Anderson v. Fautin

2014 UT App 151
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
TERRAL E. ANDERSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
JANET FAUTIN,
Defendant and Appellee.
Opinion
No. 20120972-CA
Filed June 26, 2014
Sixth District Court, Junction Department
The Honorable Paul D. Lyman
No. 070600002
Marcus Taylor, Attorney for Appellant
Tex R. Olsen, Attorney for Appellee
JUDGE STEPHEN L. ROTH authored this Opinion, in which JUDGE
GREGORY K. ORME and SENIOR JUDGE RUSSELL W. BENCH
concurred.1
ROTH, Judge:
¶1 This boundary dispute case raises a single issue
concerning the application of the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence: must the claimant show active use of the land on
both sides of a disputed boundary to satisfy the occupation
1. The Honorable Russell W. Bench, Senior Judge, sat by special
assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah Code Jud.
Admin. R. 11-201(6).

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element of the doctrine? The plaintiff purchased property in
Piute County in 1968 and did not use it or visit it for more than
two decades. The defendant owns adjacent property to the north
where for more than twenty years she and prior owners had
farmed and grazed livestock. In 2005, the plaintiff surveyed his
land and then filed a quiet title action asserting his ownership of
a narrow strip of land on the defendant’s side of a 2,000-foot
fence. The district court granted summary judgment in the
defendant’s favor, holding that the plaintiff’s silence was
evidence that the parties had long acquiesced in the fence line as
a boundary and rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that his failure
to occupy his parcel was fatal to the defendant’s boundary by
acquiescence claim. We affirm and conclude that a landowner
seeking to establish a boundary by acquiescence need only
demonstrate that she has actively used the land up to the
disputed boundary and need not show that the adjacent
landowner has done the same.
BACKGROUND
¶2 Terral Anderson purchased a piece of real property in
Piute County, Utah, in 1968.2 He left the property vacant and did
not visit it (at least the portion along his northern boundary) for
more than twenty-six years, until he retired in 1994. Janet Fautin
purchased property north of Anderson’s land in 1987. A 2,000-
foot fence originally constructed in 1930 separates Fautin’s
property from Anderson’s land and one other parcel.
¶3 About ten years after he retired, Anderson paid for a
professional survey of his property. The survey revealed that the
existing fence was 123 feet south of Anderson’s north boundary
2. “In reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment,
we recite the facts in the light most favorable to” the nonmoving
party, Anderson. See Ross v. Epic Eng’g, PC, 2013 UT App 136,
¶ 2, 307 P.3d 576.

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20120972-CA 3 2014 UT App 151
line. Anderson filed a quiet title action in 2007 asking the court
to recognize the survey as the correct boundary and to order
Fautin to move the fence. In her answer, Fautin asserted that she
had acquired the disputed land under the doctrine of boundary
by acquiescence: the fence had “been established by
acquiescence” as the “boundary for a period of substantially
more than 20 years,” and therefore Anderson could no longer
complain that the fence line was not the correct boundary.
¶4 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
Anderson argued that because he “was an absentee owner,”
“never used his land, and had no interaction with Fautin and her
predecessors,” he did not occupy his property or acquiesce in the
boundary established by the fence line, and Fautin therefore
could not establish a boundary by acquiescence. In response,
Fautin argued that “parties relying on a fixed boundary and
occupying land up to that boundary do not have
the . . . obligation of showing activity on the other side of the
boundary fence.” She also maintained that an owner’s
“indolence or silence” was not a valid defense to boundary by
acquiescence.
¶5 The district court ruled in Fautin’s favor. It held that
Anderson’s “level of activity with respect to the properties [was]
immaterial” because Fautin’s “active use of the disputed area
satisfies the occupancy requirement in establishing a boundary
by acquiescence.” Moreover, the court noted, Anderson “either
knew or should have known [Fautin] was using the disputed
area up to the fence line,” but he “never objected.” The court
concluded that Anderson’s “silence, indolence, and failure to
inspect his property constitute[d] a mutual acquiescence in the
disputed boundary line.” Anderson appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6 Summary judgment is appropriate only where there are
no genuine issues of material fact and “the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

