In the Interest of E.T., a Child v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-25-00545-CV
___________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF E.T., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 231st District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 231-763055-25

Before Kerr, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
MEMORANDUM OPINION

After a bench trial, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to his

daughter E.T.1—a now-five-year-old child whom he has never met—finding two

termination grounds:

• endangering conduct, Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(E); and

• criminal conduct resulting in his conviction, imprisonment, and inability to care
for E.T. for two years after the termination petition’s filing, id.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(P);

and that termination was in E.T.’s best interest, id. § 161.001(b)(2). In three issues,

Father complains that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support these

three findings. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (P), (2). We will affirm.

I. Background

Father “grew up smoking marijuana,” using methamphetamine and K2,2 and

“do[ing] pretty much every drug you can think of.” He has two children with his

ex-wife (Susan), but throughout their lives, Father has been in a “revolving door” in

and out of prison and has had a largely “non-existent” relationship with both

now-adult children.

1
We use initials to identify the child, we refer to family members by familial
relation, and we use pseudonyms for other parties. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).

K2 is a synthetic cannabinoid with a hallucinogenic effect. In re C.L.-F.,
2

No. 02-22-00021-CV, 2022 WL 2353091, at *1 & n.2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June
30, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).

2
Mother has also struggled with using drugs, including methamphetamine and

heroin. In 2019, Mother and Father were both sober and lived together, and in August

of that year, Mother told Father that she was pregnant.

The next month, Father was arrested for burglary of a building. Mother visited

Father twice while he was in jail, but she “cut him off” after the second visit. Father

pleaded guilty and was sentenced to three years’ confinement. While Father was

confined, E.T. was born in April 2020.

Father was released from prison in early 2021, but he was rearrested in July for

violating his parole conditions. He was again released in 2022 and lived in a halfway

house. When not incarcerated, Father tried only once to contact Mother but “got kind

of the vibe that they didn’t want [him] around.” He also once contacted her sister,

who refused to intercede, calling him “nothing but the DNA donor.”

At some point, Mother met Stepfather, and they had a child, A.T., in April

2022. That same month, Father was arrested for striking a coworker with a

two-by-four board. He pleaded guilty to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and

was sentenced to five years’ confinement. Father recalled writing only one or two

letters to Mother, but he also admitted that he “was letting [G]od just do his things. I

didn’t have no contact. . . . I didn’t want to bother nobody.”

Mother, Stepfather, A.T., and E.T. lived together. E.T.—who had never known

of Father—called Stepfather her father. Mother and Stepfather began using illegal

drugs, and in May 2023, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

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received a referral after Mother was detained in connection with a retail theft. To

responding police, Mother had appeared to be under the influence of something, and

she admitted to having drug paraphernalia in her car. A.T. (age 1) and E.T. (age 3)

were also in the car, where police found methamphetamine. They and the car “were

‘dirty’ and had an odor.” The Department opened a case, initiated a safety plan, and

began extensive efforts to help the family.

During this time, Mother became pregnant again. Mother attempted an

at-home birth at a friend’s house to avoid the Department’s further scrutiny. But

because of complications, Mother and her newborn went to the hospital, where

Mother tested positive for drugs, including fentanyl. The baby also tested positive for

drugs, and on January 23, 2024, the baby’s hospital contacted the Department. Two

days later, the Department filed a petition to terminate the rights of Mother, Father,

and Stepfather; removed the children; and placed them in the same foster home.3

After the Department notified Father of the suit, a permanency specialist first

spoke with him by phone in March 2024. Father told her that Mother had told him

she was pregnant in August 2019 but that he was unaware of Mother’s relapse. DNA

testing eventually confirmed that he was E.T.’s father. At the Department’s request,

Father completed parenting and anger-management classes in prison.

3
All three children have been raised as if they have the same biological father—
Stepfather.

4
On January 3, 2025, Mother’s parental rights were terminated to E.T., and her

and Stepfather’s parental rights were terminated to their two younger children.4

Because of Father’s incarceration, OCOK5 did not allow E.T. to visit him. OCOK

also determined that it would not be appropriate to inform E.T. about Father as she

knew only Stepfather as her father, so it was determined that Father could write E.T.

letters that OCOK would hold onto for potential use in a therapeutic setting “to

introduce the concept of [Father] . . . to E.T.” OCOK’s permanency specialist

testified that about a year after their first phone call—in March 2025—Father began

writing weekly letters to either E.T. or her, which OCOK has held.

