Parrish v. Wyttenbach

1. The Honorable Pamela T. Greenwood, Senior Judge, sat by
special assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah Code
Jud. Admin. R. 11-201(6).
2014 UT App 181
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RANITA MARIE PARRISH,
Petitioner and Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM HAYES WYTTENBACH,
Respondent and Appellant.
Memorandum Decision
No. 20130362-CA
Filed July 31, 2014
Fifth District Court, St. George Department
The Honorable Jeffrey C. Wilcox
No. 094500399
William Hayes Wyttenbach, Appellant Pro Se
Michael R. Shaw, Attorney for Appellee
SENIOR JUDGE PAMELA T. GREENWOOD authored this
Memorandum Decision, in which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and
STEPHEN L. ROTH concurred.1
GREENWOOD, Senior Judge:
¶1 Respondent William Hayes Wyttenbach contests the district
court’s order denying his request to register a Texas judgment
under the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (the UCCJEA), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-13-101

Parrish v. Wyttenbach
2. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, a precursor to the
UCCJEA, had the following purposes:
to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict,
promote interstate cooperation, litigate custody
where the child and family have the closest
connections and where significant evidence
concerning the child is most readily available,
discourage continuing conflict over custody, deter
abductions and unilateral removals of children, avoid
relitigation of another state’s custody rulings, and
promote the exchange of information and mutual
assistance between different states.
In re D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118, 123 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
20130362-CA 2 2014 UT App 181
to -318 (LexisNexis 2012). We affirm the order of the district court2
and remand to the district court for the calculation of reasonable
attorney fees incurred on appeal.
¶2 This case originated in Texas when Petitioner Ranita Marie
Parrish sought dissolution of a common-law marriage to
Wyttenbach and adjudication of custody-related issues involving
their children. In April 2009, Wyttenbach filed an Application to
File Foreign Judgment in the Utah district court, seeking to register
a May 2008 Texas order regarding child custody issues. In July
2009, the Texas court that had issued the May 2008 order held a
hearing on the matter, which resulted in an August 2009 order that
found Wyttenbach in contempt and also altered the contact
Wyttenbach was allowed with the children. Then in September
2009, Wyttenbach filed an Addendum to Application to File
Foreign Judgment, requesting that Utah invoke jurisdiction under
the UCCJEA. However, Wyttenbach made no mention of the
August 2009 Texas order in this later filing.
¶3 The district court denied Wyttenbach’s request to register
the Texas judgment under the UCCJEA. The district court
primarily based its decision on the fact that Wyttenbach had not

Parrish v. Wyttenbach
20130362-CA 3 2014 UT App 181
made the necessary averments to register the judgment, but the
district court also determined that even had Wyttenbach made the
appropriate averments, it would have declined jurisdiction as an
inconvenient forum. The district court additionally awarded
Parrish her attorney fees and costs. Wyttenbach then timely
appealed to this court.
¶4 Wyttenbach’s principal argument is that the district court’s
decision was erroneous because it faulted him for doing what was
impossible to do, that is, disclose the August 2009 Texas order in
his April 2009 Application to File Foreign Judgment. However, he
misstates the reasoning of the district court. The district court
denied Wyttenbach’s request because he failed to file certain
averments that are required to register a foreign child custody
judgment under the UCCJEA. We review for correctness the
district court’s determination that Wyttenbach failed to comply
with the UCCJEA in his effort to register the Texas child custody
determination. See In re Adoption of Baby Girl, 2010 UT App 114, ¶ 5,
233 P.3d 517 (“‘We review a district court’s interpretation of a
statute for correctness.’” (quoting O’Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, ¶ 15,
217 P.3d 704)).
¶5 As a general matter, foreign judgments may be filed in Utah
under the provisions found in the Utah Foreign Judgment Act (the
UFJA), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-5-301 to -307 (LexisNexis 2012),
after which the foreign judgment shall be treated “as a judgment of
a district court of Utah,” id. § 78B-5-302(2). However, the UCCJEA
imposes additional requirements for registration of a foreign child
custody determination. In addition to a letter requesting
registration and information about both parents and any person
awarded custody, a party must also submit to the district court
“two copies, including one certified copy, of the determination
sought to be registered, and a statement under penalty of perjury
that to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person seeking

Parrish v. Wyttenbach
3. Thereafter, “the registering court shall . . . serve notice upon the
persons named . . . and provide them with an opportunity to
contest the registration.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-13-305(2)
(LexisNexis 2012).
4. Even had Wyttenbach properly registered one or more of the
Texas judgments under the UCCJEA, this alone would not divest
the Texas court of jurisdiction and give a Utah court jurisdiction to
modify the prior child custody determinations. See id. § 78B-13-
306(2) (“A court of this state shall recognize and enforce, but may
not modify except in accordance with Part 2, Jurisdiction, a
registered child custody determination of another state.”). Much
less would the registration of a simple civil judgment under the
UFJA divest the issuing foreign court of jurisdiction over the case
in which the judgment was issued. So, Wyttenbach’s initial attempt
to register the child custody order under the UFJA in April 2009
(continued...)
20130362-CA 4 2014 UT App 181
registration the order has not been modified.” Id. § 78B-13-
305(1)(b).3
¶6 Wyttenbach undeniably failed to include and could not have
truthfully included a statement that “to the best of [his] knowledge
and belief . . . the order has not been modified,” see id., with his
request to register the Texas child custody determination in Utah.
Wyttenbach’s first filing that requested registration pursuant to the
UCCJEA was his September 2009 Addendum to Application to File
Foreign Judgment. The required averment was not made in that
filing, and such an averment would have been untruthful with
respect to the May 2008 Texas order at that time. Wyttenbach’s
initial April 2009 Application to File Foreign Judgment did not
reference the UCCJEA and therefore was not, on its face, subject to
its requirements. Regardless of the filing considered and the status
of the Texas case at that time, the simple fact is that Wyttenbach at
no point made any averment of the sort required by the UCCJEA
for the registration of a foreign child custody determination. Thus,4

Parrish v. Wyttenbach
4. (...continued)
would not have prevented the Texas court from subsequently
entering the August 2009 order, contrary to Wyttenbach’s
pervasive underlying argument that the Texas court lost
jurisdiction after Wyttenbach’s April 2009 filing.
20130362-CA 5 2014 UT App 181
the district court correctly denied Wyttenbach’s request to register
the Texas order.
¶7 Wyttenbach also argues that his rights were violated
because the judge was biased and refused to recuse himself. The
claim of bias is vague and seems to be primarily based on the fact
that the judge and opposing counsel were at one time partners in
the same law firm. A mere prior association of this sort, without
more, does not establish bias. In re Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d 1152,
1155 (Utah 1997) (Zimmerman, C.J., sitting alone). Further, because
the judge Wyttenbach accuses of bias was not the judge who issued
the order before us on appeal, these claims are not properly before
us in any event.
¶8 Parrish requests an award of attorney fees incurred on
appeal. The district court granted Parrish an award of attorney fees
under provisions of the UCCJEA, see id. § 78B-13-312 (providing for
an award to the prevailing party of “necessary and reasonable
expenses”). We “interpret[] attorney fee statutes broadly so as to
award attorney fees on appeal where a statute initially authorizes
them. . . . [W]hen a party who received attorney fees below prevails
on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on
appeal.” Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore
award Parrish her reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal, and
we remand to the district court for a determination of the amount
of this award.

Parrish v. Wyttenbach
20130362-CA 6 2014 UT App 181
¶9 We affirm the order of the district court and remand to the
district court for a calculation of reasonable attorney fees incurred
on appeal.