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Anderson does not claim that there were unresolved issues of
fact. Rather, he argues that the district court’s summary
judgment ruling was incorrect because the district court
“misread the law” when it held that Fautin’s “active use of the
disputed area satisfies the occupancy requirement in
establishing a boundary by acquiescence.” “We review a district
court’s grant of summary judgment for correctness.” Torian v.
Craig, 2012 UT 63, ¶ 13, 289 P.3d 479.
ANALYSIS
¶7 The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence allows a land
owner to establish a property line that differs from the legal
description of his property by satisfying four elements:
“(i) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments,
fences, or buildings, (ii) mutual acquiescence in the line as a
boundary, (iii) for a long period of time, . . . (iv) by adjoining
landowners.” Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, ¶ 16, 44 P.3d 781
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The long-
period-of-time element has been defined by our case law as “at
least twenty consecutive years.” Id. ¶ 23. The central issue on
appeal is whether Anderson’s inactivity on his side of the
boundary is material to the occupation requirement. The district
court held that it was not, concluding that Fautin’s “active use of
the disputed area” by itself “satisfie*d+ the occupancy
requirement in establishing a boundary by acquiescence.”
¶8 Anderson argues that “it is the conduct of both adjoining
landowners that creates the boundary line, not one acting
unilaterally.” In other words, he maintains, the occupation
element “requires occupation of their respective parcels by both
of the adjoining landowners,” and “activity on only one side of
the disputed boundary” is not enough. (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) In response, Fautin argues that Anderson
cannot use his “*s+ilence or inactivity . . . as a defense.” We
conclude that Fautin’s use of the property up to the fence line
satisfies the occupation element.

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¶9 There do not appear to be any Utah cases that have
directly addressed whether there must be active use of the
property on both sides of a disputed boundary to satisfy the
occupancy element of boundary by acquiescence. The district
court concluded that Fautin’s “active use of the disputed area
satisfies the occupancy requirement” and held that Anderson’s
“level of activity” was “immaterial” to the issue. In its analysis,
the court relied heavily on our decision in Carter v. Hanrath
(Carter I), 885 P.2d 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), and a Utah Supreme
Court opinion that reversed it, see Carter v. Hanrath (Carter II),
925 P.2d 960 (Utah 1996).
¶10 But those cases, while helpful to an analysis of mutual
acquiescence, fail to shed much light on whether occupation to
the boundary line by both owners is required to fulfill the first
element. In Carter I, a rancher grazed his cattle at the base of a
plateau owned by his neighbor. 885 P.2d at 802–03. Even though
the neighbor could not access the disputed area from her
property on the plateau and had visited it just once, we held that
the rancher’s use alone had satisfied the occupation element of
boundary by acquiescence. Id. at 802–05. We affirmed the trial
court’s decision granting title to the rancher, concluding that the
other three elements of boundary by acquiescence had also been
satisfied. Id. at 806–07. The Utah Supreme Court reversed,
holding that because the neighbor was unable “to take physical
possession of the disputed area,” her inactivity on that portion of
her land could not “be construed to be acquiescence.” Carter II,
925 P.2d at 962. The supreme court did not address our analysis
of the other three elements of boundary by acquiescence,
including our conclusion that the occupation requirement had
been satisfied despite the neighbor’s inactivity. Id. And because
the absence of “any one of the four elements is fatal” to a
boundary by acquiescence claim, Goodman v. Wilkinson, 629 P.2d
447, 448 (Utah 1981), we cannot construe the supreme court’s
silence as tacit approval of any conclusion in our own decision
that was unnecessary to the supreme court’s ultimate resolution
of the case. Thus, Carter I and Carter II do not resolve Anderson’s
contention that both owners must actively occupy their land up
to a boundary.