Father’s case was severed into a new cause and proceeded to trial in July and

September 2025. Father refused to be brought to court with a bench warrant and

remotely appeared by Zoom for part of the trial. The Department called three

witnesses: OCOK’s permanency specialist; Father’s ex-wife; and Father. Father called

no additional witnesses. E.T.’s guardian ad litem and her court-appointed special

4
Mother and Stepfather both signed affidavits voluntarily relinquishing their
parental rights. The trial court accordingly terminated their rights. See Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(K). Stepfather appealed, but this court has since affirmed the
termination order. See In re E.T., No. 02-25-00031-CV, 2025 WL 1717139, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth June 19, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.).
5
OCOK (Our Community Our Kids) is a private provider of community-based
care that contracts with the Department. See In re Z.R., No. 02-25-00268-CV,
2025 WL 3181160, at *3 n.10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 13, 2025, no pet.) (mem.
op.).

5
advocate (CASA) also testified. The ad litem explained why she thought that

terminating Father’s rights would be in E.T.’s best interest.

The trial court signed a termination order, finding, among other things, that the

Department had proved the endangering-conduct and criminal-conduct grounds and

that termination was in E.T.’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (P), (2).

II. Burden of Proof and Standard of Review

Before turning to Father’s sufficiency challenges, we set out the applicable

burden of proof and standard of review.

Termination decisions must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. See

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.001(b), .206(a); In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex.

2012). Due process demands this heightened standard because “[a] parental[-]rights

termination proceeding encumbers a value ‘far more precious than any property

right.’” In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 555 (Tex. 2012) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer,

455 U.S. 745, 758–59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397 (1982)). Evidence is clear and convincing

if it “will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the

truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007;

E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802.

For a trial court to terminate a parent–child relationship, the party seeking

termination must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the parent’s

actions satisfy just one of the many predicate grounds that are listed in Family Code

Section 161.001(b)(1), and (2) termination is in the child’s best interest under Section

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161.001(b)(2). Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1), (2); E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 803;

In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005).

Regarding Subsection 161.001(b)(1) grounds, the supreme court has articulated

an important qualification: if the trial court finds for terminating under Subsection

(b)(1)(E)—as the trial court did here—an appellate court must review that ground on

appeal because it can have potential collateral consequences for other children the

parent may have. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(M) (providing that a prior

termination under Subsection (E) is a ground for terminating parental rights to a

different child); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019) (“[I]f a court of appeals

affirms the termination on . . . [Subsection (E)], it must provide the details of its

analysis.”). Termination may not be based solely on the child’s best interest as

determined by the factfinder under Section 161.001(b)(2). Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v.

Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987); In re C.D.E., 391 S.W.3d 287, 295 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.).

A. Legal sufficiency

In evaluating the evidence for legal sufficiency in parental-termination cases, we

determine whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm

belief or conviction that the party seeking termination proved both the particular

ground for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest. In re J.F.C.,

96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002); see In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). We

review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and judgment, and

7
we resolve any disputed facts in favor of the finding if a reasonable factfinder could

have done so. J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We also must disregard all evidence that a

reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved, in addition to considering undisputed

evidence even if it is contrary to the finding. Id. That is, we consider evidence

favorable to termination if a reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary

evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. See id. In doing our job, we cannot

weigh witness-credibility issues that depend on the witness’s appearance and

demeanor; that is the factfinder’s province. J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573. And even when

credibility issues appear in the appellate record, we defer to the factfinder’s

determinations as long as they are not unreasonable. Id.

B. Factual sufficiency

We must perform “an exacting review of the entire record” in determining

whether the evidence is factually sufficient to support terminating a parent–child

relationship. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Tex. 2014). In a factual-sufficiency

review, we give due deference to the factfinder’s findings and do not supplant the

factfinder’s judgment with our own. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006).

We determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm

conviction or belief that the parent violated an alleged ground and that termination is

in the child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b); see In re C.H.,

89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002). If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence

that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so

8
significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or

conviction in the truth of its finding, then the evidence is factually insufficient.

H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108.

