In the Interest of L.M.R., C.N.H., C.J.H., and C.O.H., Children v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed August 29, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-25-00055-CV
__________

IN THE INTEREST OF L.M.R, C.N.H., C.J.H., AND C.O.H.,
CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 446th District Court
Ector County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. E-23-032-PC

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant-mother appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental
rights to her children, L.M.R.,1 C.N.H., C.J.H., and C.O.H. 2 On appeal, Appellant
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings that
she endangered the children under Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) of the Texas

L.M.R. does not share a biological father with her younger siblings, C.N.H., C.J.H., and C.O.H.
1

The associate judge terminated the parental rights of both fathers in the underlying proceeding, and neither
sought de novo review nor appealed the termination order.
2
We use initials to refer to the children. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b).
Family Code, and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding
that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interest. See TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2) (West Supp. 2024). We affirm
the trial court’s order.
Termination Findings and Standards
The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. FAM. § 161.001(b). To terminate one’s parental rights, it must be shown
by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has committed one of the acts listed
in Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(V), and that termination is in the best interest of the
children. Id. § 161.001(b)(2). Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or
degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or
conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007
(West 2019).
In this case, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence
established that Appellant: (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children
to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional
well-being of the children; (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children
with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional
well-being of the children; and (3) failed to comply with the provisions of a court
order that specifically established the actions necessary for Appellant to obtain the
return of the children, who had been in the permanent or temporary managing
conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services (the
Department) for not less than nine months as a result of the children’s removal under
Chapter 262 for abuse or neglect. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O). The trial
court further found, pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(2), that termination of

2
Appellant’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. See id.
§ 161.001(b)(2).
In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether “a
reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding
was true.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022). Cognizant of the required
appellate deference to the factfinder, “we look at all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the finding, assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor
of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a
reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not disregard ‘undisputed
facts that do not support the finding,’” and the factfinder is “the sole arbiter of the
witnesses’ credibility and demeanor.” Id. (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266
(Tex. 2002) then quoting In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021)). As such,
when considering the credibility of the evidence presented, we may not substitute
our judgment for that of the factfinder. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 316.
In assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient, we weigh the
disputed evidence that is contrary to the finding against all the evidence that favors
the finding. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We give due deference
to the finding and determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could
reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations against
the parent. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d
17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002); In re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2023, pet. denied). Because a trial court conducting a de novo hearing “may also
consider the record from the hearing before the associate judge,” we may so do as
well if it is included in the appellate record, as it is here. See FAM. § 201.015(c)
(West 2020); In re A.L.M.-F., 593 S.W.3d 271, 277 (Tex. 2019) (“[R]eview under

3
[S]ection 201.015 is not entirely independent of the proceedings before the associate
judge.”).
With respect to the best interest of the children, no unique set of factors need
be proved. L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d at 513; In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied). Further, the best interest determination does not
restrict the proof to any specific factor or factors. In re J.S., 687 S.W.3d 541, 547
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.). However, courts may use the non-exhaustive
Holley factors to shape their analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72
(Tex. 1976). These include, but are not limited to: (1) the desires of the children;
(2) the emotional and physical needs of the children now and in the future; (3) the
emotional and physical danger to the children now and in the future; (4) the parental
abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these
individuals to promote the best interest of the children; (6) the plans for the children
by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home
or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the
existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts
or omissions of the parent. Id.
To support a best-interest finding, the Department is not required to prove
each Holley factor; in some circumstances, evidence of the presence of only one
factor will suffice. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). Additionally, the same evidence that proves one
or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute sufficient, probative
evidence illustrating that termination is in the children’s best interest. C.H., 89
S.W.3d at 28; C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.
The absence of evidence of some Holley considerations does not preclude the
factfinder from reasonably inferring or forming a strong conviction or belief that

