The State of Texas v. Angel Del Hoyo

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-25-00038-CR

The State of Texas, Appellant

v.

Angel Del Hoyo, Appellee

FROM THE 22ND DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY
NO. CR2019-524A, THE HONORABLE R. BRUCE BOYER, JUDGE PRESIDING

ME MO RAN DU M O PI N I O N

The State appeals from the trial court’s orders granting Angel Del Hoyo’s Motion

to Dismiss for Denial of Speedy Trial. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On June 5, 2019, a grand jury indicted Angel Del Hoyo in three indictments

charging thirteen third-degree felony counts of online impersonation and/or stalking. Tex. Penal

Code §§ 33.07(a), (c), 42.072(a)(3)(A), (b). These provided, in part, as follows:

• First Indictment (CR2019-524A): eight counts of online impersonation (alleging the
creation of eight Instagram accounts with intent to harm, intimidate or threaten) and one
count of stalking (alleging the creation of an Instagram account and posting to it—conduct
that the actor knows or reasonably should know the other person will regard as threatening
bodily injury or death)—all committed against M.R.-1.

• Second Indictment: (CR2019-525A): one count of online impersonation (alleging the
creation of an Instagram account with intent to harm, intimidate or threaten) and one count
of stalking (alleging the creation of an Instagram account and posting to it—conduct that
the actor knows or reasonably should know the other person will regard as threatening
bodily injury or death)—both committed against A.R.

• Third Indictment: (CR2019-526A): two counts of online impersonation (alleging the
creation of two Instagram accounts with intent to harm, intimidate, or threaten) committed
against M.R.-2.

The record reflects Del Hoyo had just turned 17 years old when he allegedly

committed the online impersonation and stalking conduct. Over the next several years, Dr. Marisa

Mauro examined Del Hoyo for competency and sanity; there were several resets at Del Hoyo’s

behest; and felony jury trials in Comal County ground to a halt due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

On July 6, 2023, a grand jury reindicted the stalking counts, changing the means

and adding a complainant. Tex. Penal Code § 42.072(a),(b). These provided, in part, as follows:

• Fourth Indictment (CR2023-486A): one count of stalking committed against M.R.-1 or
T.R. (alleging underlying harassment under Tex. Penal Code § 42.07(a)(8), publishing
repeated electronic communications in a manner to likely cause emotional distress, abuse,
or torment to another person).

• Fifth Indictment (CR2023-487A): one count of stalking—committed against A.V. (alleging
underlying harassment under Tex. Penal Code § 42.07(a)(8), publishing repeated electronic
communications in a manner to likely cause emotional distress, abuse, or torment to
another person).

These indictments did not contain the language naming the Instagram accounts and

postings as had the stalking counts in the initial indictments. A series of motions, responses, orders,

and findings of facts followed:

10/27/23 Del Hoyo filed motions to quash the indictments on several grounds—one
of which was that Tex. Penal Code 42.07(a)(8) did not exist at the time
Del Hoyo allegedly committed the offenses.1

1
In 2021, the Texas Legislature added to Section 42.07(a) another means of committing
harassment: “A person commits an offense if, with intent to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment,
2
02/27/24 Del Hoyo filed motions to dismiss for denial of speedy trial—noting five
years had passed since he had been arrested.

06/17/24 The State filed amended fourth and fifth indictments, adding back in
language from the original indictments naming the Instagram accounts and
postings and alleging underlying harassment under Tex. Penal Code
§ 42.07(a)(7), sending repeated electronic communications in a manner
reasonably likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or
offend another.

06/19/24 The State filed responses to the motions to quash and motions for leave to
amend the indictments as set out above.

07/02/24 The trial court denied the motions to quash.

12/30/24 The trial court granted the motions to dismiss the indictments for denial of
speedy trial.

01/14/25 The State filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissals and request
for findings and conclusions.

01/15/25 The State filed a motion for reconsideration—supplemental.

01/17/25 The State filed its notice of appeal.

01/22/25 The State again requested findings and conclusions, filing proposed
findings and conclusions.