III. Endangering Conduct

In his first issue, Father argues that the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support the trial court’s endangering-conduct finding. See Tex. Fam.

Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). We disagree.

A. Law

“Endanger” means to expose to loss or injury, or to jeopardize a child’s

emotional or physical health. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117,

125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). Under Subsection (E), we ask whether

evidence exists that the parent engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with

someone who engaged in conduct—including acts, omissions, or failures to act—that

endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being. Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 161.001(b)(1)(E); J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125. Subsection (E) requires not just a single

act or omission but rather a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct.

J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125.

“As a general rule, conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and

instability endangers the [child’s] physical and emotional well-being.” In re P.W.,

No. 02-24-00211-CV, 2024 WL 4293564, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 26,

2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort

9
Worth 2004, pet. denied)). The specific danger to the child’s well-being may be

inferred from parental misconduct alone, and courts may look to parental conduct

both before and after the child’s birth. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009);

see In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 502 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.)

(stating that a factfinder may infer from past endangering conduct that similar

conduct will recur). Additionally, the parent’s conduct does not necessarily have to be

directed at the child, and the child is not required to suffer injury. J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d

at 125.

We identify some of the pertinent parental conduct that we can consider in an

endangering-conduct analysis:

• “Domestic violence, want of self[-]control, and propensity for violence,” In re
A.L.W., No. 04-24-00874-CV, 2025 WL 2158523, at *4 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio July 30, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d
841, 845 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.)); see also J.O.A.,
283 S.W.3d at 346;

• Conduct toward another child or a domestic partner, In re L.A.,
No. 02-25-00368-CV, 2025 WL 3683989, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec.
18, 2025, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (first citing J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345; and then
citing Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 724 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2010, pet. denied));

• Illegal drug use, see J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345;

• “[C]riminal conduct, convictions, imprisonment, and their effects on a parent’s
life and ability to parent,” In re J.B., No. 14-20-00766-CV, 2021 WL 1683942, at
*5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 29, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.);

• Beyond the fact of “mere imprisonment,” the totality of a “[a] parent’s criminal
history—taking into account the nature of the crimes, the duration of
incarceration, and whether a pattern of escalating, repeated convictions exists,”

10
In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312–13 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Boyd, 727 S.W.2d
533–34);

• Failure to provide stable housing and income, In re K.J., No. 02-25-00093-CV,
2025 WL 1600219, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 5, 2025, pet. denied)
(mem. op.);

• Mental-health issues, In re J.P.-L., 592 S.W.3d 559, 583 n.26 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2019, pet. denied); and

• Lack of significant parent–child contact, In re A.J.D., No. 02-13-00183-CV,
2013 WL 5781478, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 24, 2013, no pet.)
(mem. op.).

B. Evidence and analysis

The record contains evidence of each of these above types of endangering

conduct. We begin with Father’s history and pattern of conduct leading to his

incarcerations and being away from his children, including E.T.

Father’s ex-wife, Susan, described his involvement with the criminal-justice

system throughout his life as “[c]onsistent. Never a downtime. And if there was, it

was two or three months at a time.” She described Father’s going through a revolving

door in and out of prison, and she testified that he had been incarcerated for most of

his children’s lives: He had “[l]ittle to no[]” involvement with their lives.

Susan testified that when Father was not incarcerated, he had abused drugs,

including using marijuana, in front of the children. Once, during 2012, Father’s drug

use caused him to lose touch with reality. Father thought his son was a demon, and he

held the family in a room for three days, keeping a knife beside him. She did not think

11
that Father had ever recovered from the 2012 incident and that he had suffered

long-term mental health issues. They permanently separated in 2013.

Susan testified that Father’s conduct had caused long-lasting trauma in her and

her children. She said that Father had a strained relationship with their son and no

relationship with their daughter. And she testified that her own relationship with

Father was “toxic.”

When Father was released from prison in 2021, he told Susan about wanting

E.T. to be in his life. She told him it “probably wasn’t going to happen if he didn’t get

his stuff together.” When Father again contacted her about the Department’s removal

of E.T., she blocked him. She testified that she would be concerned if Father had any

contact with E.T. because of “the mental toll that it takes on one having to deal with

him,” and she stated, “I just don’t think it would be healthy.”

