R Construction Company v. Lavorgus Canady

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-25-00053-CV

R CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Appellant

v.

Lavorgus CANADY,
Appellee

From the 218th Judicial District Court, Wilson County, Texas
Trial Court No. CVW2100490
Honorable Jennifer Dillingham, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Irene Rios, Justice

Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice
Lori Massey Brissette, Justice
Adrian A. Spears II, Justice

Delivered and Filed: May 27, 2026

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART

A jury found appellant R Construction terminated appellee Lavorgus Canady’s

employment in retaliation for Canady’s opposition to racial discrimination under the Texas

Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”). In its first nine issues, which we construe as a

single issue, R Construction contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s

retaliation finding. In its tenth and eleventh issues, R Construction argues Canady is not permitted

to recover back pay under the TCHRA unless it is accompanied with other equitable relief. In its
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twelfth issue, R Construction argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support

the award of back pay. In its thirteenth through fifteenth issues, R Construction argues the

evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support past and future compensatory damages. In

its sixteenth issue, R Construction argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to

support the award for punitive damages. In its seventeenth issue, R Construction challenges the

award of attorney’s fees.

We hold the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Canady was

terminated in retaliation for opposing a discriminatory practice and Canady was entitled to recover

back pay. We hold the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the awards for back

pay, past compensatory damages, and punitive damages. However, we hold the evidence is legally

insufficient to support the award for future compensatory damages. Accordingly, we reverse the

portion of the trial court’s final judgment awarding future compensatory damages. In all other

respects, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

BACKGROUND

R Construction is a company that services oil rigs. Canady began working for R

Construction in November 2018 as a roustabout, which is a general laborer that may be asked to

perform a wide range of duties as assigned to service customer’s oil rigs. Eventually Canady was

promoted as a leader of a crew of roustabouts.

EOG Resources, Inc. (“EOG”) was one of R Construction’s customers. The testimony

indicates that EOG was a big customer and R Construction did a lot of work for it. In March 2019,

Canady and his crew were assigned to service an EOG oil rig. Canady and the members of his

crew were all African American and they were all riding in the truck Canady was driving to the

jobsite. When Canady and the crew arrived at the EOG oil rig, Canady rolled down his truck

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window to speak with EOG’s mud engineer on the rig. During that conversation EOG’s mud

engineer told him: “I guess your boss didn’t tell you guys I thought that you guys wouldn’t make

it past the KKK.” Canady replied, “Excuse me?” EOG’s mud engineer then repeated his

comment. Canady then rolled up his window and called his supervisor, Dustin Meyer. When

Meyer did not answer, Canady told a member of his crew: “Bro, I can’t take it. I’m not going to

do it. I refuse to.”

Canady began driving the crew back to R Construction’s yard and called “the next higher

up” person at the company, Nathan. According to Canady, when he told Nathan what occurred,

Nathan chuckled and said: “I can’t believe the guy said that, but I’ll look into it.” When Canady

arrived at R Construction’s shop, Meyer invited him into the office to talk. Canady testified Meyer

told him to stand down and teach Josh Manley, a white employee, Canady’s job so that he could

pose as the supervisor for the EOG mud engineer because R Construction needed to finish the job. 1

Manley had only been on the job for approximately a month and didn’t have the specialized

experience and skills for the job that Canady possessed; nevertheless, Manley was instructed to

see if the EOG mud engineer had a problem with R Construction in general or if he had a concern

with an African American crew. According to Canady, Manley reported to Meyer that the EOG

mud engineer was “kind of fishy” and Canady was instructed by Meyer to leave the job site.

Canady testified he went home and cried.

The next day, Meyer told Canady that he would take care of the issue regarding the EOG

mud engineer’s remarks made the previous day. Two weeks later, Canady was dispatched to a

different job site where the same EOG mud engineer was working. When Canady discovered the

mud engineer who made the KKK remarks was at the site, he left the job and returned to R

1
Canady testified: “[Meyer] told me to take Josh Manley back with me, to stand down and to show Josh my job, that
we needed to finish the job and we wanted to figure out [if the EOG mud engineer was] really being a butt or not.”

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Construction’s yard. EOG reported that Canady’s crew left the site. When the crew returned to

the yard, Nathan pulled Canady aside and asked Canady what he expected Nathan to do. Canady

replied: “Do something. . . . [P]ush it to the top.” Nathan told Canady if he pushes Canady’s

complaint any further, then R Construction will be losing business with EOG. Canady told Nathan

he did not care and did not want to work with the EOG mud engineer. Nathan said he would see

what he could do.

In the months after Canady reported the EOG mud engineer’s KKK remarks, he was

subjected to drug testing and was subjected to disciplinary actions for alleged work violations.

Prior to Canady reporting the KKK remarks, he had never received a reprimand for work

violations. Meyer fired Canady after the third reprimand. Canady sued R Construction alleging

Meyer issued the reprimands as a pretext to fire him in retaliation for opposing the EOG mud

engineer’s comments, which he believed to be discriminatory and racially harassing.

At trial, R Construction argued Canady was fired because he violated company policy three

different times and caused R Construction to lose a client. Canady, of course, argued he was the

victim of retaliatory discharge. A jury found in favor of Canady and awarded him $415,000 in

back pay, $100,000 in compensatory damages, $50,000 in future compensatory damages, and

$750,000 in punitive damages. The trial court remitted the punitive damages to $50,000 in

accordance with the statutory cap, awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $55,297.50, and

adopted the remaining damages awarded by the jury in its final judgment.

R Construction filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict arguing there is

insufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings. The motion was overruled by operation of

law. R Construction appeals.

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SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT RETALIATION CLAIM

Canady brought a retaliation claim under section 21.055 of the Texas Commission on

Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”). See TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 21.055. Under that provision of

the TCHRA, an employer commits an unlawful employment practice if the employer retaliates or

discriminates against a person who opposes a discriminatory practice. See id. Canady asserted at

trial that he was terminated by R Construction because he reported racially discriminatory remarks

made by EOG’s mud engineer. To the question of whether R Construction discharged Canady

because of his opposition to a discriminatory practice, the jury answered: “Yes.”

R Construction presents nine different arguments across its first nine issues supporting its

contention that it did not engage in discriminatory practices and did not terminate Canady in

retaliation for reporting or opposing the KKK comments made by the EOG mud engineer. Several

of R Construction’s issues focus on elements of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

framework to show a prima facie case of retaliation under the TCHRA. 2 However, that analysis

is only appropriate when the case has not yet been fully tried on the merits. See Wal-Mart Stores,

Inc. v. Canchola, 121 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003) (“In discrimination cases that have not been

fully tried on the merits, we apply the burden-shifting analysis established by the United States

Supreme Court.” (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973))). “But

when a discrimination case has been fully tried on its merits, as in this case, a reviewing court does

not engage in a burden-shifting analysis.” Canchola, 121 S.W.3d at 739. “Instead, we inquire

2
R Construction also argues the one “offhand” comment by the EOG mud engineer is not protected activity under the
TCHRA. But the protected activity was not being subjected to the KKK comment. The protected activity was
Canady’s opposition to the comment. See San Antonio Water Sys. v. Nicholas, 461 S.W.3d 131, 137 (Tex. 2015)
(“Opposition to a discriminatory practice is a protected activity irrespective of the merits of the underlying
discrimination claim.”). “However, to establish an employee opposed a discriminatory practice, the employee must
demonstrate a good-faith, reasonable belief that the underlying discriminatory practice violated the TCHRA.” Id.
Here, the record clearly shows that Canady was upset by the KKK comments, he immediately reported it to R
Construction’s management, and Canady repeatedly pressed the issue when he did not see R Construction address it.
Clearly, Canady had a good-faith, reasonable belief that the KKK comment violated the TCHRA.

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whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s ultimate finding.” Id.; see also

Pineda v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 360 F.3d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (“When there has been a trial on the merits, the evaluation process is streamlined and we

proceed directly to the ultimate question of whether the plaintiff presented enough evidence for a

jury to find that discrimination occurred.”). 3 Accordingly, we construe R Construction’s first nine

issues as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict that R

Construction terminated Canady in retaliation for reporting racially discriminatory conduct. 4

When an appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence on an adverse finding

for which the appellant did not have the burden of proof, the appellant must show no evidence

exists to support the adverse findings. Eagle Rock Timber, Inc. v. Rock Hard Rental, LLC,

672 S.W.3d 438, 448 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. denied). “We will sustain a legal

sufficiency or ‘no-evidence’ challenge if the record shows one of the following: (1) a complete

absence of evidence of a vital fact, (2) rules of law or evidence bar the court from giving weight

to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is

no more than a scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact.”

Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Williams, 360 S.W.3d 15, 21 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 810 (Tex. 2005)).

We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, indulging every reasonable

inference that would support it while disregarding all contrary evidence that a reasonable factfinder

could have disbelieved. Eagle Rock Timber, 672 S.W.3d at 448; see also City of Keller,

3
One of TCHRA’s purposes is to provide for the execution of the policies of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
See TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 21.001(1); Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tex. 2001).
“Therefore, analogous federal statutes and the cases interpreting them guide our reading of the TCHRA.” Toennies,
47 S.W.3d at 476.
4
R Construction contends the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law. We construe this as a legal sufficiency
challenge. Because R Construction does not assert a factual sufficiency challenge in its brief, we do not review the
factual sufficiency of the evidence here.

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168 S.W.3d at 822. “If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support a finding, it must be

upheld.” Eagle Rock Timber, 672 S.W.3d at 448. However, “a jury ‘may not, from meager

circumstantial evidence, reasonably infer an ultimate fact, none more probable than another.’” SCI

Funeral Servs., LLC v. Moss, No. 02-24-00182-CV, 2025 WL 876782, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Mar. 20, 2025, pet. denied) (quoting Williams, 360 S.W.3d at 21). “When the evidence

offered to prove a vital fact is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of

its existence, the evidence is no more than a scintilla and, in legal effect, is no evidence.” Williams,

360 S.W.3d at 21 (alteration omitted).

A remedy for retaliation under TCHRA “only exists when the evidence establishes that a

materially adverse employment action resulted from the employee’s protected activity.” Boxer

Prop. Mgmt. Corp. v. Dehnel, No. 02-22-00336-CV, 2024 WL 3282541, at *22 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth July 3, 2024, pet. denied). “An employee claiming retaliation must prove that but for [his]

protected conduct, [his] employer’s prohibited conduct would not have occurred when it did.” See

id. (citing Apache Corp. v. Davis, 627 S.W.3d 324, 325 (Tex. 2021)).

At trial, it was Canady’s burden to prove that he was terminated in retaliation for opposing

racially discriminatory conduct at the EOG jobsite. Thus, the question here is whether the evidence

is legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding that but for Canady’s opposition to and reporting

of racially discriminatory conduct, R Construction would not have terminated Canady when it did.

See Davis, 627 S.W.3d at 335, 337 (Tex. 2021); see also Pineda, 360 F.3d at 487 (“We have

consistently held that in retaliation cases where the defendant has proffered a nondiscriminatory

purpose for the adverse employment action[,] the plaintiff has the burden of proving that ‘but for’

the discriminatory purpose he would not have been terminated.”). “The but-for causation standard

prevents ‘an employee who knows that []he is about to be fired for poor performance’ from

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profiting off of ‘an unfounded charge of discrimination’ made to protect [him]self from an

unrelated employment action.’” Davis, 627 S.W.3d at 335–36 (alterations omitted) (quoting Univ.

of Tex. SW. Medical Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 358 (2013)).

Although not meant to supplant the “but-for” standard, the supreme court has identified

factors a reviewing court may consider when determining whether the circumstantial evidence

supports a jury’s verdict that but-for engaging in the protected activity, the plaintiff would not have

been terminated. Davis, 627 S.W.3d at 336. Those factors, as modified for this case, include:

(1) the temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse action; (2) knowledge

of the protected activity by those making the decision on termination; (3) expression of a negative

attitude toward the employee’s engagement in the protected activity; (4) the employer’s failure to

adhere to established company policies; (5) discriminatory treatment in comparison to similarly

situated employees; and (6) evidence that the stated reason for the discharge was false. Alamo

Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 790 (Tex. 2018); Davis, 627 S.W.3d at 326

n.3; Dehnel, 2024 WL 3282541, at *23.

“An adverse employment action based solely on reasons unrelated to the protected conduct

destroys the causal link.” Dehnel, 2024 WL 3282541, at *22 (citing Davis, 627 S.W.3d at 325).

And when a defendant employer proffers a permissible explanation for the termination, the

plaintiff must offer some evidence that permits the jury to infer that the defendant’s proffered

explanation for the plaintiff’s termination was a pretext for retaliation. Pineda, 360 F.3d at 487.

The jury “may not simply choose to disbelieve the employer’s explanation in the absence of any

evidence showing why it should do so.” Id.; see also Davis, 627 S.W.3d at 335 (“In analyzing

what the causal connection between protected activity and an unlawful response must be to

establish liability under the [TCHRA], we [previously] reasoned that ‘[a]n employer who has

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sufficient sound reasons for discharging an employee should not incur liability merely for disliking

the employee for reporting illegal conduct when that dislike played no part in the disputed

personnel actions.’” (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629. 635

(Tex. 1995))). While this “but-for” causation standard “best protects employees from unlawful

retaliation without punishing employers for legitimately sanctioning misconduct or harboring bad

motive never acted upon,” an employee is not required to prove that his protected activity “was

the sole reason for his employer’s adverse actions.” Davis, 627 S.W.3d at 335 (acknowledging

the but-for standard first presented in Hinds did not require an employee to prove that reporting an

illegal activity under the Whistleblower Act was the sole reason for termination, and recognizing

the same standard applies in cases alleging retaliation for opposing discriminatory practices under

section 21.055 of the TCHRA).

“Further, an employer is not forbidden from addressing performance issues involving

employees who have engaged in protected activity, including following through on known

preexisting issues and addressing existing issues that come to light only during subsequent

investigation.” Dehnel, 2024 WL 3282541, at *23 (citing Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 791–92). The

issue instead “is whether the employer’s perception of the problems—accurate or not—was the

real reason for termination.” Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 792. “And context is critical in a legal-

sufficiency review because ‘the lack of supporting evidence may not appear until all the evidence

is reviewed in context.’” Dehnel, 2024 WL 3282541, at *23 (quoting Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 793).

Here, Canady reported the EOG mud engineer’s KKK remarks immediately, and he drove

off the EOG jobsite returning to R Construction’s yard. Canady discussed the issue with Meyer

in his office with a few other members of R Construction’s management team. 5 It is undisputed

5
Although Canady did speak with Meyer when he returned to R Construction’s yard, it is unclear whether the
conversation involving other members of management occurred that day or the next day.

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that Meyer sent Canady and his crew back to the EOG jobsite. However, this time, Canady

testified he was ordered to “stand down” as the crew leader and let a less-experienced, new, white

employee, Josh Manley, pose as the crew leader even though Manley had never been a crew leader

before. Once Canady showed Manley what needed to be done, he left the EOG jobsite again.

Canady testified Manley, who was previously a subordinate to Canady, was subsequently

promoted to a position superior to Canady and was given a raise. 6 According to Canady, Manley

was given his position as crew leader after Canady was fired. Canady’s testimony regarding

Manley was corroborated by Jeramee Strain, who was another member of Canady’s crew.

Meyer acknowledged that R Construction’s company policy was to investigate claims of

discrimination or racial harassment and that the policy applied even if the discrimination or

harassment came from vendors, customers, or clients. Meyer conceded he had an obligation to

investigate the issue and to report it to the company’s human resources department. When asked

whether he reported the KKK remarks made by EOG’s mud engineer to human resources, Meyer

stated he could not recall. Meyer stated the claim was discussed with Canady and other members

of management. According to Meyer, a member of the sales team was supposed to investigate the

claim of racial harassment but Meyer was unaware that any formal investigation took place. Meyer

also stated he was unaware of any report or documentation of the alleged investigation. Meyer

conceded he never spoke with EOG or the mud engineer about the allegations of discrimination

and racial harassment. Meyer acknowledged he had a duty to report the allegation to his superiors

but stated Canady did not want to push the issue because he was worried R Construction would

lose business and Canady was concerned about losing hours to work. Canady vehemently disputed

Meyer’s statement that Canady did not want to push the issue. Although Meyer testified he

6
The evidence is disputed on whether Manley was given a temporary, supervisory job to help Meyer out for a month
or whether it was a permanent promotion that was later taken away by the owner of the company.

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interviewed members of Canady’s crew to determine what happened, Brandon Moore, another

member of Canady’s crew, disputed this testimony stating he was never interviewed or questioned

by Meyer or anyone else at R Construction regarding the incident.