02/07/25 The trial court signed an order purporting to rescind its order of dismissal,
without prejudice, and setting the case for a hearing in light of the State’s
additional records and case law in its filings.

02/10/25 The State filed, in this Court, an Emergency Motion to Abate & Remand the
case to allow the trial court to sign a new order on February 13, 2025. This
Court denied the motion.

02/13/25 The trial court signed findings and conclusions (totaling 25 pages) setting
out the delays in the case and concluding that all four Barker factors

or embarrass another . . . the person publishes on an Internet website, including a social media
platform, repeated electronic communications in a manner reasonably likely to cause emotional
distress, abuse, or torment to another person, unless the communications are made in connection
with a matter of public concern.” Tex. Pen. Code § 42.07(a)(8); Act of May 12, 2021, 87th Leg.,
R.S., ch. 178, § 1, 2021 Tex. Gen. Laws 385, 385.
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weighed heavily against Del Hoyo and “the speedy trial dismissals should
not have been granted.”

03/05/25 The State filed a motion to consolidate its five appeals.

03/29/25 This Court granted the State’s motion and consolidated its appeals.

The State appeals the dismissals of the indictments, emphasizing the trial court’s late-filed findings

and conclusions. Del Hoyo did not file a responsive brief.

ANALYSIS

Applicable Law and Standard of Review

“The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the

States through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees a speedy trial to an accused.” Gonzales v.

State, 435 S.W.3d 801, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). The Supreme Court has listed four factors

that courts should consider in addressing speedy-trial claims: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reason

for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Barker

v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). “If the defendant can make a threshold showing that the

interval between accusation and trial is ‘presumptively prejudicial,’ then a court must consider

each of the remaining Barker factors and weigh them.” Balderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d 756, 767

(Tex. Crim. App. 2016). In reviewing the trial court’s decision on Del Hoyo’s federal constitutional

speedy trial claim, we apply a bifurcated standard of review—an “abuse of discretion” standard

for the factual components and a “de novo” standard for the legal components of the trial court’s

decision. State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). “Review of the individual

Barker factors necessarily involves fact determinations and legal conclusions, but the balancing

test as a whole is a purely legal question that we review de novo.” Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768.

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Application

The trial court lacked plenary power to rescind its dismissal orders.

Before turning to the merits, we note that both the trial court’s February 7, 2025

order, purporting to rescind its dismissals, and the February 13, 2025 findings and conclusions,

which were inconsistent with the dismissals, were signed when it lacked plenary power—that is,

when it lacked the power to change its dispositions over the causes. See POWER, Black’s Law

Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “plenary power” as a court’s power to dispose of any matter

properly before it).

While a trial court’s plenary power can be extended by filing a motion for new trial

or motion in arrest of judgment, Rules 21 and 22 limit the filings of those motions in criminal cases

to defendants. Tex. R. App. P. 21.1 (new trial means rehearing on defendant’s motion); Tex. R.

App. P. 22.1 (motion in arrest of judgment means defendant’s suggestion that, for reasons stated

in motion, judgment rendered against defendant was contrary to law). See State v. Aguilera,

165 S.W.3d 695, 697–98 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“At a minimum, a trial court retains plenary

power to modify its sentence if a motion for new trial or motion in arrest of judgment is filed within

30 days of sentencing.”). Such plenary-power-extending motions cannot be filed by the State; nor

may a trial court grant a new trial on its own motion. State v. Gant, 709 S.W.3d 707, 713 (Tex.

App.—Austin 2025, pet. ref’d); State v. Carson, 13 S.W.3d 811, 812 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000,

no pet.).

Because, at the time the trial court signed the inconsistent-with-the-dismissals order

and findings and conclusions, the plenary power of the trial court in those cause numbers was

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exhausted, we do not consider either document in reviewing the merits of this case; 2 instead, and

because the State lost in the trial court, we must presume the trial court resolved any disputed fact

issues in Del Hoya’s favor, and we must also defer to the implied findings of fact that the record

supports. Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Munoz, 991 S.W.2d

at 821.

