The State of Texas v. Marcos Hingino Ramos De La Cruz

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-23-00093-CR

The STATE of Texas,
Appellant

v.

Marcos Hingino RAMOS DE LA CRUZ,
Appellee

From the 111th District Court, Webb County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2022CVJ001413D2
Honorable Jose A. Lopez, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Rebeca Martinez, Chief Justice
Irene Rios, Justice
Velia Meza, Justice

Delivered and Filed: September 17, 2025

REVERSED AND RENDERED

The State of Texas appeals the trial court’s order granting the appellee’s request for habeas

relief and dismissing the underlying criminal information. For the reasons stated below, we reverse

the judgment of the trial court and render judgment denying the appellee’s application for pre-trial

habeas-corpus relief.
04-23-00093-CR

BACKGROUND

Appellee, Marcos Hingino Ramos de la Cruz, was arrested in Webb County and charged

by information with misdemeanor criminal trespass as a part of Operation Lone Star (“OLS”). The

case was filed in the County Court at Law No. 11 and assigned case number 2022CRB000733Ll.

Ramos de la Cruz subsequently filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus in District

Court Number 111th assigned case number 2022CVJ001413D2 before transferring to the 49th

District Court. Ramos de la Cruz argued the State of Texas engaged in selective prosecution by

choosing to prosecute men for criminal trespass but not to prosecute similarly situated women for

the same offense, in violation of the Equal Protection clauses of the United States and Texas

constitutions.

On January 10, 2023, the district court issued an order stating the following:

This Court conducted a hearing on MARCOS HINGINO RAMOS DE LA
CRUZ's Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Having considered the
application and the evidence presented, this Court holds that Mr. Ramos de la
Cruz is entitled to relief on his claim of sex discrimination. He is “discharge[d]”
and the information charging him with trespass in his criminal case is dismissed
with prejudice. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.44. The underlying criminal cause
number is 2022CRB000733Ll in Webb County.

The state timely filed this notice to appeal.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, the State of Texas argues the district court lacked jurisdiction to order the

underlying criminal case dismissed. They further argue that Ramos de la Cruz’s selective-

prosecution claim is an as-applied challenge not cognizable in a pretrial habeas proceeding and

that the trial court erred by granting the application for writ of habeas corpus. 1

1
The State also argues that Ramos de la Cruz’s claim that he will be tried in abstentia is improper, but as the State
concedes, no relief was granted on this point, therefore we decline to address this. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.

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04-23-00093-CR

A. Standard of Review

Generally, we review a trial court’s ruling on a pretrial application for a writ of habeas

corpus for an abuse of discretion. See Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006);

Ex parte Jarreau, 623 S.W.3d 468 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. ref’d). “However, when,

the resolution of the ultimate issue turns on the application of purely legal standards, we review

the trial court's ruling de novo.” Jarreau, 623 S.W.3d at 472. We will uphold the trial court’s ruling

“if that ruling was supported by the record and was correct under any theory of law applicable to

the case.” Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (citing State v. Ross,

32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). “That rule holds true even if the trial court gave the

wrong reason for its ruling.” Armendariz, 123 S.W.3d at 404 (citing Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d

539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)).

B. Jurisdiction

The State argues that the district court lacked authority to dismiss the underlying criminal

proceedings because the order cited to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.44. We have

already ruled on this issue in State v. Rodriguez-Gomez, 716 S.W.3d 702 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

2024, no pet.). Appellee Ramos de la Cruz properly filed his habeas application in the district court

on October 16, 2022. Acts 1965, 59th R.S., ch. 722, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws (amended 2023) (current

version at TEX. R. CRIM. P. 11.09); see State ex rel. Rodriguez v. Onion, 741 S.W.2d 433, 434 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1987) (“There is no grant of jurisdiction to the county courts which precludes a District

Court from exercising its plenary power over issuance of writs of habeas corpus in misdemeanor

actions.”). “[W]e cannot infer, as argued in the State's first issue, that the district court lacked

authority to dismiss the information because, even if the district court lacked authority to dismiss

the information under Article 11.44 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the district court could

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04-23-00093-CR

have had authority to dismiss the information to remedy a constitutional violation.” Rodriguez-

Gomez, 716 S.W3d at 714 (citations omitted).

