Anderson v. Department of Workforce Services

1. The Honorable Pamela T. Greenwood, Senior Judge, sat by
special assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah Code
Jud. Admin. R. 11-201(6).
2014 UT App 47
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
TROY B. ANDERSON,
Petitioner,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES,
Respondent.
Per Curiam Decision
No. 20130781-CA
Filed February 21, 2014
Original Proceeding in this Court
Troy B. Anderson, Petitioner Pro Se
Amanda B. McPeck, Attorney for Respondent
Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME, CAROLYN B. MCHUGH, AND
PAMELA T. GREENWOOD.1
PER CURIAM:
¶1 Troy B. Anderson seeks judicial review of the Workforce
Appeals Board’s (the Board) decision denying his request for
unemployment benefits. We affirm.
¶2 The Utah Supreme Court recently clarified the standard for
reviewing the Board’s decisions concerning requests for
unemployment benefits. See Carbon Cnty. v. Workforce Appeals Bd.,
2013 UT 41, ¶ 7, 308 P.3d 477. Judicial review of Board decisions
often presents mixed questions of law and fact. As such, the
standard that we employ in reviewing a mixed question “can be

Anderson v. Department of Workforce Services
20130781-CA 2 2014 UT App 47
either deferential or non-deferential.” Id. We grant more deference
in cases where “the mixed finding is not ‘law-like’ because it does
not lend itself to consistent resolution by a uniform body of
appellate precedent, and/or on the premise that the mixed finding
is ‘fact-like’ because the trial court [or agency] is in a superior
position to decide it.” Id. Because of the fact-intensive conclusions
involved at the agency level, the appellate court is in an inferior
position to review the correctness of the decision and the Board’s
factual determinations are entitled to deference. See id.
¶3 Anderson asserts that the Board erred by determining that
he was ineligible for unemployment benefits. In doing so,
Anderson primarily challenges the factual basis for the Board’s
determination that he was not entitled to unemployment benefits.
Utah Code section 35A-4-405(2)(a) provides that an individual is
ineligible for unemployment benefits if the claimant “was
discharged for dishonesty constituting a crime.” Utah Code Ann.
§ 35A-4-405(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2013). A plea of no contest constitutes
an admission for purposes of section 35A-4-405(2)(b). See Salzl v.
Department of Workforce Servs., 2005 UT App 399, ¶ 17, 122 P.3d 691.
This court previously determined that if a petitioner pleads no
contest to a crime as contemplated by section 35A-4-405, without
having that plea held in abeyance, “there [is] no question that [the
petitioner] would be ineligible for benefits under 35A-4-405(2)(b).”
Id.
¶4 Utah Administrative Rule R994-405-210 provides that three
elements must be satisfied in order to deny benefits on the basis of
a petitioner’s discharge for committing a workplace crime: (1) the
claimant must be discharged for a crime in connection with his
employment, (2) the claimant’s conduct must involve dishonesty
constituting a crime, and (3) the crime must be established by a
conviction in a court of law. See Utah Admin. Code R994-405-210.
¶5 The record supports the Board’s determination that
Anderson was ineligible for unemployment benefits under section
35A-4-405. Anderson was discharged from his employment for a

Anderson v. Department of Workforce Services
20130781-CA 3 2014 UT App 47
crime in connection with his employment. Theft qualifies as
“dishonesty constituting a crime.” See Utah Admin. Code R994-405-
210. Anderson pleaded no contest to theft from his employer,
which constitutes an admission for purposes of section 35A-4-
405(2)(b). See Salzl, 2005 UT App 399, ¶ 17. Thus, the Board
correctly determined that Anderson was ineligible for
unemployment benefits.
¶6 Accordingly, we decline to disturb the Board’s ruling.