Eandre Juwon Mott v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

________________
NO. 09-23-00117-CR
NO. 09-23-00118-CR
________________

EANDRE JUWON MOTT, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 252nd District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause Nos. F21-38241 and F21-38242
________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Eandre Juwon Mott 1 was indicted for sexual assault of a child,

“McKensie,” and continuous sexual abuse of a young child, “Debbie.”2 Tex. Penal

1
The record reflects that Eandre Juwon Mott is also known as Eandre Juwon
Mott Sr.
2
We refer to the victims, their relatives, and the civilian witnesses by
pseudonyms to conceal their identities. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 30 (granting crime
victims “the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity
and privacy throughout the criminal justice process[.]”). See Smith v. State, No. 09-
1
Code Ann. §§ 22.011, 21.02. He was convicted of both offenses, and sentenced to

20 years and life, respectively, in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department

of Criminal Justice.

On appeal, Mott contends that his conviction in Trial Court Cause Number

21-38242 should be reversed because he was denied his constitutional right to

confront his accuser due to the State’s failure to produce Debbie to testify at trial.

He doesn’t assign any error to the trial court’s rulings in Trial Court Cause Number

F21-38241. We find no error in the trial court’s rulings, and consequently affirm its

judgments.

I. Background

The Beaumont Police Department received an anonymous report that an adult

man, Mott, was living with one or more underage girls. Upon investigating this

report, the police discovered that Mott had been engaged in sexual relationships with

Debbie and McKensie; Debbie was under 14 years old, and McKensie was 16 at the

time she became pregnant with Mott’s baby. Mott was in his twenties.

Mott represented himself at trial. Mott never denied having had sexual

relationships with Debbie and McKensie. Instead, his position at trial was that he

17-00081-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1874, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar.
14, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
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was not guilty of the offenses charged because both girls had lied about their ages.3

He does not argue this point on appeal, but rather contends that because Debbie did

not testify at trial, and because the trial court did not permit him to introduce the

videotape of Debbie’s forensic interview, he was denied his right to confront and

cross-examine the witnesses against him.4

Because McKensie did testify at trial, and Mott had the opportunity to

confront and cross-examine her, Mott’s sole appellate argument does not apply to

his conviction for sexual assault of a child. We therefore confine our review to

Mott’s argument as it pertains to Debbie and summarize below only that evidence

relevant to Mott’s conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a young child.

A. Officers Rodriguez and Fenner’s Testimony

Officers Brandon Rodriguez and Jonathan Fenner, of the Beaumont Police

Department, testified that they were among the officers to respond to Mott’s house

3
The record does show that Debbie lied about her age. However, even if the
evidence conclusively showed that Debbie and McKensie lied about their ages, and
that Mott had no way of determining their correct ages, his conviction would stand,
because such a mistake is not a defense to these charges. See Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§§ 21.02(b)(2)(A), 22.011(a)(2)(A); see also Fleming v. State, 455 S.W.3d 577, 582-
83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (negating a mistake-of-age defense).
4
At trial, Mott stated that he was being denied “my Sixth Amendment right
to confront my witness and my victim.” A criminal defendant does not necessarily
have the right to confront his victim (e.g., when a victim has been murdered and is
not available for trial). A criminal defendant has the right to confront “the witnesses
against him.” U.S. CONST. amend VI; See Morrow v. State, 862 S.W.2d 612, 614
(Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (citation omitted).
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after the police received the anonymous report regarding underage girls. When the

officers arrived at Mott’s residence, they knocked, and Mott answered the door and

identified himself by name and birth date. Mott was then 28 years old. The officers

also noted that there were two girls at the house; one of these girls, later identified

as Debbie, looked very young, but stated that she was 20 years old. Because of the

nature of the situation, detectives were called to the scene.

B. Detectives Landor and Duchamp’s Testimony

Detective Charles Duchamp, also of the Beaumont Police Department,

testified, describing his training and experience in the field of law enforcement. As

of the trial date, he had been assigned to the special crimes unit for several years;

this unit investigates crimes against children and sex offenses. Duchamp also

referenced his training in using Cellebrite, a computer program that downloads and

analyzes cell phone data.

In July 2021, Duchamp and his partner, Detective Staci Landor, were called

to Mott’s home after an anonymous caller reported that an adult man was living there

with underage girls. Their investigation revealed that Debbie appeared to be living

at that address with Mott. Debbie was 13 years old at that time.

Debbie and her mother were taken to a local hospital, so that Debbie could

obtain any necessary medical care, and so that she could receive a forensic

examination performed by a trained sexual-assault nurse examiner (SANE). During

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her examination, Debbie stated that she and Mott had been engaging in sexual

intercourse, and that she had videos of their sexual activity on her phone. The police

therefore secured Debbie’s phone and obtained her mother’s permission to search

and download its contents. As expected, the phone contained sexually explicit videos

of Debbie and Mott. This evidence was admitted with no objection and was played

for the jury. The videos displayed the activities alleged in the indictment.

Duchamp obtained a search warrant for Mott’s DNA, and the DPS crime

laboratory matched it to a sample taken during Debbie’s forensic examination. He

also confirmed that Debbie underwent a forensic interview at the Garth House.

