Aventine Tarrant Parkway Apartments, LP v. Stephanie Etling

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-25-00029-CV
___________________________

AVENTINE TARRANT PARKWAY APARTMENTS, LP, Appellant

V.

STEPHANIE ETLING, Appellee

On Appeal from the 96th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 096-329882-21

Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Aventine Tarrant Parkway Apartments, LP (Aventine LP) attempts

to appeal from the trial court’s interlocutory order denying its plea to the jurisdiction

in a premises-liability case brought against it by Appellee Stephanie Etling. See Tex.

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8). In its sole issue, Aventine LP argues

that the trial court erred by denying its plea to the jurisdiction. In response, Etling

argues, among other things, that we should dismiss Aventine LP’s appeal for lack of

jurisdiction because it is not a “governmental unit” authorized to file an interlocutory

appeal of a trial court’s denial of a plea to the jurisdiction. See id. Because we agree

with Etling that Aventine LP is not a governmental unit authorized to file an

interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s denial of the plea to the jurisdiction, we will

dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

II. BACKGROUND

As alleged in Etling’s live petition, in November 2019, she visited her

grandmother at an apartment complex in Keller. While she was walking her

grandmother’s dog outside at the complex, Etling stepped on a metal grate. Etling

alleged that the grate broke when she stepped on it, causing her bodily injuries. Etling

later filed a premises-liability claim against Aventine LP, alleging that it was the

“owner or property manager responsible for maintaining the walkways” at the

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apartment complex and that it “knew or reasonably should have known of

the . . . dangerous condition on said premises.”

Aventine LP answered the lawsuit, and it later filed a plea to the jurisdiction. In

its plea, Aventine LP argued that it was “entitled to assert governmental immunity

and/or derivative governmental immunity” and that immunity had not been waived.

An affidavit from Mary-Margaret Lemons was attached to Aventine LP’s plea to the

jurisdiction. In her affidavit, Lemons stated that she was the President of Housing

Authority of the City of Fort Worth, Texas d/b/a Fort Worth Housing Solutions (the

Housing Authority), which she described as “the public housing authority for the City

of Fort Worth, Texas.” Lemons explained that the Housing Authority owned the plot

of land on which the subject apartment complex was located. According to Lemons,

the Housing Authority leased that land to Aventine LP for the operation of a rental

project composed of two hundred forty apartment units.

In her affidavit, Lemons stated that Aventine LP “is a Texas limited

partnership that owns the Aventine Apartments where [Etling] allegedly fell” and that

Aventine LP’s “sole purpose is to hold title to a single asset, the Aventine

Apartments, for the benefit of [the Housing Authority] and the low to moderate

income residents it serves.” She said that Aventine LP does not have any employees,

is “entirely controlled” by the Housing Authority, and “merely serves ministerial

functions, without discretion, for [the Housing Authority].” Lemons averred that

Aventine LP is “wholly owned by Aventine 240, LLC and Fort Worth Affordability,

3
Inc.” She went on to state that Aventine 240, LLC and Fort Worth Affordability, Inc.

are “wholly owned and entirely controlled” by the Housing Authority, through the

Housing Authority’s employees. According to Lemons, Etling’s lawsuit “implicates

not only [Aventine LP’s] assets, but potentially the assets of [the Housing Authority]

as well, since [Aventine LP] is wholly owned by [the Housing Authority] by and

through [the aforementioned] affiliated entities.” Lemons also stated that the

apartment complex was managed by Orion Real Estate Services Texas LLC.

The subject lease (the Lease) between the Housing Authority and Aventine LP

concerning the land where the apartment complex was situated was attached to

Aventine LP’s plea to the jurisdiction. The Lease established the parties’ respective

rights and obligations concerning the land, with the Housing Authority described as

the “Landlord” under the Lease and Aventine LP described as the “Tenant.” On

behalf of the Housing Authority, the Lease was signed by Barbara Holston, in her

capacity as the “President and CEO” of the Housing Authority.1 On behalf of

Aventine LP, the Lease was also signed by Holston, under the following signature

block:

The Lease was signed by Holston in 2011. In her affidavit, Lemons stated that
1

she became President of the Housing Authority in 2017.