The jury heard testimony that Canady complained to several different members of

management that he felt like he was being singled-out and discriminated against after he

complained about the KKK comment. Canady pointed to Meyer’s order for him to stand down to

Manley while he posed as the crew leader. Canady also pointed to Manley’s promotion, albeit

temporary, and testified that he told management that he thought he was being subjected to

excessive drug testing and was targeted with disciplinary reprimands after he complained about

the mud engineer’s KKK remarks.

Finally, Canady testified that his hours working as a crew leader were significantly reduced

after his complaint. Moore corroborated Canady’s testimony stating he noticed Canady’s hours

were reduced after he reported the EOG mud engineer’s KKK comments. The jury was presented

with evidence showing Canady’s hours fluctuated based on the jobs R Construction received from

its customers and these fluctuations were reflected in Canady’s timesheet before and after Canady

complained about the KKK remarks. 7 R Construction presented evidence showing Canady’s hours

were not drastically reduced after the complaint. However, Canady testified he had to seek work

from another manager within the company doing different work to maintain his hours because

Meyer reduced Canady’s workload as a roustabout after he opposed the EOG mud engineer’s

7
Canady’s timesheet showing his weekly hours during the entire duration of his employment with R Construction
was admitted into evidence. Canady’s hours from mid-March 2018 through July 2018 shows Canady averaged
approximately 66.92 hours per week. Canady’s hours from mid-March 2019 through July 2019 shows Canady
averaged approximately 62.26 hours per week. However, Canady pointed out for the jury that his hours from
June 2018 through December 2018 averaged approximately 76.58 hours per week. The jury also heard testimony that
Canady had to work in a non-supervisory role in a different division of the company to maintain his hours after he
complained about the KKK comment.

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conduct. Canady also stated he was unable to maintain his supervisory role while working for the

other manager.

At trial, Meyer contended Canady was not fired for his opposition to discrimination; rather,

Meyer stated Canady was fired pursuant to R Construction’s progressive disciplinary policy. R

Construction presented evidence showing Canady received three different disciplinary reprimands

that it claims were the bases to terminate his employment. R Construction’s handbook, which was

admitted into evidence, provides that upon the first instance of misconduct, an employee will

receive an oral warning. Although the warning is called an oral warning, the handbook states that

the employee’s supervisor will discuss the misconduct with the employee and a written “notation

regarding the discussion will be made in [the employee’s] personnel record for the sole purpose of

documenting the oral warning.” At trial, this was referred to as an oral reprimand or oral warning.

Then, the handbook provides that “[u]pon the occurrence of a second infraction,” the employer’s

supervisor and an officer of R Construction will discuss the misconduct with the employee and

“[a] written [m]emo will be placed in [the employee’s] personnel file in order to keep record of

the infraction.” At trial, this was referred to as a written reprimand or a “write-up.” Although not

in the handbook, Meyer testified the third step in the progressive disciplinary policy was

suspension. Finally, the handbook provides that “[e]mployees who either fail to improve their

performance and/or behavior following repeated warning or commit a very serious infraction will

be subject to immediate termination.” Notwithstanding the progressive disciplinary policy, the

handbook warns that “some acts of misconduct are so severe as to be grounds for immediate

termination at” R Construction’s sole discretion and the progressive disciplinary policy does not

modify the at-will employment relationship between R Construction and its employees. An oral

warning is the lowest level of discipline and termination is the highest level of discipline.

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R Construction used a form when issuing reprimands. On the form, the supervisor issuing

the reprimand can check boxes indicating the reprimand is an oral warning, a written warning,

suspension, or termination. The form also has a place for the supervisor to write in the infraction

for which the reprimand was being issued.

(A) The Safety Meeting

The first reprimand R Construction argues justifies Canady’s discharge was issued because

Canady missed a safety meeting on June 18, 2019. Canady admitted he missed the safety meeting

but testified the meeting occurred on his day off. According to Canady, R Construction had an

unwritten policy that employees were not required to attend safety meetings if they were just

coming off a long shift or it was their day off. Canady testified R Construction would have

multiple safety meetings in the month that covered the same information so everyone could attend

the safety meeting during their shift. According to Canady, each employee was only required to

attend one safety meeting per month. Canady testified that he and his crew came off a fourteen-

hour shift at 5:00 AM the day of the meeting, which was scheduled for 7:00 AM. According to

Canady, he was off the day of the meeting and returned the next day to a nine-hour shift.

Timesheets were admitted into evidence corroborating Canady’s testimony.

Meyer testified the safety meeting was a “stand-down safety meeting” that everyone was

required to attend even on their day off. However, his testimony was inconsistent. For example,

he could not say whether he had conveyed to Canady’s crew that the meeting was a mandatory

“stand-down safety meeting” that should be treated differently than any other safety meeting.

Meyer first stated everyone was supposed to attend safety meetings on their days off but then

changed his testimony later stating it depends on what time the employee got off their shift. Meyer

maintained that Canady was not off on the day of the safety meeting but then couldn’t explain why

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Canady did not have any hours on his paystub showing he worked the day of the meeting or why

Canady’s write up did not state that he failed to show up to work.

Although this was Canady’s first infraction with the company, Meyer testified he skipped

the oral warning in the progressive disciplinary policy and checked the box stating this was a

written reprimand. The reprimand also stated that Canady refused to sign it because Meyer had

left it on the bulletin board inside his office before he left town and, when he returned, it was still

not signed. Canady disputed Meyer’s testimony that Canady received a written reprimand and

stated the reprimand was an oral write-up when it was posted on the bulletin, indicating Meyer

may have changed it to a written reprimand sometime later. Canady admitted he refused to sign

the reprimand because the safety meeting occurred on his day off and he was not required to attend.

Canady asked Meyer why he was written up for missing a safety meeting on his day off. According

to Canady, Meyer told him not to worry about the write-up because Meyer realized Canady had

just gotten off a long shift before the meeting.

(B) The Verbal Altercation

The second reprimand was issued because Canady and another coworker, CJ, got into an

argument at a customer’s well site on July 21, 2019. The jury heard testimony that CJ was

distracted by his phone while he was running an industrial forklift. Canady told CJ to get off his

phone while he was operating the forklift, which caused tension between Canady and CJ. At some

point, CJ ran the forklift into one of the work trucks and busted out the windshield with the pipe

that he was carrying on the forklift. Canady and CJ got into a verbal altercation, and Canady

immediately contacted Meyer to report the incident. Meyer told Canady and CJ that they needed

to cool down and get it together. He also told Canady to move the work truck so the customer

would not see the damage or that an accident had occurred. At some point, Canady reported that

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he and CJ worked out their issues, everything was okay between them, and they had finished the

job.

Meyer testified he was not going to write up Canady and CJ so long as the customer did

not complain. Several days later, Meyer called Canady and CJ into his office to issue them a

reprimand because he alleged the customer complained about their altercation.

(C) The RamTex Job

R Construction has several yards in Texas from where it operates, and each yard is in a

different geographical region. R Construction was hired by a company called RamTex to wash an

oil rig in La Grange, Texas. Although La Grange was in the geographical region of R

Construction’s Buffalo, Texas yard, Canady’s crew was sent from the Floresville yard to relieve a

Buffalo crew that was washing an oil rig in La Grange on July 24, 2019. The third reprimand

arose from this job.

R Construction was working around the clock to wash this oil rig. The Buffalo crew

worked the twelve-hour shift before Canady’s crew arrived and took over again after Canady’s

crew completed their twelve-hour shift. The jury heard evidence that this oil rig washing job was

very difficult work. The crew was working in temperatures that exceeded 100 degrees and were

using power washers that spray hot water to wash oil-based mud off the rig.

Meyer testified RamTex later fired R Construction because Canady’s crew was lazy and

took too many breaks. However, Meyer acknowledged that OSHA regulations required Canady’s

crew to take a break every hour of the twelve-hour shift in those conditions. Meyer also conceded

he did not know how many breaks Canady’s crew took during their shift or for how long the breaks

lasted. There was a picture admitted into evidence showing R Construction employees taking a

break. On cross-examination, Canady’s counsel questioned Meyer about his deposition testimony

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identifying Canady as one of the employees pictured taking a break. At trial, however, Meyer

testified he could not identify the men in the picture. Both men in the picture also wore white hard

hats and the jury heard testimony that only Canady wore a white hard hat in his crew, indicating

the picture may have been of a different crew.

