In the Interest of B.A. and B.A., Children v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-26-00055-CV
___________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF B.A. AND B.A., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 325th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 325-744365-23

Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach
MEMORANDUM OPINION

The trial court terminated the parental rights of J.G. (Mother) to her children

B.A. (Braelyn) and B.A. (Brian). 1 In three issues, Mother argues that the evidence was

legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s termination-ground

findings under Subsections (D) and (E) of Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)

and the best-interest finding under Section 161.001(b)(2). Because we hold that

sufficient evidence supports the termination of Mother’s parental rights, we will

affirm.

Background

Mother and the children’s father (Father) began dating in 2017. Braelyn was

born in November 2020, and Brian was born in September 2023.

The Department became involved with the children in June 2024 through its

Family Based Safety Services (FBSS) division; in late June, the parents agreed to a

safety plan. Soon thereafter, the Department closed the FBSS case, took the children

into its care, and filed this child-protection suit. Trial was held over five days spread

over four months—June 2025, August 2025, September 2025, and January 2026. At

trial, the Department introduced evidence that Father committed violence against

1
To protect the children’s identities, we use aliases for the children, their
parents, and anyone else through whom the children could be identified. See Tex. R.
App. P. 9.8(a), (b).

2
Mother, which she minimized, and evidence that Mother had used illegal drugs, which

she denied.

I. Father had a history of violence—of which Mother was aware—before the
Department’s involvement.

Regarding Father’s history of violence, the Department presented evidence that

he had committed violence against Mother on numerous occasions and that, as she

was aware, she was not the only target of his behavior.

A. In 2018, Father commits acts of violence against multiple people,
including Mother.

The first incident of violence against Mother that was referenced at trial

occurred in 2018. However, the trial testimony provided no details about the incident.

Mother testified that she “wouldn’t say it was domestic violence” and relayed what

she had previously told the FBSS caseworker—that she had pushed Father when they

were “in a debate.” The FBSS caseworker, on the other hand, agreed that Mother had

“admitted to violence in 2018” 2 and stated that Mother had told her that “something

had happened with her eye.”

But while the Department provided only vague statements to show that Father

had committed violence against Mother in 2018, the Department presented more

2
Although this statement could be read as Mother’s claiming that she, not
Father, had been violent, it was made as the caseworker responded to questions about
Mother’s downplaying Father’s violence and as the caseworker expressed her concern
that Mother would not be protective of the children.

3
clear and specific evidence that he had committed other acts of violence that year and

that Mother should have been aware of those acts.

The Department’s evidence showed that Father had been indicted for two

counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon committed in 2018. The evidence

further showed that

• under a plea agreement, Father was placed on deferred adjudication in
2019 for the lesser-included offenses of discharging a firearm at a
vehicle;

• as part of the plea agreement for one of those deadly-conduct cases, he
entered a plea in bar to two other counts of aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon

• one of those other offenses had been committed against C.P., the father
of Mother’s older children,3 and the other was committed against C.P.’s
mother;

• the State agreed not to prosecute those two counts, and Father admitted
his guilt to them and asked the trial court to consider them in assessing
his sentence for the deadly-conduct charge.

Mother was questioned at trial about these offenses, but she seemed to have

little information about them:

• When asked about Father’s altercation with C.P., 4 Mother claimed that it
had happened outside the home while she was inside, that she heard the
shooting, and that she did not go outside to see who was shooting.

3
Mother had two older children. When trial began, one was nine, and the other
was nearly ten. Mother testified that they were both living with C.P.
4
When Father was asked at trial what he had done to C.P., Father replied, “I
didn’t do nothing.” But he acknowledged that he had admitted his guilt to that
offense.

4
• When Mother was asked if she was aware of whether Father had been
arrested for that incident, she responded, “They just said he had a
warrant, but they didn’t say for what.” She “just figured [that his arrest]
was due to the situation that occurred” but did not ask him about it
because there “was a lot going on at that time.” She did not elaborate.

B. In 2019, the police are called to another incident with Father.

In August 2019, police were called to an incident between Father and Mother.

Mother downplayed the incident at trial:

• She testified that a neighbor had called the police because she heard
them having “a debate.”

• She acknowledged that she had been seen by EMTs, but she denied that
she had been injured, and she said that if the police report stated that she
had been bleeding from the top of her head, “that would be false.”

• She had not filled out the family-violence packet given to her by the
police at the time because “nothing happened.”

In further questioning, however, the police report from the incident was read

to Mother, and she acknowledged that what she had reported to the police that day

had been true. The report, which the trial court admitted, stated that Mother had been

bleeding and recited the explanation that she had provided at the time:

• Officers saw bleeding from “what appeared to be a cut to the top of
[Mother’s] head.”

• Mother had been initially uncooperative, but she eventually told police
that she and Father had begun arguing because he believed that she was
cheating on him.

• She went outside to leave, and Father followed and resumed the
argument, “after which [he] shoved [her] on her chest, to which [she]
responded by pushing [him] back. [Mother] stated that this back and

5
forth happened around four to five times before the last shove from
[Father] knocked [her] on the concrete.” Mother believed that this fall
was how she had injured her head, but she was not sure.

• Father’s version of events to police was that he and Mother “had been
taking several Xanax pills throughout the night and . . . that [she had]
tripped and f[allen] while attempting to enter the residence.” Father
“could not explain the injuries to [Mother’s] head.”

