In re T.S.

2015 UT App 307
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH , IN THE INTEREST OF T.S.,
A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
T.S.,
Appellant,
v.
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee.
Opinion
No. 20140656-CA
Filed December 31, 2015
Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Christine S. Decker
No. 1086746
Monica Maio and Tasha M. Williams, Attorneys
for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and Jeanne B. Inouye, Attorneys
for Appellee
JUDGE M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN authored this Opinion, in
which JUDGES S TEPHEN L. R OTH and JOHN A. P EARCE concurred.1
CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:
¶1 	T.S. appeals from the juvenile court’s denial of his motion
to dismiss a delinquency petition filed against him for rape of a
child. 	He 	contends 	that 	strict-liability 	crimes 	cannot
1. Judge John A. Pearce participated in this case as a member of
the Utah Court of Appeals. He became a member of the Utah
Supreme Court on December 17, 2015, 	before this decision
issued.

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constitutionally be applied 	to individuals under the age of
eighteen because juveniles are too immature to have constructive
knowledge 	that 	their 	actions 	might 	be 	criminal. 	T.S. 	also
contends that application of the rape-of-a-child statute to the
facts of this case would produce an absurd result. See In re Z.C.,
2007 UT 54, 165 P.3d 1206. Because T.S. fails to demonstrate that
juveniles’ diminished capacity renders their adjudication under
a strict-liability statute unconstitutional, and because T.S. does
not 	challenge 	the 	juvenile 	court’s 	factual 	findings 	that
differentiate his case from In re Z.C., we affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 	T.S. and the State stipulated to the facts recounted in this
paragraph. T.S., aged fifteen, and A.R., aged twelve, attended the
same school. They began dating. Shortly thereafter, A.R. sent a
text message to T.S. telling him that she liked short shorts. T.S.
replied that he too liked short shorts and invited A.R. to his
house. She accepted his invitation and walked to T.S.’s home.
After she arrived, the two began kissing. A.R. told T.S. that she
had had sex before, and the two engaged in mutually welcome
sexual intercourse.
¶3 	We recite further facts as briefed by the parties. A.R. later
wrote about the encounter in her diary. A.R.’s father read her
diary and apparently reported the incident to the police. The
police interviewed A.R., who described T.S. as “sensitive in a
way that’s sweet” and stated that “we knew everything that was
going on.” The State filed a delinquency petition in juvenile
court against T.S. for rape of a child, a strict-liability offense
under Utah Code section 76-5-402.1 (the Statute). If committed
by an adult, rape of a child would be a first degree felony. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402.1(2) (LexisNexis 2012). As part of the
juvenile 	proceedings 	against 	T.S., 	A.R. 	and 	her 	mother
completed a victim impact statement; A.R.’s mother wrote that

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“[b]oth minors are equally accountable for their actions. Both
parties owe each other an apology[.]” After the petition was filed
against him, T.S. voluntarily enrolled in a sexual education class
that addressed healthy sexual boundaries.
¶4 	T.S. filed a motion to dismiss the delinquency petition on
the basis that, as applied to him, the strict-liability nature of the
Statute violated his due process right to fundamental fairness
and worked an absurd result. The juvenile court denied the
motion. T.S. then entered an admission to unlawful sexual
intercourse with a minor, conditioned on a reservation of his
right to appeal the juvenile court’s denial of his motion to
dismiss.2 After he entered the admission, T.S. was adjudicated as
delinquent and ordered to complete sixty hours of community
service with credit for the time he had spent in the sexual
education class.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶5 	T.S. 	contends 	that 	the 	Statute 	is 	unconstitutional 	as
applied to him because it violates the guarantee of fundamental
fairness 	under 	the 	due 	process 	clause 	of 	the 	Fourteenth
Amendment 	to 	the 	United 	States 	Constitution. 	“Whether 	a
statutory scheme conforms with state and federal constitutional
provisions is a question of law.” State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19,
¶ 66, 20 P.3d 342. Similarly, a court’s decision to grant or deny a
2. Juvenile delinquency proceedings are not criminal in nature.
See infra ¶ 8. The equivalent conditional-plea procedure in a
Utah criminal proceeding is referred to as a Sery plea and allows
a defendant, with the consent of the prosecution, to enter a
conditional guilty plea while reserving the right to appeal a
court’s decision on a motion. See, e.g., State v. Rivera, 943 P.2d
1344, 1344–45 (Utah 1997).