Father testified that he has been sober since 2017, but his pattern of conduct

leading to his repeated incarceration has continued. While Father lived with Mother,

she became pregnant. Instead of trying to provide a stable home for a future child and

two recovering drug users, within a month of Mother’s telling him she was pregnant,

Father returned to criminal activity—burgling a building—and was confined when

E.T. was born.

Upon his release in 2021, instead of trying to be in E.T.’s life, he violated the

terms of his parole and was again imprisoned. And after being released in 2022, he

quickly returned to his criminal ways—assaulting a co-worker—and was convicted

12
and incarcerated for that violent crime. Thus, Father has been incarcerated

throughout the termination proceeding.

Father testified that he hoped to be released sometime in late January 2026. But

he acknowledged that when he is eventually released, he will not be able to

immediately provide stable housing for E.T. He plans to move into a cousin’s trailer,

which does not have the capacity to also house E.T., so he estimated that it might take

another six to eight months to set up a place for her.

When the Department asked Father how he thought things would be different

this time, Father said he “got somebody’s life at stake.” The Department immediately

questioned him about having “somebody’s life at stake before”—referring to Susan

and their two children—and Father asserted that he “wasn’t in [his] right mind” then.

But he claimed that he had learned techniques in prison to do better this time.

Father claimed to have not used drugs since 2017, and he took an

anger-management and a parenting class in prison, had been writing letters to E.T.

since March 2025, and had been meditating and praying daily in prison. But such

evidence cannot be viewed in isolation. See J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312–13; see also In re

R.J., 579 S.W.3d 97, 116 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied). “A

parent’s efforts to improve or enhance parenting skills are . . . relevant in determining

whether a parent’s conduct results in endangerment under Subsection (E).” In re J.M.,

No. 02-21-00346-CV, 2022 WL 872542, at *15 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 24,

2022, no pet.) (quoting In re M.M.M., No. 01-21-00269-CV, 2021 WL 5365102, at

13
*11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 18, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citation

modified)). But “evidence of improved conduct, especially of short duration, does not

conclusively negate the probative value of a long history of irresponsible choices.” Id.

(quoting M.M.M., 2021 WL 5365102, at *11 (citation modified).

Father has consistently chosen conduct resulting in confinement. And the

Department presented evidence of Father’s past conduct toward his now-traumatized

adult children and ex-wife, his nonviolent and violent conduct toward others that had

led to his repeated confinement, his failure to obtain stable housing, his failure to

provide for his family, and his overall lack of contact with or concern for E.T. See

J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 313; Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 533–34.

No evidence shows that Father had known that E.T. was in a deplorable

situation with Mother and Stepfather. But likewise, no evidence shows that before

March 2025—around a year after first speaking with OCOK—Father made any real

effort to know anything about E.T., her life, or her environment, or to offer her

financial, emotional, or other support. 6 In his own words, he described his efforts,

stating,

I think I wrote one or two letters to [Mother’s address] just to -- yeah, I
didn’t want to bother nobody, I didn’t want to interrupt anything that
was going on because I didn’t want anybody to make the wrong turn
with that child in the car or, you know, anything. So I was just letting --
letting the flow go.

When the Department first contacted Father, he “stated that he didn’t know
6

anything about [her].”

14
In short, the Department did not present a case of Father’s mere incarceration,

standing alone; rather, it presented evidence of a history and repeating pattern of

criminal conduct, convictions, and confinement creating familial instability and

endangering his ex-wife and their two children—and now E.T—with no definite end

in sight. See J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 313; J.B., 2021 WL 1683942, at *5. Considering the

totality of Father’s history and giving the deference we must pay to the factfinder’s

credibility determinations, on this record a reasonable factfinder—whether viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment or weighing all the disputed

evidence, see In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 630–31 (Tex. 2018)—could have formed a

firm belief or conviction that Father’s course of conduct endangered E.T.’s

well-being, see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(E); H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108;

J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

We thus hold that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to

support the trial court’s Subsection (E) finding. 7 See J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 313; K.J.,

2025 WL 1600219, at *6; J.B., 2021 WL 1683942, at *5. We overrule Father’s first

issue.

