State v. Keith

2026 UT App 51
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee,
v.
S HAWNA JO K EITH ,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20241179-CA
Filed April 2, 2026
Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Robert A. Lund
No. 231403697
Stephen Florence, Dallas B. Young, and
Jennifer Foresta, Attorneys for Appellant
Jeffrey S. Gray and Christopher D. Ballard,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which J UDGES R YAN M. HARRIS and A MY J. O LIVER concurred.
CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:
¶1 	Shawna Jo Keith appeals from the district court’s award of
restitution after she was convicted of making a false credit report
in connection with the purchase of a car. She asserts that it was
legal error for the court to order restitution based on the contract
purchase price of the car and not on the wholesale value of the car
that the car dealership had paid. We disagree and affirm the
restitution order.

State v. Keith
20241179-CA 	2 	2026 UT App 51
BACKGROUND
¶2 	On March 29, 2023, Keith entered into a contract of sale
with a Toyota dealership (the dealership) to purchase a 2016
Toyota Corolla for an out-the-door price of $19,063. In conjunction
with the sale, Keith applied for financing through the dealership.
Based on these documents, the dealership let Keith leave with the
car.
¶3 	However, the dealership later discovered that Keith had
“lied 	about 	her 	employment 	and 	income” 	in 	her 	credit
application. Employees of the dealership reached out to Keith to
request that she return the car, and although Keith texted that she
would do so, she never did. Thereafter, the dealership discovered
that in August 2023, Keith was involved in an accident wherein
the car was totaled. The dealership never received any payment
for the car.
¶4 	Keith was charged with one count of making a false credit
report. 	She 	ultimately 	pleaded 	guilty 	to 	the 	charge,
acknowledging that she “knowingly ma[de] a materially false or
misleading written statement to obtain property or credit.” The
district court accepted Keith’s plea, placed her on probation, and
scheduled a restitution hearing.
¶5 	At the hearing, the State asserted that the appropriate
measure of restitution was the $19,063 Keith had agreed to pay as
“the fair market value of the vehicle” and that the loss suffered by
the dealership “would clearly be . . . the contract amount.” Keith,
on the other hand, argued that the appropriate measure of
restitution in this case was the “actual proven damage” to the
dealership of the wholesale amount paid to acquire the car, which
was $6,500.
¶6 	After considering subsequent briefing by the parties, the
district court agreed with the State and ordered restitution in the
amount of $19,063. Keith now appeals this restitution order.

State v. Keith
20241179-CA 	3 	2026 UT App 51
ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶7 	Keith argues that the district court used an incorrect
measure of pecuniary damages and, in so doing, abused its
discretion in setting the restitution amount. Generally, “we will
not disturb a [district] court’s restitution order unless it exceeds
that prescribed by law or the [district] court otherwise abused its
discretion.” State v. Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, ¶ 5, 353 P.3d 179
(quotation 	simplified). 	However, 	“we 	review 	legal
determinations 	associated 	with 	a 	restitution 	analysis 	for
correctness.” State v. Blake, 2025 UT 21, ¶ 13, 582 P.3d 705.
ANALYSIS
¶8 	When a defendant’s criminal conduct results in pecuniary
damages, a sentencing court must order restitution to all victims
as part of the defendant’s sentence. See Utah Code § 77-38b-
205(1)(a). 	Unless 	otherwise 	provided 	by 	plea 	agreement,
restitution must be ordered “for the entire amount of pecuniary
damages that are proximately caused to each victim by the
criminal conduct of the defendant.” Id. In determining that
amount, the court must “consider all relevant facts to establish an
amount that fully compensates a victim for all pecuniary damages
proximately caused 	by the criminal 	conduct.” Id. 	§ 77-38b-
205(2)(a). Appellate decisions on restitution have emphasized that
restitution is intended to compensate victims for their actual
economic losses. See State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ¶ 9, 82 P.3d
211; see also Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 2004 UT 59, ¶ 26, 96
P.3d 893 (“To the extent possible, the fundamental purpose of
compensatory damages is to place the plaintiff in the same
position 	[it] 	would 	have 	occupied 	had 	the 	tort 	not 	been
committed.”).1 And while restitution may include compensation
1. “Cases addressing damages in the context of civil . . . actions are
relevant to our analysis because pecuniary damages in the
(continued…)

State v. Keith
20241179-CA 	4 	2026 UT App 51
for economic injury that has not yet “been incurred,” such injury
must still be “demonstrable.” Utah Code § 77-38b-102(19)(a).
¶9 	In applying these principles, courts must determine how
best to measure a victim’s actual economic loss. Although fair
market value is often used as a proxy for that loss, the appropriate
measure is not rigid and depends on the circumstances of the case.
See State v. Irwin, 2016 UT App 144, ¶¶ 6–7, 379 P.3d 68. In some
cases, particularly those involving the theft of retail inventory,
replacement or acquisition cost will provide the most accurate
measure because retail value may include anticipated profits that
are uncertain or unrealized. See id. ¶¶ 7–8. Nonetheless, Utah
precedent has not adopted a categorical rule requiring the use of
replacement cost in every case involving a retail seller; rather, it
has recognized that the proper measure of restitution must be
tailored to the nature of the loss actually sustained. See id. ¶ 6; see
also Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ¶ 15 (“The appropriate measure of
the loss or damage to a victim is fact-sensitive and will vary based
on the facts of a particular case. . . . We think it unwise to adopt a
black-letter rule that either always requires or never permits the
use of purchase price or insurance settlement amount as valuation
methods under the restitution statute.”).
¶10 	The question here is how to characterize the dealership’s
loss. Keith argues that the dealership lost only a vehicle from its
inventory and that restitution should therefore be limited to the
restitution context are those damages which a person could
recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events
constituting the defendant’s criminal activities.” State v. Irwin,
2016 UT App 144, ¶ 6 n.3, 379 P.3d 68 (quotation simplified). But
see State v. Debrok, 2025 UT 40, ¶ 20, 579 P.3d 296 (acknowledging
legislative changes to the Crime Victims Restitution Act over the
past several years “that appear to have disconnected criminal
restitution, at least to some degree, from the civil damages
framework”).