Also in 2019, Mother learned that Father had previously committed assault

against the mother of his other children. The offense occurred in 2015, and Father

had been adjudicated guilty in 2016 and sentenced to 34 days’ confinement in the

county jail. After Mother was told about it by “their family members”5 in 2019, she

never asked Father about it.

C. In 2023, Father violates his community supervision.

In 2023, after violating his community supervision conditions, Father was

adjudicated guilty for the two deadly-conduct charges for which he had been placed

on deferred adjudication in 2019. He and Mother were still in a relationship at that

time. At trial, Father admitted that he had a history of “getting deferred adjudication

. . . and then violating [his] probation.”

D. In 2024, police are called to two incidents of violence by Father
against Mother

In April 2024 and then again the next month, Father committed violence

against Mother, but Mother minimized both incidents at trial.

Although it is not entirely clear to whom “their” referred, the context suggests
5

that Mother was referring to family members of Father and of the other woman.

6
The April incident occurred when Mother took the children to the home of

Father’s mother (Paternal Grandmother). According to a police report, Father arrived

with another woman with whom he “was allegedly cheating on” Mother, and she and

the other woman argued. When Mother got into her car to leave, Father broke one of

her car’s windows with his fist.

In her trial testimony, Mother stated that “[n]othing happened to” her that day

except “a cut or something on [her] thumb” that “could’ve . . . been from the

[broken] glass” when she got out of the car. However, in cross-examination, Mother

was read an incident report—which contained a considerably different description of

the events—and she acknowledged that what she had reported to the police that day

was true. The report, which the trial court admitted, stated:

• Mother told officers that after Father broke the window, he “then
climb[ed] into the car[,] . . . force[d] the vehicle into park[,] and then
f[ou]ght[ ] with [her] inside the car.”

• Father pulled Mother out of the car “and, according to her, slam[med]
her on the ground.” Mother also told officers that “she believe[d that
Father had] bit[ten] her on the right ear[,] causing a cut and causing her
to feel pain.”

• Mother had “visible injuries and blood on both her right knee and right
ear.”

Neither parent testified that the children had witnessed the incident, but they were

apparently present, given that Mother had brought the children there.

7
The next month, on May 25—by which time Mother had, she claimed, ended

their romantic relationship—Father assaulted her in the home, leading her to call 911.

As with other incidents, Mother minimized the incident at trial:

• The FBSS caseworker testified that when she had spoken to Mother
about this incident, Mother said that she and Father had been “in a
debate.”

• In her trial testimony, Mother did not fully describe what had occurred;
she said that she “c[ould]n’t remember too much” and that she thought
“he had pushed [her] into a wall or something.” She also acknowledged
that he had flipped over the couch and broken her laptop.

• In questioning at trial, though, Mother acknowledged that she had been
taken to the hospital because she had a knot on her head. She also
acknowledged—after being shown photographs—that she had marks on
her neck that had been made by Father.

• After being read the police report, Mother admitted that she had told
police that Father had bitten the top of her head, kicked the bathroom
door off its hinges, punched her in the rib cage several times, and
choked her. She admitted that these statements to police officers were
true.6

According to Father’s trial testimony, Mother posted his bail after he was

arrested for assaulting her. 7 Mother admitted that the children had been home at the

time of Father’s assault, but she claimed that they were asleep in another room—

apparently despite any noise from Father’s overturning furniture and kicking a door

6
The report further stated that Mother told an officer that she believed that
Father “was going to throw [Brian] but that he ‘does that all the time.’” At trial, she
denied making that statement to police. That statement was not included in the part
of the report that was read back to her at trial and that she admitted was true.
7
Mother acknowledged that she had posted his bail several times.

8
off its hinges. When asked why her testimony had minimized Father’s violence, she

claimed that she “didn’t recall” what had happened until the police reports were read

to her because it had “been years” and she had suffered a concussion.

As a result of the May 2024 incident, the Department became involved with the

children, and in June 2024, the Department and the parents established a safety plan.

Under that plan, Mother agreed that her godparent (Godparent) would stay with her

at her home and supervise her possession of the children. Father agreed that he would

not return to the home, he would work services through FBSS, and his visits with the

children would occur in a public place.

II. The parents violate the FBSS safety plan, and the Department files this suit.

On June 30, Godparent called the supervisor on the FBSS case and reported

that an altercation had occurred between Mother and Father. Godparent had gone out

of town, and under the safety plan, Mother and the children were supposed to have

gone along, but they had stayed behind instead. Mother and the FBSS supervisor

presented conflicting information about what had happened between Mother and

Father:

• The FBSS supervisor testified that after receiving Godparent’s report,
she spoke to Mother over the phone, and Mother said that Father had
assaulted her and had taken the children at gunpoint using Godparent’s
gun, which had been in the home. The supervisor called 911.

• At trial, however, Mother said that Father had not taken the children
from her at gunpoint; “[h]e just took the kids.” She had no concerns
about Father’s behavior that day—“it was all allegations that did not
happen.”

9
The FBSS supervisor also called Father, and he admitted that he had taken the

children to Paternal Grandmother’s house.8 He claimed that he had taken the children

because Mother and a friend were outside Mother’s home using drugs. Father called

the FBSS supervisor again later and told her that he “needed help right away. He

stated that he needed to start his classes and that he was a danger to himself and a

danger to others.”

On July 1, 2024, the Department filed its petition in this case and sought

emergency removal of the children. Later that day, Father had an altercation with the

police that led to his being arrested:

• No witness fully explained what happened between Father and the
police on July 1, but police reports from that day state that Father had
called the police and made threats to kill himself and Mother—although
she testified that she was not actually at the scene at the time—and that
officers arrived at the scene and eventually arrested him.

