Jones v. Workforce Services

2025 UT App 201
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
JEFFREY M. JONES ,
Petitioner,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE S ERVICES ,
Respondent.
Opinion
No. 20250100-CA
Filed December 26, 2025
Original Proceeding in this Court
Luisa Gough, Attorney for Petitioner
Robert Andreasen, Attorney for Respondent
JUDGE M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which J UDGES DAVID N. M ORTENSEN and A MY J. O LIVER
concurred.
CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:
¶1 	Jeffrey M. Jones seeks judicial review of a decision of the
Workforce 	Appeals 	Board 	(the 	Board) 	denying 	him
unemployment benefits after he voluntarily quit his job. He
challenges the Board’s determinations that he failed to show good
cause for quitting and that he failed to show that he was entitled
to benefits under the standard of equity and good conscience. We
are not persuaded by Jones’s arguments, and we therefore decline
to disturb the Board’s decision.
BACKGROUND
¶2 	Jones’s employment began in March 2021 when he was
hired by a company as a night auditor. In January 2024, one of
Jones’s coworkers took a medical leave of absence, and the

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employer offered Jones the extra work hours available due to that
absence. This allowed Jones “to work at least full-time” until the
coworker returned from medical leave in August 2024. After the
coworker returned, the employer began to schedule Jones for only
“20 to 24 hours per week.”
¶3 	In this same timeframe, a garnishment that Jones “had not
fully expected” commenced on his wages. Additionally, Jones
became unable to make the rental payments for a storage unit
containing some of his belongings, which resulted in him being
locked 	out 	of 	the 	storage 	unit 	and 	unable 	to 	access 	those
belongings. Under these circumstances, Jones “found it difficult
to get by financially without the extra hours he had been working
during the previous eight months.”
¶4 	Jones then approached his employer about working more
hours. Although the employer offered him some additional hours
working in a different capacity, those extra hours did not result in
sufficient wages and Jones “continued to find it hard to make ends
meet.”
¶5 	Jones quit his job toward the end of October 2024, believing
that by doing so his employer “would pay him a lump sum for
his accumulated paid time off (PTO).” However, after Jones
quit, he was informed by the employer’s human resources
department that the policy regarding the payment of unused PTO
had been changed in 2022 and, pursuant to the new policy, Jones
was not entitled to receive payment for his unused PTO upon
termination.
¶6 	Jones 	filed 	a 	claim 	for 	unemployment 	benefits. 	The
Department 	of 	Workforce 	Services 	denied 	Jones’s 	claim,
determining both that Jones had not shown “good cause” for
leaving his job and that benefits could not be allowed under the
alternative 	“equity 	and 	good 	conscience 	provision.” 	Jones
appealed the denial of benefits.

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¶7 	An administrative law judge (the ALJ) thereafter held a
hearing to address Jones’s appeal, at which Jones argued he had
good cause for leaving his job because he understood that he
would be paid for his PTO upon leaving the job and he saw that
as his only way to access those needed funds and “keep [his] stuff
[in the storage unit] from being taken.” When questioned as to
whether he had “confirm[ed] with [human resources] whether
[he] would be paid out the PTO,” Jones responded that there was
no human resources representative located in his local office and
that he had, instead, written to his supervisor for guidance on the
matter and his supervisor told him the PTO would be paid upon
leaving. Jones also argued that his part-time hours led to financial
difficulties and that staying at the job “would have led to more
hardship” for him in that regard.
¶8 	The 	ALJ 	affirmed 	the 	decision 	denying 	Jones
unemployment 	benefits. 	The 	ALJ 	stated 	that 	he 	“was 	not
persuaded [Jones] was somehow better off financially by quitting
his job and having no income rather than being able to work 20–
25 hours a week” and that Jones could have remained at his job
“until he secured other full-time work.” The ALJ also addressed
the equity and good conscience standard and determined that the
denial of benefits was not “unreasonably harsh or an afront to
fairness” because Jones “did not act reasonably by quitting his
job,” which “resulted in him having no income rather than having
some income at 20–25 hours per week.”
¶9 	Jones then appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Board. But
the Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision. The Board concluded that
good cause was not established because Jones “failed to produce
convincing evidence that remaining employed created a hardship
outside of his control.” After noting that neither the garnishment
nor the storage unit issues were “attributable to the [e]mployer,”
the Board explained why the reduction in available work hours
did not ultimately amount to good cause to quit: “[A] reasonable
person would not have quit a job offering 20 to 24 hours per week