State v. Keith
20241179-CA 	5 	2026 UT App 51
amount the dealership paid to acquire that vehicle. The State, by
contrast, 	contends 	that 	the 	dealership’s 	loss 	arose 	from 	a
completed sales transaction induced by Keith’s fraudulent credit
application and that the proper measure of restitution is the
contract price Keith agreed to pay. We agree with the State.
¶11 	This case does not involve the theft of unsold inventory.
Instead, the evidence showed that the dealership entered into a
retail sales contract with Keith, transferred possession of the
vehicle to her, and did so in reliance on the information she
provided in her credit application. That contract established a
definite 	payment 	obligation 	in 	the 	amount 	of 	$19,063.
Accordingly, the dealership’s loss was not merely the loss of a
vehicle it could replace in its inventory; it was the loss of a
completed transaction that, absent Keith’s fraud, would have
resulted in payment of a sum certain.
¶12 	That distinction matters. In State v. Irwin, 2016 UT App 144,
379 P.3d 68, the defendant stole a number of watches that had
been part of the victim retailer’s inventory and could be replaced
at wholesale cost. See id. ¶ 3. There was no evidence that the
retailer had lost any specific sales, and the retailer “had the ability
to replace the stolen items for much less than their retail value.”
Id. ¶¶ 7–8. Under those circumstances, awarding restitution based
on retail value would have compensated the retailer for profits it
might or might not have realized and risked granting a windfall.
See id. ¶¶ 7–9. Accordingly, this court held that replacement cost
was the more accurate measure of the retailer’s actual loss. See id.
¶ 9.
¶13 	Here, by contrast, the dealership’s loss was established by
a signed contract reflecting a specific and enforceable payment
obligation. This is not a case in which the victim seeks recovery
for speculative or hypothetical profits. The dealership presented
evidence of a completed transaction and a definite price it was
entitled to receive. As Irwin itself recognizes, anticipated profits

State v. Keith
20241179-CA 	6 	2026 UT App 51
may be included in a restitution award where they are established
with sufficient certainty. See id. ¶ 8. That requirement is satisfied
here.
¶14 	And our decision in State v. Sabbagh, 2019 UT App 179, 454
P.3d 70, does not compel a different result. In Sabbagh, the State
argued that the victim retailer’s loss should include the value of a
“loss leader” pricing strategy, an argument that depended on
uncertain and unquantifiable assumptions about future customer
behavior. See id. ¶¶ 8–9. We rejected that approach because it
sought 	to 	include 	speculative 	components 	of 	damage 	not
supported by the record. See id.
¶15 	Here, by contrast, the dealership’s claimed loss does not
depend on speculation about future sales or customer conduct. It
rests on a contract that fixed the amount the dealership was to
receive in exchange for the vehicle. The loss is concrete, not
conjectural.2
¶16 	Keith 	argues 	that 	awarding 	restitution 	based 	on 	the
contract price results in a windfall because it allows the dealership
to recover more than its acquisition cost for the vehicle. But that
argument rests on the premise that the dealership’s loss should be
viewed solely as the loss of inventory. As explained above, the
2. We also note that the dealership could have presumably
pursued civil litigation against Keith under the sales contract for
the full purchase price that she had agreed to pay. And “the well-
settled 	remedial 	purpose 	of 	our 	restitution 	statute 	is 	to
compensate victims for the harm caused by a defendant and to
spare victims the time, expense, and emotional difficulties of
separate 	civil 	litigation 	to 	recover 	their 	damages 	from 	the
defendant.” State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, ¶ 14, 82 P.3d 211
(quotation simplified). Considering this purpose, it seems logical
that the restitution amount would include the amount that the
victim could pursue civilly—the contract amount.

State v. Keith
20241179-CA 	7 	2026 UT App 51
district court was not required to adopt that characterization. The
evidence supported the conclusion that the dealership’s loss was
the loss of a completed, fraud-induced sale. Measuring restitution
by the contract price places the dealership in the position it would
have 	occupied 	had 	the 	fraud 	not 	occurred—precisely 	what
restitution is designed to do. See Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp.,
2004 UT 59, ¶ 26, 96 P.3d 893.
¶17 	In 	sum, 	because 	the 	dealership’s 	loss 	arose 	from 	a
completed transaction supported by a contract establishing a
definite payment amount, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in measuring restitution by the contract price. See
generally State v. Ludlow, 2015 UT App 146, ¶ 5, 353 P.3d 179 (“A
[district] court will be deemed to have abused its discretion only
if no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the
[district] court.” (quotation simplified)). Unlike cases involving
speculative lost profits or readily replaceable inventory, the loss
here was certain and directly attributable to Keith’s conduct. The
restitution 	award 	therefore 	reflects 	the 	dealership’s 	actual
pecuniary damages and does not constitute a windfall.
CONCLUSION
¶18 	The district court did not err in applying the restitution
statute or prior legal precedent in determining that the retail
amount can be an acceptable measurement of restitution. Nor did
the court abuse its discretion in determining that the contract
amount 	was 	an 	appropriate 	measure 	of 	restitution 	on 	the
particular facts of this case. We therefore affirm the court’s
restitution order.