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¶11 Other than the Carter cases, the parties have not identified
any Utah case law that directly addresses the question presented
here. But we believe for three reasons that Utah law does not
require active occupation by both owners to establish a
boundary by acquiescence. First, in every Utah case we have
examined where the parties’ central dispute was the occupancy
requirement, courts have focused exclusively on the use of the
disputed property by the claiming party. Second, to the extent
the opposing owner’s land use has been discussed in the case
law, it seems to have been analyzed as evidence of mutual
acquiescence, not occupancy. Finally, focusing the occupancy
analysis on the claiming party’s land use is consistent with the
policy considerations underlying the boundary by acquiescence
doctrine.
¶12 In cases where the occupation element has been at issue,
Utah courts have largely ignored the opposing landowner’s use
of his own property abutting the disputed boundary line. Thus,
the supreme court has held that the occupation element is
satisfied when “a particular occupation up to a visible line
would place a reasonable party on notice that the given line was
being treated as a boundary between the properties.” Bahr v.
Imus, 2011 UT 19, ¶ 36, 250 P.3d 56 (internal quotation marks
omitted). And our cases have deemed uses like farming, raising
livestock, irrigation, or residence, see id.—uses “normal and
appropriate for the character and location of the land,” see
Englert v. Zane, 848 P.2d 165, 170 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)—to be
among the types of occupation that provide such notice to the
opposing party. For example, in Englert, we affirmed a trial
court’s decision establishing a boundary by acquiescence where
the claiming parties used their property for “gardening,
recreation, and relaxation.” Id. Our analysis focused on whether
a natural boundary (a river) and the claiming party’s use of the
disputed parcel for gardening and recreation was enough to
satisfy the occupation requirement, and we then determined that
the occupation element was met without discussing the
character of the opposing party’s land use. Id. at 168–70.
Similarly, in LPM Corp. v. Smith, we held that allegations in the
claiming party’s complaint that it had “continuously occupied

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and used the disputed parcel for farming, livestock grazing,”
and travel up to a wire fence were enough to survive dismissal
on the occupancy element. 2006 UT App 258, ¶¶ 4, 10, 16–17, 139
P.3d 292. We did not discuss the opposing owner’s land use. Id.
¶13 These cases are not aberrations; Utah appellate courts
appear to have consistently followed this approach in boundary
by acquiescence cases. See, e.g., Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, ¶ 17,
44 P.3d 781 (“In this case, *occupation+ has been established with
respect to the strip because the parties do not dispute that the
[claiming party] ha[s] occupied and used the strip up to the
fence.”); Fuoco v. Williams, 389 P.2d 143, 145 (Utah 1964) (noting
that the occupation element was not an issue because the parties
conceded that the claiming party “had occupied the land up to
*a+ ditch for a long period of years”); King v. Fronk, 378 P.2d 893,
894–95 (Utah 1963) (holding that the claiming party produced
sufficient evidence of occupation to meet the requirement of
boundary by acquiescence without discussing the opposing
owner’s land use), overruled on other grounds by Halladay v. Cluff,
685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984); Johnson Real Estate Co. v. Nielson, 353
P.2d 918, 919–20 (Utah 1960) (holding that the trial court’s factual
finding that the claiming party “had full and exclusive
possession” of the disputed property adequately supported a
boundary by acquiescence ruling without discussing the
opposing owner’s land use); Dean v. Kang Sik Park, 2012 UT App
349, ¶¶ 30–31, 293 P.3d 388 (concluding that the occupation
element was not satisfied because the claiming owners had “not
pointed us to any compelling record evidence that they used the
[d]isputed [a]rea in any significant way or that their actions
could reasonably have been expected to put the [other parties] or
their predecessors on notice that the wooden fence was being
treated as a boundary between the lots”); see also David A.
Thomas & James H. Backman, Utah Real Property Law
§ 13.05(b)(7)(ii), at 431 nn.490–91 (LexisNexis 2013) (collecting
Utah boundary by acquiescence cases).
¶14 Further, to the extent the opposing owner’s land use has
been discussed in boundary by acquiescence cases, it seems to
have been considered as evidence of mutual acquiescence, not