Meyer also contradicted himself at one point when he stated the Buffalo crew had to

complete the job, indicating R Construction was not fired from the RamTex job. Meyer’s

testimony regarding Canady’s crew’s work ethic was also directly contradicted by Canady and

Strain. Strain testified RamTex was upset when Canady’s crew arrived at the jobsite because the

Buffalo crew was not making any progress. Canady stated no one from RamTex complained about

the work Canady’s crew was doing and they were paid compliments on their work ethic when they

first started their shift. Strain corroborated Canady’s account stating Canady’s crew made progress

on the oil rig pressure washing job and RamTex employees began giving compliments to Canady’s

crew. Strain testified Canady’s crew worked a twelve-hour shift in personal protective equipment

and had to take breaks to cool off but he disputed Meyer’s testimony that they were fired for taking

too many breaks. Rather, Strain testified RamTex was pleased with the work done by Canady’s

crew when they left the jobsite.

Meyer told Canady to keep an eye on his phone because they may be sent back to La

Grange to finish the job for the Buffalo crew. Canady was subsequently told that RamTex fired R

Construction from the job and his crew would not be returning to relieve the Buffalo crew.

However, Canady received this news after the Buffalo crew relieved Canady’s crew indicating it

was the Buffalo crew’s work and not Canady’s crew that RamTex was displeased with.

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(D) The Day Canady’s Employment was Terminated

On July 26, 2019, Meyer called Canady and CJ into his office to tell them he was issuing

a written reprimand for being unprofessional on the jobsite where the forklift incident occurred.

Canady said he would sign the reprimand but asked whether CJ would be further disciplined for

insubordination and running the forklift into the truck. Meyer then asked CJ to leave and told

Canady he was being fired for accumulating too many reprimands, referring to the safety meeting,

the verbal altercation, and the RamTex job. That day Meyer issued a written reprimand for the

verbal altercation that had occurred five days earlier and a second reprimand stating Canady was

fired for “Insubordination—causing company to be terminated from that job[,]” referring to the

RamTex job.

Application

Our review requires us to determine whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to

conclude that but for Canady’s opposition to discriminatory conduct, R Construction would not

have fired him when it did. Because Canady relied on circumstantial evidence to prove his case,

we review these reprimands and the circumstances surrounding Canady’s discharge by considering

the factors mentioned above to determine whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to

conclude those reprimands were issued merely as a pretext to fire Canady in retaliation for his

opposition to discrimination.

(1) Temporal Proximity

Regarding temporal proximity between Canady’s complaint of the EOG mud engineer’s

KKK comments and Canady’s discharge, the evidence shows that Canady never received a

reprimand before his complaint of racial harassment. It was not until after he opposed what he

perceived to be discriminatory conduct that Canady received the three reprimands R Construction

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contends led to Canady’s termination. Although Canady was not fired until approximately four

months after Canady’s first complaint, the jury heard testimony that Canady continued to press the

issue with R Construction during that time period. Canady testified every time he complained

about R Construction’s inaction to address the EOG mud engineer’s KKK remarks, his hours were

reduced or he endured some form of negative reaction from R Construction. The jury also heard

testimony that Canady was excessively drug tested in the months following his complaint, and that

he was subjected to more monitored drug tests than other employees. When Canady complained

the third or fourth time, he testified he was issued the second and third reprimand all at once and

immediately terminated.

(2) Knowledge of the Protected Activity by Decision Maker

It is undisputed that Meyer was Canady’s direct supervisor. Canady immediately

complained to Meyer after EOG’s mud engineer made the KKK remarks to Canady’s crew. It is

also undisputed that in the months after Canady began complaining about the KKK comments,

Meyer issued the three reprimands leading up to Canady’s termination, and Meyer was the one

who terminated Canady’s employment for cause.

(3) Expression of a Negative Attitude Toward Canady’s Opposition to Racial Harassment.

Although Meyer testified he would take Canady’s concerns to the top, the jury heard

evidence that Canady was warned R Construction could lose EOG’s business if Canady pursued

the issue. Then, Meyer sent Manley, who was white, with Canady’s crew to pose as the crew’s

supervisor so that he could interact with the EOG mud engineer instead of Canady. A reasonable

juror could credit this as evidence suggesting R Construction was more concerned with keeping

EOG’s business than addressing the discriminatory conduct.

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Canady testified his hours were cut by Meyer or he endured some sort of negative reaction

from R Construction every time he complained R Construction was not addressing his racial

harassment complaint. As mentioned above, the jury heard evidence that Canady was only able

to maintain consistent hours by taking work in a non-supervisory role from another manager in the

company doing a different type of work.

Moreover, the jury heard testimony that there was no meaningful investigation into the

incident at the EOG jobsite. The jury could have inferred R Construction had a negative attitude

towards Canady’s complaint because it failed to follow its own company policy to thoroughly and

promptly investigate the incident.

Based on this evidence, the jury could have concluded that Meyer’s actions reflected a

negative attitude toward Canady for his opposition to racial harassment and discriminatory

conduct.

(4) Employer’s Failure to Adhere to Established Company Policies

As mentioned above, Meyer did not follow company policy when Canady reported the

KKK comment by EOG’s mud engineer. Nevertheless, R Construction contends Canady’s

employment was terminated in accordance with the company’s progressive disciplinary policy.

Meyer testified Canady performed well in his role when he first came to work for R

Construction. Canady was never demoted and never received a reprimand before he complained

about the KKK remarks from the EOG jobsite. Meyer testified issues with Canady existed prior

to the incident at the EOG jobsite but Meyer was not able to support his contention with

documentation even though R Construction’s policy was to document oral reprimands.

Canady admitted he missed the safety meeting. However, as mentioned above, Canady

testified he was following the longstanding policy that crews were not required to attend safety

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meetings on their days off or when they were coming off a long shift. Meyer acknowledged crews

were not always required to attend safety meetings after they came off a long shift but still

maintained that Canady was required to attend the June 18, 2019 meeting. Because there was

conflicting testimony on whether Canady was required to attend the June 18, 2019 safety meeting,

the jury could have resolved that conflicting testimony in Canady’s favor. See Horton v. Kan. City

S. Railway Co., 692 S.W.3d 112, 135–36 (Tex. 2024) (providing it is the jury’s role to resolve any

conflicting evidence and “[w]e cannot substitute our judgment for the jury’s”).

Canady also acknowledged his infraction when he got into the verbal altercation with CJ.

Meyer initially testified the argument between Canady and CJ did not play a role in his decision

to terminate Canady but then clarified that it did play a role in his decision to terminate Canady’s

employment. Then, Canady’s counsel impeached Meyer with deposition testimony where Meyer

stated the altercation with CJ did not play a role in his decision to fire Canady. Of course, the jury

could have considered Meyer’s equivocal testimony when assessing his credibility.

Finally, there was conflicting testimony on whether R Construction was fired from the

RamTex job because of Canady and his crew or if the Buffalo crew caused R Construction to lose

the RamTex job. Again, the jury could have resolved this conflicting evidence in Canady’s favor.

See id.

R Construction’s progressive discipline policy anticipates terminating an employee for

repeated offenses concerning the same conduct. However, none of the reprimands R Construction

proffered to justify Canady’s termination have the box checked saying Canady has had a similar

prior offense. Although Canady acknowledged he missed the safety meeting and participated in

the verbal altercation with CJ, it is not unreasonable for the jury to conclude that each of these

offenses are distinct infractions that would each only warrant oral reprimands. This further lends

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credence to the jury’s conclusion that the reprimands were just pretexts to fire Canady for opposing

racial discrimination.

The jury could have also questioned Meyer’s motive for terminating Canady’s employment

because he failed to issue a reprimand for the verbal altercation until the day he fired Canady.

Meyer admitted, however, that he is supposed to issue reprimands when the infraction occurs.

Although Meyer stated he was not going to write up Canady for this altercation unless the customer

who owned the well site where the altercation took place complained, the jury was entitled to

disbelieve Meyer and could have instead concluded that Meyer was looking for a pretext to fire

Canady.

(5) Discriminatory Treatment in Comparison to Similarly Situated Employees

The evidence also shows that Canady received disparate treatment from other similarly-

situated employees. For example, Canady received a written reprimand when he missed the safety

meeting whereas the other members of his crew that missed the meeting were all given oral

reprimands. It is undisputed that this was Canady’s first reprimand under the progressive

disciplinary policy, and R Construction provided no explanation why Canady was treated

differently from the other employees that missed the safety meeting. Meyer conceded at trial that

Canady was the only employee to receive a written reprimand while the other employees that

missed the meeting only received oral reprimands. Meyer also conceded this was Canady’s first

reprimand and could not explain why he did not receive an oral reprimand rather than a written

reprimand.

The jury could also infer that Canady’s crew were not told about the safety meeting because

members of Canady’s crew were the only employees that missed it. At the very least, the jury

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could have concluded that Meyer failed to convey the mandatory nature of the meeting or that

Canady would be reprimanded if he missed it.