4
termination is in the children’s best interest, particularly if the evidence indicates
that the parent-child relationship and the parent’s conduct has endangered the safety
and well-being of the children. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. This is so because the best
interest analysis evaluates the best interest of the children, not the parent. J.S., 687
S.W.3d at 548; In re E.C.R., 638 S.W.3d 755, 767 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, pet.
denied) (citing In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d 918, 927 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no
pet.)).
In this regard, the factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by his or
her past conduct in determining whether termination of the parent-child relationship
is in the children’s best interest. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re Z.R.M., 665 S.W.3d
825, 829 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. denied); In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379,
384 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). The factfinder may infer that a parent’s
past conduct that endangered the safety and well-being of the children may recur in
the future if the children are returned to the possession of the parent. In re J.D., 436
S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); May v. May, 829
S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1992, writ denied).
Additionally, the factfinder may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet the
children’s physical and emotional needs an inability or unwillingness by the parent
to meet the children’s physical and emotional needs in the future. J.D., 436 S.W.3d
at 118; see also In re A.S., No. 11-16-00293-CV, 2017 WL 1275614, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Eastland Mar. 31, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
The Evidence Presented at Trial
In September 2022, Appellant and the father3 moved from Florida to Odessa
with seven-year-old L.M.R., six-year-old C.N.H., three-year-old C.J.H., and two-

We refer to Appellant’s husband and the father of C.N.H., C.J.H., and C.O.H. as “the father”;
3

L.M.R.’s biological father had been incarcerated for four years by the time of the initial hearing and he was
largely uninvolved in her life.

5
year-old C.O.H. They lived with the father’s uncle, Christopher Jonathan Larkin,
until December 2022 when Larkin took the entire family to “the middle of nowhere
and just left [them] to fend for [themselves].” They purportedly moved into a fifth
wheel recreational vehicle (RV) that had no electricity or running water that was
located on a property with several other abandoned structures and trash everywhere.
In June 2023, the Department briefly investigated reported concerns over the
family’s living arrangement. Appellant and the father misrepresented that they
planned to move back to Florida on June 24; the family was placed in a hotel at the
Department’s expense, and the case was closed. Shortly thereafter, the family
returned to the RV.
In July 2023, Appellant and the father were caught shoplifting while they had
C.O.H. and C.J.H. with them. When they were arrested for misdemeanor theft,
Appellant called Larkin to care for the children while she and the father were in jail.
According to Appellant, she called Larkin despite his previous behavior because she
wanted to avoid involvement by the Department. Law enforcement and the
Department learned two days later that Larkin abandoned the children in a large
metal shed-type structure 4 on the same property as their RV. The shed, like the RV,
had no air conditioning, electricity, water, or food, and the children were without
shoes or extra clothes. Department investigator Adrian Campos observed additional
safety hazards in the shed and on the property, such as buckets of oil, gas containers,
shards of glass, trash, old tires, and a broken-down truck. Campos also entered
Appellant’s and the father’s RV on the property, which was filled with clothes, and
had no bathroom and nowhere to sleep. In fact, Campos found no running water in
any of the surrounding structures on the property.

The building is referred to as a “shed” and “shop” interchangeably throughout the record. The
4

photographs of where the children were found show a primitive industrial shed-type outbuilding that could
have previously functioned as a mechanic shop. We will hereinafter refer to the structure as a shed.