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motion to dismiss presents a question of law. West Valley City v.
Parkinson, 2014 UT App 140, ¶ 5, 329 P.3d 833. We review a
juvenile court’s resolution of a question of law for correctness.
See In re A.M., 2009 UT App 118, ¶ 6, 208 P.3d 1058.
¶6 	T.S. 	also 	contends 	that 	applying 	the 	Statute 	to 	him
produces an absurd result of the kind recognized by In re Z.C.,
2007 UT 54, 165 P.3d 1206. To the extent that this contention
challenges the juvenile court’s interpretation of statutes and case
law, we review that interpretation for correctness.3
3. The State asserts that T.S.’s arguments do not address the
bases of the juvenile court’s decision to deny his motion to
dismiss 	and 	should 	therefore 	be 	rejected. 	See, 	e.g., 	State 	v.
Wimberly, 2013 UT App 160, ¶ 17, 305 P.3d 1072. In his motion to
dismiss, T.S. argued that the Statute was unconstitutional as
applied to him because it did not take into consideration the
effects of ongoing adolescent brain development. He also argued
that the application of the Statute would produce an absurd
result. The juvenile court rejected these arguments based on its
understanding of the law. T.S.’s argument on appeal raises the
same 	claims. 	Where 	we 	are 	asked 	to 	review 	the 	court’s
resolution of those claims for correctness rather than for an
abuse 	of 	discretion, 	T.S. 	may 	properly 	rely 	on 	the 	same
arguments on appeal that he raised below so long as they
address his burden of demonstrating legal error in the court’s
decision. See id. But if T.S. challenged a factual finding of the
court, he would have to show that the finding was clearly
erroneous (ordinarily, by marshaling the evidence in support of
the 	finding 	and 	explaining 	why 	the 	evidence 	was 	legally
insufficient). See Reeve & Assocs., Inc. v. Tanner, 2015 UT App 166,
¶ 34, 355 P.3d 232. As a matter of logic, such a task will usually
involve addressing the basis for the court’s findings. Id.

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ANALYSIS
I. Due Process
¶7 	T.S. argues that applying the strict-liability rape-of-a-child
statute 	to 	him 	“violates 	his 	due 	process 	guarantee 	to
fundamental fairness because such application fails to take into
account 	the 	effects 	of 	his 	emerging 	adolescent 	brain
development on his ability to foresee and assume the risk of his
conduct; weigh the immediate benefit with the risk of harm;
resist peer pressure and control hormonal and other impulses;
self-regulate; 	and, 	perhaps 	most 	importantly, 	recognize 	the
behavior 	as 	criminally 	sanctionable.” 	More 	specifically, 	he
asserts that the application of the Statute “fails to allow for
individualized consideration and fails to account for age and
developmental limitations.”
¶8 	“[D]ue 	process 	takes 	on 	an 	altered 	form 	in 	juvenile
courts because of the rehabilitative focus of the juvenile court
system.” In re K.M., 2007 UT 93, ¶ 23, 173 P.3d 1279. Juvenile
courts are designed to rehabilitate a juvenile’s behavior “rather
than merely to accuse, convict and punish.” In re Lindh, 359 P.2d
1058, 1059 (Utah 1961). “[T]he proceedings of the juvenile court
do not fall, nor are they intended to come, within what is termed
criminal 	procedure, 	nor 	are 	the 	acts 	therein 	mentioned, 	as
applied to children, crimes.” Mill v. Brown, 88 P. 609, 613 (Utah
1907). Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court has stated
that the same due process guarantees afforded to adults in
criminal 	cases 	are 	not 	necessarily 	afforded 	to 	juveniles 	in
delinquency adjudications. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967).4
4. “It is claimed that juveniles obtain benefits from the special
procedures 	applicable 	to 	them 	which 	more 	than 	offset 	the
disadvantages of denial of the substance of normal due process.”
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21 (1967). These benefits include avoiding
(continued…)

