D'Jaman Keshod West v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed February 21, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-23-00034-CR
__________

D’JAMAN KESHOD WEST, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 350th District Court
Taylor County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 12939-D

MEMORANDUM OPINION
The jury found Appellant, D’Jaman Keshod West, guilty of the murder of
Bronson Alyan Boyles. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(3) (West Supp.
2024). The jury assessed Appellant’s punishment at confinement in the Institutional
Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for a term of twenty years.
Appellant challenges his conviction in two issues. In his first issue, Appellant asserts
that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his requested accomplice
witness jury instruction. In his second issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence in reliance upon his contention that the accomplice witness rule is
applicable to this case. We affirm.
Background Facts
Jaquay Hight’s Testimony
Jaquay Hight testified that he was playing video games at his mother’s house
with his friend Jerel Mathis on July 28, 2017. At some point that evening, D’Audre
Hight-Ealy, Janie Ortiz, and Appellant arrived. Hight-Ealy was Hight’s brother,
Ortiz was Hight-Ealy’s wife, and Appellant was Hight-Ealy’s friend. When Hight-
Ealy mentioned that he was leaving, Hight decided to join his brother so that he
could get a ride to buy hydrocodone pills. Hight did not know where his brother was
planning on going, but he heard Appellant tell Hight-Ealy to “take him to get some
free weed.” Hight testified that he did not know what Appellant meant by “free
weed” at the time, but he knew that both Hight-Ealy and Appellant had counterfeit
money in their possession. Hight testified that Mathis was still playing video games
and was not a part of the conversation.
Hight-Ealy, Appellant, Hight, and Mathis left the house in Hight-Ealy’s white
Cadillac.1 Hight-Ealy was driving. Hight-Ealy first took Hight to purchase
hydrocodone pills. After stopping at a gas station, the group proceeded to an
apartment complex. Hight testified that he did not know why they were going to the
apartment complex and that he was not aware of any “plan.”
Hight-Ealy had a friend, Tylik, who lived at the apartment complex. Hight-
Ealy and Appellant got out of the car and met Tylik outside. Hight and Mathis
remained in the car at first, but followed “a minute or two” later. Hight testified that

1
Hight testified that Ortiz left Hight’s mother’s home separately.

2
Tylik, Appellant, and Hight-Ealy were walking through the apartment complex, and
that he and Mathis were following “10, 15 feet” behind and were “just along for the
ride.” Hight and Mathis stopped and sat on a “generator”2 as Hight-Ealy walked up
a flight of stairs and went into an apartment. Appellant and Tylik stood on the
staircase leading to the apartment. Hight-Ealy remained in the apartment for “a
couple minutes.”
Hight testified that Hight-Ealy exited the apartment with Boyles and that
Hight-Ealy, Boyles, Appellant, and Tylik walked over to where Hight and Mathis
were sitting. Hight testified that he believed Boyles had a firearm on his person
because he could see the outline of a pistol under Boyles’s shirt. Tylik and Hight-
Ealy remained close to Hight and Mathis, but Appellant and Boyles began walking.
At some point, Appellant pulled money out from his pocket. Hight was “in [his]
own zone” and only “half” watching Appellant and Boyles as they walked up the
stairs to a third apartment. 3 Hight heard Boyles say, “what” loud enough to prompt
Hight to look up at the two men. Boyles and Appellant were “wrestling” on the
stairwell. Hight testified that a gunshot went off. Hight “didn’t know who shot
who” and “took off running.” Eventually, Hight-Ealy picked Hight up in the
Cadillac. Mathis and Appellant were also in the car. Hight testified that Appellant
told the men in the car that he shot Boyles and that he would kill them if they told
anyone.
The four men stopped by Hight-Ealy’s home for “[m]aybe five” minutes.
Only Hight and Hight-Ealy went inside, and Hight could not remember what he did

2
In its brief, the State states that the “generator” referenced in the reporter’s record was a
transformer box.
3
Hight admitted that he had already taken the pills that he had purchased by the time the group
arrived at the apartment complex.

