Jack William Walker v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed June 5, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-24-00072-CR
__________

JACK WILLIAM WALKER, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 42nd District Court
Taylor County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 29997-A

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Jack William Walker, entered an “open plea” of guilty to the state
jail felony offense of evading arrest or detention. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 38.04(b)(1) (West Supp 2024). The trial court admonished Appellant, accepted
his plea, and, after a punishment hearing, sentenced him to confinement for twenty-
two months in the State Jail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
(TDCJ). On appeal, Appellant contends in a single issue that his plea was not
knowingly and voluntarily made because his trial counsel was ineffective. We
affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural History
The evading offense for which Appellant was indicted was enhanced by a
prior evading conviction and two prior convictions for possession of
methamphetamine. Rather than proceeding to trial before a jury, and after the State
abandoned the enhancement allegations (which reduced the charged offense to a
state jail felony), Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and elected to enter an
“open plea” of guilty.
At Appellant’s plea hearing, the trial court thoroughly admonished Appellant
and reviewed with Appellant the documents that Appellant and his trial counsel had
signed before the plea hearing commenced, namely: (1) the written plea
admonishments—which included, among other things, statements that Appellant
was “totally satisfied with the representation given to [him] by [his] attorney” and
that his “attorney provided [him] fully effective and competent representation”—
and (2) Appellant’s judicial confession. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13
(West Supp. 2024). In response to the trial court’s admonitions, Appellant
affirmatively stated, and his trial counsel confirmed, that Appellant was competent,
that his plea was made knowingly, voluntarily, and free of coercion, and that he
understood the consequences of entering an open plea. The trial court thereafter
accepted Appellant’s plea, found Appellant guilty of the charged offense, ordered
the preparation of a presentence investigation report (PSI), and, after a subsequent
punishment hearing, sentenced Appellant to twenty-two months confinement in
TDCJ.

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On appeal, Appellant now contends that his plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily made because his trial counsel failed to advise him of the options
available to him and in turn coerced him into pleading guilty. According to
Appellant, his counsel’s failures and conduct are tantamount to ineffective assistance
of counsel.
II. Standard of Review
A. Voluntariness of Guilty Plea
A guilty plea must be knowingly and voluntarily made to be constitutionally
valid. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998). When the record shows,
as it does here, that the trial court properly admonished the defendant before
accepting the defendant’s plea, this constitutes a prima facie showing that the plea
was made knowingly and voluntarily. Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1998); Ex parte Gibauitch, 688 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tex. Crim. App.
1985); see CRIM. PROC. art. 26.13. The burden then shifts to the defendant to
establish that he entered his plea without an understanding of the consequences.
Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197 (citing Gibauitch, 688 S.W.2d at 871). This is a heavy
burden, especially when the defendant acknowledges during his plea hearing, as
Appellant did in this instance, that his plea is made knowingly and voluntarily and
that he understands the consequences of pleading guilty. Coronado v. State, 25
S.W.3d 806, 809 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, pet. ref’d).
On the other hand, a guilty plea that is made as the result
of ineffective assistance of counsel is not knowingly or voluntarily made and is,
therefore, invalid, because it does not constitute an informed choice. Ex parte
Moussazadeh, 361 S.W.3d 684, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Ex parte Burns, 601
S.W.2d 370, 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Thus, a defendant’s decision to plead
guilty, if based upon the erroneous advice of counsel, is not made knowingly and

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voluntarily. See Moussazadeh, 361 S.W.3d at 689 (citing Ex parte Battle, 817
S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
When a defendant pleads guilty as a result of relying on the advice of his trial
counsel, and then subsequently challenges the voluntariness of his plea on the basis
of ineffective assistance of counsel, the voluntariness of his plea will be measured
by whether (1) counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded of
attorneys who litigate criminal cases and, if not, (2) there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s erroneous advice, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty
and instead would have insisted on proceeding to trial. Ex parte Harrington, 310
S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Ex parte Moody, 991 S.W.2d 856, 857–
58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
Our review of Appellant’s complaint of ineffective assistance of counsel is
governed by the standard announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). The Strickland standard encompasses two elements that an appellant must
establish to prevail: (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice. Id. at 687. The
failure to succeed on either Strickland prong is fatal to the claim of ineffectiveness.
Perez v. State, 310 S.W.3d 890, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
Under the first prong, deficient performance, counsel will be deemed deficient
if his performance and representation falls below an objective standard of
reasonableness under the prevailing professional norms, considering the facts of the
case when viewed from counsel’s perspective at the time of representation.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. In undertaking this analysis, we must make every
effort to “eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight.” Id. at 689.
There is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct fell within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance. Id.; Isham v. State, 258 S.W.3d 244,