In light of this holding, we need not reach Father’s second issue challenging
7

the evidentiary sufficiency of the trial court’s Subsection (P) finding. See Tex. R. App.
P. 47.1; N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 237 n.1; In re W.H., No. 02-24-00291-CV,
2024 WL 4705128, at *2 n.4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 7, 2024, pet. denied)
(mem. op.).

15
IV. Best Interest

Concerning Father’s third issue, we likewise hold that the evidence is legally

and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. See Tex. Fam.

Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2).

A. Law

Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the

child’s best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), the best-interest

analysis is child-centered, focusing on the child’s well-being, safety, and development,

A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631. Evidence probative of a child’s best interest may be the same

evidence that is probative of a Subsection (b)(1) ground. In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239,

249 (Tex. 2013); C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1), (2).

We also consider the evidence in light of nonexclusive factors that the factfinder may

apply in determining the child’s best interest:

[1] the [child’s] desires . . . ;

[2] the [child’s] emotional and physical needs[,] . . . now and in the
future;

[3] the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the
future;

[4] the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;

[5] the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the
[child’s] best interest . . . ;

[6] the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency
seeking custody;

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[7] the stability of the home or proposed placement;

[8] the [parent’s] acts or omissions . . . indicat[ing] that the existing
parent–child relationship is not a proper one; and

[9] any excuse for the [parent’s] acts or omissions.

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976) (citations omitted); see E.C.R.,

402 S.W.3d at 249 (stating that in reviewing a best-interest finding, “we consider,

among other evidence, the Holley factors” (footnote omitted)); E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at

807.

These factors are not exhaustive, and some listed factors may not apply to

some cases. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Furthermore, undisputed evidence of just one

factor may be sufficient to support a finding that termination is in the child’s best

interest. Id. On the other hand, the presence of scant evidence relevant to each factor

will not support such a finding. Id.

B. Evidence and analysis

In weighing the Holley factors, we conclude that the evidence strongly shows a

history of acts and omissions indicating that the existing parent–child relationship was

not a proper one and that Father was not able to provide for E.T.’s current or

long-term emotional and physical needs. See 544 S.W.2d at 372.

1. E.T.’s desires

The Department presented no direct evidence from E.T. Under such

circumstances, the first Holley factor is ordinarily “considered to be neutral, weighing

17
neither for nor against the trial court’s best-interest finding.” See In re C.W.,

No. 02-23-00414-CV, 2024 WL 637264, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 15, 2024,

pet. denied) (mem. op.). But the State presented circumstantial evidence of E.T.’s

desires by presenting evidence that she had bonded with her foster family, who had

cared for her and her half-siblings. Thus, the factfinder could have considered the

evidence of E.T.’s bond with her foster family as “a reasonable proxy for [E.T.’s]

desires.” In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 833 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023,

no pet.); see also In re O.O., No. 05-24-00456-CV, 2024 WL 4403748, at *7 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Oct. 4, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The first factor supports the

best-interest finding.

2. E.T.’s emotional and physical needs

The evidence at trial showed that E.T. had shown “signs of ADD” but had

been improving through weekly behavioral therapy. In December 2024, she and her

two half-siblings were placed with a foster family that has provided consistency and

structure in her life: E.T. was thriving in kindergarten, had her own room, enjoyed

being a big sister, called her foster parents “Mom and Dad,” and behaved like a

normal five year old—an improvement since her removal.

We have said that “children need permanency and stability,” In re G.V., III,

543 S.W.3d 342, 350 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. denied), and we have

stressed that a child needs “a stable home and engaged parents” who are not

constantly incarcerated. In re G.M., No. 02-23-00061-CV, 2023 WL 4243349, at

18
*8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 29, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting In re M.J.,

No. 02-23-00026-CV, 2023 WL 3643673, at *11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 25,

2023, no pet.) (mem. op.)). Further, the trial court could have reasonably inferred

from Father’s repeated history of incarceration that his confinement-causing conduct

would likely continue and that he could not meet E.T.’s current and future physical

and emotional needs. See G.M., 2023 WL 4243349, at *8. This factor weighs in favor

of termination.