6
Campos spoke to the children after they were transported to the hospital. He
observed that they were very hungry and thirsty, their skin was “matted in dirt,” and
they were covered in bites, cuts, and other marks. It also appeared that the children
“hadn’t been bathed in much longer than just two days since the parents had been
arrested.”
Following their discharge from the hospital, the children stayed in a shelter
before being placed in three separate therapeutic foster homes across Texas.
Department caseworker Christi Wooten met with the children a month after removal.
By that time, “all their wounds were clean, all their infections . . . [t]he lice, the
scabies, all of that was taken care of.” However, Wooten described the children’s
behaviors as “the most severe significant behaviors that [she has] ever experienced
in any child in any case” in her eleven years with the Department. When she
transported C.N.H. from the shelter to the placement in Houston, C.N.H. “punched,
hit, kicked, spit, bit, called [her] names on the plane,” and ran away when they
walked off the plane into the airport. All four children were diagnosed with post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). L.M.R. has additional diagnoses of autism,
oppositional defiant disorder (ODD), and attention deficit disorder (ADD). C.J.H.
also has autism, and the three boys each have attention deficit hyperactive disorder
(ADHD) of varying extremes.
Appellant was released from jail a week after her arrest. The Department
created a family plan of service for Appellant, which the trial court approved and
made an order of the court on August 30, 2023. As part of the service plan, Appellant
was required to complete individual counseling, attend all scheduled supervised
parent-child visitation, submit to monthly drug testing, refrain from criminal
activity, obtain and maintain employment, and establish a safe and stable home
environment.

7
In September 2023, Appellant pleaded guilty to her theft charge, was
convicted thereof, and was placed on community supervision. She was arrested in
February 2024 for violating several of her community supervision conditions, and
remained confined until June 2024 because her probation was revoked. On May 14,
2024, Appellant was transported from the Ector County Detention Center to the
initial termination hearing before the associate judge. Following the presentation of
evidence, the associate judge terminated the parental rights of Appellant and both
fathers. Appellant timely sought de novo review before the referring court, and the
de novo hearing was conducted on February 21, 2025.
By the time of the de novo hearing, L.M.R. was ten, C.N.H. was nine, C.J.H.
was five, and C.O.H. was four years old. The referring court admitted into evidence
the reporter’s record and exhibits from the hearing before the associate judge. The
referring court heard that Appellant tested positive for methamphetamine in
November 2023, which was the only time she submitted to drug testing while the
case was pending. Appellant admitted to her probation officer in January 2024 that
she used methamphetamine, but subsequently claimed that her admission was
coerced. She maintained that she tested positive due to “hanging around people that
were using” methamphetamine, and eventually revealed that Larkin was the
methamphetamine user responsible for her positive results. On cross-examination
during the de novo hearing, Appellant ultimately admitted that she knowingly put
her children’s safety at risk by placing them in Larkin’s care.
Appellant purportedly missed her drug tests due to a lack of transportation,
then claimed that Wooten had not messaged her to drug test “in a few months.”
However, Wooten provided bus passes to Appellant, and the Department introduced
screenshots of text messages from Wooten to Appellant directing her to submit to
drug testing as recently as January 31 and February 10, 2025. The referring court

8
ordered Appellant to submit to drug testing after she testified at the de novo hearing,
which yielded positive results for methamphetamine and opiates.
Appellant has not maintained employment, and only attended four out of ten
counseling sessions. According to her counselor, she never accepted responsibility
for the removal of her children, and instead assigned culpability to Larkin. And
while Appellant attended most of her virtual visits, the parents’ phone batteries often
died mid-visit, and they had recurring issues with their internet connection. During
visits, Appellant had difficulty redirecting the children during their meltdowns, and
ignored the visitation supervisor’s guidance. After the visits with Appellant, L.M.R.
frequently wet the bed, and even wet herself while sitting in her chair during two
virtual visits.
Wooten testified that, despite repeatedly asking Appellant for her home
address throughout the case, Appellant never disclosed that information.
Consequently, Wooten was never able to assess the safety or appropriateness of
Appellant’s residence. Wooten further attested that she has had difficulty
communicating with Appellant. Appellant cursed and screamed at her during a jail
visit, hung up on her the day before the de novo hearing, and has continued to fault
others for the children’s removal. Wooten opined that terminating Appellant’s
parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Wooten explained that returning
the children to Appellant would put their safety at risk, and the children would not
have their basic needs met.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the referring court terminated Appellant’s
parental rights under Section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O), and found termination
to be in the best interest of the children. See FAM. § 161.0001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O),
(b)(2). This appeal followed.