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occupancy. Indeed, Utah courts routinely examine “various
landowner actions as evidence of acquiescence,” including
“*o+ccupation up to, but never over” a recognized physical
boundary. RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, ¶ 25, 96 P.3d 935. In
RHN Corp., the Utah Supreme Court concluded that a family
acquiesced in a fence as the northern boundary of their
neighbor’s land because they “farmed up to the fence line since
1938, . . . never occupied the land south of the fence,” and “never
objected to the fence line as the boundary.” Id. ¶ 27. Likewise, in
Essential Botanical Farms, LC v. Kay, the supreme court affirmed a
trial court’s ruling that two owners mutually acquiesced in a
fence as a boundary between their properties because “both
families farmed their respective properties and allowed their
cattle to graze up to, but never over the fence for nearly half a
century.” 2011 UT 71, ¶ 30, 270 P.3d 430 (internal quotation
marks omitted). And in Martin v. Lauder, we reversed a
summary judgment that rejected a boundary by acquiescence
claim, concluding that there was an issue of fact because the
claiming party disputed that the opposing owners had
“continued to access, maintain, and use the [d]isputed [p]roperty
beyond the fence after the fence was built.” 2010 UT App 216,
¶¶ 9, 13, 17, 239 P.3d 519. Without discussing the occupancy
element, we noted that the dispute about the opposing owners’
property use was material to whether the opposing owners and
their predecessors had “acquiesce[d] in the fence as a boundary
line.” Id. ¶¶ 9, 13.3
3. See also Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 420–21 (Utah 1990)
(noting the fact that “*o+wners occupied houses, constructed
buildings, farmed, irrigated, and raised livestock only within
their respective fenced areas” as evidence of mutual
acquiescence); Williams v. Oldroyd, 581 P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 1978)
(concluding that the opposing party did not acquiesce in a
boundary because he “used the disputed property on several
occasions” and the claiming party “twice offered to purchase
it”); Smith v. Security Inv. Ltd., 2009 UT App 355, ¶¶ 7–8, 223 P.3d
451 (concluding that evidence showing that the opposing party
(continued...)

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¶15 We acknowledge that a handful of cases contain language
implying that land use on both sides of a disputed boundary is
pertinent to the occupation requirement. See Orton v. Carter, 970
P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1998); Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 420
(Utah 1990); Harding v. Allen, 353 P.2d 911, 913 (Utah 1960),
overruled on other grounds by Wood v. Myrup, 681 P.2d 1255 (Utah
1984); Pitt v. Taron, 2009 UT App 113, ¶ 2, 210 P.3d 962. But a
closer reading of each case demonstrates that none of them is
inconsistent with a rule that requires active land use by only the
claiming party to satisfy the occupation element. In Pitt, we
upheld the district court’s conclusion that the occupation
element was not satisfied, noting that “the property owners did
not continuously occupy their respective portions of land up to
the fence line as a boundary.” 2009 UT App 113, ¶ 2. Our
decision, however, did not hinge on the nature of either owner’s
land use. Rather, our concern centered on the permanency of the
boundary in light of evidence that the fence between the two
properties “was never . . . permanent” and had been “moved
around to accommodate” the needs of one owner’s livestock. Id.
As we have discussed, the occupation element requires not just
land use, but “occupation up to a visible line marked by
monuments, fences, or buildings.” Ault, 2002 UT 33, ¶ 16
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The shifting
“made no use whatsoever of the disputed parcel and never
objected to the *claiming party’s+ use of the disputed parcel . . .
readily support[ed+ the trial court’s conclusion” of mutual
acquiescence); Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 168, ¶¶ 13, 17–
18, 136 P.3d 1252 (affirming the trial court’s determination that
an opposing owner did not acquiesce in a fence line as a
boundary and citing evidence that both owners “ran livestock on
the land” and “grazed cattle” as support for the trial court’s
conclusion that the fence was a cattle barrier, not a boundary
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Mason v. Loveless, 2001 UT
App 145, ¶ 21, 24 P.3d 997 (noting the fact that “herds were run
on both sides of a fence” supported a conclusion of mutual
acquiescence).