Additionally, Meyer’s handling of the verbal altercation between Canady and CJ showed

disparate treatment. On Canady’s reprimand, Meyer checked the box that stated the infraction

adversely affected the safety of an employee or the welfare of others. However, CJ’s reprimand

does not have this box checked.

Finally, the jury could have concluded Canady was treated differently than every other

member of his crew after the fallout from the RamTex job. Canady was terminated because Meyer

blamed him for losing RamTex as a customer. The reprimands for three of Canady’s crew

members following the RamTex job were admitted into evidence. Two of the three reprimands

have two boxes checked: one showing it was an oral reprimand and another showing the crew was

suspended for two days. Although Strain’s form did not have the suspension box checked, it had

dates of suspension filled out. All three reprimands have the same dates of suspension filled in.

Meyer testified he terminated Canady while the rest of his crew received suspensions

because Canady was the crew’s supervisor and R Construction lost the customer on Canady’s

watch. On all three of the crew members’ reprimands, the portion pertaining to suspension was

filled out with red ink while the other relevant portions were filled out with blue ink. Meyer could

not explain why he used two different color pens to fill out the forms other than to say he may

have begun filling the forms out the day before meeting with the employees. Canady’s counsel

elicited testimony indicating Meyer checked the box for oral reprimand and may have added the

suspension to the form after he terminated Canady to make it look like the treatment between

Canady and his crew was not so disparate.

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This inference is supported by Strain’s testimony stating he signed his reprimand but that

the suspension dates on the reprimand were not there when he signed the reprimand. He further

testified he was never suspended for the RamTex fallout and Meyer never mentioned suspension

when the reprimand was issued. Although the exhibits in the appellate record are in greyscale, it

is clear that the suspension portion of all three reprimands were filled in with a different pen than

the one used to fill out the other portions of the reprimands.

Based on this evidence, the jury could have reasonably rejected Meyer’s testimony

regarding the reprimands and instead could have concluded that Meyer doctored the reprimands

to make it look like Canady and his crew were treated similarly and Canady was only fired because

he was the supervisor. With Meyer’s credibility in question, and considering Canady’s last two

reprimands were filled out on the same day—even though the infractions occurred on different

days—the jury could have reasonably concluded that Meyer was creating documents as a pretext

to fire Canady in retaliation for his opposition to the KKK remarks made by EOG’s mud engineer.

“In reviewing the legal sufficiency of evidence to support a jury verdict, we honor the rule

that the jurors are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their

testimony, and it is their role to resolve any conflicts in the evidence.” Horton, 692 S.W.3d at 135

(internal quotation marks omitted). The circumstances surrounding the reprimands—especially

the inexplicable use of two different pens on the three crew members’ reprimands arising from the

RamTex job—is compelling evidence that permitted the jury to find that Meyer used the

progressive disciplinary policy as a pretext to fire Canady for an impermissible reason.

(6) Evidence the Stated Reason for Discharge was False

The jury also heard evidence indicating R Construction’s stated reason for Canady’s

discharge was false. As mentioned above, the circumstances surrounding the RamTex job and the

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reprimands arising from that job were compelling evidence that Meyer’s stated reason—the

progressive discipline policy—was merely a pretext to fire Canady in retaliation for his opposition

to the KKK remarks made by EOG’s mud engineer. Thus, on this evidence, the jury could have

reasonably concluded that R Construction’s stated reason for firing Canady was false.

In addition, Meyer did not write Canady up for the verbal altercation with CJ until several

days later when Meyer decided to fire Canady. Meyer stated he told Canady he would not write

him up for the altercation so long as the customer did not complain. Meyer testified the customer

later complained and that is why he issued the written reprimands against Canady and CJ. But this

reprimand was issued simultaneously with the reprimand from the RamTex job. Meyer then

proceeded to fire Canady because he missed the safety meeting, he got into an altercation with CJ

at a customer’s wellsite, and the RamTex oil rig was not cleaned properly.

The jury also could have concluded the termination from the RamTex job was a pretext to

fire Canady for an impermissible reason because all the testimony from Canady’s crew

consistently stated they worked hard and were complimented by RamTex. R Construction was

not fired from the RamTex job while Canady’s crew was working. Rather, it was the Buffalo crew

that was working when RamTex fired R Construction. Meyer could not confirm whether Canady’s

crew took breaks, how many breaks they took, or how long the breaks lasted. He could not identify

the men in the picture that was provided by RamTex showing a crew taking a break. In fact, the

testimony indicated it could have been an entirely different crew. Even if the evidence

conclusively established Canady and his crew were the men depicted in the picture, which it does

not, the jury heard evidence that OSHA requirements mandate the crew take a break every hour in

the extreme heat conditions the men were working. The jury was the ultimate factfinder and could

have disbelieved Meyer’s testimony that Canady was fired from the fallout of the RamTex job,

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especially considering the jury heard evidence that Meyer’s testimony at trial was inconsistent

with his deposition testimony. Rather, the jury could have believed the consistent testimony from

the members of Canady’s crew that they worked hard, were complimented by RamTex, and that

the Buffalo crew got R Construction fired from the RamTex job. Considering all of this evidence,

the jury could have reasonably concluded that the fallout from the RamTex job was simply a

pretext to fire Canady for his repeated opposition to the KKK remarks made at the EOG jobsite.

The evidence regarding excessive drug testing was disputed. R Construction presented

evidence that Canady was randomly selected by a third-party provider to be drug tested in May

and June 2019. David Evans, a safety officer at R Construction, testified R Construction has no

control over who gets selected for random drug tests. Evans also testified Canady was subjected

to reasonable suspicion drug tests because his urine was not within an acceptable temperature

range. Finally, Evans testified a customer requested pre-access drug tests for all R Construction

employees that were to work on a particular jobsite. According to Evans, the employees were

required to provide a negative drug test before they would be given access to the customer’s job

site. Canady testified he was subjected to many more drug tests than his peers, his drug tests were

almost always observed, and he pointed out discrepancies in Evans’s testimony using the drug test

log. It was undisputed that Canady tested negative on every drug test he took, even when he had

to take a second “reasonable suspicion” test in the same day because the company asserted his

urine sample from the first test that day was not within the acceptable temperature range. While

Canady’s testimony was also somewhat inconsistent—and he may have been including tests that

were conducted prior to the KKK incident in his allegation of excessive drug testing—the jury as

the factfinder was entitled to assess the credibility of the witnesses. We cannot substitute our

judgment for the jury and must disregard evidence contrary to the jury’s verdict unless a reasonable

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factfinder could not. Here, the jury could have found Canady’s testimony more credible and

concluded that he was subjected to excessive drug testing. Considering the details Canady

described surrounding the drug tests and the timing, the jury could have concluded R Construction

conducted drug tests that were not documented in the drug test log it admitted into evidence. While

R Construction presented evidence to the contrary, the jury could have resolved the disputed

evidence in Canady’s favor and we will not disrupt the jury’s findings.

Finally, Canady testified that one of R Construction’s safety officers told Canady to get an

employment lawyer because he thought Canady was being targeted after he reported the KKK

comment.

In sum, the jury could have reasonably concluded Canady opposed racial discrimination

and was insistent that R Construction “do something” about the treatment he received from EOG’s

mud engineer. The jury could have reasonably concluded that R Construction did not actively

engage in a meaningful investigation into the allegations because it did not want to jeopardize its

business with EOG. The jury could have also reasonably concluded that Canady’s repeated

complaints and insistence that R Construction take meaningful steps to address the comments

made by the EOG mud engineer could pose a problem for R Construction’s prospective business

with EOG and, therefore, R Construction sought a pretext to terminate Canady. Considering the

relevant factors under the appropriate standard of review, we conclude there was sufficient

evidence for the jury to draw a reasonable inference that R Construction’s proffered reasons for

termination under the progressive disciplinary policy were pretexts to terminate Canady in

retaliation for his opposition to racial harassment and discrimination. As such, the evidence was

sufficient for the jury to conclude that but-for Canady’s opposition to the racial harassment, R

Construction would not have fired him when it did.

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Accordingly, R Construction’s first nine issues are overruled.

BACK PAY

In its tenth and eleventh issues, R Construction contends chapter 21 of the labor code only

permits recovery of back pay when it is awarded in conjunction with an order granting relief to

hire, reinstate, or promote the employee.

“Issues of statutory construction are reviewed de novo.” ExxonMobile Pipeline Co. v.