• These reports align with the FBSS supervisor’s testimony that Father
had threatened to kill himself and police officers.

• Mother testified that this event occurred after she told Father that the
children had been removed, at which point he “lost it.”

It is not entirely clear how long both children were with Paternal
8

Grandmother. The FBSS supervisor testified that “nobody was being honest about
where the children were, except [Father] was the one [who told her] that one child
was with [Mother] and one child was with [Paternal Grandmother].” The FBSS
supervisor subsequently clarified that Father had originally taken both children to
Paternal Grandmother, but the next day, only one child was still there, despite
Paternal Grandmother’s telling her that she had both children.

10
In April 2025—after the Department had filed this child protection suit but

before trial—Father was placed on deferred adjudication for his May 2024 assault of

Mother. As part of his sentencing, Father entered a plea in bar regarding the three

offenses that he had been charged with as a result of the July 1 incident: assault of a

public servant, harassment of a public servant, and obstruction or retaliation. As part

of that plea, Father admitted his guilt for the July 1 offenses and asked the trial court

to consider them in his sentencing for the May 2024 assault.

III. Mother kept seeing Father, even after the Department’s involvement.

Even after the Department took the children into its care, Mother and Father

apparently continued to spend time together. In September 2024, they were together

when they were both arrested, with Mother being charged with possession of

methamphetamine.9 At trial, both Mother and Father denied that the drugs were

hers,10 but the drugs were found in the trunk of her car, which he was driving at the

time of their arrest.

The Department states in its brief that Father was also arrested for possession,
9

but although that may be the case, the record references it cites to support that
statement relate only to Mother’s possession charge. Father was asked at trial why he
was arrested, and he replied that it was “[s]omething about criminal mischief.” He said
that when he had been arrested on July 1, “they didn’t charge [him] with everything,
and then on that day when [he] got pulled over, they said that another charge had
popped up from—when [he] went to jail July 1st, [and] it was like criminal mischief or
something.” He did not explain why police had stopped them in the first place.
10
Father said, “[I]t was mine, but it wasn’t meth. . . . I guess there was meth in
it, but it was like X pills.”

11
Mother testified that she had learned in her services during the case that Father

had been abusive to her, and she discussed what she had learned in her counseling

about recognizing controlling behavior and the importance of setting boundaries. She

talked about one example of her setting boundaries: one night, she heard someone

banging on her door, and she thought it might be Father, but instead of opening the

door, she called 911.11 Further, Mother stated that she learned in counseling that she

had stayed with Father too long. But if the counseling helped Mother resolve to keep

away from Father, that boundary did not last. At the third hearing, held in September

2025, the Department moved to reopen evidence to introduce arrest reports and

police bodycam videos showing that Father had been arrested for driving while

intoxicated earlier that month and that Mother had been with him at the time.

The trial court granted Mother a six-day continuance to review the new

evidence. Before trial resumed again the next week, Father died. 12 The trial court once

again continued the trial to give Mother and the Department time to “reassess what

the best possible outcome here is” and to decide whether they preferred the trial court

to render a decision in the case or for them to “come to some other kind of

agreement.”

11
She did not, however, tell the Department’s caseworker about the incident.
12
The parties did not introduce evidence of the cause of death.

12
The parties apparently did not reach an agreement, and trial resumed in January

2026. The trial court admitted the records and bodycam footage from Father’s

September 2025 arrest for driving while intoxicated; those records stated that he was

also charged with possession of marijuana, resisting arrest, and obstruction or

retaliation. The bodycam video confirmed the Department’s assertion at the previous

hearing that Mother had been with Father in the car at the time. 13

IV. The Department presented evidence of drug use by both parents.

The Department presented evidence from which the trial court could have

found that Mother and Father had both used drugs. First, as noted above, Mother was

arrested in September 2024 for possession of methamphetamine. She claimed at trial

that she had not known that the drugs were in the trunk of her car. At the time of her

arrest, she and Father both told police officers that the drugs had been in a bag in the

trunk for over a year. Mother acknowledged that the car smelled like marijuana at the

time of her arrest, but she blamed the smell on someone else who had previously

been in the car.

After Mother’s arrest, the Department requested that she submit to drug

testing, and she participated in multiple urine drug tests throughout the case. Her

13
Mother stated in the video that the car that Father had been driving was hers.
Further, an officer asked her if Father normally “talk[s] like that” because “he sounds
intoxicated,” and Mother responded, “I asked him that, too, when I got up this
morning, because he got up before me.” If she was speaking truthfully to the officer,
then her statement indicates that, at the least, she and Father had spent the night
together.

13
urine tests submitted in September and October 2024 were negative for most

substances but positive for marijuana. Her subsequent urine tests were all negative.

But Mother also submitted to hair-strand testing in September 2024, and that

test was positive for not only marijuana but also for cocaine and methamphetamine.

See In re N.S.M., No. 01-20-00764-CV, 2021 WL 1217328, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] Apr. 1, 2021, pet. denied) (noting that “[i]t is not uncommon for a person

to contemporaneously submit a urine sample that is clean and a hair sample that

shows drug use due to the differing timeframe of use that each method of testing is

capable of detecting”). In January 2025, Mother again tested positive in a hair-strand

test to marijuana, methamphetamine, and cocaine, as well as a cocaine metabolite. An

April 2025 hair-strand test was negative for all substances.