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Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) – Endangerment
In her first issue, Appellant challenges the trial court’s findings that she
endangered the children. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). Although only one
statutory ground is necessary to support termination, appellate courts must address
a parent’s challenges to a trial court’s findings under subsections (D) or (E), as they
may have implications for the parent’s rights to other children. See FAM.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(M); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 234–35 (Tex. 2019) (addressing
due process and due course of law considerations with respect to appellate review of
grounds (D) and (E) and holding that an appellate court must provide a detailed
analysis if affirming the termination on either ground). Thus, if we conclude that
the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to uphold the trial court’s finding as
to either subsection (D) or (E), we need not address the remaining subsections. See
FAM. § 161.001(b)(1); TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. And when the evidence pertaining to
both subsections (D) and (E) is interrelated, as it is here, we may conduct a
consolidated review of the trial court’s endangerment findings. See In re A.L.S., 660
S.W.3d 257, 263–64 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, pet. denied); J.D., 436 S.W.3d
at 114; In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 503 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.).
The statutory endangerment grounds require clear and convincing proof that
the parent has: “(D) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in
conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of
the child,” or “(E) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons
who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of
the child.” FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); In re S.M.R., 434 S.W.3d 576, 585 (Tex.
2014). “[E]ndangerment encompasses a larger array of conduct that ‘expose[s a
child] to loss or injury’ or ‘jeopardize[s]’ the child.” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269,
277 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533

10
(Tex. 1987)). The term means “more than a threat of metaphysical injury or potential
ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment,” but “does not require actual
harm.” In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012); see R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at
277 (citing Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533).
To terminate a parent’s rights for endangerment under subsections (D) or (E),
the “parent’s endangering conduct need not ‘be directed at the child,’” nor must “the
child actually suffer[] injury.” R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 277 (quoting Boyd, 727
S.W.2d at 533); In re C.E., 687 S.W.3d 304, 310 (Tex. 2024). “[T]ermination under
[subsection] (D) requires that the child’s environment is a source of endangerment,
and the parent’s conduct may create that dangerous environment.” C.E., 687 S.W.3d
at 310. “A parent’s drug use, violence, or other abuse may make the child’s
environment endangering to the child.” In re J.S., 675 S.W.3d 120, 128 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2023, no pet.). “A parent acts ‘knowingly’ when the parent is aware
that the environment creates a potential danger to the child but the parent disregards
that risk.” Id. Because conditions or surroundings cannot endanger children unless
the children are exposed thereto, the relevant time frame for evaluating subsection
(D) is before the children’s removal. J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 749.
Endangerment under subsection (E), in contrast, focuses on the parent’s
conduct, and whether the endangerment of the children’s well-being was the direct
result of the parent’s acts, omissions, or failures to act. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 550.
Termination under subsection (E) must be based on more than a single act or
omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is
required. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 550; In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 634 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2000, pet. denied). “A factfinder may infer endangerment from ‘a course of
conduct’ that presents substantial risks to the child’s physical or emotional well-
being.” R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 277. A parent’s actions prior to and after the

11
children’s removal may show an endangering course of conduct. See J.S., 687
S.W.3d at 550 (“[E]ndangering conduct may include a parent’s actions before the
child’s birth and may relate to the parent’s actions while the parent had possession
of other children.”). “Even evidence of criminal conduct, convictions, and
imprisonment prior to the birth of a child will support a finding that a parent engaged
in a course of conduct that endangered the child’s well-being.” In re A.J.M., 375
S.W.3d 599, 606 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied); Walker v. Tex. Dep’t
of Fam. & Protective Servs., 312 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2009, pet. denied) (Illegal drug use and offenses that occurred before the child’s
birth may be considered as part of a course of conduct that endangers a child.).
Appellant’s own testimony established that she engaged in endangering
conduct and knowingly allowed the children to remain in an endangering
environment. See J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 311–12; In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573
(Tex. 2005). It is undisputed that the children were endangered while in Larkin’s
care. They were left in an abandoned shed without air conditioning or electricity in
the summertime, and had no food, water, or spare clothes. They were found covered
in dirt, bruises, scabs, bug bites, and head lice. Failing to remove a child from
an endangering environment can support termination under subsection (D) if the
parent is aware of the dangerous conditions or surroundings. See J.G. v. Tex. Dep’t
of Fam. & Protective Servs., 592 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, no
pet.); In re A.L.H., 468 S.W.3d 738, 746 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no
pet.). According to Appellant, Larkin abandoned her, the father, and the young
children in the middle of nowhere once he decided that he no longer wanted to help
them. Appellant also attributed her positive drug test results to exposure through
Larkin’s methamphetamine use. Appellant’s characterization of Larkin belies her
attempt to elude culpability for leaving the children with Larkin. Appellant therefore

