Sterlin Heath Wright v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed May 8, 2026

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-24-00279-CR
__________

STERLIN HEATH WRIGHT, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellees

On Appeal from the 350th District Court
Taylor County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 15674-D

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This appeal concerns the propriety of a judgment nunc pro tunc in which the
trial court corrected a judgment adjudicating guilt to include its deadly weapon
finding. In a single issue, Appellant, Sterlin Heath Wright, contends that the trial
court erred when it did so. We affirm.
I. Factual Background
Appellant was indicted for aggravated assault (Count One) and assault family
violence by occlusion (Count Two). See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.01(b)(2)(B),
22.02(a) (West 2026). For the aggravated assault offense, the indictment alleged
that Appellant “did then and there intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly cause
bodily injury to JASHA DOUGLAS, by stabbing her on or about the arm and torso,
and thereby caused serious bodily injury to the said JASHA DOUGLAS.” Id.
§ 22.02(a)(1). The victim is Appellant’s mother.
Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Appellant pled guilty to the
aggravated assault offense and was placed on deferred adjudication community
supervision for seven years. Appellant’s written plea admonishments recite that he
pled guilty to a second-degree felony. In his judicial confession, Appellant stated
that he had read the indictment and “committed each and every act alleged” in it and
agreed that “[a]ll facts alleged in the indictment or information [were] true and
correct.” While there was no mention of a deadly weapon finding at the plea hearing,
the trial court noted the terms of the plea bargain agreement and a “DW finding” on
its docket sheet.
The trial court’s order of deferred adjudication designated the charged offense
as a first-degree felony and listed the statute for the offense as “22.02(B)(1) Penal
Code.” On the field titled “Findings on [a] Deadly Weapon,” the following was
entered: “YES, NOT A FIREARM.” The order also recited:

We note that the order bears Appellant’s right thumbprint and signature. In the terms
and conditions of community supervision attached to the order of deferred

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adjudication, in bold typeface, Appellant was specifically instructed that he may not
possess, use, sell, or have under his control any deadly weapons.
The State subsequently filed a motion to revoke Appellant’s deferred
adjudication and to adjudicate his guilt for the aggravated assault offense. The trial
court held a hearing on the motion and considered testimony, including that of
Appellant’s sister who testified that she was aware that Appellant “stabbed [their]
mother [and] lacerated her liver.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court
adjudicated Appellant’s guilt, revoked his community supervision, and sentenced
him to imprisonment for twenty years in the Institutional Division of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice.
The trial court signed a judgment adjudicating guilt that recited a conviction
for a first-degree felony, listed the violated statute as “22.02(B)(1) PC,” and had
“N/A” under the field marked “Findings on Deadly Weapon”; however, the
judgment did not include the special finding language that was recited in the order
of deferred adjudication. Less than a month later, Appellant filed a “motion to
reform” the judgment “nunc pro tunc” and requested that the trial court correct the
degree of the convicted offense recited in it to a second-degree felony.
Without holding a hearing, the trial court signed a nunc pro tunc judgment
adjudicating guilt that: (1) corrected the degree of offense as Appellant requested;
(2) corrected the applicable Penal Code section to recite Section 22.02(a)(1);
(3) changed the deadly weapon finding from “N/A” to “YES, NOT A FIREARM”;
and (4) added the special finding language regarding a deadly weapon that was
recited in its original order of deferred adjudication. The trial court also signed a
nunc pro tunc order of deferred adjudication, which corrected the applicable Penal
Code section and the degree of offense, retaining the deadly weapon findings
originally recited in the order.

