Hays County, Texas, Ruben Becerra, Debbie Ingalsbe, Michelle Cohen, Morgan Hammer, and Walt Smith, in Their Official Capacities v. Leslie Carnes, Jim Camp, Cathy Ramsey, Gabrielle Moore, and Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas

CourtListener 10740945Txctapp1521.11.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

ACCEPTED
15-25-00121-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
11/21/2025 12:48 PM
NO. 15-25-00121-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK
FILED IN
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, 15TH DISTRICT15th
OF TEXAS
COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
11/21/2025 12:48:11 PM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS, RUBEN BECERRA, DEBBIE INGALSBE,
MICHELLE COHEN, MORGAN HAMMER, AND WALT SMITH,
APPELLANTS

V.

LESLIE CARNES, JIM CAMP, CATHY RAMSEY, AND GABRIELLE
MOORE, APPELLEES

ON APPEAL FROM THE 419TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS
CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-25-002049
THE HON. CATHERINE A. MAUZY, PRESIDING

APPELLEES’ RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSED
DENIAL OF TRANSFER

BILL ALESHIRE SAVE OUR SPRINGS ALLIANCE
BAR NO. 24031810 WILLIAM G. BUNCH
ALESHIRELAW, P.C. STATE BAR NO. 03342520
3605 SHADY VALLEY DR. BILL@SOSALLIANCE.ORG
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78739 ROBERT “BOBBY” LEVINSKI
TELEPHONE: (512) 320-9155 STATE BAR NO. 24097993
CELL: (512) 750-5854 BOBBY@SOSALLIANCE.ORG
FACSIMILE: (512) 320-9156 4701 WESTGATE BLVD., D-401
BILL@ALESHIRELAW.COM AUSTIN, TX 78745
TEL: 512-477-2320
FAX: 512-477-6410
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Appellees submit this response to the Court’s letter of November

14, 2025, regarding the Court’s majority proposed denial of the transfer

of this case to the 3rd Court of Appeals. Appellees contend the Court lacks

exclusive intermediate appellate jurisdiction because the Appellants’

bond validation lawsuit was not “against” the Texas Attorney General.

INTRODUCTION

The sole issue on the merits in this appeal is whether Hays County

Commissioners Court violated the Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA,

Tex. Gov’t Code ch. 551) and the trial court correctly reversed and voided

the Order calling the bond election and granted Appellees’ election

contest. The jurisdictional issue for this Court is whether the case is

“against” the Texas Attorney General.

The Attorney General was tangentially involved in the proceeding

below because Hays County responded to Appellees/Plaintiffs’ lawsuit

alleging the TOMA violation with a bond-validation lawsuit under Tex.

Gov’t Code ch. 1205. As opposed to being a party litigant, the Attorney

Appellees’ Response on Proposed Denial of Transfer
Page |2
General’s role in the bond-validation case was to provide information and

legal analysis to the trial court focused on the validity of the bonds. This

is demonstrated by the Prayer in the Attorney General’s pleading, asking

only that the Court “enter such order as may be proper.” The Attorney

General has filed a waiver of submitting a brief in this appeal.

This Court’s preliminary decision (Justice Field dissenting) that it

has jurisdiction displaces the 3rd Court of Appeals, the appellate court

with jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a district court’s judgment under

TOMA against a local governmental body within the 3rd Court’s appellate

district—which is what this appeal actually is.

ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES

THE STATUTE AT ISSUE AND THE FACTS IN THIS CASE DO NOT DEMONSTRATE
JURISDICTION FOR THE 15TH COURT OF APPEALS.

In this Court’s letter of November 14, 2025 at page 2, the Court

said, “Whether a suit falls within this exclusive jurisdiction provision

depends on the terms of any governing statute and the facts in each case.”

(emphasis added). Appellees do not disagree with that statement. The

governing statute involved is the Texas Open Meetings Act—over which

this Court would have jurisdiction only if a state governmental body was

Appellees’ Response on Proposed Denial of Transfer
Page |3
accused of violating the Act. The facts of this case all revolve around

compliance with TOMA and do not involve any claim against any state

official or office. Therefore, even if this Court believes that EDJA lawsuits

are generally within its jurisdiction, it may well decide that given the law

and facts at issue now in this appeal, the Court lacks jurisdiction.