The State’s other argument alleging the district court lacked jurisdiction because the writ

did not formally issue with service on an officer with custody of Ramos de la Cruz also fails.

“Because (1) formal issuance of a writ is not a jurisdictional requirement, (2) the State fails to

argue or provide a record to show that it did not enter a general appearance in the trial court

proceedings, that the trial court did not otherwise obtain personal jurisdiction over the State, or

that it did not receive notice that the district court was considering [Ramos de la Cruz’s] habeas

application, and (3) the district court had, in effect, issued the writ when it granted relief on the

merits of [Ramos de la Cruz’s] application, we conclude that the district court did not lack

jurisdiction based on any alleged failure of the district court to formally issue a writ.” Rodriguez-

Gomez, 716 S.W.3d at 717.

C. Cognizability

The State, in its brief, argues that Ramos de la Cruz’s selective prosecution claim is an as-

applied challenge that is not cognizable in a pretrial writ of habeas corpus. Ramos de la Cruz,

however, disputes this argument.

From our review, the facts and arguments in this case are substantively the same as those

in Ex parte Aparicio, in which the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the Ramos de la

Cruz’s claim of selective arrest and prosecution was cognizable under the facts of that case. 707

S.W.3d 189, 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Aparicio v. Texas, No. 24-6057,

2025 WL 1787753 (U.S. June 30, 2025). Accordingly, we conclude that Ramos de la Cruz’s claim

is cognizable.

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04-23-00093-CR

D. Selective Prosecution

The State argues Ramos de la Cruz brought a selective enforcement claim, rather than a

selective prosecution claim and thus the trial court abused its discretion by granting the application

without evidence of prosecutorial discrimination. However, as the Court of Criminal Appeals has

confirmed, “both selective prosecution and selective enforcement claims use the same Equal

Protections standards derived from the same line of Supreme Court precedents.” Aparicio, 707

S.W.3d 189 at 200. Thus, regardless of the label used by Ramos de la Cruz in his application, the

analysis used by the Court is the same.

To establish a prima facie case of “selective prosecution or selective enforcement, the

claimant must prove with ‘exceptionally clear evidence’ that: 1. The prosecutorial policy had a

discriminatory effect; and 2. it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” Aparicio, 707 S.W.3d

at 204 (citations omitted). The second prong requires the claimant “definitively show that an

otherwise facially neutral law is being administered in bad faith—that it was ‘directed so

exclusively against a particular class of persons . . . with a mind so unequal and oppressive’ that

equal protection of the law was denied.” Id. at 208 (emphasis in original) (quoting U.S. v.

Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–65 (1996)). In other words, the claimant must show by

“‘exceptionally clear evidence’ that the OLS mindset administering the facially neutral criminal

trespass law was ‘so unequal and oppressive’ against him because he is male.” Id. at 210 (emphasis

in original) (citations omitted).

The evidence here is substantively the same as the evidence presented in Aparicio.

Aparicio, 707 S.W.3d at 189. We therefore conclude, based on our review of the entire record and

after considering the parties’ arguments, that the evidence is insufficient to show that the State of

Texas’ policy was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Aparicio, 707 S.W.3d at 204.

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04-23-00093-CR

CONCLUSION

The District Court had jurisdiction to issue the writ and render a ruling of dismissal of the

underlying charges. However, because Ramos de la Cruz failed to establish the second prong of

his selective prosecution claim, the trial court erred in granting his application for writ of habeas

corpus. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment denying Ramos de

la Cruz’s application for pretrial habeas corpus relief. We also dismiss any other pending motions

as moot.

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH

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