4
Etling responded to Aventine LP’s plea to the jurisdiction. In her response,

Etling argued that Lemons was an interested witness and that her affidavit was “not

clear, positive, direct, credible, [and] free from contradiction.” She also maintained

that Aventine LP could not “step[] into the shoes” of the Housing Authority. Indeed,

Etling pointed out that Aventine LP had moved to designate the Housing Authority

as a responsible third party in the lawsuit.2

Following a hearing, the trial court signed an order denying Aventine LP’s plea

to the jurisdiction. This interlocutory appeal followed.

2
A copy of Aventine LP’s motion for leave to designate certain entities as
responsible third parties was attached to Etling’s response to the plea to the
jurisdiction. In that motion, Aventine LP requested leave to designate Orion Real
Estate Services Texas, LLC, Orion Real Estate Group, and the Housing Authority as
responsible third parties.

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III. DISCUSSION

We begin our analysis by addressing Etling’s argument that we do not have

appellate jurisdiction over Aventine LP’s appeal.3 See State v. Ninety Thousand Two

Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars and No Cents in United States Currency ($90,235), 390 S.W.3d

289, 291 (Tex. 2013) (stating that “we may not address the merits of a case absent

jurisdiction”).

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Whether we have jurisdiction over an appeal is a legal question that is reviewed

de novo. Eckerd Youth Alternatives, Inc., 2022 WL 2176523, at *2 (citing Tex. A & M

Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2007)). If the record does not

affirmatively reflect that we have appellate jurisdiction, we must dismiss the appeal.

Id. (citing IFS Sec. Grp., Inc. v. Am. Equity Ins. Co., 175 S.W.3d 560, 562 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2005, no pet.)).

As a general rule, an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment. CPS

Energy v. Elec. Reliability Council of Tex., 671 S.W.3d 605, 614 (Tex. 2023). Certain

statutes, however, authorize interlocutory appeals over particular kinds of trial court

orders. Id. Section 51.014(a)(8) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code

authorizes an interlocutory appeal from a trial court order that “grants or denies a plea

Even if Etling had not raised the issue, we are obligated to review sua sponte
3

issues affecting our jurisdiction. Eckerd Youth Alternatives, Inc. v. Pytel, No. 02-21-
00332-CV, 2022 WL 2176523, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 16, 2022, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (citing M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Tex. 2004)).

6
to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit as that term is defined in Section 101.001.”

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8). Pursuant to Section 101.001(3), the

term “[g]overnmental unit” means,

(A) this state and all the several agencies of government that collectively
constitute the government of this state, including other agencies bearing
different designations, and all departments, bureaus, boards,
commissions, offices, agencies, councils, and courts;

(B) a political subdivision of this state, including any city, county, school
district, junior college district, levee improvement district, drainage
district, irrigation district, water improvement district, water control and
improvement district, water control and preservation district, freshwater
supply district, navigation district, conservation and reclamation district,
soil conservation district, communication district, public health district,
and river authority;

(C) an emergency service organization; and

(D) any other institution, agency, or organ of government the status and
authority of which are derived from the Constitution of Texas or from
laws passed by the legislature under the constitution.

Id. § 101.001(3).

To qualify as a governmental unit under Section 101.001(3)(D), an entity must:

(1) be an “institution, agency, or organ of government” and (2) derive its “status and

authority” from the Texas Constitution or “from laws passed by the legislature.” Id.

§ 101.001(3)(D); see CPS Energy, 671 S.W.3d at 614. “Under the first prong, the phrase

‘institution, agency, or organ of government’ has a broad meaning, with the phrase

‘organ of government’ encompassing ‘an entity that operates as a part of a larger

governmental system.’” Eckerd Youth Alternatives, Inc., 2022 WL 2176523, at *3 (citing

7
Univ. of the Incarnate Word v. Redus, 518 S.W.3d 905, 910 (Tex. 2017)). “To satisfy the

second prong, ‘the entity asserting immunity from suit must have a legislative or

constitutional source from which it derived its status and authority.’” Id. (quoting

Lenoir v. U.T. Physicians, 491 S.W.3d 68, 77 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet.

denied) (op. on reh’g)).