3. Emotional and physical danger to E.T.

By all accounts, Father was not using drugs when he met Mother and did not

know that Mother had started using drugs because he had been imprisoned and not in

contact with her or E.T. But the trial court was free to consider Father’s prior drug

use, his conduct toward Susan and their children, and his pattern of criminal conduct,

including at least one violent act, that could endanger E.T. physically and emotionally

were she placed with him. See In re A.A., No. 13-25-00157-CV, 2025 WL 2475157, at

*12 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 27, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The

trial court was also permitted to measure Father’s future conduct by his past conduct

in determining whether termination of his parental rights was in the children’s best

interest.” (citing In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet.

denied))); see also L.A., 2025 WL 3683989, at *10 (holding that a parent’s violent

criminal conduct leading to confinement supports best-interest finding).

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Susan, Father’s ex-wife, testified to his dangerous past conduct toward her and

their children. She testified to the emotional strain that his conduct—including his

consistent involvement with the criminal-justice system—had placed on their

relationships and said that Father had caused “long-lasting traumatic effects” to them.

She expressed concern for E.T. were Father to have contact with her, stating, “I just

don’t think it would be healthy.”

By contrast, the Department’s proposed permanent placement presented a safe

and stable home for E.T. with her half-siblings and the adoption-motivated foster

parents with whom she had formed strong bonds. See G.M., 2023 WL 4243349, at *8.

This factor supports termination.

4. Parental abilities of the individual seeking custody

E.T.’s young age places a premium on the parental abilities of those seeking

custody and on the stability of her future home. See In re K.W., No. 02-24-00082-CV,

2024 WL 3461749, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 18, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.).

The CASA advocate and guardian ad litem both testified that E.T.’s foster parents had

been meeting E.T.’s needs. The foster parents were in the process of adopting E.T.’s

two younger half-siblings, and they also wanted to adopt E.T. Father, on the other

hand, testified that he wanted to meet E.T. but acknowledged that he could not

provide immediate housing or support for her upon his release. He thought “it would

be like a process . . . maybe like . . . a three or five-month deal to where she would get

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to know [him] . . . and gradual[ly] move in with [him],” and he thought it would take

six to eight months to have a place for her to stay.

The court heard evidence from Susan about Father’s poor parenting and his

having traumatized their two children as he went in and out of prison—conduct that

continued before and after E.T. was born. See A.A., 2025 WL 2475157, at *12; E.D.,

419 S.W.3d at 620. Father claimed to have not been in his right mind when he failed

to uphold his parental responsibilities to his older children but claimed that he had

learned new techniques in prison so that he could be different upon his next release.

Both the CASA advocate and the guardian ad litem testified that E.T.’s placement that

was meeting her needs would be at risk if the court waited for Father “to prove that

he is, indeed, a changed person.” The ad litem testified that E.T. “is safe, she is stable,

she is happy, she is with her biological [half-]siblings,” and she stated, “I believe it’s in

her best interest that she remain there.”

The trial court was entitled to consider the evidence of Father’s repeated

convictions leading to confinement and his inability to meet E.T.’s basic needs—like

housing—for the foreseeable future. See In re A.F.R., No. 01-20-00355-CV,

2020 WL 6140181, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 20, 2020, pet. denied)

(mem. op.). This factor favors termination.

5. Programs available to promote E.T.’s best interest

Father completed parenting and anger-management classes in prison. But

because of his incarceration, Father could not complete the Department’s services and

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programs that could have helped him to meet E.T.’s basic needs. In contrast, E.T.’s

foster parents were taking her to therapy sessions and were helping her do well in

school. The foster parents were motivated to adopt her and her younger half-siblings.

On balance, this factor weighs in favor of termination. See In re B.K.G.D.,

No. 01-20-00057-CV, 2020 WL 3821086, at *13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July

2, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding that “parental abilities” and “programs

available” factors weighed in favor of termination where parents had completed

“some, but not all, of” their required services and potential adoptive parents were able

to meet child’s needs); In re J.O., No. 11-19-00088-CV, 2019 WL 3822198, at *2–

3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 15, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding evidence

sufficient to support best-interest finding where record reflected that adoption-

motivated foster parents met the child’s needs).

6. Plans for E.T.

Father had difficulty articulating his future plans for E.T. He talked about a

“process to where she would have to meet [him], talk to [him], maybe like go through

a three or five-month deal to where she would get to know [him] . . . and gradual[ly]

move in with [him].” But he asked the trial court, “What do you think?” And then

Father talked about needing to save up for several months to find a place where he

and E.T. could live together.