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nature of the relevant boundary in Pitt was fatal to a finding of
occupation independent of the parties’ land use. Consequently,
to the extent Pitt could be read as requiring active use by both
owners to establish occupation up to a boundary, it is
inconsistent with the way Utah courts have generally
approached the issue, see supra ¶¶ 12–13, and the pertinent
language appears to have been unnecessary to the result and
therefore dicta.
¶16 Likewise, in Staker, the Utah Supreme Court noted that
the occupation element was satisfied in a boundary by
acquiescence case involving multiple parties because “*h+ouses
were built and land occupied; land was farmed, improved and
irrigated, and livestock was kept.” 785 P.2d at 419–20. While this
language by itself might imply that the land use by all property
owners is pertinent to the occupation requirement, the court also
noted that there were “no allegations that the parcels lacked
occupation up to a visible line,” and it did not indicate whether
the property use it discussed referred to the six defendants
asserting a boundary by acquiescence or the plaintiff who
opposed it. Id.
¶17 Two other cases analyze occupation and mutual
acquiescence together, making it difficult to discern whether
references to the opposing party’s property use were pertinent to
occupation or merely evidence of mutual acquiescence. See
Orton, 970 P.2d at 1257; Harding, 353 P.2d at 913. In Orton, the
supreme court affirmed a trial court’s ruling establishing a
boundary by acquiescence. 970 P.2d at 1258. After noting
evidence of a partial fence between the two properties, the fact
that “all prior owners of both lots viewed the old fence line as
the boundary” and evidence that “the owners occupied their
respective properties to that line,” the court concluded that both
the acquiescence and occupation elements had been satisfied
without further discussion. Id. at 1257.
¶18 And in Harding, the supreme court seemed to treat the
opposing owner’s land use as pertinent to the occupation
element, but its analysis mirrors the way subsequent courts have

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approached mutual acquiescence. See 353 P.2d at 913–14. In that
case, the opposing party argued that “no boundary by
acquiescence could be acquired as to [his land], which was
vacant, because of [his own] nonoccupancy.” Id. at 912–13. The
court rejected that argument, holding that all the elements of
boundary by acquiescence were satisfied. Id. at 913–14. The court
pointed to the opposing party’s plans to open a candy store and
frequent visits to the property as evidence of occupancy even
though the opposing landowner had never followed through by
improving the land in any way. Id. The court’s analysis,
however, relied on mutual acquiescence case law, id., and its
reasoning, though couched in terms of occupancy, closely
resembles the way Utah appellate courts currently approach the
question of mutual acquiescence:
The occupancy intended as a requirement in
satisfying the rule may be actual or constructive, by
an owner, who may frequently or occasionally
enter and physically occupy his land, but who
must be shown to have occupied it thus at such
reasonable intervals and during a period within
which a boundary by acquiescence might be
acquired, as to have knowledge of the physical
facts that, through passage of time, might create
rights in others to his land under the doctrine, with
an opportunity to interrupt their fruition.
Id. Mutual acquiescence similarly turns on whether the
circumstances of an owner’s action or inaction permit a
reasonable inference that she “impliedly consents” to a physical
boundary. See Essential Botanical Farms, LC, 2011 UT 71, ¶ 26
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶19 Similar to Orton, the Harding court’s reliance on mutual
acquiescence cases for a conclusion about occupancy makes it
difficult to determine whether the court saw the opposing
owner’s activity as pertinent to the occupation requirement or
merely as evidence of his acquiescence. Thus, while it is possible
to argue that language in Harding and Orton is inconsistent with

