Mustapha Zouguaghi v. Amanda Zouguaghi

Opinion filed March 20, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
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No. 11-24-00130-CV
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MUSTAPHA ZOUGUAGHI A/K/A SHERIF MOSTAFA
ZOUGARY, Appellant

V.
AMANDA E. ZOUGUAGHI, Appellee

On Appeal from the 231st District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 231-737299-23

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce entered on a default basis after
Appellant, Mustapha Zouguaghi a/k/a Sherif Mostafa Zougary, did not file an
answer. 1 Appearing pro se, Appellant appears to be contending in a single issue that
the trial court erred by requiring him to have supervised visitation with his children
because he could not afford the fees associated with it.2 We note at the outset that
we do not have the benefit of a reporter’s record from any of the proceedings that
occurred below.
On July 18, 2023, Appellee, Amanda E. Zouguaghi, filed an original petition
for divorce. On January 18, 2024, the trial court entered a “Default Final Decree of
Divorce.” Among other things, the divorce decree named Appellee as the sole
managing conservator of the couple’s three children with the right to designate their
primary residence. The decree also named Appellant as the possessory conservator.
The decree specified that Appellant would only have supervised possession of the
children “through Family Court Services pursuant to a separate court order.”
Further, the decree provided that Appellant had “the right to elect community
supervision” and that he would be required to pay any and all fees for community
supervision. Finally, the decree provided that Appellant’s “periods of possession
shall continue to be supervised until he has complied with all requirements and
completed all services as set forth by the Department of Family and Protective
Services.”
On February 7, 2024, Appellant filed a pro se motion for new trial. In the
motion, Appellant appeared to assert a request to change his visitation of the children
from supervised to unsupervised. The clerk’s record indicates that the trial court

1
This appeal was transferred to this court from the Second Court of Appeals pursuant to a docket
equalization order issued by the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.§ 73.001 (West Supp.
2024). We decide this case in accordance with the precedent of the Second Court of Appeals under the
principles of stare decisis. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
2
Appellant’s brief is handwritten, and it is very difficult to read. We additionally note that we do
not have the benefit of an Appellee’s brief. When the appellee fails to file an appellate brief, we nevertheless
review the merits of the appellate issues to determine whether reversal of the trial court’s ruling is
warranted. Yeater v. H-Town Towing LLC, 605 S.W.3d 729, 731 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020,
no pet.).
2
heard the motion for new trial on February 27, 2024 and overruled it on that date.
However, we do not have a reporter’s record from this hearing.
The clerk’s record contains two additional orders pertaining to Appellant’s
supervised visitation of the children. Both orders were signed by an associate judge
on April 23, 2024. One order provides for “Community Supervised Visitation”
provided by Family Court Services at a rate of $55 an hour. The other order provided
for supervised visitation at the Family Court Services Visitation Center at a rate of
$15 per visit following the payment of a one-time $50 fee. We do not have a
reporter’s record with respect to the entry of either of these orders.
In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant appears to be asserting that the trial court
erred by ordering supervised visitation because Appellant does not have the financial
resources to pay the required fees for supervised visitation.
Because a trial court has broad discretion to decide the best interest of a child
in family law matters such as custody, visitation, and possession, we review the trial
court’s decisions in these areas for an abuse of that discretion. See Gillespie v.
Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982). A trial court abuses its discretion when
it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, or when it clearly fails to correctly analyze or
apply the law. See In re D.S., 76 S.W.3d 512, 516 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2002, no pet.). The trial court is best able to observe and assess the witnesses’
demeanor and credibility, and to sense the “forces, powers, and influences” that may
not be apparent from merely reading the record on appeal. Niskar v. Niskar, 136
S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.). Therefore, we defer to the trial
court’s resolution of underlying facts and to credibility determinations that may have
affected its findings, and we will not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s
judgment. George v. Jeppeson, 238 S.W.3d 463, 468 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2007, no pet.).

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The appellant bears the burden of bringing forward a sufficient record to show
the trial court’s error. Aduli v. Aduli, 368 S.W.3d 805, 819 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). “Without a complete record, we must presume the
missing portions of the record would support the trial court’s decision.” Id. If no
findings of fact were requested or entered, we infer that the trial court made all
findings necessary to support its judgment. See Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d
108, 109 (Tex. 1990).
A trial court may place conditions on a parent’s access, such as supervised
visitation, when it is in the child’s best interest. In re A.G., 531 S.W.3d 329, 333
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.); In re A.L.E., 279 S.W.3d 424, 431–
32 n.7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“It is beyond question that,
in an appropriate case, a trial court may order a parent’s visitation to be
supervised.”).
The record before us does not reflect that Appellant presented his argument to
the trial court that he was unable to pay for supervised visitation. While Appellant
referenced supervised visitation in his motion for new trial, he did not assert an
inability to pay in the motion even though the divorce decree provided that Appellant
would be required to pay all expenses in connection with supervised visitation. 3 Our
rules for preservation of error preclude a party from raising a complaint for the first
time on appeal. Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249, 258 (Tex. 2014); Jurgens v.
Martin, 631 S.W.3d 385, 408 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, no pet.). Accordingly,
Appellant failed to preserve for our review his contention based upon an inability to
pay for supervised visitation. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; see also Tex. Dep’t of
Protective & Regulatory Services v. Sherry, 46 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. 2001) (“As a

3
In the absence of a reporter’s record from the hearing on the motion for new trial, Appellant is
unable to demonstrate that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for new trial. See Aduli, 368 S.W.3d
at 819.
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rule, a claim, including a constitutional claim, must have been asserted in the trial
court in order to be raised on appeal.” (quoting Dreyer v. Greene, 871 S.W.2d 697,
698 (Tex. 1993)).
As noted previously, the trial court may require that a parent’s visitation of
his child be supervised when it is in the child’s best interest. See A.G., 531 S.W.3d
at 333. For example, the trial court may institute visitation restrictions if there is
evidence that a parent poses a physical danger to the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 153.004(e)(1) (West Supp. 2024) (“It is a rebuttable presumption that it is
not in the best interest of a child for a parent to have unsupervised visitation with the
child if credible evidence is presented of a history or pattern of past or present child
neglect or abuse or family violence by [] that parent.”). In the absence of findings
of fact and a reporter’s record, we must presume that the trial court had both a legal
and evidentiary basis for requiring supervised visitation for Appellant. See Aduli,
368 S.W.3d at 819. Further, in the absence of findings and a reporter’s record,
Appellant is unable to demonstrate that the trial court’s decision to restrict his
visitation was not in the best interest of the children.
We overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal.
This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment and orders of the trial court.

JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE

March 20, 2025
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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