William Thomas Cruze v. the State of Texas

AFFIRMED as MODIFIED and Opinion Filed June 24, 2024

S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-23-00451-CR

WILLIAM THOMAS CRUZE, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F22-00055-T

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Reichek, Goldstein, and Garcia
Opinion by Justice Reichek
Following a jury trial, appellant William Thomas Cruze appeals his conviction

for indecency with a child by sexual contact. He contends the evidence is legally

insufficient to prove he committed the offense. In a cross issue, the State asks us to

make two modifications to the judgment. As modified, we affirm.

Background

The complainant in this case is A.S. In 2009, when A.S. was 7 years’ old, her

mother Renee and youngest sister died in a car accident. The family struggled after

the accident, and from October 2011 to August 2015, A.S., her sister E.S., and her
brother went to live with Robyn Cruze and appellant. Robyn is Renee’s adoptive

mother and A.S.’s biological great aunt. Robyn is married to appellant, and A.S.

called him “grandpa.” In 2017, when A.S. was back living with her father and his

new wife, the stepmother noticed E.S. watching a suggestive cartoon which led to

both girls’ making outcries about appellant’s behavior.

Appellant was charged with continuous sexual abuse of A.S. and E.S., and the

cases were tried jointly. The indictment charging appellant with continuous sexual

abuse of A.S. alleged that on or about May 1, 2015, he intentionally and knowingly,

during a period that was 30 or more days in duration, when he was 17 years of age

or older, committed two or more acts of sexual abuse against A.S., a child younger

than 14 years of age. Four predicate acts of sexual abuse were alleged—penetration

of A.S.’s sexual organ by appellant’s finger, contact between appellant’s mouth and

A.S.’s sexual organ, contact between A.S.’s mouth and appellant’s sexual organ, and

contact between A.S.’s hand and appellant’s sexual organ.

A.S., who was twenty at the time of trial in 2022, testified things were normal

the first year she lived with Robyn and appellant. After that, appellant began asking

her to take nude pictures of herself on his phone and progressed to doing more

uncomfortable things. A.S. and E.S. shared a room at appellant and Robyn’s house.

They had bunk beds, and A.S. slept in the bottom bunk. Appellant started out by

lying in bed with her and rubbing her back, but as time went on he engaged in various

sexual acts. One of the things appellant made A.S. do was touch his penis. A.S.

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stated, “He grabbed my hand and put it on it and showed me how to move it up and

down.” Appellant’s hand was on top of her hand as it touched his penis. She could

not remember how many times appellant made her touch his genitals, but it happened

more than once. A.S. indicated that it happened “pretty regularly,” but not as

regularly as other sexual acts.

Appellant’s witnesses included his wife Robyn and his daughter Britanie.

Britanie lived in appellant’s house with A.S. and E.S. from 2011 to 2013. Britanie

had one child when she moved in and her second child was born in 2012. She

testified the house was “crazy and loud and there were kids everywhere.” She said

there was never quiet time or private time. On cross-examination, Britanie admitted

she was using methamphetamine while she lived in the house. Robyn testified that

their household had an open door policy for the children living there. Any time the

children were in their rooms, the door was to be left open unless they were changing

clothes. Appellant would sometimes rub the girls’ backs at bedtime to help them

fall asleep, but he was not in their room for long.

The jury charge gave the jury the option to find appellant guilty of continuous

sexual abuse of A.S. as charged in the indictment, guilty of the lesser included

offenses of aggravated sexual assault of a child or indecency with a child, or not

guilty. The charge instructed the jury to find appellant guilty of indecency with a

child if it unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally or

knowingly engaged in sexual contact with A.S. by causing contact between her hand

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and his genitals with intent to gratify his sexual desire. The jury found appellant

guilty of indecency with a child, and the trial judge assessed his punishment at 17

years’ confinement. The jury found appellant not guilty of the charges involving

E.S.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his sole issue on appeal, appellant asserts the evidence is legally insufficient

to support his conviction for several reasons. He suggests that because the jury

rejected the more serious charges against him and acquitted him in the case involving

E.S., it reached the verdict as a compromise. In addition, he contends A.S.’s

testimony was “bereft of details.” Because the State was focused on proving

continuous sexual abuse, he argues, it never focused on any specific acts constituting

indecency and did not prove the time or place of the indecency. He also points to

the lack of medical or scientific evidence and argues A.S.’s statements to the forensic

interviewer, who testified about the interview, were vague. Finally, he asserts there

was no evidence of his intent to gratify his sexual desire.

A person commits indecency with a child if he engages in sexual contact with

a child younger than 17 years of age or causes the child to engage in sexual contact.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a). “Sexual contact” includes any touching of any

part of the body of a child with the person’s genitals if committed with the intent to

arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. Id. § 21.11(c)(2).

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In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction,

we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine

whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational

factfinder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Alfaro-Jimenez v. State, 577

S.W.3d 240, 243, 243–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). The factfinder may choose to

believe all or any part of any witness’s testimony. See Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d

611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). The Jackson standard gives full play to the

responsibility of the factfinder to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.

Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). An appellate court

cannot act as a thirteenth juror and make its own assessment of the evidence. Id. “A

court’s role on appeal is restricted to guarding against the rare occurrence when the

factfinder does not act rationally.” Id.

A child victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to support a conviction for

indecency with a child. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07; Keller v. State, 604

S.W.3d 214, 226 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. ref’d). In the context

of indecency with a child, the finder of fact can infer the requisite intent to arouse or

gratify sexual desire from a defendant’s conduct, remarks, and all the surrounding

circumstances. Keller, 604 S.W.3d at 226. No oral expression of intent or visible

evidence of sexual arousal is necessary. Id.

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We disagree with appellant that A.S. did not provide sufficient details to

establish the elements of indecency. A.S. testified that on multiple occasions, in her

bed at his house, appellant forced her to touch his penis with her hand and move her

hand up and down. The jury was free to believe this testimony even though it did

not credit A.S.’s testimony about other acts of sexual abuse. Further, from A.S.’s

testimony, the jury could infer appellant’s intent to arouse or gratify his sexual

desire. No medical, scientific, or physical evidence was required to prove

appellant’s guilt.

Regarding appellant’s assertion that the State failed to prove when the offense

occurred, the State was not required to prove the exact date of the indecency. It was

required to prove the offense occurred prior to the presentment of the indictment and

within the limitations period. Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253, 255–56 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1997); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.02(6). There is no limitations

period for indecency with a child, see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 12.01(1)(E),

and the evidence showed the offense was committed during the time A.S. lived with

appellant from 2011 to 2015, prior to presentment of the indictment.

Finally, there is nothing in the record to support the idea that the jury reached

a “compromise verdict.” The jury was instructed that it was required to find

appellant not guilty unless it found from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt

that he was guilty of the charged offense or one of the lesser included offenses.

Absent evidence to the contrary, we must presume the jury followed the trial court’s

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instructions. See Costilla v. State, 650 S.W.3d 201, 213–14 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

verdict, a rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of indecency

with a child by contact beyond a reasonable doubt. We overrule appellant’s sole

issue.

Modification of the Judgment

In a cross issue, the State asks the Court to modify the judgment to comply

with article 42.01 of the code of criminal procedure. Article 42.01 provides that in

the event of a conviction of an offense for which registration as a sex offender is

required under Chapter 62, the judgment must include a statement that the

registration requirement of that chapter applies to the defendant and a statement of

the age of the victim of the offense. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.01 § 1(27).

Indecency with a child by contact is subject to sex offender registration

requirements. See id. art. 62.001(5)(A). The judgment in this case, however, does

not state that appellant is required to register as a sex offender or indicate the age of

the victim.

The State requests that we modify the judgment to state that the victim’s age

was “less than 14 years old.” We agree that this appropriate. See Vasquez v. State,

No. 05-20-00116-CR, 2022 WL 2951667, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 26, 2022,

pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (statement that victim’s age at

time of offense was “less than 14 years” constitutes statement of age of victim as

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required by article 42.01). The record does not reflect A.S.’s exact age at the time

of the offense, but it occurred while she lived with appellant. She moved out in

August 2015 when she was 13 years’ old.

We also make one more modification on our own motion. Indecency with a

child by contact is a sexually violent offense when committed by a person 17 years

of age or older. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.001(6)(A). In the trial of a

sexually violent offense, the judge shall make an affirmative finding of fact and enter

the affirmative finding in the judgment if the judge determines that the victim or

intended victim was younger than 14 years of age at the time of the offense. Id. art.

42.015(b). The judgment for a sexually violent offense should reflect this finding in

addition to any required statement of the victim’s age for registrable offenses.

Decker v. State, No. 05-18-01259-CR, 2020 WL 614100, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas

Feb. 10, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see Lopez v. State,

No. 05-22-01222-CR, 2024 WL 1154143, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 18,

2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

We have the power to modify a judgment to speak the truth when we have the

necessary information to do so. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d

26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d) (en banc). We sustain the State’s cross issue and

modify the judgment in this case to show that the sex offender registration

requirements apply and that the age of the victim at the time of the offense was less

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than 14 years’ old. In addition, we modify the special findings portion of the

judgment to include an affirmative finding that the victim or intended victim was

younger than 14 years of age at the time of the offense.

As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/Amanda L. Reichek/
AMANDA L. REICHEK
JUSTICE

Do Not Publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
230451F.U05

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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT

WILLIAM THOMAS CRUZE, On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial
Appellant District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F22-00055-T.
No. 05-23-00451-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice
Reichek. Justices Goldstein and
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Garcia participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED as follows:

In the checkbox next to the phrase “Defendant is required to register
as a sex offender in accordance with Chapter 62, CCP,” we INSERT
an “X”;

Next to the phrase “The age of the victim at the time of the offense
was,” we REMOVE “N/A” and INSERT “less than fourteen years of
age” in its place; and

We INSERT the following “Special Finding”: “The Court
affirmatively finds that the victim or intended victim was younger
than fourteen years of age at the time of the offense.”

As MODIFIED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 24th day of June, 2024.

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