Notably, “[w]hether an entity is entitled to an interlocutory appeal and whether

an entity has sovereign immunity are separate questions with separate analytical

frameworks.” Rosenberg Dev. Corp. v. Imperial Performing Arts, Inc., 571 S.W.3d 738, 748

(Tex. 2019); see also Univ. of the Incarnate Word, 518 S.W.3d at 911 (“To determine

whether an entity is immune, courts should rely not on the Tort Claims Act’s

definition of governmental unit, as we have here [when deciding the issue of appellate

jurisdiction under Section 51.014(a)(8)], but on the ‘nature and purposes’ of sovereign

immunity.”). Accordingly, appellate courts routinely determine their own appellate

jurisdiction before addressing issues of immunity. See, e.g., Rosenberg Dev. Corp.,

571 S.W.3d at 747–48 (determining appellate jurisdiction “[a]s a preliminary matter”

before turning to issue of immunity); Univ. of the Incarnate Word, 518 S.W.3d at 911

(deciding issue of appellate jurisdiction and remanding issue of immunity);

152 Lakewest Cmty., LP v. Ameristar Apartment Servs., L.P., No. 05-20-00483-CV,

2021 WL 5710553, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 2, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(addressing its appellate jurisdiction and holding that it possessed jurisdiction over

one appellant but not the other before addressing immunity of appellant over whom it

8
did have jurisdiction); Orion Real Est. v. Sarro, 559 S.W.3d 599, 602–04 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 2018, no pet.) (similar).

B. Analysis

At the outset of this appeal, we sent a letter to the parties questioning our

jurisdiction, and Aventine LP filed a brief in support of appellate jurisdiction. In that

brief, Aventine LP pointed to two cases—TRST Corpus, Inc. v. Financial Center, Inc.,

9 S.W.3d 316 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g) and

Lincoln Property Co. v. Herrera, No. 13-23-00276-CV, 2025 WL 339036 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jan. 30, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.)—to support its argument

that we have jurisdiction because it is a governmental entity pursuant to

Section 101.001(3)(D).4 In response, Etling relied primarily on two cases—TRST

Corpus, Inc. (one of the cases cited by Aventine LP) and Orion Real Estate—to support

its contention that we do not have jurisdiction because Aventine LP is not a

governmental entity pursuant to Section 101.001(3)(D). We will discuss these three

cases, along with a fourth we have found—152 Lakewest Community, LP—in turn.

In TRST Corpus, Inc., a plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the Teacher Retirement

System of Texas (TRS), which is a state agency, and it also filed claims against TRST

Corpus, Inc. (TRST), a “title-holding subsidiary corporation” of TRS. 9 S.W.3d

4
Aventine LP filed a reply brief in which it addressed Etling’s argument that we
lack appellate jurisdiction. In that reply brief, Aventine LP also relied on TRST
Corpus, Inc. and Lincoln Property Co.

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at 319. Both TRS and TRST filed pleas to the jurisdiction; the trial court granted

TRS’s plea, but it denied TRST’s plea. Id. at 320. TRST filed an interlocutory appeal,

and the plaintiff argued that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction because TRST

was not a governmental unit under Section 101.001. Id. In analyzing that issue, the

Fourteenth Court of Appeals noted that TRS derived its authority from Article 16,

Section 67 of the Texas Constitution. Id. at 321; see Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 67. That

provision of the Texas Constitution provides that the legislature “may enact general

laws establishing systems and programs of retirement and related disability and death

benefits for public employees and officers,” and it states that “[t]he assets of a system

are held in trust for the benefit of members and may not be diverted.” Tex. Const.

art. XVI, § 67(a)(1). It further provides that “[e]ach statewide benefit system must

have a board of trustees to administer the system and to invest the funds of the

system in such securities as the board may consider prudent investments.” Tex.

Const. art. XVI, § 67(a)(3).