Jones v. Workforce Services
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to guarantee they would receive zero hours of work. Rather, a
reasonable 	person 	would 	have 	retained 	their 	part-time
employment until they secured a job that offered more hours.” As
to the PTO issue, the Board determined that Jones “reasonably
could have confirmed the payout policy with human resources
before resigning his job.” Additionally, the Board noted that, after
he quit, Jones had been able to work out a payment plan with the
storage unit company, and the Board reasoned that Jones “could
have pursued this solution and retained his employment instead
of quitting his job.”
¶10 	Regarding the equity and good conscience standard, the
Board also agreed with the ALJ that the denial of benefits in this
case was “not an affront to fairness.” The Board determined that
Jones’s “decision to quit [his] part-time job because he had
financial issues was not logical, sensible, or practical,” and the
Board reasoned that “[a]t the very least, [Jones] could have kept
his employment and attempted to open an unemployment claim
based upon his reduction in hours.”
¶11 	Jones now seeks judicial review by this court of the Board’s
decision denying unemployment benefits.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶12 	Jones contests the Board’s determinations that he failed to
show (1) good cause for quitting his job and (2) that it would be
contrary 	to 	equity 	and 	good 	conscience 	to 	deny 	him
unemployment benefits. See generally Utah Admin. Code R994-
405-105 (“The claimant has the burden to establish that the
elements of good cause or of equity and good conscience have
been met.”). Each of these determinations is a fact-like mixed
question of law and fact, and we therefore apply a deferential
standard of review to the Board’s determinations. See Sawyer v.
Department of Workforce Services, 2015 UT 33, ¶ 25, 345 P.3d 1253

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(good cause); Neckel v. Department of Workforce Services, 2015 UT
App 292, ¶ 14, 364 P.3d 65 (equity and good conscience). “Thus,
we will uphold the Board’s decision so long as it is within the
realm 	of 	reasonableness 	and 	rationality.” 	EAGALA, 	Inc. 	v.
Department of Workforce Services, 2007 UT App 43, ¶ 9, 157 P.3d 334
(quotation simplified); accord Smith v. Board of Review of Indus.
Comm’n, 714 P.2d 1154, 1155 (Utah 1986). “However, we must be
vigilant in our review of mixed findings to ensure that they are
based on correct legal principles. We review the legal standard
applied to a particular mixed question for correctness.” Sawyer,
2015 UT 33, ¶ 25 (quotation simplified).
ANALYSIS
I. Good Cause
¶13 	Jones first argues that the Board erred in determining that
he failed to show good cause for quitting his job. See Utah Code
§ 35A-4-405(1)(a) 	(stating 	that 	claimants 	are 	not 	eligible 	for
unemployment benefits if they “left work voluntarily without
good cause”). “To establish good cause, a claimant must show
that continuing the employment would have caused an adverse
effect which the claimant could not control or prevent” and “that
an immediate severance of the employment relationship was
necessary.” Utah Admin. Code R994-405-102. Additionally, “[t]he
separation must have been motivated by circumstances that made
the continuance of the employment a hardship or matter of
concern, sufficiently adverse to a reasonable person so as to
outweigh the benefits of remaining employed.” Id. R994-405-
102(1)(a). Good cause to quit is evaluated by “the objective
standard of whether a reasonably prudent person would be
justified in quitting under similar circumstances.” Sawyer v.
Department of Workforce Services, 2015 UT 33, ¶ 30, 345 P.3d 1253
(quotation simplified). And good cause is not established if the
claimant 	“reasonably 	could 	have 	continued 	working 	while

