Homer Esquivel Jr. v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-25-00216-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

HOMER ESQUIVEL JR., Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 105TH DISTRICT COURT
OF KLEBERG COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices West and Cron
Memorandum Opinion by Justice West

In 2022, appellant Homer Esquivel Jr. pleaded guilty to (1) possession of a

controlled substance, a second-degree felony, and (2) felon in possession of a firearm, a

third-degree felony enhanced to second degree; he was placed on deferred adjudication

community supervision for ten years. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.115(d); TEX.
PENAL CODE §§ 12.42(a), 46.04(e). In 2023, the State filed a motion to revoke community

supervision and adjudicate guilt, alleging thirty violations of the terms of his community

supervision. Appellant pled true to twelve of the thirty violations. The trial court revoked

community supervision, adjudicated appellant guilty on both counts, and sentenced him

to ten years’ imprisonment on each count to run concurrently. See TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 12.33(a). Appellant’s court-appointed counsel filed an Anders brief stating that there are

no arguable grounds for appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We

affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.

I. ANDERS BRIEF

Pursuant to Anders v. California, appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel

filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that her review of the record

yielded no grounds of reversible error upon which an appeal could be predicated. See id.

Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas,

an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds

none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set

out pertinent legal authorities.” (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.))); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510

n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel

Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014),

appellant’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no

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reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Appellant’s counsel also informed this Court

in writing that she: (1) notified appellant that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a

motion to withdraw; (2) provided appellant with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed

appellant of his rights to file pro se responses, to review the record prior to filing those

responses, and to seek discretionary review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous;

and (4) provided appellant with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record

that only requires appellant’s signature and date with instructions to file the motion within

ten days. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20; see also In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408–09.

Appellant filed a pro se response. When appellate counsel files an Anders brief

and the appellant independently files a pro se response, the court of appeals has two

choices:

[i]t may determine that the appeal is wholly frivolous and issue an opinion
explaining that it has reviewed the record and finds no reversible error. Or,
it may determine that arguable grounds for appeal exist and remand the
cause to the trial court so that new counsel may be appointed to brief the
issues.

Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (internal citations

omitted). We are “not required to review the merits of each claim raised in an Anders brief

or a pro se response.” Id. at 827. Rather, we must merely determine if there are any

arguable grounds for appeal. Id. If we determine there are such arguable grounds, we

must remand for appointment of new counsel. Id. Reviewing the merits raised in a pro se

response would deprive an appellant of the meaningful assistance of counsel. Id.

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II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief, and we have found

nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827–28 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it

considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but

found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate

Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.

III. JUDGMENT MODIFICATION

Appellant pled true to the following counts enumerated in the state’s motion to

revoke: “5, 14, 17, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30.” (emphasis added). However, the

judgment states that appellant pled true to the following counts: “5, 15, 17, 21 & 23-30.”

(emphasis added). We have authority to modify judgments to reflect in court oral

pronouncements. See French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); see

also Renteria v. State, No. 13-24-00388-CR, 2025 WL 1186322, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 24, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (not designated for

publication); TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b). Accordingly, we modify the trial court’s final judgment

to reflect that appellant pled true to count 14 and did not plead true to count 15.

IV. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

In accordance with Anders, appellant’s counsel has asked this Court for

permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five

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days from the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion

and this Court’s judgment to appellant and to advise him of his right to file a petition for

discretionary review. 1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at

411 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

V. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.

JON WEST
Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
23rd day of April, 2026.

1 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case

by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary
review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed
within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion
for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for
discretionary review must be filed with the Clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See id. R. 68.3.
Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 68.4. See id. R. 68.4.
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