The court of appeals noted that the bylaws adopted by the TRS Board of

Trustees provided TRS with the authority to maintain title-holding subsidiaries of

property or other interests in TRS’s real estate investment portfolio. TRST Corpus,

Inc., 9 S.W.3d at 321. The court stated that the record indicated that TRS had formed

TRST as a “title-holding subsidiary corporation,” that it was the shole shareholder of

TRST’s stock, and that “TRST’s sole purpose [was] to hold title to a multi-million-

dollar asset for the benefit of the TRS members.” Id. Under those circumstances, the

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court of appeals held that TRST was entitled to bring its interlocutory appeal of the

trial court’s denial of its plea to the jurisdiction. Id. Only after the court of appeals

determined its jurisdiction did it move on to analyze whether TRST was entitled to

governmental immunity. See id. at 321–24.

In Lincoln Property Co., an estate filed a premises-liability suit against a housing

authority, a limited partnership, and a company after the decedent was injured at “an

apartment complex dedicated to public housing.” 2025 WL 339036, at *1. The three

defendants filed pleas to the jurisdiction, which were denied by the trial court. Id. at

*1, *3. On appeal, the defendants argued that the trial court erred by denying their

pleas because they were each entitled to governmental immunity. Id. at *4. The

housing authority argued that it was entitled to immunity under Section 392.006 of the

Texas Local Government Code; the limited partnership maintained that it was entitled

to immunity because it was a “title-holding subsidiary entity whose sole purpose [was]

to hold title to assets for the benefit of” the housing authority; and the company

contended that it was entitled to derivative immunity because it had no discretion to

act with respect to the complained-of premises defect. Id. at *5. Notably, the Corpus

Christi–Edinburg Court of Appeals did not address the issue of whether it had

appellate jurisdiction over the case, nor did it address whether the defendants were

governmental units under Section 101.001(3)(D). Rather, the court’s analysis focused

on the issue of whether the defendants were entitled to governmental immunity. See

id. at *4–5.

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In Orion Real Estate, a young boy was bitten by a dog at an apartment complex.

559 S.W.3d at 601. The boy’s father sued a housing authority and a public facility

corporation that owned the complex, Orion who managed the complex, and a

resident of the complex who was caring for the dog. Id. The trial court later granted

a motion to dismiss filed by the housing authority, but it denied a plea to the

jurisdiction filed by the public facility corporation and Orion. Id. at 602. The public

facility corporation and Orion filed an interlocutory appeal. Id.

On appeal, the San Antonio Court of Appeals considered whether it had

appellate jurisdiction over the case, analyzing whether the public facility corporation

and Orion were governmental units under Section 101.001(3)(D). Id. at 602–03. The

court noted that the public facility corporation was owned and operated by the

housing authority, which was a governmental unit. Id. at 603. The court stated that

Sections 303.021 and 392.066 of the Texas Local Government Code specifically allow

a housing authority to create a nonprofit public facility corporation for certain

purposes. Id. (citing Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 303.021, 392.066). By virtue of

that statutory authority, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the public facility

corporation was “an ‘institution, agency, or organ’ of government whose ‘status and

authority’ are derived from laws passed by the legislature.” Id. Accordingly, the court

held that it had jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal as to the public facility

corporation. Id.

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Turning to Orion, the court stated that “Orion is a private company hired as an

independent contractor to manage [the apartment complex].” Id. The court noted

that Orion did “not point to any constitutional or statutory provision from which it

derive[d] its status and authority,” and the court further stated that it was not aware of

any constitutional or statutory provision conferring such authority on Orion. Id.

Accordingly, the court held that Orion was not a governmental unit under

Section 101.001(3)(D) and that the court therefore did not have jurisdiction over the

interlocutory appeal as it related to Orion. Id. Only after determining its own

jurisdiction over the appellants did the court of appeals begin to analyze whether the

public facility corporation—the only appellant it had jurisdiction over—was entitled

to governmental immunity or derivative immunity. See id. at 603–07.

In 152 Lakewest Community, LP, a plaintiff sued a housing authority, a public

facility corporation, and a limited partnership to recover money allegedly owed to it

for performing repair work on some townhomes. 2021 WL 5710553, at *1. The

defendants each filed pleas to the jurisdiction. Id. The trial court granted the housing

authority’s plea, but it denied the pleas filed by the public facility corporation and the

limited partnership. Id. On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals considered whether

the public facility corporation and the limited partnership were governmental units

under Section 101.001(3)(D). Id. at *2. Pointing to Orion Real Estate, the court held

that the public facility corporation was a governmental unit under Section

101.001(3)(D) because statutes specifically allow housing authorities to create

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nonprofit public facility corporations for certain purposes. Id.; see Tex. Loc. Gov’t

Code Ann. §§ 303.021, 392.066; Orion Real Est., 559 S.W.3d at 603.