The Department’s plan for E.T. was for her current foster parents to adopt her

and to keep her with her half-siblings if the trial court terminated Father’s parental

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rights. And the evidence showed that the foster parents wanted that outcome. The

guardian ad litem testified that the court should not delay the Department’s

permanent solution to see if Father really had become a “changed” person. She

explained that E.T. was “in a placement that [was] meeting all of her needs” and

should be allowed to remain in that safe, stable environment. “Stability and

permanence are paramount in the upbringing of children.” In re M.E.-M.N.,

342 S.W.3d 254, 263 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied). This factor favors

termination.

7. Stability of the home and proposed placement

Under the Texas Family Code, “the prompt and permanent placement of the

child in a safe environment is presumed to be in the child’s best interest.” Tex. Fam.

Code Ann. § 263.307(a). At the time of trial, E.T. “had been placed in a stable home,

and the plan was for her to be adopted into that family.” See In re V.S.,

No. 02-22-00063-CV, 2022 WL 2252775, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 23,

2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citation modified). Evidence about placement plans

and adoption is relevant to the child’s best interest. In re J.A.B., No. 2-06-404-CV,

2007 WL 3037720, at *6 n.40 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 18, 2007, no pet.) (mem.

op.). The testimony of the CASA advocate and guardian ad litem established that E.T.

“interacts well with her placement family and that her needs . . . are amply met.” See

V.S., 2022 WL 2252775, at *6. In contrast, Father’s criminal conduct—including a

recent act of violence against a coworker—resulted in his confinement for nearly all

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E.T.’s life, leaving him with no relationship with her and no concrete plan to provide

for her basic emotional and financial needs. This factor weighs in favor of

termination.

8. Acts or omissions indicating that the parent–child relationship was not
proper

A month after Mother told Father that she was pregnant with E.T., he

committed a crime and went to prison. He made little to no effort to contact Mother

or to find out about E.T. after she was born. When he was released from prison, he

was rearrested. After being released, he committed a violent act and was again

imprisoned. Not until after the Department contacted Father had he tried more

consistently to communicate with E.T. by writing letters to her. In short, despite

having repeated opportunities to be a supportive parent, Father instead chose to

commit crimes that led to his confinement and absence from E.T.’s life. He has never

met E.T., and she does not know him. Father’s acts and omissions led to his having

no relationship with E.T. and tended to demonstrate that his proposed relationship

with E.T. at some point after he is released from prison would not be a proper one.

This factor weighs in favor of termination.

9. Excuses

Father did not offer much to excuse his conduct. He gave no explanation for

committing a crime during Mother’s pregnancy and offered no good explanation for

striking his coworker with a two-by-four. He had simply assumed that two

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Spanish-speaking coworkers were plotting against him, so he attacked: “I . . . got in

the wrong situation and took care of the situation wrong.”

Although Father testified that Mother had cut him out of her life, he did not

explain his lack of effort to establish contact with E.T. or to develop a relationship

with her before the Department’s removal. Father testified that he was “letting the

flow go” and not “want[ing] to bother nobody.” But the trial court could have

reasonably found that such statements reflected his lack of concern for E.T. rather

than an excuse.

Father also acknowledged that he wanted to provide for E.T., but he could not

explain how his conduct would differ from how he had treated his other children. He

claimed to have not been in his right mind when he was responsible for them, said

that he had been sober since 2017, and said that he had learned techniques to make

better decisions. But even assuming Father quit using drugs in 2017, he did not

explain why he had twice committed crimes and ended up in prison after

impregnating Mother—knowing that he was about to be a father for the third time.

The trial court was entitled to find that this factor weighed in favor of termination.

C. Holding

Considering the record as a whole, we conclude that the Holley factors weigh

against Father. We hold that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief

or conviction that termination of Father’s parental rights was in E.T.’s best interest

and that the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial

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court’s best-interest finding. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2); H.R.M.,

209 S.W.3d at 108; J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266; C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25. We overrule

Father’s third issue.

V. Conclusion

Having overruled Father’s first and third issues, and without reaching his

second, we affirm the trial court’s termination order.

/s/ Elizabeth Kerr
Elizabeth Kerr
Justice

Delivered: January 22, 2026

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