Amanda Rountree, the caseworker assigned to the case after the children had

been taken into care, testified that she was concerned because Mother would not

admit to using cocaine or methamphetamine, but she also would not or could not

provide an alternative explanation; she “couldn’t tell [Rountree] who she could have

been around or what environment she was [in] where she was exposed to these

drugs.” By the time of trial, however, Mother did have an explanation: she blamed the

positive methamphetamine and cocaine tests on exposure from having been in the

same room in which someone had used drugs—specifically, Paternal Grandmother;

Mother said, “[s]he’ll probably just be finishing and I’ll walk in her room.”

14
Father also had a positive drug test during the case. His February 2025 hair-

strand test was positive for cocaine, 14 methamphetamine, and a metabolite of heroin.

Father testified that he did not know why the test was positive, claiming that it must

have been “something [he had] touched in jail or something.”

V. The trial court did not find Mother credible and terminated her parental
rights.

At the conclusion of trial, the trial court found the predicate termination

grounds in Subsections (D) and (E) and that termination was in the children’s best

interest. In announcing its ruling, the trial court stated that throughout the case and

during the trial, Mother had demonstrated a pattern of dishonesty, and the court

further expressed concern about her “decision-making capabilities[ and] her abilities

to keep the children safe.” The trial court further stated that Mother had “put[ ]

100 percent of the blame of the reason the children were in care on [Father], and she’s

still not taking any responsibility for it, has also not changed her thinking”; that “while

[M]other has a stable home or placement, the [c]ourt has no confidence that the home

will stay that way due to Mother’s inability to make safe decisions, not only for herself

but for the children”; and that Mother had “demonstrated that she cannot meet the

emotional and physical needs of the children.” Mother now appeals.

14
Father had a 2016 conviction for a 2012 possession-of-cocaine offense.

15
Standard of Review

For a trial court to terminate a parent–child relationship, the party seeking

termination must prove two elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the

parent’s actions satisfy one predicate ground listed in Family Code Section

161.001(b)(1); and (2) that termination is in the child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code

§ 161.001(b); In re Z.N., 602 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. 2020). Evidence is clear and

convincing if it “will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or

conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code

§ 101.007; Z.N., 602 S.W.3d at 545.

To determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient in parental-termination

cases, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding

to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction

that the finding is true. Z.N., 602 S.W.3d at 545. The factfinder may draw inferences,

but they must be reasonable and logical. Id. We assume that the factfinder settled any

evidentiary conflicts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could have done

so. Id. We disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved,

and we consider undisputed evidence even if it is contrary to the finding. Id.; In re

J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). That is, we consider evidence favorable to the

finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless it is

conclusive. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). The factfinder is the sole

16
judge of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336,

346 (Tex. 2009).

To determine the factual sufficiency of the evidence, on the other hand, we

must perform “an exacting review of the entire record” to decide whether a factfinder

could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the Department proved the

termination ground and that termination would be in the child’s best interest. In re

A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 500, 502–03 (Tex. 2014); see Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b); In re

C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). If the factfinder reasonably could form such a

firm conviction or belief, then the evidence is factually sufficient. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at

18–19. But if a factfinder reasonably could not—because the disputed evidence that

could not reasonably support the finding is too significant—then the evidence is

factually insufficient. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). As with the legal

sufficiency standard, the factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and

demeanor, A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 503, and we give due deference to the factfinder’s

findings, H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108.

Discussion

I. Predicate Termination Grounds

Mother argues that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to show

endangerment under Subsections (D) or (E) because there was no evidence that the

children “suffered any physical or emotional trauma in regard to the domestic

violence,” which she claims they never mentioned; because her positive drug tests for

17
cocaine and methamphetamine were due to her being around drug users, not her own

drug use; and because her negative urine and hair-strand tests in April and July

2025 show that her services had assisted her in learning to cope with any desire to use

marijuana or any other drugs.

A. Endangerment Grounds

Subsections (D) and (E) address child endangerment. “Endanger” in this

context “means to expose to loss or injury” or “to jeopardize.” In re J.F.-G.,

627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d

531, 533 (Tex. 1987)). The term “means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or

potential ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment.” In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d

796, 803 (Tex. 2012) (quoting Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533). But the endangering conduct

need not be directed at the child, and the child need not actually suffer injury. J.F.-G.,

627 S.W.3d at 312 (quoting Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533).

Subsection (D) addresses endangering environments. Tex. Fam. Code

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D). It authorizes termination when a parent has knowingly placed or

knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger

the child’s physical or emotional well-being. Id. Because conditions and surroundings

cannot endanger a child who is not exposed to them, the relevant time frame for

evaluating endangerment under Subsection (D) is before the child’s removal. In re

J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 749 (Tex. 2022). A parent’s conduct in the home and the

suitability of a child’s living conditions are relevant considerations in a Subsection (D)

18
analysis. Id.; In re Z.R., No. 02-25-00268-CV, 2025 WL 3181160, at *7 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Nov. 13, 2025, no pet.); In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).

Subsection (E) focuses on endangering conduct. Tex. Fam. Code

§ 161.001(b)(1)(E). It authorizes termination when the parent engaged in conduct that

endangers the child’s physical or emotional well-being or knowingly placed the child

with persons who engaged in such conduct. Id. “As a general rule, conduct that

subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability” endangers the child’s physical

and emotional well-being. In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2004, pet. denied). A Subsection (E) finding generally may not be based on a single act

or omission; rather, it requires “a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of

conduct.” J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125; Z.R., 2025 WL 3181160, at *7.