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“[T]he 	applicable 	due 	process 	standard 	in 	juvenile
proceedings . . . is 	fundamental 	fairness.” 	McKeiver 	v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971) (plurality opinion).
¶9 	T.S.’s argument proceeds in three steps: (1) ongoing brain
development 	causes 	adolescents 	to 	evaluate 	situations 	and
consequences poorly; (2) as a result, the United States Supreme
Court 	has 	recognized 	that 	the 	United 	States 	Constitution
requires that juveniles not be treated as fully competent adults in
regards to the death penalty, life sentences without parole, or
understanding the waiver of their rights; and (3) applying a
strict-liability statute to a juvenile therefore runs afoul of the
Constitution because juveniles lack awareness that their actions
might be criminal.
¶10 	T.S. 	quotes 	several 	sources 	that 	address 	behavioral
changes 	during 	adolescence 	due 	to 	the 	process 	of 	brain
development. See generally Sara B. Johnson, Robert W. Blum, &
Jay N. Giedd, Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise and
Pitfalls of Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J.
Adolescent Health 3, 216–21, Sept. 2009, http://www.jahonline.
org/article/S1054-139X09002511/fulltext#sec3 (last visited Dec. 1,
2015); L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral
Manifestations, 24 Neuroscience & Behavioral Reviews 4, 417–63,
June 2000; American Bar Association Juvenile Justice Center,
Kids 	Are 	Different: 	How 	Knowledge 	of 	Adolescent 	Development
Theory Can Aid Decision-Making in Court 21–23 (Lourdes M.
Rosado ed., 2000); National Juvenile Defender Center, Toward
Developmentally Appropriate Practice: A Juvenile Court Training
Curriculum 6 (2009); Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg,
(…continued)
classification as criminals, avoiding civil disability penalties, and
avoiding 	public 	scrutiny 	through 	the 	use 	of 	confidential
proceedings. Id. at 23–24.

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Rethinking 	Juvenile 	Justice 	(2010); 	Brief 	for 	the 	American
Psychological Association, et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412,
08-7621), 	2009 	WL 	2236778. 	The 	changes 	identified 	by 	the
sources include increased thrill-seeking, increased risk-taking,
increased susceptibility to peer pressure, and ignoring future
consequences in favor of immediate gratification.
¶11 	T.S. explains that, in light of such research, the United
States 	Supreme 	Court 	“has 	repeatedly 	acknowledged 	that
juveniles are different in constitutionally significant ways.” He
points us to several cases: Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)
(holding that the imposition of the death penalty upon juvenile
offenders violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (holding that,
in non-homicide cases, juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced to
life in prison without the possibility of parole); Miller v. Alabama,
132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (holding that juvenile offenders cannot be
sentenced to life in prison without parole even in homicide
cases); and J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (holding
that 	the 	proper 	standard 	for 	evaluating 	Miranda 	claims 	in
juvenile 	cases 	is 	that 	of 	a 	reasonable 	child, 	not 	that 	of 	a
reasonable adult). T.S. explains that in each of these cases, the
ongoing 	development 	of 	adolescent 	brains 	was 	of 	central
importance to the Supreme Court’s analysis. T.S. also refers us to
two Utah cases that considered the impact of juvenile status: In
re K.M., 2007 UT 93, 173 P.3d 1279 (holding that, where a
juvenile court had failed to ensure that a juvenile understood the
nature and elements of the crime to which she was admitting,
the juvenile’s plea was not knowing and voluntary) and In re
D.V., 2011 UT App 241, 265 P.3d 803 (reversing a contempt
finding 	against 	a 	juvenile 	because 	the 	court 	order 	he 	was
accused of violating was, in light of his age, not sufficiently
specific to inform him of what he was required to do or what
consequences he faced for failing to obey).

