MacEe Dion Green v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-24-00081-CR

MACEE DION GREEN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 124th District Court
Gregg County, Texas
Trial Court No. 50356-B

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Macee Dion Green pled not guilty to the indictment of unauthorized use of a motor

vehicle and waived a jury trial. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.07. After a bench trial, the trial

court assessed a punishment of fifteen months in a state-jail facility. Green appeals, asserting

that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove the person named in the indictment was the

owner of the vehicle. Because we find that there was sufficient evidence to support Green’s

conviction, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. Standard of Review

“In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to

the trial court’s judgment to determine whether any rational [fact-finder] could have found the

essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williamson v. State, 589 S.W.3d

292, 297 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912

(Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); Hartsfield v. State, 305

S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d). “Our rigorous [legal sufficiency]

review focuses on the quality of the evidence presented.” Id. (citing Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917–

18 (Cochran, J., concurring)). “We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks

opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the [fact-finder] ‘to fairly resolve

conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts

to ultimate facts.’” Id. (quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)

(citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19)); see Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2007).

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“Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined

by a hypothetically correct jury charge.” Id. at 298 (quoting Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240

(Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “The ‘hypothetically correct’ jury charge is ‘one that accurately sets

out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of

proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the

particular offense for which the defendant was tried.’” Id. (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240).

“In our review, we consider ‘events occurring before, during and after the commission of

the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common

design to do the prohibited act.’” Id. at 297 (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (quoting

Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985))). “It is not required that each

fact ‘point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative

force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.’” Id. (quoting

Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13).

“Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are equally probative in establishing the

guilt of a defendant, and guilt can be established by circumstantial evidence alone.” Id. (citing

Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13).

“Further, ‘we must consider all of the evidence admitted at trial, even if that evidence was

improperly admitted.’” Id. at 297–98 (quoting Fowler v. State, 517 S.W.3d 167, 176 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2017) (citing Moff v. State, 131 S.W.3d 485, 489–90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)),

rev’d in part, 544 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)).

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The fact-finder, as “the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be

given their testimony[, could] ‘believe all of [the] witnesses’ testimony, portions of it, or none of

it.’” Id. at 297 (second alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 10 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2014)). “We give ‘almost complete deference to a [fact-finder’s] decision when that

decision is based upon an evaluation of credibility.’” Id. (quoting Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d

699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)).

II. Green’s Conviction of Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle Was Supported by
Legally Sufficient Evidence

On December 19, 2019, Tomesha Jamerson went to Highland Village Apartments in

Gregg County, Texas, to pick up her mother to go buy groceries. Surveillance footage from the

apartment complex shows that, after Jamerson entered her mother’s apartment, Green entered

Jamerson’s running vehicle and drove toward the exit. The surveillance footage then shows that

Jamerson ran after the vehicle. At that point, Green stopped the vehicle and then got out.

Jamerson testified that she did not give Green permission to drive her vehicle.

To establish the offense of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, the State was required to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Green (1) “intentionally and knowingly” (2) “operate[d]

another’s . . . motor-propelled vehicle” (3) “without the effective consent of the owner.” TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.07(a). In its indictment, the State alleged that Green “did then and there

intentionally and knowingly operate a motor-propelled vehicle, to-wit: an automobile, without

the effective consent of T. Jamerson, the owner thereof.” Green only challenges the sufficiency

of the evidence showing that “T. Jamerson” was the owner of the vehicle and argues that the

evidence proved the victim was merely a renter of the vehicle.
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In questioning Jamerson’s ownership, Green notes that, according to an officer’s report,

the officer spoke with a sales manager at AB Rent A Car who said the vehicle was “rented.”

Also, Green points to conflicting evidence in the record about whether Jamerson purchased with

financing, leased, or rented the vehicle.

Whether Jamerson’s financial arrangement was considered a “purchase,” “lease,” or

“rental” does not matter because, under the Texas Penal Code, an “[o]wner” need merely have

“possession of the property . . . or a greater right to possession of the property than [Green].”

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(35)(A) (Supp.); see Alexander v. State, 753 S.W.2d 390, 392

(Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (“The Legislature, while constructing the present Penal Code, . . . chose

to disregard [a narrow] definition in favor of a single, general definition which incorporated the

‘greater right’ theory and was unlimited in application.”); see also Edwards v. State, No. 01-20-

00064-CR, 2020 WL 6435769, *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 3, 2020, no pet.) (mem

op., not designated for publication) (“This meaning is broad enough to include third parties who

have actual possession under a lease or rental contract.”). “‘Possession’ means actual care,

custody, control, or management.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(39) (Supp.).

The indictment alleged that “T. Jamerson” was the owner of the vehicle.1 Jamerson

testified that she “purchased” the vehicle through AB Rent A Car. However, she later described

the financial arrangement as “lease to pay,” meaning that she would not “have” title to the

1
Green also argues that, because the vehicle was owned by AB Rent A Car, “it is better to name a person when
alleging ownership.” In making this argument, Green alludes to an indictment issue on appeal. However, Green did
not preserve any indictment issue because he failed to object prior to trial or file a motion to quash the indictment.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.14(b). In any case, “[w]here one person owns the
property, and another person has the possession of the same, the ownership thereof may be alleged to be in either.”
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.08.
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vehicle until she paid the full amount of the loan. The record does not reflect that Green had any

ownership interest in the vehicle. Under this circumstance, Jamerson’s testimony constituted

“circumstantial evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt

that [Jamerson] had a greater right to the actual care, custody, control, or management of the

vehicle than [Green].” Koehl v. State, 857 S.W.2d 762, 765 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

1993, pet. ref’d). That is because, whether the vehicle was purchased or leased, Jamerson had

both possession of the vehicle and a greater right to possession of the vehicle than Green.

We, therefore, conclude that the State presented legally sufficient evidence to support

Green’s conviction of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.

As a result, we overrule Green’s sole point of error.

III. Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Scott Stevens
Chief Justice

Date Submitted: October 1, 2024
Date Decided: October 7, 2024

Do Not Publish

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