First factor: the length of delay.

The length of delay is measured from the time an accused is arrested or indicted

until he demands a speedy trial or is tried. Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 648. Courts find delays

approaching one year to be unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry. Balderas,

517 S.W.3d at 768. In this case, Del Hoyo was originally arrested on December 18, 2018; he was

rearrested on June 17, 2019 after the first three indictments were filed. He alleges he first asked

for a speedy trial in the summer of 2023, when both sides were ready and the case was “passed

over for a more serious case,” and he filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial on

February 27, 2024—an interval of around four to five years. Such an interval stretches “far beyond

the minimum needed to trigger the enquiry” and “weighs heavily in favor of finding a violation of

the speedy trial right.” Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); State v. Uhl,

717 S.W.3d 117, 129 (Tex. App.—Austin 2025, pet. ref’d). In the middle of the speedy trial

hearing the trial court acknowledged “we have delay.” And we agree.

2
Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(g) provides: “Once the record has been filed in the
appellate court, all further proceedings in the trial court—except as provided otherwise by law or
by these rules—will be suspended until the trial court receives the appellate-court mandate.” Tex.
R. App. P. 25.2(g). Here, the trial court retained the power to file findings and conclusions because
the clerk’s record had not yet been filed. See Taylor v. State, 163 S.W.3d 277, 279 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2005, pet. dism’d) (filing of both clerk’s and reporter’s record deprives trial court of power
to act further). It did not, however, retain the power to change its disposition.
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The State argues that the real length of delay was only 197 days, not enough to

trigger a speedy trial inquiry. Its math relies on what it sets out as the reasons for the delay that

cannot be solely attributed to the State: 1896 – 513 (Covid) = 1383; 1383 – 627 (Del Hoyo’s

requests) = 765; 765 – 280 (agreed resets) = 476; 476 – 279 (also Del Hoyo’s requests) = 197.

Courts generally do not consider the reasons for the delay under this first prong of

the Barker test. See, e.g., Uhl, 717 S.W.3d at 129; Laird v. State, 691 S.W.3d 30, 38 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2023, pet. ref’d). And while the Court of Criminal Appeals has held, as the State notes in

its calculations, that delay caused by good faith plea negotiations should not be weighed against

the prosecution, it did so in the context of looking at the reasons for the delay. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d

at 824. Again, because the delay stretched far beyond the minimum needed to trigger the additional

inquiry, this factor weighs heavily in favor of finding a speedy-trial-right violation. Dragoo,

96 S.W.3d at 314; Uhl, 717 S.W.3d at 129. We turn to the remaining factors.

Second factor: the State’s reason for the delay.

When a court assesses the second Barker factor—the State’s reason for the delay—

it assigns different weights to different reasons. Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768. “A deliberate

attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the

government.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. “A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded

courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate

responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the

defendant.” Id. “Delay caused by either the defendant or his counsel weighs against the

defendant.” Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768. “[A] valid reason, such as a missing witness, should

serve to justify appropriate delay.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. “In the absence of an assigned reason

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for the delay, a court may presume neither a deliberate attempt on the part of the State to prejudice

the defense nor a valid reason for the delay.” Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 314.

At the November 18, 2024 hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court set out

the setting schedule as reflected in its court coordinator’s notes:

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. What she has is: COVID, January through October
of 2021; June 2022, Defense, ready, State, not ready; August 2022, both sides not
ready; October 2022, Defense not ready, State, ready; February 2023, Defense not
ready, no announcement from the State. [Here, the State interjected to say it was
ready.] August 2023, both sides ready. Case not reached. October 2023, case not
reached. March 2024, State ready, no announcement from the Defense written
down. Case moved to evidentiary docket.

Del Hoyo acknowledged that some of the delays were due to Del Hoyo’s need for

competency and sanity evaluations, but argued some were due to the pandemic, and, although the

State repeatedly announced ready, it did so on “indictments that were defective.” “It wasn’t until

much later here that they tried to fix those after the deficiencies being pointed out.” “So even

though you may have some ‘State’s ready’, it was not until much, much later in the game that they

were actually ready after amending indictments.” The State responded that, “indictment or not,

we were ready.” The State offered and the trial court admitted timeline exhibits.