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¶12 	T.S. 	continues 	by 	asserting 	that 	“application 	of 	[the
Statute] to an accused who is also a child violates the due
process 	guarantee 	of 	fundamental 	fairness 	because 	such
application fails to account for the limitations of adolescent brain
development.” Specifically, he attacks the strict-liability aspect of
the Statute, arguing that “[b]ecause strict liability crimes allow
for 	punishment 	without 	a 	finding 	of 	criminal 	intent, 	their
application must be carefully circumscribed.” According to T.S.,
strict-liability statutes criminalize “conduct that a reasonable
person should know is subject to stringent public regulation”
and while “adults are presumed to have the capacity to assume
those risks,” that presumption cannot be applied to adolescents.
He suggests, without citation to authority, that “[w]ithout this
underlying concept of notice, [strict-liability] statutes make little
sense.” Because juveniles’ brains are still developing (causing
them to take risks, ignore consequences, and fall under the
influence 	of 	peer pressure), 	he 	urges us to hold that 	it 	is
fundamentally unfair to conclude that a juvenile “could foresee
and appreciate the risk of his [or her] conduct.”
¶13 	The essence of T.S.’s argument is that the Statute is
unconstitutional, as applied to him, because a minor accused of
violating the Statute lacks notice, due to his immaturity, that
“mutually 	welcome, 	non-forcible 	sexual 	intercourse 	[is] 	a
criminal offense.” But T.S. does not cite any authority to the
effect that strict-liability statutes are unconstitutional when the
defendant would not have reasonably known that his or her
actions were prohibited. Indeed, proof of a culpable mental state
is not a due process requirement. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S.
514, 535 (1968) (noting that the United States Supreme Court
“has never articulated a general constitutional doctrine of mens
rea”).
¶14 	The authorities relied upon by T.S. did not hold that
adjudication of a juvenile as delinquent is unconstitutional when
the 	juvenile 	was 	unaware 	that 	his 	or 	her 	behavior 	was

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20140656-CA 	9 	2015 UT App 307
proscribed.5 Rather, these cases recognized the immaturity of
adolescent brains and held that, as a consequence, (1) juveniles
are less culpable than adults, (2) the most severe punishments
meted 	out 	to 	adults 	may 	amount 	to 	cruel 	and 	unusual
punishment if applied to juveniles, and (3) juveniles may require
greater 	procedural 	safeguards 	than 	adults. 	None 	of 	these
considerations circumscribe the legislature’s power to “declare
what constitutes an offense against society and to define the
elements that constitute such an offense.” See United States v.
Ransom, 942 F.2d 775, 776, 777 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting the “long
history 	of 	statutory 	rape 	as 	a 	recognized 	exception 	to 	the
requirement of criminal intent”). We conclude that T.S. has not
established that due process guarantees permit a juvenile to raise
ignorance of the law as a defense.
¶15 	T.S. also argues that “[s]trict liability statutes purposefully
allow for no individualized determinations or considerations
and it is precisely this lock-step application of [the Statute] that is
so directly at odds with [the Supreme Court’s] reasoning in
Graham and Roper.” T.S. urges that “[t]he ‘one size fits all’
application 	of 	[the 	Statute] 	to 	T.S. 	fails 	to 	allow 	for
individualized consideration and fails to account for age and
developmental limitations.” But the Supreme Court considered
and rejected harsh and inflexible sentencing of juvenile offenders
in those cases, not the application of strict-liability statutes to
juveniles. A post-adjudication sentencing6 is a fundamentally
different process than the culpability adjudication itself, and T.S.
5. We recognize that T.S. cited these cases primarily to establish
the 	proposition 	that 	courts 	have 	recognized 	constitutional
implications arising from the differences between adolescent and
adult brains.
6. We use the term “sentencing” here to include the juvenile
court’s order requiring T.S. to perform community service.