12
cannot maintain ignorance to circumvent a finding that she placed her children with
a person who engaged in endangering conduct. The trial court reasonably concluded
that Appellant endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being by
placing them in Larkin’s care. See In re N.L.S., 715 S.W.3d 760, 765–66 (Tex. 2025)
(citing J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 315). And her choice to do so simply to avoid
involvement by the Department demonstrates her unwillingness to prioritize the
safety and well-being of her children above her own. See In re M.S., 662 S.W.3d
620, 630–31 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2023, pet. denied) (in addition to “domestic
violence concerns,” the father left his children with the mother “when he
knew something was wrong with her”); In re K.G., No. 11-24-00236-CV, 2025
WL 477650, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 13, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A
parent’s decision to leave a child in the care of a known drug user subjects the child
to a life of uncertainty and instability that endangers the child’s physical and
emotional well-being.”); E.G. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-22-
00469-CV, 2022 WL 17970222, at *9 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 28, 2022, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (the father endangered the child by leaving the child with the mother,
whom he knew to be a methamphetamine user).
Appellant not only endangered her children by placing them in Larkin’s
care—the evidence demonstrates that she knowingly exposed the children to unsafe
and inappropriate living conditions that endangered their physical and emotional
well-being. Following the Department’s investigation in June 2023, Appellant was
aware that the RV without running water, electricity, a bathroom, or anywhere to
sleep was unsuitable and unsafe for the children. Rather than being forthcoming
with the Department and prioritizing the safety of her children, she and the father
lied about moving back to Florida, and returned to the RV after the Department
closed its investigation. Less than a month later, Appellant was arrested for

13
shoplifting while she had her two youngest children with her. This evidence of
Appellant’s criminal conduct that resulted in her confinement is relevant to the
endangerment analysis. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 315–17.
Appellant submitted to drug testing once during the pendency of the case,
which yielded positive results for methamphetamine. She also tested positive for
methamphetamine and opiates during the de novo hearing. Drug use and its effects
on the parent’s life and ability to parent may demonstrate an endangering course of
conduct. J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345; In re K-A.B.M., 551 S.W.3d 275, 286 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.); In re R.F., No. 11-24-00271-CV, 2025 WL 994024,
at *8 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 3, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing J.S., 687
S.W.3d at 550 (“Evidence of endangerment is demonstrated in many forms,
including . . . alcohol and drug abuse.”)). That is because any drug activity or
substance abuse may render the parent incapable of parenting. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at
550, 554 (citing R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278). On this record, the trial court could
have formed a firm conviction or belief that the children were exposed to illegal
drugs, which contributed to the children’s endangering environment. See J.W., 645
S.W.3d at 749–50 (“[A] parent’s knowledge of the other parent’s drug use during
pregnancy and corresponding failure to attempt to protect the unborn child from the
effects of that drug use can contribute to an endangering environment.”).
Finally, the children’s violent tendencies and threatening behavior support the
trial court’s endangerment findings. L.M.R. “had to be sedated numerous times”
during her two hospitalizations “for telling the staff and the children that she was
going to kill them and lash out on them aggressively.” The father informed Wooten
that he taught the children how to box and encouraged them to fight each other.
Appellant claimed that the father was teaching the children “to defend themselves
because this world is a cruel place.” The children’s violent behavior toward their