3
in the house. The group then went back to Hight’s mother’s home, where Appellant
and Hight-Ealy dropped Hight and Mathis off.
Hight testified that the police searched his mother’s home “early on” in the
investigation of Boyles’s death. A couple days after the initial search, Hight told the
police they could find the firearm Boyles was shot with at his mother’s home. The
police found the firearm in the shed in Hight’s mother’s backyard. Hight testified
that he could not remember who told him the firearm was at his mother’s house.
Hight said that he wanted the police to find the firearm that was used to shoot Boyles
because he thought it might have Appellant’s fingerprints on it, which would prove
that his brother did not shoot Boyles.
Hight denied being “involved in any kind of sale” of marihuana that night.
Hight testified that he knew Appellant had a reputation for fighting and that he did
“not really” know Appellant to carry a firearm on his person. Hight acknowledged
that he had previously said that Appellant was “ruthless” and known to carry a
firearm. Hight testified that he believed Appellant shot Boyles because no one else
was on the staircase when the shot was fired.
Jerel Mathis’s Interview
Mathis testified that he was unable to remember any of the events of July 28,
2017. Both the State and Appellant’s trial counsel introduced portions of Mathis’s
video-recorded police interview. The video clips were admitted and played for the
jury by agreement of the parties.
Mathis told the interviewing detectives that Hight-Ealy first told him that they
were “going to get some weed” and “never mentioned” that they were going to “hit
a lick.”4 Mathis said that it was his understanding that the marihuana was going to

4
Sergeant Paul Martinez testified that, in his experience, the term “hit a lick” meant “[r]ob, steal,
theft, stuff like that.” “Furthermore, several published cases refer to the term ‘lick’ as involving robbing or
stealing.” Walter v. State, 581 S.W.3d 957, 974 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, pet. ref’d) (collecting cases).

4
be bought, not stolen. However, Mathis became aware that there was a plan to “hit
a lick” while everyone was in the car. Mathis said that “they had it all planned out”
about thirty minutes before arriving at the complex, but he and Hight were “just there
for the ride, pretty much.”
The group arrived at Tylik’s apartment first, and Appellant was the only
person to immediately leave the car to speak to him. After the other three men got
out of the car, the group walked towards Boyles’s apartment. Hight-Ealy went into
Boyles’s apartment, Appellant and Tylik stood by the door, and Hight and Mathis
stood further away.
Hight-Ealy exited Boyles’s apartment, and Hight-Ealy and Boyles went to go
get marihuana. Mathis could see that Boyles had a firearm in the pocket of his
sweatpants, and Mathis told Appellant and Hight-Ealy that Boyles had a firearm on
him. Boyles asked the group if they were trying to rob him. Appellant pulled a
firearm out. Boyles ran up the stairs and Appellant followed. Boyles made it to the
top of the stairs and tried knocking on an apartment window. Boyles and Appellant
wrestled, and Appellant shot Boyles.
The group left the apartment complex and went to Hight-Ealy’s house. Mathis
stayed in the car while the others went inside. When the other men returned, Hight-
Ealy had a cleaning product with him. Appellant said that he hid the firearm
somewhere in Hight-Ealy’s shed in the backyard. Hight-Ealy and Appellant dropped
Hight and Mathis off at Hight’s mother’s home and left. Hight-Ealy told everyone
in the car to not speak about what happened.
Mathis testified that Hight-Ealy was the “master planner” of the robbery, and
Hight-Ealy planned on being the person to talk to Boyles.5 Mathis said that he had

5
The State introduced a portion of Mathis’s testimony from Hight-Ealy’s trial, in which Mathis
denied saying that the robbery was Hight-Ealy’s idea.