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20140656-CA 	10 	2015 UT App 307
does not explain how or why a sentencing proceeding conducted
in 	an 	unconstitutional 	manner 	can 	invalidate 	the 	statute
prohibiting specified actions in the first place. Nor does T.S.
explain how application of a strict-liability statute violates his
alleged right to individualized consideration in sentencing when
the juvenile court in fact considered the particular circumstances
of his case, including T.S.’s voluntary participation in sexual
education classes and A.R.’s victim impact statement, before
ordering him to perform community service.
¶16 	T.S. has not shown that juveniles are entitled to notice that
their 	actions 	are 	illegal 	before 	they 	may 	be 	adjudicated
delinquent. It follows that the Statute is not unconstitutional for
failing 	to 	require 	special 	notice 	to 	juveniles 	due 	to 	their
immaturity before those minors can be held responsible for
strict-liability crimes.
II. Absurd-Result Doctrine
¶17 	T.S. also contends that In re Z.C., 2007 UT 54, 165 P.3d
1206, “has application in determining whether [the Statute], as
applied to T.S., violates the fundamental fairness guarantee of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” There, a
thirteen-year-old girl and a twelve-year-old boy engaged in
mutually welcome sexual touching. In re Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶¶ 1,
17 & n.6. Delinquency petitions were filed against both children
for sexual abuse of a child. Id. ¶ 1. The Utah Supreme Court
vacated Z.C.’s adjudication, holding that the application of the
statute produced an “absurd result” that could not have been
intended by the legislature. Id. ¶ 25. The supreme court limited
its holding to “situations where no true victim or perpetrator can
be identified,” recognizing that “[e]ven among children under
the age of fourteen, there are unfortunately situations where an
older or more physically mature child abuses a younger or
smaller child.” Id. ¶ 24.

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20140656-CA 	11 	2015 UT App 307
¶18 	T.S. urges us to apply In re Z.C.’s holding to his case. But
the juvenile court’s factual findings distinguish his case from In
re Z.C. The court found that here, unlike in In re Z.C., “[t]here is
an 	identifiable 	distinction 	between 	the 	perpetrator 	and 	the
victim.” The court also noted that In re Z.C. concerned juveniles
who were of similar ages. In contrast, the court here “[did] not
find the fifteen year old [T.S.] and the twelve year old [A.R.] to
be of similar ages.” T.S. does not challenge these findings on
appeal,7 and we are therefore bound by them. Because the
juvenile court found that a distinct perpetrator and a distinct
victim existed in this case, In re Z.C. is not directly applicable.
¶19 	T.S. also asks us to expand In re Z.C.’s holding to include
his case, arguing that the “cultural and legal context within
which [In re Z.C.] was issued has changed significantly in the last
eight years, thereby justifying a more expansive application of
the reasoning underlying the decision to the facts of this case.”
¶20 	First, T.S. notes that “the United States Supreme Court
[has] 	issued 	several 	important 	decisions 	that 	changed 	the
contours of juvenile delinquency jurisprudence.” But, as we have
noted, those decisions concerned sentencing and procedural
7. T.S. does assert, “In this case, there is no clear victim and
perpetrator; 	rather, 	there 	are 	two 	‘culpable 	participants.’ . . .
They attend the same junior high school, and there is an age gap
of just two years and five months between them.” T.S. does not
frame 	this 	as 	a 	challenge 	to 	the 	juvenile 	court’s 	contrary
findings. Even if he had, this challenge fails to carry his burden
of persuasion. See Reeve & Assocs., Inc. v. Tanner, 2015 UT App
166, ¶ 34, 355 P.3d 232 (“Logically, to show that a factual finding
is against the clear weight of the evidence [and thus clearly
erroneous], 	an 	appellant 	must 	candidly 	recount 	all 	of 	the
evidence 	supporting 	the 	finding 	and 	explain 	why 	it 	is
outweighed by the competing evidence.”).

