Matthew Ryan Hubbell v. the State of Texas

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-24-00200-CR

MATTHEW RYAN HUBBELL, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 108th District Court
Potter County, Texas
Trial Court No. 078539-E-CR, Honorable Douglas Woodburn, Presiding

March 20, 2025
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Following a plea of not guilty, Appellant, Matthew Ryan Hubbell, was found guilty

by a jury of murder.1 By his two issues, he challenges his conviction based on: (1) the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction; and (2) the ineffective assistance of

his counsel during the punishment phase of the trial. We affirm.

1 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §19.02(b).
BACKGROUND

Since 2006, Appellant lived in Amarillo while his mother worked in New York City

for Barnes & Noble. In 2018, his mother was laid off by Barnes & Noble, and she returned

to live with Appellant in his home in Amarillo. A year later, Appellant and his mother had

an altercation in which he clubbed his mother over the head repeatedly with a crowbar in

his bedroom. He dragged her body to the bathroom and put it in the bathtub. Unsure of

what to do, he called his closest friend, and they met to discuss how to dispose of the

body. The friend, who worked for a lawncare company at the time, loaned him a shovel

and a corrosive chemical to accomplish the task. Appellant also showed the friend a bite

mark he received on his arm during the altercation, and the friend thought it was too small

to be an adult. Afraid Appellant had in fact killed a child, the friend called the police.

While attempting to locate Appellant’s whereabouts, the investigating officers

convinced the friend to call Appellant and engage him in conversation, which was video

recorded on an officer’s bodycam. During the phone conversation, Appellant did not

explicitly confess to the murder, but he claimed he “did it” because she threatened to “put

[him] in jail” and “came at [him] with a crowbar.” Appellant did not disclose his location

during the phone conversation, and officers were unable to ascertain his whereabouts

based on cellphone tower data during the call. Homicide detectives assigned to the case

performed a database search and located an address belonging to Appellant’s mother.

The detectives investigated the house and found Appellant’s car parked in the driveway.

They obtained a search warrant for the house and requested Appellant exit the house.

He finally exited the house and was detained; and police entered the house and

discovered a decomposing body in the crawlspace beneath his house. Appellant was

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arrested and charged with murder. During the autopsy, the forensic pathologist noted the

decomposition of the body indicated she had died within the prior three-to-five days.

At trial, Appellant pleaded not guilty under a theory of self-defense. He did not

contest the issue of whether he had killed his mother or the manner in which she was

killed. He testified his mother had been declining mentally, and that her behaviors had

become more abusive after she returned to Amarillo. He told the jury his mother’s mental

degradation finally resulted in her attacking him with a knife while he was napping in his

bedroom. He claimed he accidentally killed her while defending himself from the knife

attack. The State rebutted the theory by playing video evidence showing Appellant’s

mother walked to a convenience store shortly before her death to buy snacks and

cigarettes and showed no apparent signs of mental decline. The forensic pathologist who

conducted the autopsy also testified his mother was hit “at least five times on the face

and five on the head.” After deliberation, the jury found Appellant guilty of murder.

During the punishment phase, neither the State nor Appellant’s counsel introduced

any additional witnesses or evidence. Both the State and Appellant’s counsel made

arguments regarding the amount of punishment, including a special issue on whether, by

a preponderance of the evidence, “he caused the death under the immediate influence of

sudden passion arising from an adequate cause.”2 The jury did not find in favor of

Appellant on the special issue and sentenced him to the maximum punishment: ninety-

nine years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.

ISSUE ONE—SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

2 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(d).

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For his first issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

his conviction. Primarily, he argues the evidence was insufficient for finding he did not in

fact defend himself in the act of killing his mother. Alternatively, he urges the evidence

was sufficient by a preponderance to prove the special issue.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The only standard a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the

evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense the State is required

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). See Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d

854, 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We consider all the evidence in the light most favorable

to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences

to be drawn therefrom, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2014) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19).

ANALYSIS

We first examine the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the offense of

murder. Relevant to the case before us, a person commits murder if the person:

(1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual; [or]

(2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly
dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1), (2).