5
never seen Hight-Ealy with a firearm, but had seen Appellant with a firearm. Mathis
believed that Appellant shot Boyles because Appellant said that he did, Appellant
was the only one with a firearm on his person after the shooting, and Appellant was
the only person with Boyles at the top of the staircase when Boyles was shot.
Janie Ortiz’s Testimony
Janie Ortiz is Hight-Ealy’s wife. Ortiz testified that she and Hight-Ealy went
to his mother’s house and met with Hight, Mathis, and Appellant. Ortiz had gotten
a babysitter and was planning on spending time with Hight-Ealy that night.
However, Hight-Ealy changed the plans when he offered to give Hight, Mathis, and
Appellant a ride. Hight-Ealy told Ortiz to wait for him to get back, but Ortiz was
upset and left in her own vehicle.
Ortiz did not see Hight-Ealy again until he returned home “in the middle of
the night.” Ortiz and her children had fallen asleep in the living room while watching
television. Ortiz woke up to the door being unlocked and heard Hight-Ealy go into
the kitchen. Ortiz also heard Hight and Appellant in the house. The men were only
in the house for “a couple of minutes.” On cross-examination, Ortiz acknowledged
that she previously told a detective that she only saw Hight-Ealy in the house, but
she corrected herself in her testimony and confirmed that she saw Hight and
Appellant in the house, as well.
Ortiz did not see Hight-Ealy again until he came back home the next morning.
Ortiz testified that Hight-Ealy looked like he had been up all night. Ortiz and Hight-
Ealy drove to his mother’s house, and Hight-Ealy told Ortiz that Appellant had shot
someone. When they arrived at his mother’s home, Hight-Ealy was “stressed” and
“wouldn’t stay still.” Appellant told Hight-Ealy to calm down because Hight-Ealy
“didn’t shoot [Boyles].”

6
Ortiz testified that she did not allow firearms in her home; she had never seen
Hight-Ealy with a firearm. Ortiz had never seen Mathis or Hight with a firearm,
either. Ortiz testified that Appellant “always had a gun” “on him.”
Courtney Stanaland’s Testimony
Courtney Stanaland was Boyles’s live-in girlfriend at the time of the murder.
Stanaland testified that Boyles had recently decided that he no longer wanted to sell
marihuana. However, Boyles had about ten grams of marihuana in his possession
that day. Boyles told Stanaland that he owed his friend Paul Fisher money and that
he was going to sell the marihuana to pay Fisher back and then he would “be done.”
Stanaland heard a knock at the door close to midnight. Boyles opened the
door to a “random” man that they did not know. The man introduced himself as
“Brandon.” At trial, Stanaland identified the man as Hight-Ealy, who she described
as a “five six, seven maybe” “African-American” man with “[l]ight skin.” Hight-
Ealy asked Boyles for an ounce of marihuana, and Boyles told him that he did not
have that much. Boyles decided to go to Fisher’s nearby apartment to get the rest of
the marihuana that Hight-Ealy requested so that he could make the sale to Hight-
Ealy and pay Fisher back. Boyles told Stanaland to stay in the apartment, lock the
door, and wait for him to come back. Stanaland testified that Boyles did not have a
firearm on his person and that, to her knowledge, Boyles did not have a firearm in
the apartment.
Stanaland locked the door and heard a gunshot “not even a minute later.”
Stanaland ran to Fisher’s apartment and saw that Boyles had been shot. Stanaland
said that she was “screaming, who shot my boyfriend, who shot my boyfriend, over
and over again” and that people were coming out of their apartments. People that
were nearby transported Boyles to the hospital, and Fisher drove Stanaland to the
hospital.

7
Stanaland was able to identify Hight-Ealy in a lineup as the man who knocked
on the apartment door. During cross-examination, Stanaland confirmed that she had
reported during an interview with police, that Boyles told Hight-Ealy that he was
“not afraid to put a [racial slur] down,” and that she believed what Boyles “meant
by that [was] fighting because he didn’t have a gun.”
Paul Fisher’s Testimony
Paul Fisher testified that Boyles was his best friend and that they lived in the
same apartment complex. It was a thirty-second walk between Fisher’s apartment
and Boyles’s apartment. Fisher said that he was playing a video game when Boyles
was shot and that he did not hear the gunshot because the game he was playing was
a “first-person shooter” game. Fisher heard Boyles screaming for help and banging
on his door after he was shot. Fisher testified that he helped pick Boyles up and take
him to the hospital. Fisher did not see a firearm on Boyles’s person that night and
did not know of any firearms that Boyles possessed at the time of his death.
Ashley Day Testimony
Ashley Day testified that she was walking to her friend’s apartment when she
saw “three or four guys” talking on a stairwell. Day heard a gunshot, and the men
fled. Day did not see the men get into a car, but she saw a “white SUV speed off”
and out of the complex. Day called 9-1-1. Day testified that she saw a “light-skinned
male with a gun run down the stairs and flee with the rest of the guys.” Day said
that the man she saw that night was smaller than Appellant and that she would not
“mistake [Appellant] for someone who is light-skinned.”
Macaya Edwards’s Testimony
Macaya Edwards testified that Hight and Hight-Ealy are her brothers, and that
Appellant is her son’s father. Edwards testified that Hight-Ealy was “intoxicated”
at some point after Boyles’s death and told her that he had killed somebody.