B. Endangering Conduct and Environment

Evidence of domestic violence against a parent can in some cases support an

endangerment finding. Abusive or violent conduct by a parent can produce an

environment that endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being, and thus a

parent’s decision to continue living with someone who has committed domestic

violence can support a Subsection (D) finding. In re E.A., No. 02-24-00535-CV,

2025 WL 1085189, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 10, 2025, pet. denied). “The

factfinder may consider domestic violence and a propensity for violence as evidence

of endangerment, even if the violence did not occur in the children’s presence, was

19
not directed at the children, or did not physically injure the children.” Id. Likewise, a

parent’s continuing relationship with an abuser can support a Subsection (E) finding.

See In re D.D.D., No. 01-23-00078-CV, 2023 WL 4872399, at *11 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 1, 2023, no pet.); In re N.E., No. 01-22-00739-CV,

2023 WL 2530197, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 16, 2023, pet. denied).

A parent’s involvement with illegal drugs may also support an endangerment

finding under Subsection (D) or (E). A parent’s illegal drug use “exposes the children

to the possibility that the parent may be impaired or imprisoned.” In re J.S.,

687 S.W.3d 541, 551 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.). While illegal drug use is

not necessarily, by itself, enough to show endangerment, “a pattern of drug use

accompanied by circumstances that indicate related dangers to the child can establish

a substantial risk of harm,” and a reviewing court should consider drug-use evidence

along with other evidence “that demonstrates that illegal drug use presents a risk to

the parent’s ‘ability to parent.’” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 278 (Tex. 2024) (quoting

J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345); see R.W., 129 S.W.3d at 739. For example, “[w]hen a

pattern of drug use is coupled with credible evidence of attendant risks to

employment, housing, and prolonged absence from the children, a factfinder

reasonably can find endangerment to the child’s physical or emotional well-being

under (D) and (E).” R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 281; see In re M.H., No. 01-25-00702-CV,

2026 WL 471744, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 19, 2026, pet. filed)

20
(stating that Subsection (D) finding may be based on a pattern of drug use along with

evidence of “attendant risks to employment and housing”).

Relatedly, engaging in illegal conduct that can subject one to imprisonment can

be part of the endangerment analysis. “While imprisonment alone is not a basis to

terminate a parent’s rights, it is an appropriate factor to consider because when a

parent is incarcerated, he or she is absent from the child’s daily life and unable to

provide support to the child,” negatively affecting “the child’s living environment and

emotional well-being.” In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 503 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2009, no pet.); see In re N.L.S., 715 S.W.3d 760, 765 (Tex. 2025) (stating that “mere

imprisonment will not, standing alone, constitute engaging in conduct [that]

endangers the . . . child,” but that a parent’s criminal history—considering such

matters as “the nature of the crimes, the duration of incarceration, and whether a

pattern of escalating, repeated convictions exists”—is evidence that can support an

endangerment finding (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

C. Application

So, does the evidence in this case support an endangerment finding? We hold

that it does.

First, Mother had two positive hair-strand tests for cocaine, methamphetamine,

and a metabolite of marijuana, and the amount of methamphetamine and cocaine in

her hair had increased by the time of the second hair-strand test, in which she also

tested positive for a cocaine metabolite. Mother offered no explanation or expert

21
testimony regarding how she could have tested positive for a cocaine metabolite if she

had not ingested cocaine. 15 See, e.g., In re N.T., No. 02-24-00067-CV,

2024 WL 2066375, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 9, 2024, no pet.) (noting

testimony that positive test for cocaine metabolites indicated ingestion of the drug).

Although Mother denied ever using cocaine or methamphetamine, the trial court

could have disbelieved that testimony. As for marijuana, Mother admitted that she

had used it through September 2024—that is, even after the children had been taken

into care.

Moreover, before the positive drug tests, Mother was arrested for possession of

methamphetamine, and the trial court could have disbelieved the testimony that she

did not know that the drugs were in the car—particularly when she and Father both

15
For both hair-strand tests, the drug testing service provided a test results
document that stated that Mother had tested positive for cocaine metabolites. But for
the first test, the accompanying lab report from the lab that had actually performed
the test stated that the test was positive for “cocaine” and negative for the cocaine
metabolites benzoylecgonine, cocaethylene, and norcocaine. See Kirk v. State,
No. 01-20-00111-CR, 2021 WL 3083045, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July
22, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (describing cocaethylene
as a metabolite created by having cocaine and alcohol in the bloodstream at the same
time); D.L.E.B. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-19-00186-CV,
2019 WL 3721330, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 8, 2019, pet. denied) (describing
norcocaine and benzoylecgonine as cocaine metabolites). No party presented
testimony about the drug-testing process or explanations of their results, so there was
no testimony about how many days or months before the testing Mother could have
used the substances for which she had a positive hair-strand test. There was also no
testimony about whether she could have had a false positive result for a cocaine
metabolite by simply having been in the room where someone had recently used the
drug.

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told the police at the time of her arrest that the drugs had been in her car for a year.

Additionally, the FBSS caseworker testified that when she and another caseworker

removed the children, Mother appeared “possibly under[ ] the influence”; “[h]er

demeanor was much different from” when the caseworker had seen her a few days

prior, and she “seemed to be flush. Her eyes seemed to be glossy. She was shaky.”