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our occupation analysis, our approach is in harmony with the
substantive holdings of those cases and, as we explain infra, with
the long-standing policy behind the boundary by acquiescence
doctrine.
¶20 Finally, restricting the analysis of occupation to the
claiming party’s land use is consistent with the policy concerns
that underlie boundary by acquiescence. The doctrine “is rooted
in policy considerations of avoiding litigation and promoting
stability in landownership” and serves the “peace and good
order of society . . . by leaving at rest possible disputes over long
established boundaries.” Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19, ¶ 35, 250 P.3d
56 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The
“essence” of boundary by acquiescence “is that where there has
been any type of a recognizable physical boundary, which has
been accepted as such for a long period of time, it should be
presumed that any dispute or disagreement over the boundary
has been reconciled in some manner.” Baum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725,
726 (Utah 1974) (citation omitted). For that very reason, the
doctrine focuses on perhaps the central concern in deciding
ancient boundary disputes between competing owners: “Under
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, property rights are
determined by actual possession of land.” Gillmore v. Cummings,
904 P.2d 703, 707 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); see also Olsen v. Park
Daughters Inv. Co., 511 P.2d 145, 148 (Utah 1973) (noting that
property rights acquired through boundary by acquiescence are
“based on actual possession of land”); cf. Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78B-2-211, -213 (LexisNexis 2012) (providing that land must
be enclosed, cultivated, or improved for a claimant to establish
ownership through adverse possession); id. § 57-9-2(2), (3)
(LexisNexis 2010) (exempting from the Marketable Record Title
Act property interests established by continuous possession for
forty years or more and rights “arising from prescriptive use or a
period of adverse possession”).
¶21 A rule requiring active occupation on both sides of a
disputed boundary runs counter to the central policy concerns
that seem to underlie the doctrine. If opposing owners can avoid
the doctrine through their own inaction, an owner with land

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adjacent to a vacant lot would be insecure in her title no matter
how long the land had been under her exclusive development
and possession. Physical boundaries established long ago in
reliance on what are now considered primitive and imprecise
surveying techniques could be challenged most easily by owners
who had long neglected their property. Thus, requiring active
occupation “by both of the adjoining landowners,” as Anderson
suggests, would undermine the stability of land ownership and
potentially encourage litigation by undercutting the
presumption in favor of actual possession upon which the
doctrine is based. It would also reward an opposing owner’s
indolence in the face of active occupation by the claiming owner.
See Lane v. Walker, 505 P.2d 1199, 1200 (Utah 1973) (holding that
an owner “consent*ed+ by silence” to a fence as a boundary
because he did not do “anything about it for 48 years” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT App 168,
¶ 15, 136 P.3d 1252 (noting that “silence, or the failure to object
to a line as a boundary” is evidence of acquiescence (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
¶22 Thus, in light of the underlying policy and our review of
the pertinent case law, we conclude that an owner satisfies the
occupation element of boundary by acquiescence when her use
of land up to a visible line “would place a reasonable party on
notice that the given line was being treated as a boundary
between the properties.” See Bahr, 2011 UT 19, ¶ 36. The land use
of the other owner may be pertinent to the issue of mutual
acquiescence, but it is not material to the occupancy
requirement.
¶23 Here, there is no dispute that Fautin and her predecessor
“grazed livestock on the property” and “continued to use [it] up
to the existing fence line for a period of more than 20 years.”
Anderson has not alleged that the fence functioned as anything
other than a boundary or that Fautin’s activity was insufficient
to objectively demonstrate to any neighboring owners that she
was treating the fence as a boundary. We therefore agree with
the district court that Fautin’s “active use of the disputed area
satisfies the occupancy requirement in establishing a boundary

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20120972-CA 14 2014 UT App 151
by acquiescence” and that Anderson’s failure to occupy the land
up to the fence does not defeat that requirement.
¶24 Furthermore, because the other three elements of
boundary by acquiescence are either satisfied or uncontested on
appeal,4 we affirm the district court’s conclusion that Fautin
“satisfied, as a matter of law, the four requirements for
establishing a boundary by acquiescence.”
CONCLUSION
¶25 We agree with the district court that the claiming party in
a boundary by acquiescence case can satisfy the occupation
element by establishing her own active property use up to a
visible boundary. We therefore conclude that Fautin’s active use
of her land up to the fence for more than twenty years satisfied
the occupation requirement. And because Anderson has not
challenged the district court’s determination that the other three
elements were also satisfied, we affirm its decision establishing
the fence as the boundary between the two properties.
___________
4. Anderson challenged whether Fautin had met the mutual
acquiescence requirement in the summary judgment
proceedings before the district court, and the court’s written
decision addressed “whether there was mutual acquiescence in
the [fence] line as a boundary” separately from the occupation
requirement. Anderson does not challenge that component of
the district court’s decision on appeal. Rather, he characterizes
the “one issue” in the case as whether “the doctrine of boundary
by acquiescence require[s] occupation by adjoining landowners
on both sides of the monumented line.”