14
peers, teachers, caregivers, and each other permit the rational inference that they
were exposed to violence and aggression in Appellant’s and the father’s care. See
In re D.J.W., 624 S.W.3d 60, 67 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.) (“Domestic
violence may support a finding of either environment or course-of-conduct
endangerment.”); In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d 92, 110 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017,
no pet.) (“Domestic violence, want of self-control, and propensity for violence may
be considered as evidence of endangerment.” (quoting In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d 841,
845 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.)).
To stabilize their behaviors, the children have required extensive care while
in the conservatorship of the Department. They are all in some form of trauma-
focused therapy and behavioral therapy, and each requires specialized assistance or
accommodations in school. L.M.R. was hospitalized twice for threatening to harm
others and herself, and was living in a residential treatment facility at the time of the
de novo hearing. She will need therapies and other services indefinitely, and requires
twenty-four-hour monitoring due to her aggressive behaviors. C.J.H. was also sent
to a psychiatric hospital after he attempted to harm his teachers and classmates the
day before the de novo hearing. When he is discharged, he will return to the
therapeutic foster home where C.O.H. is also placed. Prior to C.J.H.’s
hospitalization, he required constant supervision in school “because he’s known to
hurt his peers”—poking their eyes, choking, throwing things, hitting, and “things
like that.” The children’s behaviors and diagnoses permit the strong inference that
Appellant engaged in conduct that endangered the children, or knowingly allowed
them to remain in an endangering environment.
Based on the foregoing, the evidence is sufficiently clear and convincing such
that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm conviction or belief that
Appellant disregarded her parental obligations to the degree that she “knowingly

15
allowed the children to remain in an endangering environment” and “knowingly
placed [the children] with persons who engaged in [endangering] conduct.” FAM.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); see J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 750.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue.
Best Interest of the Children
In her second issue, Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of
the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights
is in the best interest of the children. “‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing
a much broader, facts-and-circumstances based evaluation that is accorded
significant discretion.” In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Holley,
544 S.W.2d at 371–72). We reiterate that the trial court, as the trier of fact, is the
sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312. We are not at
liberty to disturb the determinations of the factfinder so long as those determinations
are not unreasonable. Id. at 311–12; J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573. Giving the requisite
due deference to the trial court, we hold that, based on the evidence in the record and
the application of the Holley factors, the trial court could have formed a firm belief
or conviction that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the best interest
of the children. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
Evidence of each Holley factor is not required to support a best-interest
finding. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 366 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014,
pet. denied); In re S.O., No. 05-22-01019-CV, 2023 WL 2237084, at *11 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Feb. 27, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). In other words, the absence of
evidence regarding some of these factors does not preclude a best-interest finding,
“particularly if [the] undisputed evidence shows the parental relationship
endangered the child’s safety.” In re N.T., 474 S.W.3d 465, 477 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2015, no pet.). Consequently, “evidence relating to one single factor may be

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adequate in a particular situation to support a finding that termination is in the best
interests of the child.” J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 552 (quoting In re K.S., 420 S.W.3d 852,
855 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.)). And evidence that is relevant to
Section 161.001(b)(1) termination grounds may be probative of the child’s best
interest. See E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249–50 (Tex. 2013) (citing C.H., 89 S.W.3d
at 28).
The clear and convincing evidence that Appellant endangered the children
also established that terminating her parental rights was in the children’s best
interest. Significantly, Appellant’s criminal activity resulted in her arrest and
inability to care for the children. Rather than placing her children in a safe
environment while she was in custody, Appellant chose to leave them in the care of
a known methamphetamine user who had recently abandoned the entire family.
Appellant also tested positive for methamphetamine as well as opiates, which posed
infinite potential dangers to the children and “implicates most of the Holley factors.”
In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595, 607 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied).
A parent’s continuing pattern of drug use can support a best-interest finding due to
the “attendant risks to employment, housing, and prolonged absence from the
children.” R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 281. Additionally, the children’s behaviors
indicate that they witnessed violence in their home. In re O.E.R., 573 S.W.3d 896,
905 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.) (“Physical violence in the home leads to an
unstable and unpredictable environment for children.”); K.G., 2025 WL 477650, at
*5.
Appellant never secured and maintained her own stable housing or
employment. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 742 (considering the parent’s unstable and
uncertain living situation in upholding the trial court’s best-interest finding). During
Appellant’s brief absence from her children while she and the father were in jail, she