The trial court did not have to believe Mother’s denials of drug use. See In re A.H.,

No. 02-21-00402-CV, 2022 WL 1682422, at *11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 26,

2022, no pet.). Although the trial court stated at the end of trial that Mother had

“clean UAs and indicated that her hair would be clean as well[,] [s]o she addressed the

substance abuse issue,” the court could also have believed that Mother was still

downplaying her drug use at trial even after completing outpatient drug treatment as

part of her services.

Further, even if Mother’s positive hair-strand tests were due to external

exposure rather than ingestion, then as the trial court noted, those tests would mean

that Mother had chosen to spend time around drug users. See In re D.A.,

No. 02-22-00260-CV, 2022 WL 17841133, at *10 & n.11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Dec. 22, 2022, pet. denied) (noting that positive test for cocaine metabolites indicated

that mother had ingested the drug, and further noting that even if the trial court had

not found that mother had used cocaine, the court could have reasonably found that

her positive hair-strand tests showed that she had “persisted in frequenting places

where people used drugs or in spending time with drug users”). Indeed, Mother’s

23
explanation for why her car smelled like marijuana at the time of her arrest was that

someone had been “recently in the car” because “someone [who they] had recently

g[iven] a ride to was smoking.” Combining the positive drug tests she blamed on

exposure and police finding drugs in her car, the trial court could find that Mother

had risked exposing her children to drugs and had risked her own imprisonment by

her choices. Indeed, the trial court noted that Mother was either lying about using

cocaine and methamphetamine or was choosing to be around those drugs; the court

stated at the end of trial that “while [Mother] did complete drug and alcohol

treatment, she never did admit to drug use and would always make an excuse for how

she was exposed,” so “she is either being dishonest about using drugs or she is putting

herself in situations around controlled substances.”

Furthermore, the testimony showed that Mother stayed in a relationship with

Father even after he committed domestic violence against her. On at least one

occasion, the children were in the home at the time. Moreover, Mother bailed him out

of jail on numerous occasions, including after he was arrested for the incident of

violence against her while the children were in the home. During the FBSS case, she

violated the safety plan by having possession of the children unsupervised, which led

to Father’s taking the children from her care. Even after the children had been taken

into care, and even after trial had begun, Mother continued to spend time with Father.

Moreover, at trial, Mother continued to downplay the violence he had committed

against her and others.

24
Considering the entire record, we conclude that the trial court could have

reasonably formed a firm conviction or belief that the Department had proved at least

the termination ground in Subsection (E). Because the evidence is factually sufficient

to support the Subsection (E) finding, it is necessarily also legally sufficient. See In re

M.B.-O., No. 02-25-00306-CV, 2025 WL 3558966, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Dec. 11, 2025, pet. denied). We overrule Mother’s second issue, which challenges the

Subsection (E) finding. Because only one predicate termination ground is required, In

re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003), we do not address Mother’s first issue

challenging the Subsection (D) finding. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

II. Best-interest Finding

Mother’s third issue challenges the evidentiary sufficiency to support the trial

court’s best-interest finding.

A. Best-Interest Factors

Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the

child’s best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), the best-interest

analysis is child-centered, focusing on the child’s well-being, safety, and development,

In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). In determining whether evidence is

sufficient to support a best-interest finding, we review the entire record. In re E.C.R.,

402 S.W.3d 239, 250 (Tex. 2013). Evidence probative of a child’s best interest may be

the same evidence that is probative of a Subsection (b)(1) ground. Id. at 249; C.H.,

89 S.W.3d at 28; see Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1), (2). We also consider the

25
evidence in light of factors, set out in Holley v. Adams, that the factfinder may apply in

its best-interest determination. 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976) (citations

omitted); see E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249 (stating that in reviewing a best-interest

finding, “we consider, among other evidence, the Holley factors” (footnote omitted));

E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 807. These factors are not exhaustive, and some listed factors

may not apply to some cases. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Furthermore, undisputed

evidence of just one factor may be sufficient to support a finding that termination is

in the child’s best interest. Id. On the other hand, the presence of scant evidence

relevant to each factor will not support such a finding. Id.

B. Analysis

Although the trial court had some evidence weighing against a best-interest

finding, the court had factually sufficient evidence to find that termination was in the

children’s best interests.

1. Neutral evidence

One factor that the trial court could consider was the children’s desires. Holley,

544 S.W.2d at 371–72. However, when trial began, Braelyn was nearly five, and Brian

was one year, nine months. When children are too young to express their desires, the

factfinder may consider “observations of the child’s interactions with parents,

including any perceived ‘bonding’ between the child and parent.” In re L.A., No. 02-

25-00368-CV, 2025 WL 3683989, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 18, 2025, no

pet.). Here, Mother testified that her visits with the children had gone “pretty well”

26
and were full of “loving, caring, laughing, [and] giggling.” Rountree testified that

initially, Mother “presented as maybe emotionless, stoic” at her visits, but that she

“had gotten better” with her “engagement and her presence with the children.” 16

Rountree acknowledged that in the permanency report filed shortly before trial, she

reported that Mother’s behavior during her visits was “healthy and appropriate.”

There was no testimony regarding the children’s relationship with their

placement at the time of the trial court’s judgment; before the final hearing date, the

Department filed a motion to modify conservatorship, asking the trial court to name

L.C., the children’s fictive kin, as possessory conservator. 17 The Department’s

attorney represented to the trial court that the visits with L.C. “ha[d] gone well,” but

that was the extent of the information that the trial court had about the children’s

feelings about L.C. We cannot say that the evidence related to the children’s desires

weighs in favor of or against the trial court’s finding.