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Appellant filed a motion to reform the nunc pro tunc judgments and argued
that the deadly weapon finding that was added to them was improper because (1) the
indictment charged him with committing aggravated assault causing serious bodily
injury and did not allege that a deadly weapon was used or exhibited during the
commission of the offense, (2) Appellant’s plea documents stated that he admitted
to “aggravated assault,” and his judicial confession admission that “all deadly
weapon findings are true” was merely precatory because there was no deadly
weapon allegation stated in the indictment, and (3) the “substantive change[s]”
occurred after the trial court’s plenary power had expired, and the indictment was
not void or voidable because it properly alleged the offense of aggravated assault by
causing serious bodily injury, to which Appellant pled guilty.
The trial court held a hearing, found that the omission of the deadly weapon
finding in the original judgment adjudicating guilt was a clerical error, and denied
Appellant’s motion. In its order, the trial court stated that the absence of a deadly
weapon finding in the original judgment adjudicating guilt was a clerical error and
that, “[a]t the time of sentencing, the [c]ourt found that [Appellant] had used or
exhibited a deadly weapon, though that finding was not stated on the record.”
II. Analysis
In support of his sole issue on appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court
violated his right to due process when it corrected the judgment adjudicating guilt to
include a deadly weapon finding because it did not hold a hearing before it signed
the nunc pro tunc judgment. Appellant also contends that the trial court made this
allegedly substantive change after its plenary jurisdiction had expired. Finally,
Appellant contends that because the indictment is silent as to a deadly weapon
allegation, a deadly weapon finding was improper. We conclude that (1) Appellant’s
due process rights were not violated because the trial court held a hearing on his
motion to reform the nunc pro tunc judgments, (2) the trial court’s affirmative deadly
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weapon finding is supported by the evidence and was therefore proper, and
(3) because the omission of a deadly weapon finding was a clerical error, the trial
court could correct the error at any time.
A. Deadly Weapon Findings
For a trial court to enter a deadly weapon finding, the trier of fact must first
make an “affirmative finding” to that effect. Duran v. State, 492 S.W.3d 741, 746
(Tex. 2016); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42A.054(c) (West Supp. 2025). The
Court of Criminal Appeals has specified several ways that the factfinder can make
an affirmative deadly weapon finding. Generally, a trial court can determine that
the trier of fact made an affirmative deadly weapon finding if: (1) the indictment
alleged the use of a deadly weapon, and the defendant was found guilty “as charged
in the indictment”; (2) the indictment alleged the use of a per se deadly weapon (e.g.,
a firearm); or (3) the jury made an express finding of fact pursuant to a special issue
that is submitted in the trial court’s punishment charge. Wilson v. State, 714 S.W.3d
900, 913 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2025, no pet.) (citing Duran, 492 S.W.3d at 746);
see Polk v. State, 693 S.W.2d 391, 396 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). None of these
circumstances apply here. However, when the trial court is the trier of fact, it has
the authority to make an affirmative deadly weapon finding if the facts show, and it
believes, that the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the
commission of the charged offense. See Brown v. State, 91 S.W.3d 353, 359 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2002, no pet.) (citing Fann v. State, 702 S.W.2d 602, 604 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1985)); Spencer v. State, No. 07-24-00006-CR, 2024 WL 3872933, at
*2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 19, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (collecting cases).
Here, the indictment charged Appellant with aggravated assault and alleged
that he caused the victim to sustain serious bodily injury by “stabbing” her and
“thereby caus[ing] serious bodily injury” to her. Although the indictment did not
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expressly allege the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon, that omission is neither
fatal nor dispositive, and we conclude that the trial court’s deadly weapon finding
was proper in this case.
As relevant here, a “deadly weapon” is “anything that in the manner of its use
or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” PENAL
§ 1.07(a)(17)(B) (West Supp. 2025). The Court of Criminal Appeals has explained
that “there is no logical way to commit the offense of aggravated assault without
using a deadly weapon.” Duran, 492 S.W.3d at 749 (citing Landrian v. State, 268
S.W.3d 532, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (noting that both statutory aggravators of
simple assault involve the use of a deadly weapon)); cf. Blount v. State, 257 S.W.3d
712, 714 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (holding that the defendant received adequate
notice that there would be a deadly weapon issue in a burglary-of-a-habitation case
because the offense of aggravated assault cannot be committed without using a
deadly weapon); Roots v. State, 419 S.W.3d 719, 725 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013,
pet. ref’d) (“[W]hile the judgment of conviction in this case does not expressly state
that the trial court found appellant guilty as charged in the indictment, because the
indictment did not allege that appellant caused serious bodily injury to the victim,
had the trial court not found that appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, it
could not have convicted him of aggravated assault at all.”). This is especially true
in this case, where the victim’s injuries from the stabbing, among other things,
resulted in a laceration to her liver.
Although the indictment does not specify the object that Appellant used to
stab the victim, and there is no direct evidence in the record that identifies it, to
“stab” denotes the use of an object, such as a knife or other pointed implement, which
can be a deadly weapon if by its manner of use or intended use it is capable of causing
serious bodily injury. See Edison v. State, No. 09-19-00261-CR, 2020 WL 3454918,
at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 24, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
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publication); Monje-Mora v. State, No. 11-12-00232-CR, 2014 WL 4251157, at *3
(Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 21, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (citing PENAL § 1.07(a)(17)(B)). Whatever implement or object that
was used here, the indictment alleged that Appellant caused serious bodily injury to
the victim by stabbing her, and he judicially confessed that he did so. See
Crumpton v. State, 301 S.W.3d 663, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); cf. Wilson, 714
S.W.3d at 913 (“Appellant’s guilt was not conditioned on the use of a deadly weapon
during the commission of the offense as there were other aggravating factors alleged
in the indictment.”). The implement Appellant used in the offense caused serious
bodily injury to the victim and therefore it was capable of doing so. See PENAL
§ 1.07(a)(17)(B). Thus, a deadly weapon finding was proper. See id.; CRIM. PROC.
art. 42A.054(c).
In a bench trial, the trial court need not state a deadly weapon finding in its
oral pronouncement of judgment if the charging instrument alleged the use of a
deadly weapon; instead, this finding may be recited for the first time in the trial
court’s written judgment. Guthrie-Nail v. State, 506 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App.
2015) (citing Ex parte Huskins, 176 S.W.3d 818, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“[A]
trial court is not required to orally announce a deadly-weapon finding at sentencing
if the allegation of [the] use of a deadly weapon is clear from the face of the
indictment.”)). Here, it is undisputed that the trial court did not orally pronounce a
deadly weapon finding at the revocation hearing when Appellant was sentenced nor
did it recite such a finding in its written judgment adjudicating guilt. In fact, the trial
court entered “N/A” in the section for a deadly weapon finding in its judgment.
However, the indictment alleged that Appellant stabbed the victim, which caused
her serious bodily injury, and the evidence showed that Appellant used an object to
stab the victim causing a laceration to her liver. Thus, the remaining question that
we must address is whether the trial court could correct the omission of its deadly
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weapon finding and reform its judgment adjudicating guilt to include this finding by
signing a nunc pro tunc judgment.
B. Nunc Pro Tunc Judgments
The purpose of a nunc pro tunc judgment is to provide a method for trial courts
to correct the record when there is a discrepancy between the trial court’s judgment
and findings as orally pronounced in open court and those that are recited in its
written judgment. See Blanton v. State, 369 S.W.3d 894, 897–98 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012). The corrections must indicate that judgment was in fact rendered but for
some reason it was not properly entered into the record at the time of judgment. Id.
at 898.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has implied that nunc pro tunc proceedings
are appropriate to include something in a judgment when a statute has created a trial
court’s ministerial duty to include it. See Ex parte Ybarra, 149 S.W.3d 147, 148
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (stating that the Code of Criminal Procedure requires a trial
court to grant presentence jail time credit and holding that if the trial court fails to
do so, it may correct the judgment through a nunc pro tunc order). As relevant here,
Article 42A.054(c) states that “[o]n an affirmative finding regarding the use of
exhibition of a deadly weapon . . . the trial court shall enter the finding in the
judgment of the court.” CRIM. PROC. art. 42A.054(c) (emphasis added).
Corrections to the record are limited to clerical errors—discrepancies between
the entry of a judgment in the record and the judgment that was rendered and
signed—and are not appropriate for errors that involve judicial reasoning. Blanton,
369 S.W.3d at 898. The determination of whether an error is clerical or judicial—
which is a substantive change to a judgment that cannot be remedied by a nunc pro
tunc judgment—is a matter of law that we review de novo. Id.
A nunc pro tunc judgment is inappropriate if it modifies, changes, or alters the
original judgment pronounced in open court, or has the effect of creating a new
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order. Blanton, 369 S.W.3d at 898. And nunc pro tunc judgments may not be used
by the trial court to change the record to show what the trial court believes should
have occurred in the original proceeding. Id. After the trial court’s plenary
jurisdiction has expired, it may still correct clerical, but not judicial, errors in a
judgment through a nunc pro tunc judgment. Thomas v. State, 445 S.W.3d 288, 290
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (citing State v. Bates, 889 S.W.2d
306, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)); see State v. Garza, 442 S.W.3d 585, 588–89 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (“The trial court [is] not authorized to enter a
judgment nunc pro tunc correcting a judicial error outside its plenary power.” (citing
Loud v. State, 329 S.W.3d 230, 236 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet.
ref’d))). 1
1. Application – The Trial Court’s Nunc Pro Tunc Judgment Corrected
Clerical Errors
Appellant pled guilty to the indicted offense of aggravated assault causing
serious bodily injury by stabbing the victim, and he judicially confessed that all facts
alleged in the indictment and all affirmative findings were true. 2 The trial court’s
original judgment adjudicating guilt included the notation “N/A” in the section for
deadly weapon findings. The trial court then signed a nunc pro tunc judgment in
which it corrected the “N/A” notation by adding its deadly weapon finding.