8
Edwards clarified that Hight-Ealy told her that he had “killed” Boyles, not that he
had “shot” him. Edwards testified that Hight-Ealy’s statement that he killed
someone means something “different” than a statement that he shot someone.
Edwards could not remember whether Hight-Ealy had ever said that he “shot”
Boyles.
The Investigation
A spent nine-millimeter shell case and a fragment of a copper jacket from a
bullet projectile were recovered from the scene. Boyles’s autopsy revealed that there
was an imprint of a muzzle on his skin and gunpowder present in the tissue beneath
the entrance wound on his body, meaning that the firearm was pressed to him when
it was fired.
Sergeant Paul Martinez with the Abilene Police Department testified that he
began his investigation at the hospital. Sergeant Martinez spoke with Stanaland
twice, first at the hospital and then at the police station. Sergeant Martinez then
conducted searches of Boyles’s and Fisher’s apartments. Officers canvassed the
apartment complex to gather information from any witnesses. Sergeant Martinez
testified that he spoke with Day, but she “claimed not to hear or see anything.”
Sergeant Martinez testified that Stanaland gave him a description of the man
who knocked on the apartment door before Boyles was shot. In a lineup, Stanaland
positively identified Hight-Ealy as the man she saw that night. After researching
Hight-Ealy, Sergeant Martinez drafted a search warrant for Hight-Ealy’s home.
Hight-Ealy was arrested on outstanding warrants, and he agreed to speak with
Sergeant Martinez. A brown leather holster was recovered from a closet in Hight-
Ealy’s home. Sergeant Martinez also spoke with Hight, Mathis, Tylik, Appellant,
Ortiz, and Edwards. Officers then searched Appellant’s residence. Detectives

9
recovered a handgun from Appellant’s residence, but it was not the handgun used to
shoot Boyles.
On August 2, officers received consent to search Hight’s mother’s home.
Officers had been told that the firearm used in the shooting was possibly in the
home’s backyard, but officers did not find a firearm. The next day, Hight called the
police department and said that the firearm was in the storage building behind his
mother’s home. Hight said that he did not touch the firearm and that it was in a
“brown towel and plastic bag.” The firearm was found in Hight’s mother’s shed and
was subsequently tested by a ballistics company. Sergeant Martinez testified that
the firearm was found to be the weapon used to shoot Boyles. No “usable DNA”
was found on the firearm.
Hight-Ealy told Sergeant Martinez that he planned on committing an
aggravated robbery and that he knew Appellant had a firearm. Sergeant Martinez
asked Hight-Ealy about his alleged statement that he was the person who shot
Boyles, and Hight-Ealy told Sergeant Martinez that “he said it, but he was drunk.”
Sergeant Martinez testified that he always believed Appellant was the person
that shot Boyles, but “there was always that room that [Hight-Ealy] might have just
because of some of the things that we were hearing.” Sergeant Martinez presented
a total of five cases in connection with the murder—one for Appellant, Hight-Ealy,
Hight, Mathis, and Tylik—but the District Attorney’s Office ultimately chose to
prosecute only two of the cases—the ones against Appellant and Hight-Ealy.
Sergeant Martinez testified that he sent a case to the District Attorney’s Office on
Hight-Ealy for the murder of Boyles not because he thought Hight-Ealy shot Boyles,
but under the “law of parties.” Sergeant Martinez testified that he saw Hight-Ealy
testify during his own trial and concluded that Hight-Ealy’s testimony left “no

