it
considered the cumulative impact of the three incidents in its
ruling.

¶23 However, the court did err in stating that “an attempt to
enter into [Staszkiewicz’s] home would cause her to fear for her
safety, particular[ly] after the incident at the school of driving next
to or so close to the car and making the statements listed” in the
petition. (Emphasis added.) The Porch Incident—in which
Thomas attempted to enter Staszkiewicz’s home—occurred over

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Staszkiewicz v. Thomas

three years before, not after, the Driving Incident. But the question
we must answer is whether the error harmed Thomas. See, e.g.,
Harris v. Hunt, 2024 UT App 117, ¶ 17, 557 P.3d 228 (concluding
that even if “the court erred by not making specific findings, . . .
we deem any such error harmless under the circumstances”); TKS
Co-Pack Mfg., LLC v. Wilson, 2024 UT App 87, ¶ 113, 552 P.3d 258
(finding “any error on the part of the court here was harmless”).
The district court was required to consider the “cumulative effect”
of Thomas’s course of conduct directed at Staszkiewicz in
determining whether it was “enough to cause fear or emotional
distress.” Anderson v. Deem, 2023 UT App 48, ¶ 31, 530 P.3d 945.
So, regardless of the particular order in which these two events
occurred, the court had to consider the impact of both the Porch
Incident and the Driving Incident. And the evidence—police
reports, Staszkiewicz’s testimony, Father’s texts, and Neighbor’s
signed statement—supported the court’s finding that Thomas’s
actions “would cause [Staszkiewicz] to fear for her safety.” We
therefore conclude that the court’s chronological error was
harmless. 3

3. Staszkiewicz asserts that Thomas’s appeal is frivolous and
requests an award of attorney fees pursuant to rule 33 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Utah R. App. P. 33(a); see also id. R.
33(b) (“[A] frivolous appeal is . . . one that is not grounded in fact,
not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law.”). “The
sanction for bringing a frivolous appeal is applied only in
egregious cases, lest there be an improper chilling of the right to
appeal erroneous lower court decisions.” Marroquin v. Marroquin,
2019 UT App 38, ¶ 36, 440 P.3d 757 (cleaned up). While Thomas’s
arguments were unpersuasive because they were based on a
legally incorrect standard, we do not view this error to be so
“egregious” that it warrants sanctions. We therefore decline to
award attorney fees.

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Staszkiewicz v. Thomas

CONCLUSION

¶24 In light of the facts and circumstances of this matter, we
find no reversible error by the district court in its ruling that
Thomas’s actions constituted a course of conduct that would
cause a reasonable person in Staszkiewicz’s circumstances to fear
for her own safety. We therefore affirm the district court’s ruling
and reject Thomas’s challenge to the civil stalking injunction.

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