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250 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, pet. ref’d). To overcome this deferential
presumption, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be firmly founded in
the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged
ineffectiveness. Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005);
Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Walker v. State, 406
S.W.3d 590, 593–94 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, pet. ref’d). In this regard, we will
not inquire into counsel’s trial strategy unless no possible basis exists to support such
strategy or tactics. Johnson v. State, 614 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
Op.] 1981).
Counsel’s deficient performance prejudices a defendant if “counsel’s errors
were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” Perez, 310 S.W.3d at 893
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). As such, to satisfy the second prong,
prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the case would have been different but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694;
Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The “reasonable
probability” component of the prejudice prong must rise to a level such that it
undermines the confidence in the outcome of the case. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694;
Isham, 258 S.W.3d at 250. In this analysis, “the prejudice prong turns on whether
the deficiency made any difference [in] the outcome of the case.” Walker, 406
S.W.3d at 599 (quoting Riley v. State, 378 S.W.3d 453, 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)).
“This is a heavy burden which requires a ‘substantial,’ and not just a ‘conceivable,’
likelihood of a different result.” Id. at 599.
Thus, in the context of a challenge to a plea of guilty, the focus of the prejudice
inquiry is “whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the
outcome of the plea process,” and whether a defendant has shown that “but for

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counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty.” Ex parte Torres, 483 S.W.3d
35, 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Challenges on Direct Appeal
In most instances, direct appeal is an inadequate vehicle by which to raise a
complaint of ineffective assistance of counsel because the record is typically
undeveloped and will not show the extent of counsel’s conduct and alleged failures.
Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392; Mallet v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex. Crim. App.
2001); Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813–14. This is especially true when counsel’s trial
strategy does not appear in the record. Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392. In such
circumstances, trial counsel should ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to explain
his actions before being denounced as ineffective. Id.; Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d
107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
When the record contains no direct evidence of counsel’s reasons for the
challenged conduct, counsel’s performance must be reviewed with great deference
and without resort to hindsight, and we “will assume that counsel had a [valid]
strategy if any reasonably sound strategic motivation can be imagined.” Lopez v.
State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 143 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). However, we will not speculate
about counsel’s motives or strategy in the face of a silent record. Thompson, 9
S.W.3d at 814. Therefore, if the record is silent as to any explanation for counsel’s
actions and alleged failures, as it is in this case, we “will not conclude [that] the
challenged conduct constituted deficient performance unless the conduct was so
outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.” Garcia v. State,
57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); see also State v. Morales, 253 S.W.3d
686, 696–97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392; Bone v. State,
77 S.W.3d 828, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (The defendant must show that there
was no plausible, professional reason for counsel’s specific acts or omissions.).

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III. Analysis
At the outset, we note that Appellant did not file a motion for new trial. Thus,
Appellant’s trial counsel did not have the opportunity to explain or defend his actions
or trial strategy or respond to what Appellant now contends constitutes deficient
performance. On a record that does not reveal counsel’s reasoning, we “must
presume that counsel is better positioned than the appellate court to judge the
pragmatism of the particular case, and that [counsel] ‘made all significant decisions
in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.’” Delrio v. State, 840 S.W.2d
443, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690); see Morales,
253 S.W.3d at 697; Screws v. State, 630 S.W.3d 158, 164–65 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2020, no pet.).
As we have said, the alleged ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the
record. Here, Appellant’s bare assertions are not. Instead, Appellant’s allegations
of deficient performance and prejudice are based solely on conclusory and
unsupported statements that are set forth in his appellate brief, and not in the record
before us. See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814. Conclusory statements, whether they
appear in the record or not, cannot support a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. See Ex parte Parra, 420 S.W.3d 821, 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Ruiz v.
State, 293 S.W.3d 685, 693 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. ref’d).
Despite this, Appellant maintains that his plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily made because he received questionable advice from his trial counsel,
namely that his trial counsel did not (1) explain the basis of the State’s allegations
in the indictment, (2) explain the options that were available to Appellant (including
the option to proceed to trial or enter an open plea to the trial court without an
agreement), or (3) permit Appellant to freely choose which option he preferred.
However, the record is devoid of any evidence that supports Appellant’s global and

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conclusory assertions. Rather, the record affirmatively shows that Appellant’s plea
was knowingly and voluntarily made after he consulted with his trial counsel—and
that he made an informed choice to plead guilty. See Davison v. State, 405 S.W.3d
682, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (due process requires that the record affirmatively
show that a defendant entered a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty with an
understanding of the consequences); Griffin v. State, 703 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986) (the voluntariness of a guilty plea is reviewed based on the totality
of circumstances and the entire record).
Further, there is no evidence that Appellant was coerced or induced by his
trial counsel into pleading guilty. To the contrary, Appellant’s responses to the trial
court’s admonitions during the plea hearing, and his acknowledgments in the written
plea admonishments and his judicial confession, affirmatively show that Appellant:
(1) understood the nature of the proceedings, the charge pending against him, and
the consequences of pleading guilty; (2) was pleading guilty knowingly, voluntarily,
and free of any coercion; and (3) had conferred with his trial counsel before electing
to waive his right to a trial by jury and enter an open plea of guilty. Moreover,
Appellant also acknowledged that he was completely satisfied with the
representation that he received from his trial counsel.
We conclude that the record does not support Appellant’s claim of
ineffectiveness. To prevail, Appellant was required to satisfy the “heavy burden” of
demonstrating that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of his case would have been different. See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812; Walker, 406 S.W.3d at 599. He failed
to do so.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal.

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IV. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

June 5, 2025
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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