Jones v. Workforce Services
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looking for other employment.” Utah Admin. Code R994-405-
102(1)(b)(i).
¶14 	Jones 	asserts 	that 	the 	Board 	applied 	an 	“incorrect
standard” in making its good cause determination when it
reasoned that the garnishment of wages and the issues with the
storage unit were not “attributable to the [e]mployer” and when
it considered that Jones had later been successful in working out
a payment plan with the storage unit company. Jones argues that
the “adverse effect[]” caused by his continued employment was
his “insufficient income due to reduced hours” and that his efforts
to mitigate the damage caused by the adverse effect (either before
or after he quit) do not indicate that he had the ability to “control
or prevent” the adverse effect itself. See id. R944-405-102.
¶15 	But even so, the relevant standard also states that “good
cause 	will 	not 	be 	found” 	in 	situations 	where 	the 	claimant
“reasonably could have continued working while looking for
other employment,” id. R944-405-102(1)(b), and the Board found
that this was the case here. Specifically, the Board determined that
when faced with insufficient hours and income, “a reasonable
person would not have quit a job offering 20 to 24 hours per week
to guarantee they would receive zero hours of work” but, instead,
“would have retained their part-time employment until they
secured a job that offered more hours.” Further, a showing of
good 	cause 	requires 	that 	“an 	immediate 	severance 	of 	the
employment relationship was necessary,” id. R994-405-102, and
that 	the 	hardship 	created 	by 	continued 	employment
“outweigh[ed] the benefits of remaining employed,” id. R994-405-
102(1)(a). But here, as the Board articulated, the financial hardship
Jones 	was 	experiencing 	would 	not 	have 	been 	avoided 	or
ameliorated by quitting his job and forgoing the benefits of having
at least part-time employment; instead, such hardship would be
exacerbated. Thus, Jones did not show that quitting his job was
necessary or that the benefits of quitting would outweigh the
benefits of part-time employment.

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¶16 	Jones pushes back, relying on what he understood to be the
company’s unused PTO policy and arguing that at the time of his
departure from the company, he reasonably understood that he
would receive a lump-sum payout if he quit and that this would
have helped to alleviate his financial strain. But the Board was not
convinced that quitting without further verification of a PTO
payout was reasonable: “[Jones] reasonably could have confirmed
the payout policy with human resources before resigning his job.”
Thus, where the Board essentially found that it was unreasonable
for Jones to give up consistent part-time employment without first
verifying that quitting would result in a lump-sum payment for
his unused PTO, the Board appropriately did not credit Jones’s
unreasonable misunderstanding in its assessment of whether
Jones reasonably could have continued working while looking for
other employment.1
¶17 	Finally, Jones argues that “the Board’s good cause analysis
was infirm because it failed to consider all the financial hardship
evidence when reviewing the effects [he] was suffering from his
employment.” Specifically, Jones points to his assertions that he
1. Regarding the Board’s apparent determination that Jones’s
reliance on a PTO payout was unreasonable, we note that there is
substantial evidence in the record supporting such a finding,
including information from a human resources representative
that the updated PTO policy was found in the most recent
employee 	handbook 	(issued 	in 	2022) 	and 	that 	“[t]his 	was
acknowledged electronically by all [employees] in 2022.” See
generally Utah Code § 63G-4-403(5)(g) (providing for relief where
“the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the
court”); Drake v. Industrial Comm’n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997)
(“When reviewing the factual findings made by an administrative
agency, an appellate court will generally reverse only if the
findings are not supported by substantial evidence.”).