1
Appellant also contends that the trial court lost its plenary power and therefore its jurisdiction to
make a substantive change to its judgment. This question is resolved by our determination that the nunc
pro tunc judgment corrected only clerical, and not judicial, errors.
2
Although the trial court’s order of deferred adjudication included deadly weapon findings, these
are not dispositive because such findings properly apply to an adjudication of guilt. See Redmon v. State,
No. 06-24-00188-CR, 2025 WL 3133949, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Nov. 10, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (citing Kinkaid v. State, 184 S.W.3d 929, 930 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006,
no pet.)). However, they are probative of the trial court’s intention to make a deadly weapon finding. See
Thornton v. State, No. 05-16-00565-CR, 2017 WL 1908629, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 9, 2017, pet.
ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting the inclusion of an affirmative deadly weapon
finding and special finding in the order of deferred adjudication in determining that the trial court’s omission
of the deadly weapon finding in the judgment was a clerical error).
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On Appellant’s due process issue, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in
Guthrie-Nail is controlling and dispositive. In that case, pursuant to a negotiated
plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to commit capital murder.
506 S.W.3d at 2–4. The trial court orally pronounced the defendant guilty of
“conspiracy to commit capital murder just as set forth in the indictment,”
which alleged an intent to enter the victim’s home and kill him by shooting him. Id.
at 2–3, 7. The plea documents did not mention or refer to a deadly weapon finding.
Id. at 3. In its written judgment, the trial court entered the notation “N/A” in the
section for deadly weapon findings. Id. About two months later, without holding a
hearing, the trial court signed a nunc pro tunc judgment that (1) changed the “N/A”
entry to “Yes, a Firearm” and (2) added a special finding that the defendant “used or
exhibited a deadly weapon or was a party to the offense and knew that a deadly
weapon would be used or exhibited.” Id.
Because the trial court did not hold a hearing before it signed the nunc pro
tunc judgment, the court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether
its failure to enter a deadly weapon finding was a clerical error or a judicial error.
Id. at 7 (“Because the record does not conclusively establish that a deadly-weapon
finding was made at or before the time the written judgment was signed, remanding
this case for a hearing on the nunc pro tunc is not a ‘useless task.’”); see Blanton,
369 S.W.3d at 900 (“[B]efore any unfavorable nunc pro tunc judgments are entered
against a defendant, the person convicted must be given the opportunity to be present
for a hearing and represented by counsel to afford him due process of law.” (citing
Shaw v. State, 539 S.W.2d 887, 890 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976))). 3