10
questions” about who the shooter was. Sergeant Martinez testified that he believed
Appellant was the person who shot Boyles.
Requested Accomplice Witness Instruction
At the charge conference, Appellant’s trial counsel requested that “the Court
would include the standard jury instruction regarding accomplice testimony and the
requisite that there be some independently corroborating evidence of the
accomplice’s testimony.” Appellant’s trial counsel argued that Detective Martinez’s
decision to bring cases for aggravated robbery and murder to the District Attorney’s
Office against Hight, Hight-Ealy, Mathis, and Tylik in addition to Appellant was
“prima facie sufficient” to make them accomplices in fact. The trial court denied
the request.
Analysis
Accomplice Witness Instruction
In his first issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion
when it denied his request for an accomplice witness jury instruction because Hight
and Mathis were accomplice witnesses. 6 We review an alleged jury-charge error
with a two-step process. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743–44 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005). First, we must determine whether error actually exists in the charge, and
second, if error does exist, whether sufficient harm resulted from the error to require
reversal. Id.; Abdnor v. State, 871 S.W.2d 726, 731–32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). If
the defendant preserved the error by timely objecting to the charge, an appellate
court will reverse if the defendant demonstrates that he suffered some harm as a
result of the error. Sakil v. State, 287 S.W.3d 23, 25–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)
(quoting Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). We

6
Ordinarily, we would address an issue challenging the sufficiency of the evidence first. But
because Appellant’s evidentiary challenge in his second issue is based on his assertion that the accomplice
witness rule is applicable to this case, we will initially address his first issue.

11
review a trial court’s decision not to submit an instruction in the jury charge for an
abuse of discretion. See Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 121–22 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2000).
Under Article 38.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, “[a] conviction
cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other
evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed; and the
corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense.”
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.14 (West 2023). “Therefore, if an accomplice
to the offense testifies for the State, the accomplice’s testimony must be corroborated
by non-accomplice evidence that tends to ‘connect the accused to the offense.’”
State v. Ambrose, 487 S.W.3d 587, 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (quoting Smith v.
State, 332 S.W.3d 425, 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). The trial court must include
an accomplice witness instruction in its charge if the issue is raised by the evidence
because it is the “law applicable to the case.” Id.
An accomplice is one who participates with a defendant in the commission of
a crime and acts with the requisite culpable mental state. See Paredes v. State, 129
S.W.3d 530, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). “The participation must involve an
affirmative act that promoted the commission of the offense with which the accused
is charged.” Id.; Kunkle v. State, 771 S.W.2d 435, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
A witness can be an accomplice either as a matter of law or as a matter of fact.
Ash v. State, 533 S.W.3d 878, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Zamora v. State, 411
S.W.3d 504, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Cocke v. State, 201 S.W.3d 744,
747 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). A witness is an accomplice as a matter of law when
“the witness has been charged with the same offense as the defendant or a lesser-
included offense, or ‘when the evidence clearly shows that the witness could have
been so charged.’” Zamora, 411 S.W.3d at 510 (quoting Cocke, 201 S.W.3d at 747–

