Veronica Marie Salazar v. the State of Texas

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-24-00230-CR

VERONICA MARIE SALAZAR, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 108th District Court
Potter County, Texas
Trial Court No. 077722-E-CR, Honorable Douglas R. Woodburn, Presiding

September 15, 2025
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Veronica Marie Salazar, Appellant, was convicted of possession of less than one

gram of methamphetamine, a controlled substance, and sentenced to two years’

confinement.1 In this appeal, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the propriety

of a line of questioning during her cross-examination, and the assessment of attorney’s

fees. We affirm the judgment.

1 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(a), (b).
BACKGROUND

In March of 2019, Officer Jeremy Strikland of the Amarillo Police Department was

conducting surveillance on a location where drug activity was suspected to occur. He

observed a pickup truck driven by Appellant stop at the house. A passenger exited the

vehicle, entered the house, and returned to the vehicle a few minutes later. Officer

Strikland relayed the information to Officer Keith Quirk, who was nearby. Officer Quirk

followed the vehicle and conducted a traffic stop after he observed a failure-to-signal

violation.

Upon stopping Appellant, Officer Quirk asked her to get out of the vehicle, which

she did. Her two passengers remained in the vehicle. Appellant initially gave Officer

Quirk a false name, but she eventually revealed her identity. She gave Officer Quirk

consent to search the vehicle. Officer Quirk was joined on the scene by Officer Strikland,

who conducted the search. Appellant’s passengers, Mia and Bryan, then exited the

vehicle.

Officer Strikland located a wallet under the front of the driver’s seat and brought it

to the patrol car. Appellant stated that it was not her wallet. Officer Strikland opened the

wallet, which contained Appellant’s Texas identification card and Social Security card. It

also contained a rolled-up five-dollar bill containing a crystal-like substance which was

later determined to be methamphetamine.

At trial, Appellant testified that the wallet was hers but that she did not place the

methamphetamine in it. She testified that before the traffic stop, the wallet was inside her

purse. When she exited the vehicle to speak to the officer, her purse and wallet were

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located behind the seat of the truck, not on the floorboard of the truck. Appellant

contended that Mia or Bryan, both of whom had access to her wallet, tried to conceal the

methamphetamine in Appellant’s wallet to avoid trouble for themselves.

The jury found Appellant guilty and she was sentenced to a two-year term of

incarceration. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Sufficiency of the Evidence

By her first issue, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her

conviction. She contends that the jury could not have rationally found beyond a

reasonable doubt that she knowingly possessed methamphetamine because evidence

that the police did not observe Bryan and Mia’s movements inside the vehicle while

Appellant was being questioned indicates that Bryan and/or Mia could have planted the

methamphetamine. Appellant states that more than thirty minutes elapsed from the time

Appellant was removed from the vehicle to the time when her passengers stepped out.

During that time, the officers were focused on Appellant and not observing the

passengers, who had the ability and opportunity to place the methamphetamine in

Appellant’s wallet.

In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence in the light

most favorable to the verdict to determine whether, based on the evidence and

reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622
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(Tex. Crim. App. 2017). “[O]nly that evidence which is sufficient in character, weight, and

amount to justify a factfinder in concluding that every element of the offense has been

proven beyond a reasonable doubt is adequate to support a conviction.” Brooks v. State,

323 S.W.3d 893, 917 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (Cochran, J., concurring). When reviewing

all the evidence under the Jackson standard of review, the ultimate question is whether

the jury’s finding of guilt was a rational finding. See id. at 906–07 n.26. In our review, we

defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge

of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. See id. at 899.

When the contraband is not in the exclusive possession of the accused, a

factfinder may nonetheless infer that the accused intentionally or knowingly possessed

the contraband if there are sufficient independent facts and circumstances justifying such

an inference. Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The

Court of Criminal Appeals has cited with approval several non-exclusive factors that may

establish an affirmative link connecting a defendant to the knowing possession of

contraband: (1) the defendant’s presence when a search is conducted, (2) whether the

contraband is in plain view, (3) the defendant’s proximity to and the accessibility of the

narcotic, (4) whether the defendant was under the influence of narcotics when arrested,

(5) whether the defendant possessed other contraband or narcotics when arrested, (6)

whether the defendant made incriminating statements when arrested, (7) whether the

defendant attempted to flee, (8) whether the defendant made furtive gestures, (9) whether

there was an odor of contraband, (10) whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia

were present, (11) whether the defendant owned or had the right to possess the place

where the drugs were found, (12) whether the place where the drugs were found was

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enclosed, (13) whether the defendant was found with a large amount of cash, and (14)

whether the conduct of the defendant indicated a consciousness of guilt. Tate v. State,

500 S.W.3d 410, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The number of factors present in a given

case is not as important or compelling as the logical force the factors have in establishing

the elements of the offense. Wootton v. State, 132 S.W.3d 80, 87 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d). Moreover, the links need not be so strong as to rule out

every other possibility except the defendant’s guilt. Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 748

(Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Thus, while these factors may guide our analysis, ultimately the

inquiry remains that set forth in Jackson, i.e., whether, based on the combined and

cumulative force of the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom, the jury was

rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–

19.