Coleman, 512 S.W.3d 895, 899 (Tex. 2017). “In construing a statute, our objective is to determine

and give effect to the [l]egislature’s intent.” Energen Res. Corp. v. Wallace, 642 S.W.3d 502, 509

(Tex. 2022). “[W]e presume the [l]egislature chose the statute’s language with care, purposefully

choosing each word, while purposefully omitting words not chosen.” In re CenterPoint Energy

Hous. Elec., LLC, 629 S.W.3d 149, 158–59 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding).

However, we also recognize it is “a fundamental principle of statutory construction that

words’ meanings cannot be determined in isolation but must be drawn from the context in which

they are used.” Willacy Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Sebastian Cotton & Grain, Ltd., 555 S.W.3d 29,

39 (Tex. 2018). “In ascertaining legislative intent, we read the entire statute as a whole and do not

consider isolated sections, provisions, or terms in a vacuum.” EXLP Leasing, LLC v. Galveston

Cent. Appraisal Dist., 554 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2018). We presume the legislature wants all

statutory provisions to be fully effective and we may insert additional words into a statutory

provision only when it is necessary to give effect to the clear legislative intent. DLB Architects,

P.C. v. Weaver, 305 S.W.3d 407, 409 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (citing Hunter v. Fort

Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tex. 1981)); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.

§ 311.021. Thus, we must construe statutes in a way that harmonizes and gives effect to the

different provisions when possible. In re Mem’l Hermann Hosp. Sys., 464 S.W.3d 686, 716

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(Tex. 2015) (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 311.025, 311.026(a)); Tex. Indus. Energy

Consumers v. CenterPoint Energy Hous. Elec., LLC, 324 S.W.3d 95, 107 (Tex. 2010).

Section 21.258 provides the equitable relief available to an employee from an employer

who engages in an unlawful employment practice:

(a) On finding that a respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice as
alleged in a complaint, a court may:
(1) prohibit by injunction the respondent from engaging in an unlawful
employment practice; and
(2) order additional equitable relief as may be appropriate.
(b) Additional equitable relief may include:
(1) hiring or reinstating with or without back pay;
(2) upgrading an employee with or without pay;
(3) admitting to or restoring union membership;
(4) admitting to or participating in a guidance program, apprenticeship, or on-
the-job training or other training or retraining program, using objective job-
related criteria in admitting an individual to a program;
(5) reporting on the manner of compliance with the terms of a final order issued
under this chapter; and
(6) paying court costs.
(c) Liability under a back pay award may not accrue for a date more than two years
before the date a complaint is filed with the commission. Interim earnings,
workers’ compensation benefits, and unemployment compensation benefits
received operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.

TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 21.258. Subsection 21.2585(c) of the labor code states compensatory

damages awarded for an unlawful employment practice does not include back pay. See id.

§ 21.2585(c). R Construction correctly contends back pay is not considered compensatory

damages. However, pointing to subsection 21.258(b), R Construction argues that backpay may

only be attained when the trial court orders the employer to hire, reinstate, or promote the

employee. We disagree.

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Subsection 21.258(a) provides that a court may “order additional equitable relief as may

be appropriate” upon a finding that the employer engaged in an unlawful employment practice as

alleged by the employee in a complaint. Id. § 21.258(a)(2). Our sister courts have held “[a]n

employee that asserts a claim under the TCHRA may recover back pay as a form of equitable

relief.” In re Scherer, 684 S.W.3d 875, 890 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, orig. proceeding); W.

Telemarketing Corp. Outbound v. McClure, 225 S.W.3d 658, 667 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, pet.

granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (“[T]he trial court has discretion to award back pay as equitable

relief in a race discrimination lawsuit.”); Shear Cuts, Inc. v. Littlejohn, 141 S.W.3d 264, 271 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (“The trial court has discretion to award back pay as equitable

relief in a race discrimination lawsuit.”); Stanley Stores, Inc. v. Chavana, 909 S.W.2d 554, 563

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1995, writ denied) (“The trial court has discretion to award

back pay as equitable relief in an age discrimination lawsuit.”); City of Austin v. Gifford,

824 S.W.2d 735, 740 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no writ) (rejecting appellant’s argument that back

pay is not allowed under the TCHRA and holding the TCHRA “specifically allows for back pay”).

We agree with our sister courts that “additional equitable relief” in subsection 21.258(a)(2) gives

the trial court broad discretion to order an award of back pay, and we reject R Construction’s

assertion that subsection (b) requires back pay to be awarded only when hiring, reinstating, or

promoting an employee.

The plain language of the statute reinforces our interpretation. In subsection 21.258(b), the

legislature’s use of the words “may include” in the phrase “[a]dditional equitable relief may

include: . . .” indicates the list in that subsection is an example of types of equitable relief rather

than an exhaustive list. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.005(13) (“‘Includes’ and ‘including’

are terms of enlargement and not of limitation or exclusive enumeration, and use of the terms does

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04-25-00053-CV

not create a presumption that components not expressed are excluded.”); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.

§ 311.016(1), (5) (providing “‘[m]ay’ creates discretionary authority or grants permission or a

power” whereas “‘[m]ay not’ imposes a prohibition . . . .”). If the legislature had intended to

exclude back pay as a form of equitable relief, it would have said so plainly. Subsection

21.258(b)(1) and (2) simply clarify that the trial court may award back pay in addition to ordering

the employer to hire, reinstate, or promote the employee so that back pay and those remedies are

not mutually exclusive. The phrase “with or without” indicates back pay is an optional component

that can accompany these remedies; however, an order requiring an employer to hire, reinstate, or

promote an employee is not a mandatory prerequisite to award back pay.

Finally, “[t]he remedies provided under the TCHRA mirror those available under Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964” and “[o]ne of the TCHRA’s purposes is to harmonize state and

federal employment discrimination law.” El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757, 760

(Tex. 2012); see also TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. 21.001(1) (stating one of the general purposes of

chapter 21 is to “provide for the execution of the policies of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 and its subsequent amendments[.]”). Therefore, we look “to federal law in applying our own

statute . . . .” Olivas, 370 S.W.3d at 760; Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 476

(Tex. 2001) (“[A]nalogous federal statutes and the cases interpreting them guide our reading of

the TCHRA.”). Relying on the phrase providing that a court may award “any other equitable relief

as the court deems appropriate” in the analogous federal statute, the Third Circuit concluded

“[b]ack pay is available to a successful Title VII plaintiff under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”

Spencer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 469 F.3d 311, 315 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Consistent with this

language, we have treated back pay as a form of equitable relief . . . .”).

Accordingly, R Constructions tenth and eleventh issues are overruled.

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In its twelfth issue, R Construction contends the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support the $415,000 back pay award.

“In order for a jury award to survive a legal sufficiency challenge, there need only be some

evidence that a substantial loss occurred which affords a reasonable basis for estimating the

amount of that loss.” Tex. Dep’t of Public Safety v. Williams, No. 03-08-00466-CV, 2010 WL

797145, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 19, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (internal quotation marks

and alterations omitted). “While a legal sufficiency inquiry ends when some evidence to support

the award is found, [a] factual sufficiency analysis also examines whether the precise amount of a

jury’s award is proper.” Id. at 7. The jury has the discretion to award damages within the range

of evidence presented at trial so long as a rational basis exists for the jury’s calculation. Id. And

“[s]o long as a rational basis for the calculation of damages exists, a jury’s finding will not be

disregarded merely because its reasoning in arriving at its figure may be unclear.” Id. Where the

evidence supports a range of potentially appropriate awards, the jury award will be factually

sufficient when it does not differ greatly outside that range. Id.

The correct measure of back pay is the amount of money the employee would have earned

had he not been terminated, less the amount the employee earned after he was terminated. A&L

Industrial Servs, Inc. v. Oatis, No. 01-11-00471-CV, 2013 WL 5970933, at *7 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 7, 2013, no pet.); Williams, 2010 WL 797145, at *7; Littlejohn,

141 S.W.3d at 271. “In general, back pay liability in a wrongful termination case commences from

the time the discriminatory conduct causes economic injury and ends upon the date of the

judgment.” Palasota v. Haggar Clothing Co., 499 F.3d 474, 483 (5th Cir. 2007); McClure,

225 S.W.3d at 668 (calculating range of back pay in a sufficiency review from the date of

termination until the month of trial).