12
48). If a witness is an accomplice as a matter of law, the trial court must
affirmatively instruct the jury that the witness is an accomplice whose testimony
must be corroborated. Id. But where there is conflicting or inconclusive evidence
as to whether a witness is an accomplice, the trial court should include an accomplice
witness instruction that “asks the jury to (1) decide whether the witness is an
accomplice as a matter of fact, and (2) apply the corroboration requirement, but only
if it has first determined that the witness is an accomplice.” Id.
Appellant contends that the evidence presented at trial entitled him to an
accomplice witness instruction because it raised, at the very least, a fact issue as to
whether Mathis and Hight engaged in an affirmative act promoting the commission
of Boyles’s murder. Appellant asserts that by virtue of Mathis’s testimony, Mathis
and Hight made a plan with Hight-Ealy and Appellant to “rob a drug dealer” and
“hit a lick” and thereby constituted an affirmative act to assist in the commission of
Boyle’s murder. As for Hight’s testimony, Appellant asserts that, “[i]f the group
discussed and planned to ‘hit a lick’ in Hight’s presence . . . it strains incredulity to
suggest Hight didn’t know exactly what was meant by that term and what was
expected of him as back-up[.]” We will construe Appellant’s argument as a
contention that the trial court should have included an accomplice witness
instruction that tasked the jury with determining whether (1) Hight and/or Mathis
were accomplices as a matter of fact, and (2) there was corroborating evidence
supporting Hight’s testimony and Mathis’s statement. See Zamora, 411 S.W.3d at
510.
In response, the State contends that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Appellant’s request to include an accomplice witness instruction in its
charge because Mathis and Hight were not accomplices and were “merely present”
at the crime scene. The State asserts that there was no evidence that Hight knew

13
there was a plan to commit aggravated robbery or that Hight assisted in or promoted
the commission of the robbery. The State further asserts that, even assuming Mathis
knew that there was a plan to “hit a lick,” there is no evidence that Mathis was
actually involved in the crime—only that he had knowledge of a plan to commit a
crime and that he was present at the time that crime was committed.
Appellant’s contention that Hight and Mathis were “involved in the planning
of the armed robbery” is not supported by the evidence. Both Hight and Mathis
testified that they kept their distance from the others while they were at the apartment
complex. Hight testified that he did not know that Hight-Ealy and Appellant were
planning to commit a robbery, he was not involved in any purchase of marihuana
that night, and he and Mathis were “just along for the ride.” Mathis stated that he
was unaware of a plan to “hit a lick” until “they” formulated a plan while in the car.
While Mathis did not specify who he was referring to when he said, “they had it all
planned out,” Mathis stated that he and Hight were “just there for the ride” and that
Hight-Ealy was the “master planner” behind the robbery.
In summary, the State is correct in its assertion that the evidence showed only
that Mathis had knowledge of a plan to commit a crime and that Hight and Mathis
were present during the crime’s commission. Mere presence at the scene of a crime
is not enough to render a witness an accomplice; nor is a witness an accomplice
merely because he knew of a crime and failed to disclose it. See Druery v. State,
225 S.W.3d 491, 498–500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (holding that two witnesses’
knowledge that the appellant was planning on murdering someone and presence at
the murder were not affirmative acts entitling the appellant to an accomplice witness
instruction); Kunkle, 771 S.W.2d at 441 (holding that a witness’s knowledge of a
group’s planned crime, failure to abandon the group, and presence at the crime were
not sufficient circumstances to warrant an accomplice witness instruction). Rather,

14
there must be sufficient evidence to connect the witness to the crime as a
“blameworthy participant.” Druery, 225 S.W.3d at 498; Cocke, 201 S.W.3d at 748.
Accordingly, there was no evidence in the record to support that Mathis or Hight
were accomplices in Boyles’s murder. Therefore, an accomplice witness instruction
was not law applicable to the case, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to include an inapplicable instruction in its charge. See Ambrose, 487
S.W.3d at 593. We overrule Appellant’s first issue.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his second issue, Appellant contends that, under an application of the
accomplice witness rule, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.
Specifically, Appellant asserts that no witnesses other than Hight and Mathis said
that Appellant was present during the planning of the crime or when the crime was
committed, no forensic or DNA evidence linking Appellant to the crime was found,
and that Day testified that Appellant was not the person she saw running from the
scene with a firearm in his hand. The State asserts that Hight and Mathis were not
accomplice witnesses whose testimony required corroboration, but there was
nevertheless sufficient evidence to corroborate their testimony.
In order to support a conviction based on the testimony of an accomplice,
there must be corroborating evidence that tends to connect the accused with the
offense. CRIM. PROC. art. 38.14; Malone v. State, 253 S.W.3d 253, 257 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008). In reviewing the sufficiency of corroborating evidence, we eliminate
the accomplice testimony from consideration and focus on the remaining portions of
the record to determine whether there is any evidence that tends to connect the
defendant with the commission of the crime. Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 361
(Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Cathey v. State, 992 S.W.2d 460, 462–63 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999)). The corroborating evidence may be direct or circumstantial and need not be