The evidence presented in this case shows several links between Appellant and

the methamphetamine found. Appellant was stopped shortly after making a brief stop at

a suspected drug house around 2:30 in the morning. Appellant was present when the

search was conducted, was in close proximity to and could easily access the drugs, had

a right to possess the vehicle she was driving, and owned the wallet in which the drugs

were found. Further, Appellant’s conduct of lying to the police about her identity and

denying ownership of her purse and wallet indicated a consciousness of guilt.

Even considering the defense evidence that Bryan and Mia had access to

Appellant’s wallet, and weighing it against the State’s evidence, we conclude that the jury

was rationally justified in finding Appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The State

is not required to “disprove every conceivable alternative to a defendant’s guilt.” Tate,
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500 S.W.3d at 413. Here, the jury heard both the State’s and Appellant’s theories of the

case. It was the jury’s prerogative to choose between reasonably equal competing

theories. Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). By its verdict,

the jury implicitly rejected Appellant’s defensive theory implicating Bryan and Mia and

accepted the State’s equally plausible theory that Appellant knowingly possessed the

methamphetamine that was in her wallet.

After reviewing the evidence above in the light most favorable to the verdict, we

conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that

Appellant was guilty of the charged offense. We overrule Appellant’s first issue.

Propriety of Questioning in Cross-Examination

By her second issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in

permitting the State to cross-examine her with a question that presupposed the truth of a

matter that the record showed was false. Appellant’s complaint arises from the following

exchange, which occurred during the State’s cross-examination of Appellant:

Q: So I want to talk about – you said your wallet was in your purse –

A: Correct.

Q: – before you were stopped. So what you want this jury to believe is that
while you – when you were stopped, you weren’t paying attention to what
was going on in your vehicle, and someone took your wallet out of your
purse, opened it up, put meth in there, closed it, and then put it all the way
under the seat of your vehicle. Is that – that’s what you want them to
believe?

A: I would believe they reached over the bed of the truck – or the seat of the
truck, grabbed my wallet and put something inside of it, and it was now on
the floor opened.

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Q: Underneath your seat.

A: It’s a one-bed truck; one-seat truck.

***
Q: But someone, without you noticing, did all that in your vehicle and then
put it under where you were sitting?

A: While I was being questioned by the police; yes.

Q: Oh, so they did this while you were out of the car being questioned?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Even though the officers testified that there was always another officer
talking to the other people in the vehicle; you’re going to disagree with that?

A: That –

Appellant’s Counsel: I’m going to object; that’s a mischaracterization
of testimony. That was not the testimony offered by the police officers, Your
Honor. That is facts not in evidence.

The Court: Well, again, the Jury can decide; this is cross-
examination.

Appellant’s Counsel: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: So, again, the officers were lying?

A: Correct.

The State concedes that the video recording of the stop shows that there was not

“always another officer talking to” the passengers in the vehicle. Thus, the prosecutor’s

statement inaccurately represented that Bryan and Mia were always under observation.

Appellant argues that the State’s mischaracterization of the evidence affected her entire

defensive theory and thereby her substantial rights, requiring reversal of the case. In

response, the State asserts that Appellant waived this complaint. We agree with the

State.

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A defendant must object to an allegedly improper statement and pursue the

objection to an adverse ruling in order to preserve her right to complain about the

statement on appeal. Cockrell v. State, 933 S.W.2d 73, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en

banc). In this case, Appellant’s counsel objected that the prosecutor had

mischaracterized testimony. However, counsel failed to pursue that objection to an

adverse ruling. The trial court responded to Appellant’s objection by stating that “the Jury

can decide . . . ,” which was not sufficient to preserve error. See DeRusse v. State, 579

S.W.2d 224, 235 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (statement by trial court that “The

jury will remember the testimony that has been elicited” not sufficient to preserve

complaint of improper jury argument); Mayberry v. State, 532 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1975) (issue not preserved for review where trial court responded to objection with

statement, “Jury will recall the evidence . . .”); Kingsbury v. State, 625 S.W.3d 686, 704

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, no pet.) (same); Norman v. State, No. 14-11-00433-CR,

2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 7968, at *52–53 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 20, 2012,

pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same).

By failing to pursue her objection to an adverse ruling, Appellant did not preserve

this issue for our review. Consequently, we overrule Appellant’s second issue.

Attorney’s Fees

In her final issue, Appellant asserts that the Bill of Cost improperly charges her

$6,952.50 in attorney’s fees. Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain

such a charge because she was determined to be indigent throughout this proceeding

and there is no record evidence showing a material change in her financial circumstances.

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See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.04(p). Appellant requests that “the attorney fee

should be deleted from the bill of costs.”

We agree with Appellant that there is no record basis to support the assessment

of attorney’s fees against her in this matter. However, while the Bill of Cost reflects that

attorney’s fees of $6,952.50 were incurred in this case, it also reflects that the balance

owed by Appellant for attorney’s fees is $0. Because the Bill of Cost shows that Appellant

has no outstanding balance due for attorney’s fees, we conclude that it is not necessary

to modify the Bill of Cost as requested. See Manyuon v. State, No. 07-25-00084-CR,

2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 5978, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 11, 2025, no pet. h.)

(dismissing appeal as moot when basis of appeal was $500 charge for attorney’s fees but

Bill of Cost showed no balance for attorney’s fees owed by appellant). Appellant’s third

issue is overruled.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled each of Appellant’s three issues, we affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

Judy C. Parker
Justice

Do not publish.

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