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In this case, Appellant did not contest he committed an act clearly dangerous to human

life—hitting someone over the head with a crowbar—that caused the death of an

individual. Rather, he argues the evidence regarding his motivation for the killing

established he hit his mother in self-defense after she attacked him with a knife. He urges

his self-defense claim was corroborated not only by the physical evidence, but his own

testimony, which was not contested by any other witness or evidence presented by the

State.

A jury verdict of guilty is an implicit finding rejecting the defendant’s self-defense

theory. Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (quotations and

citation omitted). In resolving the sufficiency of the evidence, we look not to whether the

State presented evidence which refuted Appellant’s self-defense testimony but rather we

determine whether, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact would have found the essential elements of the

offense beyond a reasonable doubt and also would have found against Appellant on the

self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Defensive evidence which is merely

consistent with the physical evidence at the scene of the alleged offense will not render

the State’s evidence insufficient since the credibility determination of such evidence is

solely within the jury’s province and the jury is free to accept or reject the defensive

evidence. Id.

Here, Appellant did not present any evidence which was inconsistent with the

physical evidence. Only his explanation of the murder differed from the State’s: his

mother attacked him with a deadly weapon—a knife—and he acted in self-defense. He

was also the only witness to the events. But by returning a verdict of guilty, the jury clearly

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discredited Appellant’s explanation of the events and concluded Appellant did not act in

self-defense. Womack v. State, No. 07-19-00399-CR, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 6091, at *8

(Tex. App.—Amarillo July 29, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(factfinder is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses). In addition, even though only

a preponderance of the evidence was required to prove the special issue, Appellant’s

special issue claiming he acted out of “sudden passion” rested on his testimony his

mother provoked him by attacking him. Having already discounted his testimony he acted

in self-defense, the jury necessarily did not find he was provoked by his mother.3 Thus,

Appellant also failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence he acted out of sudden

passion.

The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found the essential

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and also to have found against

Appellant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Braughton, 569 S.W.3d

at 609. We overrule Appellant’s first issue.

ISSUE TWO—INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

For his second issue, Appellant claims he received ineffective assistance of his

counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show

both deficient performance and prejudice. Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 687 (Tex.

3 “Sudden passion” means passion directly caused by and arising out of provocation by the

individual killed or another acting with the person killed which passion arises at the time of the offense and
is not solely the result of former provocation. § 19.02(a)(2).
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Crim. App. 2009) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052,

80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). In assessing a claim of ineffective assistance, an appellate

court “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct [fell] within the wide

range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the [appellant] must overcome the

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered

sound trial strategy.” Williams, 301 S.W.3d at 687 (citing Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436,

440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). An appellant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland

test negates a court’s need to consider the other prong. Id. While the ultimate question

of prejudice under Strickland is reviewed de novo, the trial court is afforded total deference

on any underlying historical fact determinations. Johnson v. State, 169 S.W.3d 223, 239

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005); accord State v. Hradek, __ S.W.3d__, 2024 Tex. Crim. App.

LEXIS 1012, (Tex. Crim. App. 2024).

ANALYSIS

Appellant complains his trial counsel failed to introduce any witnesses during the

punishment phase of his trial, and this resulted in the jury applying the maximum

punishment. To establish a claim based on ineffective assistance, an appellant must

show (1) his counsel’s representation fell below the objective standard of reasonableness

and (2) there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s deficiency the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 340 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2009) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). In other words, an appellant must show

his trial counsel’s performance was deficient and he was prejudiced by the deficiency.

State v. Gutierrez, 541 S.W.3d 91, 98 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (emphasis added).

Prejudice is not presumed and must be demonstrated by an appellant, even when he

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alleges counsel’s performance was deficient during the punishment phase of the trial.

See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2467 (2005).

Assuming arguendo his counsel’s performance was deficient during the

punishment phase of trial, Appellant does not make any argument or point to any

evidence in the record demonstrating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

deficiency, the resulting sentence would have been different. Therefore, he has failed to

meet the second prong of Strickland and cannot prevail on his claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel. Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 340–41.

Appellant’s second issue is overruled.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Alex Yarbrough
Justice
Do not publish.

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