15
sufficient by itself to establish the defendant’s guilt; it is sufficient if the combined
weight of the non-accomplice evidence tends to connect the defendant to the offense.
Solomon, 49 S.W.3d at 361; Gosch v. State, 829 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Tex. Crim. App.
1991). Such corroboration may come from small details. Trevino v. State, 991
S.W.2d 849, 852 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We review the corroborating evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict. Taylor v. State, 328 S.W.3d 574, 578 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Once corroborated, testimony of an accomplice
may be considered by the jury in the same manner as other competent evidence. See
Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 632 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
In our disposition of Appellant’s first issue, we determined that neither Mathis
nor Hight were Appellant’s accomplices. As such, the accomplice witness rule has
no application to a review of the sufficiency of the evidence in this case.
We further note that Mathis’s version of events came from his recorded
statement to interviewing police officers—not his in-court testimony at Appellant’s
trial. Mathis’s out-of-court statement that was admitted at trial was significant
because he stated to the police that Appellant shot Boyles. This fact that Mathis’s
out-of-court statement was admitted at trial has an important effect on our analysis:
Only an accomplice’s in-court testimony need be corroborated.
Bingham v. State, 913 S.W.2d 208, 211–213 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
Although an accomplice’s testimony cannot be corroborated by prior
statements made by the accomplice witness to a third person, Smith v.
State, 332 S.W.3d 425, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), an accomplice’s
out-of-court statement does not, itself, have to be corroborated under
[Article] 38.14, and the jury is entitled to regard it as independent
evidence of an appellant’s guilt as long as it is corroborated as required
by Texas Rule of Evidence 803(24) (statement against interest).
Archie v. State, 340 S.W.3d 734, 737 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
Bible v. State, 524 S.W.3d 257, 260–61 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, no pet.); see also
Ruiz v. State, 631 S.W.3d 841, 854 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d)

16
(“Article 38.14 only addresses and applies to ‘accomplice-witness’ testimony, and
not statements, any past statements that were made by [the witness] and that were
elicited through the testimony of those to whom the statements were made do not
fall within the purview of Article 38.14.”); Qualls v. State, 547 S.W.3d 663, 671
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. ref’d) (“[A]n accomplice’s out-of-court
statement may not be used as corroboration . . . but it is also not evidence requiring
corroboration under Article 38.14.”). Mathis’s statement, which was given during
an interview conducted during the investigation of Boyles’s death, was not in-court
testimony. Therefore, it was not accomplice witness testimony subject to the
corroboration requirement of Article 38.14. See Bible, 524 S.W.3d at 260–61.
Further, because Appellant’s trial counsel did not object to the State’s admitted
portions of Mathis’s interview, “any error in admitting the statement was not
preserved and the statement was admitted for all purposes.” See id. at 261 (noting
that the lack of an objection at trial prevents a later complaint that an out-of-court
statement is not corroborated under Rule 803(24) of the Texas Rules of Evidence).
Thus, even if Mathis was an accomplice, his out-of-court statement was not subject
to the corroboration requirement of Article 38.14. See id.
Further, even if we assume that (1) the trial court erred in refusing to include
an accomplice witness instruction in its charge, and (2) Hight’s testimony constituted
accomplice witness testimony, there was still sufficient non-accomplice evidence to
corroborate Hight’s testimony. Ortiz testified that Hight-Ealy told her Appellant had
shot someone. Ortiz also heard Appellant tell Hight-Ealy to “calm down” because
Hight-Ealy “didn’t shoot [Boyles].” Finally, Ortiz testified that she had never seen
Hight-Ealy, Hight, or Mathis with a firearm, but she knew Appellant “always” had
a firearm on his person. Because there was sufficient evidence to corroborate
Hight’s testimony, the jury would have been free to consider it in the same manner

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as other competent evidence—even if it was accomplice witness testimony. See
Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632. We overrule Appellant’s second issue.
This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE

February 21, 2025
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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