THIS CASE IS NOT “AGAINST” THE TEXAS ATTORNEY GENERAL

This Court—instead of the 3rd Court of Appeals—has exclusive

intermediate appellate jurisdiction in this case only if the bond-

validation lawsuit was brought “against” the Texas Attorney General

under the Expedited Declaratory Judgment Act (EDJA). See Tex. Gov’t

Code § 22.220(d)(1). In construing the EDJA use of the word “against,”

there are several principles that guide the Court. “Words and phrases

shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar

and common usage.” Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011. As the Supreme

Court said:

Generally, we will accept the words used according to their
ordinary meaning, unless given a specific statutory definition;
we will not give them an exaggerated, forced, or constrained
meaning. Also, we will presume that the Legislature used
every word of a statute for a purpose. Finally, we will try to

Appellees’ Response on Proposed Denial of Transfer
Page |4
avoid construing a statutory provision in isolation from the
rest of the statute; we should consider the act as a whole, and
not just single phrases, clauses, or sentences.
Cities of Austin, Dallas, Ft. Worth & Hereford v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 92

S.W.3d 434, 442 (Tex. 2002).

“Against” is not a term defined in the statute, so the Court applies

its common meaning. “The word ‘against’ means ‘in opposition or hostility

to[.]’ Note Inv. Group, Inc. v. Associates First Capital Corp., 476 S.W.3d

463, 477 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2015, no pet.)(citing, Against, Webster's

Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1988); see also Indem. Ins. Co. v. City

of Garland, 258 S.W.3d 262, 269 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.)(citing

The New Oxford American Dictionary 29 (1st ed. 2001) as defining

“against” as “in opposition to.”); see https://thelawdictionary.org/against/

defining “against” as “adverse to; contrary; opposed to; without the

consent of; in contact with.”

If the Legislature had intended to give this Court even broader

jurisdiction, it could have used words in the jurisdictional statute, Tex.

Gov’t Code § 22.220(d) to do so. For example, instead of giving this Court

jurisdiction solely over matters brought “against” state personnel, the

Appellees’ Response on Proposed Denial of Transfer
Page |5
Legislature could have also included any matter in which state personnel

“participate”; or where it would be “bound by the judgment”; or any case

in which the Attorney General “must be served notice” with the petition.

Or the Legislature could easily have provided this Court with jurisdiction

over all appeals of EDJA lawsuits. But that is not the choice the

Legislature made.

The Court’s jurisdictional statute does not contain language giving

the Court broad jurisdiction, such as over cases considered “critical to the

State’s interests.” See Court’s 11/14/25 Letter, page 4. For example,

challenges to the constitutionality of state statutes are certainly critical

to the State’s interests, but Tex. Gov’t Code §22.220(d)(2) does not even

give this Court jurisdiction over all cases challenging the

constitutionality or validity of a state statute or rule; only those where

“the attorney general is a party to the case.” See e.g., Tex. Civ. Prac. &

Rem. Code §37.006(b); the statute requires that the Attorney General be

served with a “copy of the proceedings” and that the Attorney General is

entitled to be heard. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.006;

Nabelek v. Bradford, No. 01-02-00359-CR, 2003 WL 1937200, at *2 (Tex.

Appellees’ Response on Proposed Denial of Transfer
Page |6
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 24, 2003, no pet.)(noting that in such

cases, the Attorney General is entitled to be heard but does not require

that the Attorney General be made a party defendant.). Thus, this Court

does not have jurisdiction unless the Attorney General intervenes in the

lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of state laws or rules.

This Court should not assert jurisdiction beyond the plain language

in its jurisdictional statute. The Legislature restricted this Court’s

jurisdiction to suits “brought [ ] against” the state, and the EDJA is not

such a case.

EDJA lawsuits are not brought “in opposition to” or in “hostility to”

the Texas Attorney General or even styled “versus” the Texas Attorney

General. Instead, the EDJA is a proceeding in rem and class action

against all persons who reside, own property, are taxpayers in the area,

or who have a claim in any property or money to be affected by the public

securities. Tex. Gov’t Code § 1205.023. The Attorney General is not a

member of the class. Similarly, the EDJA “Notice to Interested Parties”—

section 1205.041 (emphasis added)—does not include the Attorney

General. The duties of the Attorney General in an EDJA lawsuit are to

Appellees’ Response on Proposed Denial of Transfer
Page |7
advise the Court whether the Attorney General believes the bond-

validation petition is defective or whether the bonds would be invalid or

unauthorized. An EDJA is clearly not a lawsuit brought versus, or

“against,” the Attorney General. Compare, Tex. Gov’t Code § 1205.042

(requiring only that the Attorney General be served a copy of the petition)

with Tex. Gov’t Code section 552.324(a)(1) permitting a governmental

body to file suit seeking to withhold information from a requestor under

the Texas Public Information Act if the suit “is filed in a Travis County

district court against the attorney general....” (emphasis added).