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was unhoused, that he was facing the possibility of losing all his
belongings in storage, and that his income “was reduced by over
50%.”2 Yet Jones fails to explain how the severity of his condition
would make it less reasonable for him to continue working while
he sought full-time employment. Thus, we do not see that any
failure of the Board to specifically articulate these facts indicates
an infirmity in its good cause analysis.
¶18 	Thus, while we are sympathetic to Jones’s situation, we are
not persuaded that the Board applied an incorrect standard in
assessing whether Jones had established the elements of good
cause. We therefore decline to disturb the Board’s determination
on this point.
II. Equity and Good Conscience
¶19 	Jones next challenges the Board’s determination that he did
not satisfy the equity and good conscience standard, which
provides that “[a] claimant may not be denied eligibility for
benefits if the claimant leaves work under circumstances where it
would be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a
disqualification.” Utah Code § 35A-4-405(1)(b).
¶20 	To 	establish 	that 	denial 	of 	unemployment 	insurance
benefits would be against equity and good conscience, claimants
must 	demonstrate, 	among 	other 	things, 	that 	they 	acted
reasonably in deciding to quit. See Utah Admin. Code R994-405-
103(1)(a). “[A] claimant acted reasonably if the decision to quit
was logical, sensible, or practical. There must be evidence of
2. The Board’s findings indicate that Jones was able to work “at
least full-time” while his coworker was on medical leave and
that his hours were reduced to “20 to 24 hour per week” upon
the 	coworker’s 	return. 	Thus, 	the 	Board 	was 	cognizant 	of
the 	significant 	reduction 	in 	hours 	and 	income 	that 	Jones
experienced.

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circumstances which, although not sufficiently compelling to
establish good cause, would have motivated a reasonable person
to take similar action . . . .” Id.; accord Neckel v. Department of
Workforce Services, 2015 UT App 292, ¶ 15, 364 P.3d 65. On judicial
review, however, this court “will not engage in a free-wheeling
judicial foray into the record to impose a decision based on our
collective sense of equity and fairness.” Neckel, 2015 UT App 292,
¶ 15 (quotation simplified). Rather, our analysis of the fact-like
issue before us “must reflect the broad discretion conferred by the
legislature upon the [Board].” Adams v. Board of Review of Indus.
Comm’n, 776 P.2d 639, 642 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
¶21 	Jones argues that the Board again applied the wrong legal
standard—this 	time 	by 	assessing 	the 	reasonableness 	of 	his
decision to quit with the benefit of hindsight instead of as of the
time the decision was made. But, again, we do not agree. The
Board did not base its decision on whether Jones was ultimately
successful in obtaining a PTO payout but, rather, whether it was
reasonable for Jones to quit without first verifying with human
resources that he would receive such a payment. And after having
previously 	determined 	that 	such 	action 	by 	Jones 	was 	not
reasonable, the Board concluded that Jones’s “decision to quit
[his] part-time job because he had financial issues was not logical,
sensible, or practical.”
¶22 	Jones additionally argues that the Board “failed to even
engage 	with 	the 	facts,” 	specifically 	the 	facts 	that 	he 	“was
unhoused and facing the loss of his property” and that he made a
“reasonable assumption” that he would receive the PTO payout.
But the Board discussed the fact that Jones was “facing financial
issues,” and it had earlier recognized that he “had trouble paying
for his storage unit.” And the Board had also already considered
the PTO issue. Thus, we are not convinced that the Board ignored
or failed to engage with those facts in arriving at its determination
that, under these circumstances, Jones “did not act reasonably by
quitting his job” and stating that “[a]t the very least, he could have

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kept his employment and attempted to open an unemployment
claim based upon his reduction in hours.”
¶23 	Thus, we do not agree that the Board applied the wrong
legal standard or failed to engage with the facts in making its
determination that Jones had not shown that he qualified for
benefits under the equity and good conscience standard.3
CONCLUSION
¶24 	Jones’s various claims of legal error fail, and we therefore
decline to disturb the Board’s decision denying unemployment
benefits.
3. Jones primarily argues that the Board applied certain incorrect
legal standards. And to the extent that any portions of his
arguments were also intended to challenge the Board’s ultimate
determinations as to good cause 	and 	the 	equity 	and 	good
conscience standard, they are also unavailing. As stated above, we
are required to defer to the Board’s determinations regarding both
good cause and the equity and good conscience standard, and
under this deferential standard of review, we do not substitute
our judgment for that of the Board. See supra ¶ 12. Accordingly,
based on the record in this case, the Board did not exceed its
discretion in its conclusion on either issue; that is, the Board’s
conclusions 	were 	“within 	the 	realm 	of 	reasonableness 	and
rationality.” EAGALA, Inc. v. Department of Workforce Services, 2007
UT App 43, ¶ 9, 157 P.3d 334 (quotation simplified).