First, the delays related to Del Hoyo’s need for competency and sanity evaluations

do not count against the State. State v. Lopez, 631 S.W.3d 107, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

Neither do Del Hoyo’s continued attempts to get the prosecutors to offer pretrial diversion. Munoz,

991 S.W.2d at 824. Second, the delays related to the pandemic and the difficulty of getting a jury

trial once the courts opened back up (the “cases not reached” docket entries) weigh against

the State, though not heavily. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531; Shaw v. State, 117 S.W.3d 883, 890 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2003) (delay attributable to crowded trial court docket weighs in favor of finding of

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Sixth Amendment violation “although not heavily”); Uhl, 717 S.W.3d at 133 (delay caused by

government shutdown weighed against State only slightly); Laird, 691 S.W.3d at 40 (same). Third,

the delays related to the State’s problems in drafting its original indictments also weigh against the

State, but again not heavily. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531; Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 651 (State’s

delay in providing interpreter constituted official negligence). Fourth, the delays related to the

State’s problems in the superseding stalking indictments asserting new theories not applicable

to the case and an additional complainant also weigh against the State, though not heavily.

Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 On balance, the reasons for the delay factor weigh against the State,

though not heavily.

Third factor: the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial.

A court must give the third Barker factor—the defendant’s assertion of his right to

a speedy trial—strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant has been deprived

of that right. Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 771. “A defendant’s lack of a timely demand for a speedy

trial indicates strongly that he did not really want one.” Id. Inaction weighs more heavily against

a violation the longer the delay goes on. Id. “Filing for a dismissal instead of a speedy trial will

generally weaken a speedy-trial claim because it shows a desire to have no trial instead of a speedy

one.” Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 283 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

Del Hoyo’s actual motion was a dismissal motion, which weakens his speedy trial

claim. Id. But reviewing the record, we have found the issue of the lack of speedy trial was

brought up by Del Hoyo at several pretrial hearings and Del Hoyo repeatedly referred to an oral

demand for a speedy trial (as opposed to a dismissal) made in the summer of 2023.

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• 02/27/24 Del Hoyo informed the trial court he would be filing a motion to dismiss for
denial of a speedy trial. That same day, Del Hoyo filed motions to dismiss for denial of
speedy trial—noting five years had passed since he had been arrested.

• 05/21/24 Del Hoyo argued his motion to quash and motion to dismiss for lack of a
speedy trial together. Del Hoyo set out the fact that the superseding indictments actually
charged Del Hoyo for new crimes, crimes that did not exist at the time of the conduct (the
allegation of the underlying harassment as Tex. Penal Code 42.07(a)(8)—publishing on an
Internet website). “And that’s why I filed the speedy trial motion. This is five years down
the road, and it was—this was done by [the DA] herself. So the fact she would go—after
four years, go indict him for a crime that didn’t even exist at the time is the problem here,
Judge.” Del Hoyo argued that by doing so, “what it did is it stopped them from trying the
cases in a timely fashion.” At that hearing, Del Hoyo also called Dr. Mauro to testify about
prejudice. The trial court did not have time to hear from the State its response to the speedy
trial motion but the parties agreed that any additional delay would not count against the
State. Del Hoyo also pointed out the deficiencies in the original stalking indictments, the
failure to allege the repetitiveness of the underlying conduct, that it was committed “on
more than one occasion.” See Tex. Penal Code § 42.072(a).