When Mott requested to show the jury the videotape of Debbie’s forensic interview,

the State objected that Mott had not laid the correct predicate for showing the tape;

the trial court sustained the objection.

Detective Staci Landor also went to Mott’s house and spoke to Debbie on the

date in question. Landor generally confirmed Duchamp’s testimony.

C. Tanya Gregory’s Testimony

Ms. Gregory, Debbie’s mother, testified that Debbie was 12 years old in

November 2020, and turned 13 the following summer. According to Gregory,

Debbie explained her visits to Mott’s house by claiming that she was babysitting his

children. Until July 2021, when officers investigated the anonymous complaint,

Gregory was unaware that Debbie had been living with Mott.

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D. Niya Knighton’s Testimony

Niya Knighton, the sexual assault nurse examiner who examined Debbie,

testified, describing her education and training in the field of forensic nursing.

Knighton described the procedures involved in a forensic examination, noting that it

may include collecting DNA evidence.

During Debbie’s examination, Debbie named Mott as the person with whom

she had had sexual relations, so Knighton collected evidence and made a report of

her findings. Debbie also told Knighton that her cell phone contained videos of

sexual encounters with Mott. Mott did not object to either Knighton’s testimony or

her report.

E. Michelle Turner’s Testimony

Turner, a forensic scientist with the Texas Department of Public Safety Crime

Laboratory, described her educational and professional qualifications. She also

described her usual job duties, as well as the procedures involved in screening sexual

assault evidence for further analysis.

F. Berenger Chan’s Testimony

Chan, like Turner, is a forensic scientist at the DPS Crime Laboratory, where

his responsibilities include analyzing samples to interpret DNA profiles. After

describing DNA and its use in criminal investigations, Chan explained how DNA is

analyzed.

6
In this case, Chan received a DNA sample collected from Mott for comparison

with swabs taken from Debbie during her sexual assault examination. According to

Chan, it was 997 septillion times more likely that the DNA profile obtained from

Debbie’s vaginal and cervical swabs came from Mott than from an unknown,

unrelated individual.

II. Standard of Review

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that “[i]n

all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with

the witnesses against him. U.S. CONST. amend VI.

A Confrontation Clause violation, when it occurs, is constitutional error

subject to a harm analysis under Rule 44.2(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate

Procedure. See Langham v. State, 305 S.W.3d 568, 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010);

Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a).

III. Analysis

Mott argued that he should have been provided the opportunity to confront

and cross-examine Debbie at trial, or, in the alternative, that he should have been

allowed to show the jury the videotape of Debbie’s forensic interview. Because the

trial court denied Mott both of these requests, he contends that the trial court violated

the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

7
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as incorporated to

the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees a criminal defendant the

right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]” U.S. CONST. amends VI,

XIV, § 1; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (holding that the confrontation

clause applies to prosecutions in state courts). “Witness” is defined not as the victim

of a crime, but as “‘one who has testified in an official proceeding.’” Morrow v.

State, 862 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (citation omitted). Because

Debbie did not testify at trial, she was not a witness, as the Court of Criminal Appeals

has defined that term. Id. In addition, Mott did not attempt to make her a witness by

issuing a subpoena to require her appearance at trial. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.

art. 24.01(a); see also Kinnett v. State, 623 S.W.3d 876, 891-94 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d) (regarding the right to subpoena a witness).

Mott, therefore, had no right to confront or cross-examine her during his trial and no

Confrontation Clause violation occurred.

As for Mott’s request to introduce the videotape of Debbie’s forensic

interview, Mott failed to make an offer of proof, and therefore has failed to preserve

error. Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(2); see Mays v. State, 285 S.W.3d 884, 891 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2009) (affirming a capital murder conviction noting the absence of an offer of

proof does not preserve the alleged error for appellate review). Without knowing

what that videotape would have shown, and how its content would have benefitted

8
Mott’s defense, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in denying Mott’s

request to play the tape, particularly since he failed to follow the rules of evidence

to demonstrate that the tape was admissible. See Fletcher v. State, 474 S.W.3d 389,

396 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (holding a pro se criminal

defendant to the same standard as a licensed attorney).

In addition to the above, Mott has failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s

alleged error harmed him. Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a). The record contains

overwhelming evidence of Mott’s guilt, in that it proves beyond a reasonable doubt

that Mott engaged in multiple acts of sexual abuse of Debbie, that she was under 14

years old at the time, that he was then at least 17 years old, and that these acts took

place over a period over 30 days in duration. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02(b). Even

if Debbie had testified and admitted that she lied about her age, this hypothetical

evidence would have added nothing to Mott’s defense because, as noted above, there

is no mistake-of-age defense in this type of case. See Fleming v. State, 455 S.W.3d

577, 582-83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (negating mistake-of-age defense).

We overrule Mott’s sole appellate argument.

IV. Conclusion

Finding that Mott was not denied his constitutional right to confront or cross-

examine the witness, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

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AFFIRMED.

JAY WRIGHT
Justice

Submitted on December 22, 2023
Opinion Delivered January 31, 2024
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Wright, JJ.

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