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failed to ensure that they were adequately cared for, supported, and protected. See In
re E.P.C., 381 S.W.3d 670, 683–84 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.) (The
parent’s failure to provide proper nutrition, leaving the child alone, and his lack of
remorse for doing so was evidence of endangerment.). Even after removal, she made
no monetary contributions to assist with or provide for her children’s upbringing.
And Appellant’s transient lifestyle and refusal to provide her home address suggests
an inability or unwillingness to achieve the permanence and stability that her
children need to thrive. See In re J.A.R., 696 S.W.3d 245, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2024, pet. denied) (“Stability and permanence are paramount in the
upbringing of children.”). The trial court could have rationally inferred that
relinquishing the children to Appellant’s care would subject them to a life of
uncertainty and instability, which is contrary to their best interest. See In re E.M.,
No. 11-24-00310-CV, 2025 WL 1240792, at *10 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 30,
2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2004, pet. denied)).
Although Appellant “acknowledge[d] that she did not have stability,” she
maintained that Larkin’s conduct rather than her own led to the children’s removal.
She also denied any violence in the home prior to the Department’s involvement,
but ignored the “significant and severe aggressive behaviors in each of her children
that are learned behaviors from unstable and chaotic home environment with some
form of domestic violence.” Appellant attributed her positive drug test results to
“hanging around people that were using” methamphetamine, then blamed Larkin.
The trial court could consider Appellant’s minimization of culpability and her failure
to properly address the Department’s concerns regarding her lack of safe and stable
housing. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72; In re E.G., 643 S.W.3d 236, 254 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2022, no pet.) (“Mother’s untreated mental health issues gave way

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to behavior that resulted in [the child’s] removal and constituted conduct that
endangered [the child’s] physical and emotional well-being.”); In re A.H., No. 11-
24-00075-CV, 2024 WL 3879987, at *7 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 21, 2024, pet
denied) (mem. op.) (“[Mother’s] past behavior, minimization of her conduct, [and]
drug use . . . permit the rational conclusion that relinquishing [the child] to her care
would pose a substantial risk of harm to the child.”).
Appellant’s failure to complete the tasks and services required by her service
plan support the trial court’s best-interest finding. See E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249
(A parent’s failure to complete court-ordered services can support a best-interest
finding.). “A fact finder may infer from a parent’s failure to take the initiative to
complete the services required to regain possession of [her] child that [she] does not
have the ability to motivate [herself] to seek out available resources needed now or
in the future.” In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2017, pet. denied). Wooten’s efforts to arrange drug treatment for Appellant and to
address her housing issues were ultimately futile. Appellant also failed to articulate
any concrete plan to personally provide for the children. She testified that she was
“trying to look for a house that’s big enough” for the family, and was “looking for a
job.” See J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 119–20 (“The fact finder may compare the contrasting
plans for a child by the parent and the Department and consider whether the plans
and expectations of each party are realistic or weak and ill-defined.”). However,
Appellant’s remote desire to eventually support her children is not enough to
alleviate the trial court’s and the Department’s concerns for the children’s safety and
well-being. Therefore, Appellant’s uncertain living situation and failure to
demonstrate the ability to secure stable housing further support the trial court’s best-
interest finding. See J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 119 (“A parent’s inability to provide
adequate care for her children, unstable lifestyle, lack of a home and income, lack of