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Here, Canady was terminated on July 26, 2019, and the trial court signed the final judgment

on October 29, 2024, a period of approximately 274 weeks. A timesheet showing the hours

Canady worked and how much he was paid per week for the duration of his employment was

admitted into evidence. Canady’s time and wage sheet reflects that Canady earned $2,398.75 in

one week approximately six months before he was terminated. For determining a range, the jury

could have based the top end of the range on the week Canady earned the most money in wages,

which was $2,398.75. See McClure, 225 S.W.3d at 668 (“The jury could have based lost earnings

on Appellee’s highest weekly earnings statement.”). Multiplying the highest wage earned in a

week, $2,398.75, by 274 weeks equals $657,257.50.

The jury heard testimony that Canady earned interim income of approximately $4,000 to

$5,000 at another job in 2019, he earned approximately $40,000 in 2020, and he earned

approximately $19,000 in 2021. Thus, the jury could have concluded the high end of Canady’s

back pay range after deducting his interim earnings is $593,257.50. 8

The jury has discretion to award damages as long as the damage award is within the range

of evidence presented at trial and a rational basis exists for its calculation. Oatis, 2013 WL

5970933, at *7; Williams, 2010 WL 797145, at *5; McClure, 225 S.W.3d at 668 (citing Mayberry

v. Tex. Dep’t of Agric., 948 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, writ denied)). The jury

awarded back pay in the amount of $415,000, well below the high-end range of $593,257.50.

Thus, the jury’s back pay award is within the range of evidence admitted at trial and there is a

rational basis for the jury’s calculation. Because the jury’s award does not differ greatly outside

the permissible range based on the evidence, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the

jury’s back pay award.

8
$657,257.50-$4,000-$40,000-$20,000=$593,257.50.

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In its brief, R Construction proffers calculations to suggest the range of back pay was much

lower. These calculations are based on an average annual salary Canady earned while he was

employed by R Construction. However, most of the wages considered in these calculations were

based on the sixteen-dollar-per-hour rate Canady was earning in 2018 rather than the nineteen

dollars per hour Canady testified he was making when his employment was terminated. Further,

Meyer testified the roustabout’s hours would fluctuate and the jury heard evidence that Canady

expected to work thirty to forty hours of overtime per week. R Construction argues there was no

testimony regarding how much Canady would make per hour for overtime worked. But the jury

could have easily calculated the overtime pay from the time and wage sheet admitted into

evidence. 9

Finally, R Construction argues neither the jury nor the reviewing court is permitted to

consider lost wages for 2022, 2023, or 2024 because there is no evidence of interim earnings after

2021. R Construction does not cite any authority directly supporting this proposition. An absence

of interim earnings evidence does not establish that interim earnings existed but were not

considered in the calculation, such that the evidence no longer supports the back pay award. If R

Construction wanted to limit its liability, it should have elicited testimony or presented evidence

showing Canady had interim earnings after 2021 that would reduce the back pay award. R

Construction did not.

Accordingly, R Construction’s twelfth issue is overruled.

9
The jury could easily calculate Canady was earning approximately $28.50 per hour of overtime. Another rational
basis to support the jury’s calculation is Canady’s testimony that he expected to work thirty to forty hours of overtime
per week. If Canady earned $19 per hour for forty hours per week, his weekly regular pay would be $760. When you
add thirty-five hours per week of overtime pay (35x$28.50=$997.50), Canady’s gross pay per week would be
$1757.50 ($760+$997.50=$1757.50). $1757.50 multiplied by 274 weeks is $481,555. After reducing interim
earnings in the amount of $64,000, the high range based on Canady’s testimony is $417,555. Thus, the jury could
have rationally calculated the back pay award based on Canady’s testimony as well.

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04-25-00053-CV

COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

In its thirteenth through fifteenth issues, R Construction challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence to support the jury’s award of $100,000 in past compensatory damages and $50,000 in

future compensatory damages.

(A) Past Compensatory Damages

Here, the jury question on compensatory damages did not separate damage findings for

each element of compensatory damages. Instead, the jury charge asked what sum of money would

fairly and reasonably compensate Canady for his “[c]ompensatory damages in the past, which

include emotional pain and suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life,

and other noneconomic losses.” The question on future compensatory damages also includes the

same list of compensatory damages. R Construction did not object to these jury questions.

“If a party does not ask for separate damage findings, it can challenge only the sufficiency

of the evidence supporting the entire award of damages.” Oatis, 2013 WL 5970933, at *9. “To

challenge a multi-element damage award on appeal successfully, a party must address all of the

elements of damages and show that the evidence is insufficient to support the entire damage

award.” Id.

R Construction argues the evidence is insufficient to support an award for mental anguish

because the record lacks evidence of the nature, duration, and severity of mental anguish sufficient

to show a substantial disruption in Canady’s daily routine or a high degree of mental pain and

distress that is more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger. See Anderson

v. Durant, 550 S.W.3d 605, 618–19 (Tex. 2018). Then, R Construction contends no meaningful

distinction exists between mental anguish and loss of enjoyment of life. Therefore, it argues an

award for loss of enjoyment of life must fail for the same reasons that an award for mental anguish

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fails. A similar argument was rejected by a federal court that concluded: “Loss of capacity for

enjoyment of life is conceptually distinct from mental anguish.” Chacon v. Copeland,

103 F.Supp.3d 827, 838 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (“For example, a person might lose a foot in an

accident, and experience pain and mental anguish; but once the body heals and the anguish fades,

the harms the person suffers given the loss of the foot, such as difficulty ambulating, or inability

to participate in certain recreational activities, still remain, and are compensable.”). For the reasons

explained in Chacon, and because the legislature listed these elements of compensatory damages

separately in subsection 21.2585(d) of the labor code, we likewise conclude they are separate and

distinct elements of damages See id.; TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 21.2585(d).

Here, the record contains evidence that would certainly support the award of compensatory

damages for the loss of enjoyment of life but also tends to support an award for emotional pain

and suffering. 10 The jury heard testimony that after Canady was terminated, he could no longer

afford basic living costs. Canady testified he lost his house and his vehicle because he could not

afford rent or the car payment, and he was forced to move in with his mother and sleep on her

couch. Notably, Canady testified the financial burden forced him to send his three oldest children

to live with their mother six months before trial because he could not afford to raise them after he

was terminated. The Supreme Court has “declared it plain beyond the need for multiple citation

that a natural parent’s desire for and right to the companionship, care, custody, and management

of his or her children is an interest far more precious than any property right.” Santosky v. Kramer,

455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). Canady testified his wrongful

discharge strained his relationship with his children. Canady explained that he had full custody of

10
In its fifteenth issue, R Construction asks us to determine whether there must be evidence in the record that directly
supports the amount of mental anguish damages awarded pursuant to Gregory v. Chohan, 670 S.W.3d 546, 560–62
(Tex. 2023). Because we need not address the mental anguish element of damages, it is not necessary for us to
determine the binding effect of Gregory. Therefore, we decline to address this issue.

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his three oldest children for fifteen years before he had to send them to live with their mother. He

told the jury that he tried to raise his children to stand up for what’s right, but he testified that when

he stood up for what’s right, he lost everything, including his children. Canady stated his inability

to live up to the example he strived to set for his children was humiliating, stripped him of his

pride, and caused him to lose weight. Canady further testified he hopes he can get his children

back one day when he is able to support them again.

Assuming without deciding there must be evidence of the nature, duration, and severity of

Canady’s loss of enjoyment of life to support the jury’s award, we conclude Canady satisfied this

burden. He testified he had full custody of his children for most, if not all, of their lives. Six

months before trial, Canady had to give up this right because he could no longer afford to rear his

children after he was wrongfully discharged. The loss of enjoyment of life with his children is

significant when considering he previously had full custody of the children before his termination

and, after termination, he was completely unable to care for them or be present in their daily lives.

See Dehnel, 2024 WL 3282541, at *30 (stating, as an example, testimony about “losing time with

family and friends and other substantial impacts on family relationships” is sufficient nature,

duration, and severity evidence to support an award of mental anguish damages).

For these reasons, we hold this record contains sufficient evidence supporting the jury’s

$100,000 award for loss of enjoyment of life. See Smith v. Harrah’s New Orleans Mgmt. Co., 213

F. App’x. 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2007) (“A plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for loss of life

enjoyment if he proves that his lifestyle was detrimentally altered or if he was forced to give up

activities because of his injury.”); Chapin v. Mid-States Motors, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-34-TS,

2007 WL 2164527, at *1 (N.D. Ind. July 25, 2007) (concluding sufficient evidence supported a

$100,000 award for emotional suffering, in part because the plaintiff testified “he was humiliated

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and depressed, he lost physical custody of his children, . . . , he lost his house, he had difficulty

sleeping, and he had stomach pains” after he was wrongfully discharged); Harris v. Reneau, Inc.,

No. 2:20-CV-00849-MHH, 2021 WL 3270495, at *7 (N.D. Ala. July 30, 2021) (concluding

evidence was sufficient to support a $50,000 award of compensatory damages when, as a result of

wrongful termination, the plaintiff’s car was repossessed, she and her children were evicted from

their apartment, she was unable to eat some nights because she had only enough food for her

children, and she was afraid that she would lose custody of her children supported an award of

compensatory damages).