• 06/03/24 Del Hoyo again addressed the speedy trial motion, noting that he had
just heard the Court grant a motion in a previous case that was “not as old as this one.”
Del Hoyo stated, “Yes, Judge. I’ve argued for speedy trial and was passed over in a similar
fashion. You heard this is a child with autism. He was 17 years old at the time. And this—
I’m not—I’m not arguing the speedy trial motion. I’m just making a record of what I’m
about to ask for, is you heard what he’s been through since. This—there is something odd
about this case where it’s been treated, for this office, over heavily-handed. I’ve begged
for a pretrial diversion in a case where this kid has not committed an offense before or after
this, and I’ve been repeatedly denied by prosecutors in this room.” At the same hearing,
the State argued that “And had we really been talking about asserting a right, we would
have already had this trial. It would have happened back at least . . . over a year ago now.”
Del Hoyo noted that “And since you weren’t here, we did show up for a trial announcement
where we were number one and begged for a trial. We got passed over for a more serious
case.” The prosecutor said, “I don’t have any record of y’all ever asserting your right to a
speedy trial.” The trial court asked the defense attorney to “find that” in the record.

• 07/02/24 The trial court announced it would not grant the motion to quash and asked
if there was anything else, to which Del Hoyo replied, “Need a speedy trial.” The trial
court stated, “That’s really the gist of it is it not?” and asked “how come this case has not
been prosecuted since 2017, when the original arrest was made?” The prosecutor stated
that it was not prepared to argue the speedy trial issue; the setting had been to pick a
trial date. The trial court asked Del Hoyo when he had made the original demand, and
Del Hoyo responded: “I think about a year ago. We were number one and number two
and got passed over, and I made the objection on the record.” The trial court asked his
coordinator to look at the records for Del Hoyo to check, and reset for another pretrial
hearing to determine the speedy trial motion.

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The next two settings were reset at Del Hoyo’s request, and then, on November 18,

2024, the parties argued the speedy trial issue.

By our count, Del Hoyo filed the motion and raised the issue at least four times.

See Barker, 407 U.S. at 529 (trial court can exercise discretion to “weigh the frequency and force

of the objections as opposed to attaching significant weight to a purely pro forma objection”); Cf.,

State v. Beck, 695 S.W.3d 729, 747 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, no pet.) (filing of motion

unaccompanied by timely request for hearing or ruling indicates acquiescence in delay); Huff v.

State, 467 S.W.3d 11, 29–30 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. ref’d) (lack of attempt to have

claim heard weighs against finding a constitutional violation).

The State argues Del Hoyo only asked for a dismissal and never provided the record

that showed the request he said he made at the 2023 settings where the case was passed over.

But because Del Hoyo prevailed in the trial court, we must presume the trial court resolved any

disputed fact issues in his favor. See Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 648; Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 821.

At the hearing on the dismissal motion, Del Hoyo represented again that he invoked the speedy

trial right at a jury trial setting back in the “summer of last year.” At a minimum, we find that

Del Hoyo’s announcements of ready for trial support the trial court’s implied finding that Del Hoyo

wanted a speedy trial. The State argues that even if arguendo Del Hoyo made that assertion of the

right, “any such assertion was not genuine, particularly where the record is devoid of any follow-

up assertions, requests, etc.” But, given Del Hoyo’s announcements of ready and his persistence

in arguing the speedy trial issue, we find that this factor weighs in favor of Del Hoyo.

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Fourth Factor: prejudice to the defendant.

The fourth Barker factor focuses on prejudice to the defendant related to the length

of the delay. Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 772. “To analyze prejudice, we consider three interests of

defendants that the Speedy Trial Clause was designed to protect: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial

incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the

possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Id. “The last interest is the most important because

the fairness of the criminal-justice system is distorted when a defendant is unable to adequately

prepare his defense.” Id.

Initially, we note that Del Hoyo was not incarcerated, nor did he present evidence

that a trial would be unfair because his defense would be impaired. Instead, at the May 21, 2024

hearing, Dr. Mauro testified concerning the second prejudice factor—the impact of the delay on

the level of anxiety and concern of the accused. She said she had met with Del Hoyo, “in 2020,

2022, 2023, and 2024 for various referrals related to his pending criminal case, including

competency, sanity, insanity, mitigation, and for this current proceeding related to speedy trial.”