PRAYER

For these reasons, Appellees ask the Court to transfer the appeal

to the 3rd Court of Appeals because the 15th Court of Appeals does not

have jurisdiction over this TOMA case.

Respectfully submitted,

_____________________________
Bill Aleshire
Texas Bar No. 24031810
AleshireLAW, P.C.
3605 Shady Valley Dr.
Austin, Texas 78739

Appellees’ Response on Proposed Denial of Transfer
Page |8
Cell: (512) 750-5854
Telephone: (512) 320-9155
Facsimile: (512) 320-9156
Bill@AleshireLaw.com

Save Our Springs Alliance
William G. Bunch
State Bar No. 03342520
bill@sosalliance.org
Robert “Bobby” Levinski
State Bar No. 24097993
bobby@sosalliance.org
4701 Westgate Blvd., D-401 Austin,
TX 78745
Tel: 512-477-2320
Fax: 512-477-6410

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

Appellees’ Response on Proposed Denial of Transfer
Page |9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument
has been served upon all parties of record via e-filing on this 21st day of
November 2025.

MCGINNIS LOCHRIDGE LLP
1111 West Sixth Street, Building B, Suite 400
Austin, Texas 78703
512.495.6000 (telephone)
512.495.6093 (telecopier)
mshaunessy@mcginnislaw.com
idavis@mcginnislaw.com
ajones@mcginnislaw.com
jpiriano@mcginnislaw.com

Lynn Saarinen, Assistant Attorney General
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
FINANCIAL LITIGATION SECTION, GENERAL LITIGATION
DIVISION
MC-017
P. O. Box 12548
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
lynn.saarinen@oag.texas.gov
Attorney General of Texas

The Honorable Jeffrey D. Kyle
Clerk of Court
Third Court of Appeals
P.O. Box 12547
Austin, TX 78711-2547
* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL * thirdcoawebcontact@txcourts.gov

Appellees’ Response on Proposed Denial of Transfer
P a g e | 10
_____________________________
Bill Aleshire

Appellees’ Response on Proposed Denial of Transfer
P a g e | 11
Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

William Aleshire on behalf of Bill Aleshire
Bar No. 24031810
Bill@AleshireLaw.com
Envelope ID: 108337481
Filing Code Description: Response
Filing Description: APPELLEES' RESPONSE ON PROPOSED DENIAL
OF TRANSFER
Status as of 11/21/2025 1:01 PM CST

Case Contacts

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Claude Heath 9347500 bheath@bickerstaff.com 11/21/2025 12:48:11 PM SENT

Ian M.Davis idavis@mcginnislaw.com 11/21/2025 12:48:11 PM SENT

Raymond Abarca Raymond.Abarca@oag.texas.gov 11/21/2025 12:48:11 PM SENT

Tristan AGarza tristan.garza@oag.texas.gov 11/21/2025 12:48:11 PM SENT

Michael Shaunessy mshaunessy@mcginnislaw.com 11/21/2025 12:48:11 PM SENT

Julie Denny jdenny@mcginnislaw.com 11/21/2025 12:48:11 PM SENT

Amy Botelho abotelho@mcginnislaw.com 11/21/2025 12:48:11 PM SENT

Austin Jones ajones@mcginnislaw.com 11/21/2025 12:48:11 PM SENT

Bill Aleshire bill@aleshirelaw.com 11/21/2025 12:48:11 PM SENT

Bill Bunch bill@sosalliance.org 11/21/2025 12:48:11 PM SENT

Bobby Levinski bobby@sosalliance.org 11/21/2025 12:48:11 PM SENT

William Gammon firm@gammonlawoffice.com 11/21/2025 12:48:11 PM SENT

Lynn Saarinen lynn.saarinen@oag.texas.gov 11/21/2025 12:48:11 PM SENT

Rosemarie Kanusky rkanusky@mphlegal.com 11/21/2025 12:48:11 PM SENT

Matthew PhilipHines mhines@mphlegal.com 11/21/2025 12:48:11 PM SENT

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