Accordingly, we overrule R Construction’s thirteenth issue.

(B) Future Compensatory Damages

In its fourteenth issue, R Construction challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support

the jury’s $50,000 award of future compensatory damages. We agree.

To recover future compensatory damages, Canady had to show that there is a reasonable

probability that he will suffer such damages in the future. Perez v. Arredondo, 452 S.W.3d 847,

860 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). The record does not contain any evidence that

Canady will continue to suffer any loss of enjoyment of life or emotional pain in the future. There

is no evidence that he is no longer the managing conservator with the right to designate the

children’s primary residence such that he will not be able to reclaim full custody of his children

after he is made whole from the judgment in this case. Likewise, there was no evidence of any

future mental anguish, emotional suffering, or other economic and non-economic losses.

Accordingly, we sustain R Construction’s fourteenth issue.

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PUNITIVE DAMAGES

In its sixteenth issue, R Construction contends the evidence is insufficient to support the

$50,000 award of punitive damages.

An employee may recover punitive damages from a non-governmental employer if the

employee proves the employer engaged in a discriminatory practice with malice or reckless

indifference to the employee’s state-protected rights. TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. § 21.2585(b). The

plaintiff bears a clear and convincing burden of proof to recover punitive damages. TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(b). Clear and convincing evidence is the degree of proof that

will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the

allegations sought to be established. Id. § 41.001(2).

“In reviewing the legal sufficiency of evidence to support a finding that must be proved by

clear and convincing evidence, a [reviewing] court must look at all the evidence in the light most

favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm

belief or conviction that its finding was true.” Horizon Health Corp. v. Acadia Healthcare Co.,

Inc., 520 S.W.3d 848, 866 (Tex. 2017) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). “[T]he

reviewing court must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a

reasonable factfinder could do so.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Similarly, in a factual sufficiency review, we must give due consideration to evidence that

the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing, and we consider whether

the disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved the disputed

evidence in favor of its finding. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). “If, in light of the

entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor

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of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or

conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.” Id.

The jury question on punitive damages tracked the statutory language and asked the jury

whether it found by clear and convincing evidence that R Construction retaliated against Canady

with malice or with reckless indifference to Canady’s right to be free from retaliation for

opposition to discriminatory practices. Clear and convincing was properly defined as the measure

or degree of proof that produces a firm belief or conviction of the truth of the allegations sought

to be established. Malice was defined as “a specific intent by R Construction to cause substantial

injury of harm to Canady and/or that R Construction acted with reckless indifference towards

Canady’s legally-protected rights.”

“[E]vidence of retaliation alone is generally insufficient to support an award of punitive

damages; otherwise, punitive damages would be awarded automatically in every retaliation case.”

Ancira Enters., Inv. v. Fischer, 178 S.W.3d 82, 94 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.). “Thus, not

every sufficient proof of pretext and discrimination is sufficient proof of malice or reckless

indifference.” Wantou v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex., L.L.C., 23 F.4th 422, 439 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal

quotation marks omitted). The terms “malice” and “reckless indifference” focus on the actor’s

state of mind. Id. “Both ‘pertain to the employer’s knowledge that it may be acting in violation

of federal law, not its awareness that it is engaging in discrimination or retaliatory conduct.’” Id.

(alterations omitted) (quoting Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 534 (1999)); see also

Safeshred, Inc. v. Martinez, 365 S.W.3d 655, 663 (Tex. 2012) (“And malice might also exist when

an employer knows the retaliatory firing is unlawful and does it anyway.”). In addition, evidence

that the employer failed to respond effectively to discrimination complaints may be sufficient to

sustain an award of punitive damages. Wantou, 23 F.4th at 440 (“When ‘Wal-Mart failed to

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respond effectively to [discrimination complaints],’ the Fifth Circuit has found sufficient evidence

to sustain an award of punitive damages.” (quoting Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores,

Inc., 188 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 1999))).

Here, as fully explained in the section above regarding the sufficiency of the retaliation

claim, Meyer conceded he had an obligation to investigate Canady’s complaints of racial

discrimination and report it to the human resources department. However, Meyer could not recall

if he reported the discrimination to human resources. Instead, a member of the sales team allegedly

investigated the claim, though Meyer admitted he was unaware any formal investigation actually

occurred or whether there was a report or documentation of the alleged investigation. Meyer

claimed Canady did not want to push the issue any further, but the jury could have rejected Meyer’s

excuse considering Canady vehemently disputed this contention with his own testimony. The jury

could have also rejected Meyer’s testimony that he interviewed Canady’s crew regarding the EOG

mud engineer’s remarks because it heard testimony from one of Canady’s crew members that the

crew member was never interviewed or asked about the KKK remarks. Based on this disputed

evidence, the jury could have formed a firm belief or conviction that R Construction failed to

effectively respond to Canady’s complaints of racial harassment and instead fired him in retaliation

for his opposition to discriminatory conduct.

More importantly, however, the jury heard testimony Meyer may have falsified the

reprimands of Canady’s crew following the RamTex job to make it look like Canady was not being

treated so disparately from his crew members. One of the main reasons R Construction argued it

terminated Canady was because his crew lost RamTex as a customer. In fact, this was the only

reason written in Canady’s termination reprimand. Meyer testified this was a serious infraction

and stated he suspended the other members of Canady’s crew as well. However, Jeramee Strain

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testified he was only given an oral reprimand following the fallout from the RamTex job and the

suspension portion filled out in red ink must have been added after he signed the reprimand. The

reprimands of Canady’s crew members were introduced into evidence. The jury heard testimony

and could see that while most of the reprimands were filled out with one pen, the suspension

portions of each reprimand was filled out with a different pen. It appears the same pen was used

to fill the suspension portions of each member of Canady’s crew, indicating the suspension

portions of each reprimand were all filled out at the same time. The jury could have rejected

Meyer’s testimony that he suspended other members of Canady’s crew after the RamTex fallout

and instead believed Strain’s testimony that the crew members were only given oral reprimands.

The jury could have then reasonably concluded that Meyer added suspension to each of the crew

members’ reprimands after he fired Canady to make it look like Canady was treated similarly to

his crew members for losing the RamTex account. On this pretext, Meyer could later say Canady

was fired rather than suspended because he was the crew leader, which is how Meyer justified

Canady’s firing at trial. Based on this evidence, the jury could have reasonably formed a firm

belief or conviction that Meyer sought to cover his tracks by falsifying documents because he

knew terminating Canady would violate Canady’s legally protected right against retaliation and

chose to do it anyway. Therefore, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s

finding that R Construction retaliated against Canady with malice or reckless indifference to his

legally protected rights.

Accordingly, we overrule R Construction’s sixteenth issue.

ATTORNEY’S FEES

Section 21.259 of the labor code permits the trial court to award reasonable attorney’s fees

as part of the costs to a prevailing party in a proceeding under chapter 21. See TEX. LAB. CODE

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ANN. § 21.259. In its seventeenth issue, R Construction argues to the extent our disposition in this

appeal changes Canady’s status as a prevailing party then we should also reverse the award of

attorney’s fees. However, our disposition does not change Canady’s status as a prevailing party.

In the alternative, R Construction argues to the extent that some of the damages are

removed from the judgment, we should remand the cause so the trial court can reassess the amount

of reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees. R Construction does not cite any authority for this

proposition; therefore, this issue is waived for inadequate briefing. Even if we did not find waiver,

Canady was the prevailing party and recovered back pay, past compensatory damages, and

punitive damages notwithstanding our judgment striking future compensatory damages.

Attorney’s fees are not segregated by damages, but rather by claims. See Kinsel v. Lindsey,

526 S.W.3d 411, 427 (Tex. 2017) (“[A] claimant must segregate legal fees accrued for those

claims for which attorney’s fees are recoverable from those that are not.”). Here, Canady prevailed

on his claim for retaliation. Therefore, he is entitled to his reasonable and necessary attorney’s

fees. R Construction does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the

reasonableness or necessity of attorney’s fees.

Accordingly, R Constructions’ seventeenth issue is overruled.

CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court’s judgment awarding Canady $50,000 in future compensatory

damages. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

Irene Rios, Justice

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