State v. Landon

2014 UT App 91
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
S HANE WELLS LANDON,
Defendant and Appellant.
Memorandum Decision
No. 20130068-CA
Filed April 24, 2014
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable William W. Barrett
No. 111905872
Allyson Barker, Attorney for Appellant
Simarjit S. Gill and Colleen K. Witt, Attorneys
for Appellee
J UDGE G REGORY K. ORME authored this Memorandum Decision,
in which J UDGE JAMES Z. D AVIS and SENIOR JUDGE R USSELL W.
BENCH concurred.1
ORME, Judge:
¶1 	Defendant Shane Landon was convicted of obstruction of
justice, a class A misdemeanor, and driving on a suspended or
revoked license, a class C misdemeanor. He now appeals those
convictions, arguing that the trial court improperly admitted
evidence of other acts under rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of
1. The Honorable Russell W. Bench, Senior Judge, sat by special
assignment as authorized by law. See generally Utah Code Jud.
Admin. R. 11-201(6).

State v. Landon
20130068-CA 	2 	2014 UT App 91
Evidence. Because we conclude that Defendant has failed to
demonstrate prejudice, we affirm.
¶2 	Defendant was arrested for obstructing a U.S. Marshal’s
attempts to serve a warrant for the arrest of Defendant’s cousin. At
his trial, Defendant testified on his own behalf and claimed he did
not think the marshal with whom he spoke on the phone was a real
law enforcement officer. The marshal recounted that when he
spoke with Defendant on the phone, he referred to specific statutes
dealing with harboring a fugitive. This testimony, coupled with
evidence that the cousin’s mother was crying and emphatic that the
police and marshals were really at her house, was clearly calculated
to dispel Defendant’s claim that he assumed the phone call was a
ruse or a practical joke. In a further effort to refute Defendant’s
contention, the State attempted to elicit testimony from Defendant
regarding his general familiarity with arrest warrants and how
they are served. After several failed attempts by the State to induce
a meaningful response from Defendant, who was evasive and
vague in his answers, the trial court intervened and asked, “Have
you ever been arrested on a warrant?” Defendant responded, “Yes,
I have.” The trial court then prohibited the State from inquiring
further into the nature of Defendant’s warrant arrest or whether he
was actually convicted of any crime.2
¶3 	We “will not overturn a jury verdict for the admission
of improper 	evidence 	if 	the 	admission 	of 	the 	evidence 	did
not reasonably [a]ffect the likelihood of a different verdict.”
State v. S.H., 2002 UT 118, ¶ 26, 62 P.3d 444. See also State v. Cruz,
2005 UT 45, ¶ 16, 122 P.3d 543 (discussing the prejudice element of
the plain error doctrine, which requires a showing that “absent the
2. The court did allow the State to ask whether Defendant’s arrest
concerned a crime involving dishonesty. See Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(2)
(allowing impeachment of a witness by evidence of a criminal
conviction if the elements of the crime require proving “a dishonest
act or false statement”) (emphasis added). Defendant indicated that
it did not.

State v. Landon
20130068-CA 	3 	2014 UT App 91
error, 	there 	is 	a 	reasonable 	likelihood 	of 	a 	more 	favorable
outcome”); State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, ¶ 35, 20 P.3d 342 (stating
that a trial court’s error is only reversible if the error is harmful,
such that “there is a sufficiently high likelihood of a different
outcome”). “For an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a
different 	outcome 	must 	be 	sufficiently 	high 	to 	undermine
confidence in the verdict.” State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah
1987).
¶4 	Thus, even assuming that the trial court committed an
evidentiary 	error 	in 	admitting—indeed, 	in 	directly
eliciting—evidence of Defendant’s prior arrest pursuant to an
outstanding warrant, and even assuming that the error was
properly preserved for appeal or, if it was not, that the plain error
exception would otherwise apply, we conclude that Defendant has
failed to demonstrate prejudice. See Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a) (“Any
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded.”).
¶5 In an attempt to demonstrate prejudice, Defendant analogizes
to State v. Leber, 2010 UT App 387, 246 P.3d 163. In Leber, the
defendant was accused of felony child abuse based on an incident
involving his sixteen-year-old son. Id. ¶ 1. Because “the evidence
presented at trial was not clearly supportive of either” the son’s or
the defendant’s version of events, the case rested on a credibility
determination as to whose version of events was accurate. Id.
¶¶ 12, 18. The trial court then erroneously admitted evidence of
the defendant’s prior instance of child abuse against his son, a
prior assault 	charge 	against 	the 	defendant, 	and 	a 	domestic
violence incident involving the defendant and his son’s mother. Id.
¶¶ 4, 8. We held that the erroneous introduction of this evidence
created a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome, essentially
by tipping the credibility balance rather dramatically against the
defendant, thus undermining our confidence in the jury’s verdict.
Id. ¶ 18.
¶6 	Here, 	as 	in 	Leber, 	the 	case 	depended 	on 	a 	credibility
determination as to whose version of events was accurate,

State v. Landon
20130068-CA 	4 	2014 UT App 91
Defendant’s or the marshal’s. However, unlike Leber, there is
additional evidence in this case that supports the marshal’s version
of events. The testimony of Defendant’s aunt, as well as parts of
Defendant’s own testimony, corroborated the marshal’s testimony.
For example, Defendant’s aunt and the marshal both testified that
she became scared and upset while speaking with Defendant on the
phone and urged him to bring his cousin to the marshals. And the
marshal and Defendant testified similarly in many regards about
the content of their telephone conversations. For example, the
marshal testified that Defendant “definitely knew who I was,” and
Defendant 	conceded 	that 	there 	came 	a 	time 	during 	the
conversations when he “had an inclination it could be true.”
¶7 	Additionally, in Leber, the evidence of the defendant’s prior
acts of abuse and assault were very similar—indeed, virtually
identical—to the type of conduct alleged against the defendant in
that case. Conversely, in this case the introduction of evidence
concerning Defendant’s prior warrant arrest, without additional
information about the general character of the crime or the
existence of a conviction, presents significantly less risk of harm
than did the propensity evidence in Leber. Therefore, Defendant has
not met his burden of showing prejudice, i.e., of demonstrating a
sufficiently high likelihood of a different outcome. See State v.
Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, ¶ 35, 20 P.3d 342 (noting that the burden of
showing the harmfulness of an error rests on the complaining
party).
¶8 	Under the circumstances, the evidence presented at trial was
more than sufficient to convince a jury of Defendant’s guilt, even
absent 	the 	arguably 	improper 	evidence 	of 	his 	prior 	arrest.
Consequently, there is not a reasonable likelihood of a different
result absent that evidence, and our confidence in the jury’s verdict
is not undermined.
¶9 	Affirmed.