2. Evidence against the finding

As for the stability of the home or proposed placement, the children’s physical

needs, and the plans for the children, see Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72, the trial court

heard that the children had been placed in five different foster homes during the case,

Rountree had a more strongly positive evaluation of Father’s visits with the
16

children; she answered “very much so” when asked if the children were excited to see
Father and bonded with him at the visits.

The motion stated that the Department was “not waiv[ing] its request that the
17

parental rights of [Mother] be terminated.”

27
meaning that the Department had not provided a stable placement for the children.

Further, there was some evidence that Mother could provide stability in some areas.

She had a full-time job and an apartment with space for the children. She also had

completed the services requested by the Department. Mother testified that she had

learned in her services “not to put [her]self in certain situations, like how [her] hair

follicle [had] c[o]me back jacked up, just being around certain people.” She had also

learned that children “can also be triggered” by being around domestic violence “just

from seeing it or hearing it,” and that could put them at risk for repeating the cycle.

The trial court had records showing that Mother and Father had obtained dental care

for Braelyn in 2022 and 2023. Evidence that Mother had a suitable home, had stable

employment, had completed her services and learned from them, and had made

efforts to provide for the children’s physical health weighs against the trial court’s

finding.

3. Evidence supporting the finding

On the other hand, the trial court had some evidence that Mother’s plans for

the children were not feasible. Mother works nights, and her proposed childcare

during her shift was to have the children with Father’s father (Paternal Grandfather).

But when Rountree had previously asked Paternal Grandfather about accepting

placement of the children during the case, he had someone living with him who had a

criminal history as well as a history with child protective services, and Paternal

Grandfather told Rountree that he would not tell that person to move out. Mother

28
presented no evidence that Paternal Grandfather had since removed that person from

his home.

There was also no testimony that Paternal Grandfather’s home had room for

the children. When Rountree had spoken with him about being a possible placement

during the case, he said that he had no space for them. Father’s attorney asked her if it

was true that Paternal Grandfather had planned to put in bunk beds for the children,

but Rountree testified that it was not true.18 Mother did not offer any evidence of

other alternative plans for caring for the children while she worked other than having

Paternal Grandfather keep the children overnight. This evidence weighs in favor of

the trial court’s finding. Additionally, as of the time of trial, Mother still had a pending

felony charge for possession of methamphetamine, see Tex. Health & Safety Code

§ 481.115(a), (c), which created some degree of uncertainty about the future, see Tex.

Penal Code § 12.34 (providing punishment range for third-degree felony).19

18
In Mother’s attorney’s subsequent questioning of Rountree, the attorney
asserted, “[W]e did hear some testimony earlier that [Paternal Grandfather] was
willing to put bunk beds in his place for the children. Do you remember hearing
that?” Rountree testified, “Yes, ma’am.” But in fact, what Rountree had heard earlier
was not testimony on that point but rather Father’s attorney’s questioning. The only
testimony on the issue was Rountree’s testimony that Paternal Grandfather had no
such plans.

Based on the record before this court, Mother appeared to be eligible for
19

deferred-adjudication community supervision. See Tex. Code Crim Proc. art.
42A.102(b).

29
Further, as noted, the Department had filed a motion to have a fictive kin

placement named as possessory conservator. At the last hearing, the Department’s

attorney informed the trial court that a home study for that person had been

approved, the children had already had visits with her, and the placement was willing

to adopt the children.20 The Department’s attorney stated that the person had a

relationship with Mother, “which is good, and so she could allow [Mother], if she

fe[lt] like [Mother] was safe, to have some contact with the children.” The children’s

attorney ad litem told the trial court that the person would be “a positive placement”:

“I think she’ll be very protective, and so I’m very much in support of that placement.

I also am in support of termination as well.” Mother expressed no concerns with that

placement; her attorney expressed her opposition to termination but also stated that if

the trial court found that termination was in the children’s best interest, then Mother

did not oppose placement with that fictive kin. Thus, there was no dispute that the

proposed placement was suitable for the children.

The trial court could also consider the children’s emotional and physical needs

at the time of trial and in the future. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. Although

Mother and Father had provided some medical and dental care for the children in the

past, the Department also presented evidence that Braelyn had needed extensive

20
Mother’s brief states that the children’s current placement is not interested in
adoption, but while that was true of their placement when trial began, it was not true
of L.C., the fictive kin with whom the children were placed at the end of trial.

30
dental work after she came into care. Further, although the trial court had some

evidence that the kids had suffered some medical issues while in care—a blister and

diaper rash on Brian and scalp issues with Braelyn—there was no evidence of any

serious concern. Mother noticed the blister during a visit, something that had not

been noticed by the foster parents or the day care. Rountree testified that after

Mother brought it to her attention, the Department had “assess[ed] how it

happened,” and although the caseworker did not explain what she had learned in that

assessment, she testified that she had no concerns about abuse by the foster parents.

As for the diaper rash, the caseworker testified that it was due to his having had issues

with diarrhea. Finally, as for the concerns about Braelyn’s scalp, the foster parent

“produce[d] medical documents and a prescription” that showed that the issue was

already being treated by a doctor.