3
On remand, the trial court confirmed that it intended to make an affirmative deadly weapon
finding, and its subsequent nunc pro tunc judgment was affirmed on appeal. See Guthrie-Nail v. State,
No. 05-18-00904-CR, 2019 WL 2171224, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 20, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem.
op., not designated for publication). However, we need not remand because, as we have said, the trial court
clearly expressed that it intended to make a deadly weapon finding.

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Here, after the hearing on Appellant’s motion to reform the nunc pro tunc
judgment to vacate the deadly weapon finding, the trial court stated in its order that
the absence of a deadly weapon finding in the original judgment adjudicating guilt
was a clerical error and that, “[a]t the time of sentencing, the [c]ourt found that
[Appellant] had used or exhibited a deadly weapon, though that finding was not
stated on the record.” In other words, under circumstances similar to those in
Guthrie-Nail,4 the trial court followed the remedy expressed in Guthrie-Nail—it
held a subsequent hearing to address its nunc pro tunc judgment and expressly
confirmed that it had made a deadly weapon finding at the revocation hearing, at the
time its written judgment was signed, and that the absence of this finding in its
written judgment was a clerical error. 506 S.W.3d at 7. Thus, it is of no consequence
that the trial court did not orally pronounce a deadly weapon finding at the time it
sentenced Appellant because a deadly weapon finding is not part of the sentence and
need not be orally pronounced. Huskins, 176 S.W.3d at 820–21. Furthermore, “a
trial court is not required to orally pronounce a deadly-weapon finding at sentencing
if the allegation of [the] use of a deadly weapon is clear from the face of the
indictment.” Id. at 821. Such is the case here.
The trial court found Appellant guilty of an offense—aggravated assault
causing serious bodily injury by stabbing his mother and lacerating her liver—that
logically could not have been committed without the use or exhibition of a deadly
weapon. “As a matter of law, the trial court has the authority to add the affirmative
finding to the judgment even without any request from the State, if the facts support
that finding.” Bowman v. State, No. 09-24-0322-CR, 2025 WL 2972653, at *15

4
The circumstances here are more favorable to a finding of a clerical error: Appellant pled guilty
to the charged offense of aggravated assault, his judicial confession stated that all affirmative findings made
by the trial court were true, and the trial court’s order of deferred adjudication included a deadly weapon
finding and a special finding that Appellant had used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission
of the charged offense.

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(Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 22, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (citing Flores v. State, 690 S.W.2d 281, 283 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)
(en banc)). And the trial court explicitly confirmed, in its order denying Appellant’s
motion to reform the nunc pro tunc judgment, that it did not exercise its discretion
to decline to make a deadly weapon finding because it did, in fact, make that finding.
We conclude that the omission of a deadly weapon finding in the original judgment
adjudicating guilt was a clerical error as a matter of law and was subject to correction
in the trial court’s nunc pro tunc judgment. See Blanton, 369 S.W.3d at 898; see
also CRIM. PROC. art. 42A.054(c).
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue.
III. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

May 8, 2026
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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