Emmanuel Pippins v. the State of Texas

DISMISS and Opinion Filed July 11, 2024

S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-24-00434-CR

EMMANUEL PIPPINS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F23-45622

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Reichek, and Justice Kennedy
Opinion by Chief Justice Burns
Appellant appeals his conviction for fraudulent use or possession of

identifying information, a state jail felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.51(b),

(c)(1). We conclude we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, and we dismiss the appeal.

A plea bargain provided that appellant would plead guilty to the charge and

receive a punishment of nine months’ confinement. The plea bargain also provided

it was “open for 12.44(a),” meaning the trial court would decide whether the

punishment would be reduced to misdemeanor punishment. See id. § 12.44(a). The
trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to nine months’ confinement in

the Dallas County Jail under section 12.44(a).

The plea agreement included admonitions to appellant, including that if the

punishment assessed did not exceed the agreement between appellant and the

prosecutor, the trial court would have to give permission for appellant to appeal. The

plea agreement also included waivers of appellant’s rights, including that appellant

“Waives the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals.” The record includes the trial

court’s certification of defendant’s right of appeal and provides, “I certify that this

criminal case is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has no right of appeal.”

A defendant in a criminal case has the right of appeal as set out in the Code

of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 44.02. TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a) Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2

provides that in “a plea-bargain case—that is, a case in which a defendant’s plea was

guilty . . . and the punishment did not exceed the punishment recommended by the

prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant,” a defendant may appeal only “those

matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial,” “after

getting the trial court’s permission to appeal,” or “where the specific appeal is

expressly authorized by statute.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). When an appellant

waives his right to appeal as part of his plea bargain agreement with the State, a

subsequent notice of appeal filed by him fails to “initiate the appellate process,”

Lundgren v. State, 434 S.W.3d 594, 599, 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), and “no

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inquiry into even possibly meritorious claims may be made,” Chavez v. State, 183

S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When an appeal from a plea bargain is

not authorized by Rule 25.2, “[a] court of appeals, while having jurisdiction to

ascertain whether an appellant who plea-bargained is permitted to appeal by Rule

25.2(a)(2), must dismiss a prohibited appeal without further action, regardless of the

basis for the appeal.” Chavez, 183 S.W.3d at 680.

In this case, the record shows appellant and the State agreed appellant would

plead guilty in exchange for a specific recommended punishment. The documents

appellant signed admonished appellant he would have no right of appeal if the trial

court followed the punishment recommendation except for matters raised by written

motion and ruled on before trial or if the trial court granted appellant permission to

appeal.

The clerk’s record does not contain any motion ruled on before trial, and the

certification of appellant’s right of appeal shows the trial court did not grant

appellant permission to appeal. Therefore, under Rule 25.2(a), appellant has no right

of appeal. See Chavez, 183 S.W.3d at 680.

Rule 25.2(d) also requires the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal if there is

no certification from the trial court showing the defendant has the right of appeal.

TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d). The certification affirmatively shows appellant did not have

the right to appeal, and the certification is supported by the record. Therefore, we

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must dismiss the appeal. Id.; see Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2005).

We requested appellant and the State to file letter briefs addressing the

jurisdictional issue. Appellant’s counsel filed a letter brief setting out the facts and

then stating counsel “defers to the Court’s determination of the jurisdictional issue

in this case.”

We conclude we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, and we dismiss the appeal

for want of jurisdiction.

/Robert D. Burns, III/
ROBERT D. BURNS, III
CHIEF JUSTICE

Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

240434F.U05

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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT

EMMANUEL PIPPINS, Appellant On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial
District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-24-00434-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F23-45622.
Opinion delivered by Chief Justice
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Burns. Justices Reichek and Kennedy
participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the appeal is DISMISSED for
want of jurisdiction.

Judgment entered July 11, 2024.

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