Turning to the limited partnership, the court noted that the public facility

corporation served as its general partner. 152 Lakewest Cmty., LP, 2021 WL 5710553,

at *3. The court stated that the limited partnership “cannot be considered a public

facility corporation” because it was not a corporation. Id. And while the housing

authority testified that it had formed the limited partnership to act as the operator and

manager of the townhomes, the court held that “[a]bsent statutory authority not

present here, an entity hired to manage such a facility is not a governmental unit for

purposes of [appellate] jurisdiction.” Id. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal

for lack of jurisdiction as to the limited partnership. Id. After determining its

jurisdiction over the appellants, the court of appeals turned to the issue of whether

the public facility corporation—the only appellant the court had jurisdiction over—

was entitled to governmental immunity or derivative immunity. Id. at *3–5.

Here, the only defendant below was Aventine LP; Etling did not file suit

against the Housing Authority; Orion; Aventine 240, LLC; Fort Worth Affordability,

Inc.; or Trinity River Public Facility Corporation.5 Thus, our jurisdiction hinges on

5
After we sent our letter to the parties questioning our jurisdiction, Aventine
LP filed an amended notice of appeal in which it was joined by the Housing
Authority. The Housing Authority, however, was not a party below, and it has no
standing to bring an appeal. See Pandozy v. City of Dallas, No. 05-09-00587-CV, 2010
WL 2927469, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 28, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(“Because Pandozy was not a party below, he has no standing to bring this appeal.”);

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whether Aventine LP—not any other entity—is a governmental unit under

Section 101.001(3)(D). See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 51.014(a)(8),

101.001(3)(D); see also Medlin v. King, 705 S.W.3d 267, 283 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2024,

pet. denied) (“Generally, only parties of record have standing to appeal the trial

court’s judgment.”).

As noted above, under the second prong of Section 101.001(3)(D), to qualify as

a governmental unit, an entity must derive its status and authority from the Texas

Constitution or from laws passed by the legislature. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code

Ann. § 101.001(3)(D); see CPS Energy, 671 S.W.3d at 614. Here, Aventine LP does not

point to any provision in the Texas Constitution from which it derives its status and

authority. The only statutory provision cited by Aventine LP is Section 392.006 of

the Texas Local Government Code. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 392.006. That

provision provides, in pertinent part: “For all purposes, including the application of

the Texas Tort Claims Act (Chapter 101, Civil Practice and Remedies Code), a

housing authority is a unit of government and the functions of a housing authority are

essential governmental functions and not proprietary functions.” Id. That statute,

however, says nothing about limited partnerships. See id. And we have found no

Tri-State Salvage Co. v. City of El Paso, No. 08-08-00250-CV, 2009 WL 641300, at *1
(Tex. App.—El Paso Mar. 12, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The judgment was against
Tri-State Salvage not McIntosh. We find that because McIntosh was not a party to
the suit below, he does not have standing to bring this appeal.”). In any event, when
Aventine LP filed its brief after the amended notice of appeal, it listed only itself as an
appellant.

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statute or provision in the Texas Constitution giving status and authority to a limited

partnership that is as tangentially related to a housing authority as Aventine LP is to

the Housing Authority in this case.6

The circumstances in this case closely resemble those in 152 Lakewest

Community, LP and Orion Real Estate, where the respective courts of appeals held that

they did not have jurisdiction over certain parties because those parties could not

point to any statute or provision in the Texas Constitution from which their status

and authority were derived. See 152 Lakewest Cmty., LP, 2021 WL 5710553, at *3;

Orion Real Est., 559 S.W.3d at 603.7

The circumstances here are distinguishable from those in TRST Corpus, Inc.,

because in that case, there was evidence that TRS’s authority was derived from the