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20140656-CA 	12 	2015 UT App 307
safeguards 	rather 	than 	the 	distinction 	between 	victims 	and
perpetrators. 	See 	supra ¶¶ 11, 	15–16. 	They 	therefore 	do 	not
suggest expansion of the absurd-result doctrine applied by In re
Z.C.
¶21 	Second, T.S. points to the rising use of social media, the
prevalent 	sharing 	of 	sexually 	explicit 	“selfies,”8 	and 	the
increasing 	ease 	of 	“sexual 	exploration 	between 	adolescent
peers.” But none of these degrade the line between cases “where
no true victim or perpetrator can be identified” and cases, like
T.S.’s, where the juvenile court has found that such a distinction
exists. See In re Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 24.
¶22 	Third, T.S. contrasts In re Z.C.’s statement that sexual
abuse of a child “merits serious penalties because of the extreme
psychological harm that the perpetrator causes the victim” with
his assertion that, here, there was no clear victim or perpetrator.
See In re Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 18, 165 P.3d 1206. But, as we have
discussed, the juvenile court did find that there was a clear
victim and perpetrator in this case, and T.S. does not challenge
that finding on appeal. See supra ¶ 18. Moreover, we note that the
Utah Legislature has enacted a mechanism to temper those
penalties 	in 	certain 	cases.9 	See 	Utah 	Code 	Ann. § 77-2-9(2)
(LexisNexis 2012).
8. 	“The 	term 	‘selfie’ 	is 	the 	name 	given 	to 	a 	self-portrait
photograph, often snapped at odd angles with smartphones, and
typically made to post on a social networking website (or sent in
a text message).” United States v. Doe, Criminal No. 1:12-cr-00128-
MR-DLH, 2013 WL 4212400, at *8 n.6 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 14, 2013)
(citation, 	brackets, 	and 	additional 	internal 	quotation 	marks
omitted).
9. “When a person under the age of 16 is alleged to have
committed any violation [of the sexual offenses chapter] the
(continued…)

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20140656-CA 	13 	2015 UT App 307
¶23 	Fourth, T.S. expresses concern that, in thirty-eight states,
his adjudication might require him to register as a sex offender
“if he traveled to or lived” in them. One of these states is Texas,
where, according to the parties’ stipulation, T.S. intends to
continue his studies after graduating from high school. But T.S.
concedes that he would not be required to so register in Utah.
Because no state has yet required him to register as a sex
offender, this argument is not ripe. See Bodell Constr. Co. v.
Robbins, 2009 UT 52, ¶ 29, 215 P.3d 933 (explaining when an issue
is ripe for appeal). And even if his claim does eventually ripen,
the appropriate challenge should be to the particular statute
requiring T.S. to register in that other state rather than to the
validity of the Utah statute under which he was adjudicated.
¶24 	Fifth, T.S. asserts that despite the considerable latitude
enjoyed by juvenile courts, “no amount of judicial lenity can
ameliorate the effects of a law that is flawed to begin with.”
However, this circular assertion presupposes that the Statute is
flawed—the very thing T.S. is attempting to demonstrate and
which we have rejected.
(…continued)
court may enter a diversion in the matter if the court enters on
the record its findings that: (a) the person did not use coercion or
force; (b) there is no more than two years’ difference between the
ages of the participants; and (c) it would be in the best interest of
the 	person 	to 	grant 	diversion.” 	Utah 	Code 	Ann. § 77-2-9(2)
(LexisNexis 2012). T.S. is not eligible for diversion due to the two
year and five month age gap between himself and A.R. While
the changes in our society may have degraded the line between
juveniles who are more than two years apart, it is the province of
the 	Utah 	Legislature, 	and 	not 	appellate 	courts, 	to 	evaluate
whether the policy decision to set that line should be revisited.

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20140656-CA 	14 	2015 UT App 307
¶25 	T.S. has not convinced us that events since the issuance of
In re Z.C. require the expansion of that case’s holding to cases
where, as here, the juvenile court has determined that a distinct
perpetrator and a distinct victim exist.
CONCLUSION
¶26 	We cannot conclude that application of the Statute to T.S.
violated 	his 	constitutional 	rights 	by 	failing 	to 	require 	the
factfinder to consider T.S.’s immaturity before adjudicating him
delinquent. Nor has T.S. shown that the juvenile court ignored
the individual circumstances of his case. Because T.S. does not
challenge the factual findings differentiating his case from In re
Z.C., he cannot show that his adjudication constituted an absurd
result as described by that case. Additionally, T.S. has not
presented a compelling rationale for expanding the holding of In
re Z.C. to fact patterns such as that present in his case. We
therefore conclude that T.S. has not demonstrated error in the
juvenile court’s denial of his motion to dismiss.
¶27 	Affirmed.