In re C.J. (S.H. v. State)

2013 UT App 284
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF C.J., A PERSON UNDER
EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
____________
S.H.
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee.
Per Curiam Decision
No. 20130885-CA
Filed November 29, 2013
Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Andrew A. Valdez
No. 1081667
Sophia Moore, Attorney for Appellant
John E. Swallow and Carol L.C. Verdoia, Attorneys
for Appellee
Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem
Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME, CAROLYN B. MCHUGH, and
STEPHEN L. ROTH.
PER CURIAM:
¶1 S.H. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights.
Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
juvenile court’s decision on the grounds for termination and the
best interests of the child. We affirm.
¶2 “[I]n order to overturn the juvenile court’s decision [to
terminate parental rights], the result must be against the clear

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20130885-CA 2 2013 UT App 284
weight of the evidence or leave the appellate court with a firm and
definite conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re B.R., 2007
UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). We “review the juvenile court’s factual findings based
upon the clearly erroneous standard.” In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66,
¶ 11, 21 P.3d 680. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, in
light of the evidence supporting the finding, it is against the clear
weight of the evidence. See id. Therefore, “[w]hen a foundation for
the court’s decision exists in the evidence, an appellate court may
not engage in a reweighing of the evidence.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82,
¶ 12.
¶3 After an April 2013 adjudication hearing, the juvenile court
found that C.J. was neglected by Mother based upon Mother’s
admission to the allegations of the State’s petition. The juvenile
court then ordered the Division of Child and Family Services
(DCFS) to provide reunification services, contingent upon Mother’s
entry into residential drug treatment. The family and child plan
required Mother to complete a substance abuse evaluation, a
domestic violence assessment, random drug screens, a
psychological evaluation, drug court screening, and residential
drug treatment. At the June 2013 permanency hearing, the juvenile
court found that Mother had not cooperated with random drug
testing, had not entered residential drug treatment or attended
drug court, and had visited C.J. only once. The court found that
Mother had not substantially complied with the family and child
plan or court orders and that C.J. could not be safely returned to
Mother’s custody. The court further found that the services offered
to Mother by DCFS constituted reasonable efforts to reunify
Mother with C.J. and that the requirements of the plan were clearly
communicated to her. Based upon Mother’s lack of any effort to
comply, the juvenile court terminated reunification services and
changed the permanency goal to adoption in July 2013. At the
termination trial in September 2013, Mother requested more time
to remedy the circumstances that caused C.J. to come into custody.
She provided evidence of a drug and alcohol evaluation obtained
the morning of the termination trial and testified that, despite her
previous lack of cooperation, she was now willing to begin drug

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20130885-CA 3 2013 UT App 284
treatment and comply with random drug testing and other court
orders.
¶4 In order to find grounds for termination of parental rights,
a juvenile court must conclude that any one of the grounds
enumerated in Utah Code section 78A-6-507 exists. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-6-507 (LexisNexis 2012). The evidence amply supports
the juvenile court’s determination under section 78A-6-507(1)(d)
that the child had been cared for in an out-of-home placement and
that DCFS made diligent efforts to provide appropriate services to
Mother “who substantially neglected, willfully refused, or has been
unable or unwilling to remedy the circumstances that caused [her]
child to be in an out-of-home placement and there is a substantial
likelihood that [Mother] will not be capable of exercising proper
and effective parental care in the near future.” See id. § 78A-6-
507(1)(d). Similarly, the evidence amply supports the juvenile
court’s conclusion that Mother had demonstrated a failure of
parental adjustment in that she had been unable or unwilling
within a reasonable time to substantially correct the conduct or
conditions that led to the placement outside the home
notwithstanding the reasonable efforts of DCFS. See id. § 78A-6-
507(1)(e); see also id. § 78A-6-502(2) (defining “failure of parental
adjustment”).
¶5 Although Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
to support each ground for termination of her parental rights, her
central assertion is that she has fully addressed the circumstances
that caused her child to be in an out-of-home placement and has
the present ability to parent C.J. Mother claims that she is drug free
and has stable and appropriate housing and the ability to provide
for her child financially. However, her assertions are based almost
completely upon her own testimony and fail to account for the
totality of the evidence before the juvenile court. It is a significant
overstatement for Mother to assert that she has fully addressed the
circumstances that caused C.J. to come into State custody.
¶6 A juvenile court is required to weigh evidence of present
parenting ability against a parent’s past behavior. However,

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20130885-CA 4 2013 UT App 284
if a parent has demonstrated some improvement in
parenting ability but not a strong likelihood that the
parent can provide a proper home for the child in the
very near future, after a long period of separation, a
history of problems and failure to remedy, and
deterioration of the relationship between the child
and parent, this court should not overturn a court’s
order terminating parental rights.
In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 13. Here, the evidence of Mother’s present
parenting ability was so insubstantial and speculative that the
juvenile court did not err in its weighing of present parenting
ability against past behavior. The juvenile court found that Mother
”displayed a conscious disregard for the parent child relationship
which led to the destruction of [the] parent child bond.” Although
Mother claimed to have stable housing and income, her testimony
demonstrated that she still was unemployed and had difficulty
supporting herself, and that her housing with a relative continued
throughout the case. She had not completed any drug treatment
that she had attempted, and she had obtained a new drug and
alcohol evaluation only on the morning of the trial. Mother had
demonstrated no significant change in her circumstances and
provided no credible evidence that she had the present ability to
parent C.J. or that she had remedied the circumstances that caused
C.J. to come into custody.
¶7 Mother also contends that she was unable to complete the
required residential drug treatment only because the court
terminated her reunification services and that if she had been given
more time, she would be able to show substantial compliance. The
juvenile court terminated reunification services at the permanency
hearing held two months after the adjudication because Mother
had taken no steps whatsoever to participate in services. At the
permanency hearing, Mother did not dispute the DCFS report on
her lack of progress and did not request an extension of services.
Mother was not entitled to any particular period of services, and
services can be terminated by the court at any time. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-6-312(14)(a) (Supp. 2013) (“If reunification services are

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20130885-CA 5 2013 UT App 284
ordered, the court may terminate those services at any time.”).
Furthermore, “if a minor is not returned to the minor’s parent or
guardian at the permanency hearing,” the court shall order the
termination of reunification services and make a final
determination regarding an alternate permanency plan. See id.
§ 78A-6-314(4) (2012). The juvenile court found that Mother used
her anger at C.J.’s removal as an excuse to continue to use drugs
after C.J. was taken into custody. Mother refused to cooperate by
completing the required drug treatment, and she refused to submit
to random drug testing. The juvenile court did not err in
terminating reunification services based upon Mother’s lack of
effort to comply.
¶8 Mother’s challenge to the best interests determination is
that, contrary to the juvenile court’s finding, it was not “strictly
necessary” to terminate her parental rights because she presented
evidence that she planned to engage in treatment in the future and
needed more time to remedy the circumstances that caused C.J. to
come into State custody. This argument does not address the
juvenile court’s findings on best interests, including that the foster
family had integrated C.J. into their family; had provided a safe,
stable, caring, and nurturing environment; had provided necessary
medical care to address C.J.’s flat head and physical therapy for his
motor skills deficits; and has the desire to adopt him if the parental
rights of the parents are terminated. Because Mother has not
challenged the findings except to argue that she should have been
granted more time to begin treatment and regain custody, we
conclude that the challenge to the best interests determination is
without merit.
¶9 Because “a foundation for the court’s decision exists in the
evidence,” we affirm the juvenile court’s decision terminating
parental rights. See In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435.