Texas Constitution. See 9 S.W.3d at 321. The subject constitutional provision

6
According to Lemons’s affidavit, that relationship appears to be that Aventine
LP is a limited partnership wholly owned by Aventine 240, LLC and Fort Worth
Affordability, Inc., two entities that are wholly owned by the Housing Authority. But
according to the Lease, that relationship appears to be that Aventine LP is a limited
partnership whose sole general partner is Aventine 240 LLC, whose sole member is
Trinity River Public Facility Corporation.
7
Aventine LP discussed Orion Real Estate in its reply brief. Aventine LP
emphasized that the court of appeals in that case analyzed the issue of whether the
defendant was entitled to governmental immunity in its own right before turning to
the issue of whether the defendant shared governmental immunity with the housing
authority. But Aventine LP fails to mention that before the court of appeals
addressed the issue of immunity, the court first addressed whether it had appellate
jurisdiction. See Orion Real Est., 559 S.W.3d at 602–03. We too follow that same
framework, addressing our own jurisdiction first.

16
specifically provided that the legislature could enact laws establishing systems and

programs of retirement for public employees and officers and that the assets of the

system were to be held in trust for the benefit of the members and could not be

diverted. Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 67. The bylaws of the TRS Board of Trustees—a

board that was specifically contemplated by the Texas Constitution, see Tex. Const.

art. XVI, § 67—provided TRS with the authority to maintain title-holding subsidiaries

of its property, like TRST. TRST Corpus, Inc., 9 S.W.3d at 321. There is no similar

provision or evidence here.

Lincoln Property Co. is distinguishable because, as noted above, the Corpus

Christi–Edinburg Court of Appeals did not address the issue of whether it had

appellate jurisdiction over the case, nor did it address whether the defendants were

governmental units under Section 101.001(3)(D). See generally Lincoln Prop. Co.,

2025 WL 339036. The analytical framework used by the court of appeals in Lincoln

Property Co.—to assess whether each defendant was entitled to governmental

immunity—is different from our analysis here—where we are assessing whether

Aventine LP is a governmental unit under Section 101.001(3)(D) for purposes of

establishing our appellate jurisdiction.8 See Rosenberg Dev. Corp., 571 S.W.3d at 748;

Univ. of the Incarnate Word, 518 S.W.3d at 911.

8
In its reply brief, Aventine LP seems to conflate the issue of whether it is
entitled to derivative governmental immunity with the issue of whether we have
appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. While Aventine LP’s reply brief is
rife with arguments pertaining to derivative governmental immunity, it fails to

17
Accordingly, without any constitutional or statutory provision conferring status

and authority on Aventine LP, we conclude that Aventine LP does not qualify as a

governmental unit under Section 101.001(3)(D). See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code

Ann. § 101.001(3)(D); 152 Lakewest Cmty., LP, 2021 WL 5710553, at *3; Orion Real

Est., 559 S.W.3d at 603. And because we have determined that Aventine LP does not

qualify as a governmental unit under Section 101.001(3)(D), we do not address

whether Aventine LP is entitled to derivative immunity. See Rosenberg Dev. Corp.,

571 S.W.3d at 747–48; Univ. of the Incarnate Word, 518 S.W.3d at 911; 152 Lakewest

Cmty., LP, 2021 WL 5710553, at *2–3; Orion Real Est., 559 S.W.3d at 602–04; see also

Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars and No Cents in United States Currency

($90,235), 390 S.W.3d at 291 (stating that “we may not address the merits of a case

absent jurisdiction”).

IV. CONCLUSION

Because Aventine LP does not qualify as a governmental unit under

Section 101.001(3)(D), the trial court’s order denying Aventine LP’s plea to the

jurisdiction is not an appealable order. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §

51.014(a)(8). We thus lack jurisdiction over this appeal, and we dismiss it for want of

jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).

mention or discuss Section 51.014 (the statute authorizing appeals of interlocutory
orders) or Section 101.001(3) (the statute defining “governmental unit” that is
referenced in Section 51.014(a)(8)). See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§§ 51.014(a)(8), 101.001(3).

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/s/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack
Justice

Delivered: October 9, 2025

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