She had diagnosed him with autism spectrum disorder; said he had a “developmental history of

inflexible thinking and behavior” and “problems with social development and social cues,

limited friendships, difficulty forming friendships, difficulty interpreting social cues from other

people.” She described him as non-violent and responsible with tasks but “youthful” and socially

immature, “a little bit childlike.” She said he has “had no other offenses, and “was, I believe,

only 16 when this happened and now was about to turn 23.” She said the delay had taken a

significant toll on him:

• “It’s been—it’s been very challenging to him in terms of his functional capacity, his family
relationships, his mental health, and his development.”

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• “Probably most importantly today, he—he’s lost housing related to this. His family—his
mother is—English is second language, and she’s very limited there and has very little
understanding of his mental health needs, his autism, and—and really, the legal case. So
she’s—she’s become frustrated with him over time because he’s not able to financially
provide for himself.”

• His mother had kicked him out of the house after he had called police on his sister’s
boyfriend for abusing his sister. He was temporarily living with his grandfather.

• Although he is bilingual, he hasn’t been able to find employment with these pending
felonies; “he has background checks done, and so—and then he’s not able to get the jobs.”
He was unable to obtain a translation/interpretation services job at Ibex because of that.
And, the restaurant jobs he had got he lost after he was rearrested on the new indictments
and his bosses saw him on “Mugshots.”

• “And now, I’m quite concerned with his safety, especially as a person with—with autism.
He’s very vulnerable to other people. And so I’m worried without stable housing and—
and how long that family support is going to last with Grandpa and without income.”

• In spite of all this he had gotten into Texas A&M, but he had not gone because he “hasn’t
been able to secure housing because of his pending felony.”

• He “has been struggling with anxiety and depression.”

• “He’s an almost 23-year-old young man who’s been dealing with this for six years. It’s
held him back . . . from moving on at all in life, having friends, girlfriend, job, college,
while this is all pending.”

Aside from cross-examining Dr. Mauro to get her to acknowledge that Del Hoyo

himself was responsible for the initial charges, the State did not rebut this showing of prejudice

from the delay. At a later pretrial hearing, on July 2, 2024, the trial court asked “if anybody has

reconsidered their position on this case, given the light of the testimony I heard last time from the

doctor?” At the November hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court stated “again, I am

gonna go ahead and take note of Dr. Morrow’s testimony with regards to effect on this young man”

and then heard arguments. In the middle of the arguments, the trial court stated “we have harm.”

The State argues here that Del Hoyo’s “anxiety and concern, if any, was caused not by the delay,

13
but by unrelated difficulties with [his] alleged autism and issues occurring in his family’s home.”

But the trial court heard that the autism exacerbated the effects of the delay, and at least some of

the issues occurring in his family’s home were directly tied to his inability to support himself

because of the pending charges. We agree with the trial court’s explicit finding of harm. Cf. Kelly

v. State, 163 S.W.3d 722, 728 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (uncontroverted testimony about prejudice

can be disregarded by trial judge if record provides reasonable articulable bases for disbelieving

it); Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 286 (no prejudice where “there was no evidence that appellant lost his

job or had his work schedule disrupted—he was a retiree who continued to work as a hunting guide

in Mexico and did maintenance work for friends”).

Balancing the factors.

Having addressed the four Barker factors, we must now balance them. Balderas,

517 S.W.3d at 773.

Weighing in favor of finding a violation of Del Hoyo’s speedy trial right are the

facts that the delay was excessive, much of the delay was attributable to problems with the State’s

indictments, he asserted his right, and some prejudice resulted from the delay. Weighing against

finding a violation are the facts that Del Hoyo was responsible for at least part of the delay both

before and after jury trials were suspended as a result of COVID, and he ultimately asked for a

dismissal. We hold that the four factors, balanced together, weigh in favor of finding a violation

of Del Hoyo’s right to a speedy trial. We therefore overrule the State’s issue.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled the State’s issue, we affirm the trial court’s orders of dismissal.

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__________________________________________
Chari L. Kelly, Justice

Before Justices Triana, Kelly and Theofanis

Affirmed

Filed: December 10, 2025

Do Not Publish

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