Regarding the children’s emotional needs, see id., Rountree testified that Braelyn

had “entered care with limited expressive language,” with the Department having

“concerns about her possibly being on the spectrum[ and her] ability to fully adapt

and function normally in, like, regular environments and in the foster homes that [the

Department was] placing her in.” Although Rountree acknowledged that it was

possible that Braelyn’s behavioral issues were “related to her placement[s],” she also

stated that the issues existed when Braelyn entered care. When Rountree talked to

Mother about the concerns, Mother “said that [the concerns] weren’t there before”

but that “[the maternal grandmother] primarily dealt with a lot of [Braelyn’s]

31
behavioral concerns.” From the testimony, the trial court could have believed that

Braelyn had behavioral concerns before she entered care—issues that may or may not

have been exacerbated by her placements—and that Mother had failed to recognize

the concerns and had no experience in addressing them. That evidence weighs in

favor of the trial court’s finding. See In re S.M.O., No. 04-24-00253-CV,

2024 WL 4280991, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 25, 2024, pet. denied)

(noting that father’s reluctance to accept child’s developmental delay weighed in favor

of best-interest finding). Mother did take parenting classes as part of her services, but

Rountree testified that the children did not have behavioral issues during their visits

with Mother during the case, so the trial court had no evidence as to whether the

classes had helped Mother—or had not helped her—learn how to address Braelyn’s

issues.

Additionally, the trial court had evidence related to Mother’s endangering the

children by staying with them in a home with Father despite his violent acts toward

her. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72 (listing emotional and physical danger to the

children at the time of trial and in the future as a best-interest factor). We recognize

that it can be difficult—and sometimes dangerous—for a domestic-violence victim to

leave an abuser. But the concern in this case was not that Mother did not have the

resources or ability to end her relationship with Father sooner than she did. The

concern was that Mother did not seem to recognize the seriousness of the situation

32
and its potential effect on her children. While Mother is not responsible for Father’s

violence against her, the trial court could consider her reaction to it.

Indeed, the trial court had evidence that Mother continued to choose to spend

time with Father even after he moved out during the FBSS case and even after the

children had been taken into care based in large part on his violent acts. As we noted,

Mother was found driving with Father—with her letting him drive her car—months

after their children had been taken into care, a situation that led to her arrest. Then,

during trial, she was again caught with Father in her car, which she again had let him

drive, apparently leading to his arrest for driving while intoxicated.

The trial court also could consider that Mother had displayed a curious lack of

interest in learning more about Father’s other criminal offenses, including an incident

of domestic violence against the mother of his other children and violent conduct

toward the father of her other children. Moreover, the trial court could infer from

Mother’s minimizing Father’s violence in her testimony that she did not truly

recognize the danger to her children from such violence and that she therefore could

not adequately protect her children from it and perhaps did not recognize the need to

do so. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72 (considering parental abilities of individual

seeking custody); In re A.M., No. 02-24-00199-CV, 2024 WL 4157766, at *16 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Sept. 12, 2024, pet. denied) (noting in best-interest analysis

evidence that mother could not protect herself, “much less anyone else,” from

abusive partner). This evidence weighs in favor of the best-interest finding.

33
Mother’s being stopped by police in the car with Father during trial also

undermined her testimony that she had learned “not to put [her]self in certain

situations.” Thus, even if the trial court had believed that Mother’s positive

hair-strand tests had resulted from her spending time around others using drugs, the

trial court could believe that Mother had still not learned to be careful about the

persons with whom she socialized.

Further, also relevant to evaluating potential danger to the children was the

evidence of Mother’s drug use. If the trial court believed that Mother’s positive drug

tests indicated that she had used illicit drugs, the court could have then further found

that her trial testimony that she had never used those drugs was an indication that she

was not serious about staying sober and that she could not be trusted to not endanger

the children in the future by using illegal drugs. Likewise, if Mother had been

choosing to be around users of illegal drugs, that choice had put her at risk of

imprisonment and of losing her parental rights, and the trial court did not have to

credit her testimony that she had learned to be more careful about who she spent time

with—particularly when Mother was caught again spending time with Father during

trial. This evidence weighs in favor of the trial court’s best-interest finding. See In re

A.E., No. 05-14-01340-CV, 2015 WL 1184179, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 16,

2015, pet. denied) (noting that trial court could consider in its best-interest analysis

mother’s choice to minimize past drug use and her history of being in abusive

relationships).

34
4. Conclusion

The trial court had some evidence from which it could find that Mother could

provide some stability to the children in that she had a place to live and a job. Further,

Father’s unfortunate death during the case meant that there could no longer be any

issue with Mother choosing him over the children.

On the other hand, by the last day of trial, the Department had found a fictive

kin placement for the children, and all parties agreed that the placement was suitable.

If the trial court believed the caseworker’s testimony that Braelyn had behavioral

issues when she came into care, then the trial court could also believe that Mother was

unaware of those issues or was unable to address them. Most importantly, despite

Mother’s receiving counseling and other services, she continued to minimize Father’s

violent history as well as her drug use or her association with drug users. When a

parent has endangered a child, the parent’s failure to recognize and rectify that

endangerment raises serious concerns about the parent’s willingness and ability to

protect the child from danger in the future. Here, the trial court could find from the

evidence that the Department was correct in concluding that Mother could not be

trusted to be protective of the children.

Considering the entire record, we hold that the trial court could form a firm

conviction or belief that the Department had proved that termination would be in the

children’s best interest. Because the evidence was therefore factually sufficient to

35
support the best-interest finding, it was therefore also legally sufficient. See M.B.-O.,

2025 WL 3558966, at *10. We overrule Mother’s third issue.

Conclusion

Having overruled Mother’s second and third issues, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

/s/ Mike Wallach
Mike Wallach
Justice

Delivered: June 4, 2026

36