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parenting skills, and poor judgment may be considered when looking at the
children’s best interest.”); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
The trial court could likewise consider the Department’s previous
involvement with Appellant and the father “for the physical neglect of the shop and
trailer”—the same property where Larkin left the children. Knowing that the RV
was unsuitable for the children, Appellant nevertheless returned to the property after
the Department’s initial involvement. And contrary to Appellant’s assertion that she
bathed the children daily, Campos observed that the children were covered in layers
of dirt, which indicated to him that they had not bathed in a long time. Campos’s
conclusion was corroborated by L.M.R.’s excitement about having food, running
water, and daily baths in her foster home. It also appeared to Campos that the
children had been sleeping on the dilapidated couch and recliner chair in the shed,
and were surrounded by safety hazards. As such, the trial court could rationally infer
that Appellant was, at minimum, indifferent to the children’s physical health and
emotional well-being, given her knowledge of the dangerous living conditions in
which she placed her children. Such “evidence of parental indifference weighs
heavily in favor of a factfinder’s finding that termination is in [the children’s] best
interest.” In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 823 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2023, no pet.); see also A.H., 2024 WL 3879987, at *6 (“Appellant broadcasted the
father’s ongoing aggression and violence on social media, rather than attempting to
protect [the child] from it.”).
Appellant only submitted to drug testing once in the years leading up to the
de novo hearing, then a second time after being ordered to do so during the hearing.
Appellant tested positive for methamphetamine twice and positive for opiates on
February 21, 2025. The trial court was permitted to rely on the drug test results in
finding that Appellant engaged in illegal drug use, despite Appellant’s denials

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thereof. See E.D., 682 S.W.3d at 607 (continuing pattern of illegal drug use
“implicates most of the Holley factors”); In re S.B., 207 S.W.3d 877, 887–88 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (“A parent’s drug use, inability to provide a stable
home, and failure to comply with his family service plan support a finding that
termination is in the best interest of the child.”); see also In re T.L.C., No. 01-17-
00498-CV, 2018 WL 4139004, at *15–18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 30,
2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (considering the mother’s decision to leave her four-
year-old and eleven-month-old children home alone at night).
Most importantly, given the child-centered focus of the best-interest inquiry,
we may not discount the children’s improvement since removal. See J.W., 645
S.W.3d at 746–47. Wooten explained that the children were in their best placements
to provide for each of their specialized needs. As those needs moderate and stabilize,
the Department will continue its search for adoptive placements. Furthermore,
C.O.H. and C.J.H. are too young to express their desires, and the children’s ad litem
opined that L.M.R. and C.N.H. lacked the intellectual ability to express a rational
decision. Under such circumstances, the factfinder may consider whether the
children have bonded with their caregivers, are well-cared for by them, and whether
the children have spent minimal time with a parent. In re E.J.M., 673 S.W.3d 310,
334 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, no pet.); see also In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d 822,
834 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (stating that evidence
showing that a young child had bonded with foster family supported best-interest
finding). Here, the children’s medical and therapy needs that are vital to their
recovery and continued improvement are being met in their respective placements.
See In re M.C.L., No. 04-21-00277-CV, 2022 WL 219002, at *6 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Jan. 26, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (It is in the child’s best interest to be with
a foster family that “has been attentive to meet [the child’s] needs.”). C.N.H. is

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responding relatively well to services, treatments, and interventions, and apologized
to Wooten for how he behaved toward her in the past. C.O.H. is improving his self-
regulation skills, and L.M.R. has exhibited less aggression toward her teachers and
peers. L.M.R. will need continued therapies and intensive long-term care. The trial
court could consider the children’s access to greater levels of care and resources in
their placements in determining their best interest.
Upon considering the evidence as it relates to Appellant’s actions and
inactions, the emotional and physical danger to the children now and in the future,
the emotional and physical needs of the children now and in the future, Appellant’s
lack of parental abilities and stability, and her criminal conduct and drug use, we
hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s
finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the best interest of the
children. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741; Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second issue.
This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the order of the trial court.

JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE

August 29, 2025
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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