In the Interest of A.I.R.R. and A.M.R., Children v. the State of Texas

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-24-00333-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.I.R.R. AND A.M.R., CHILDREN

From the 474th District Court
McLennan County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2023-1764-6

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (“the Department”) filed

a petition seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights to A.I.R.R. and A.M.R.1

Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights under Texas

Family Code Sections 161.001(b)(1)(D), 161.001(b)(1)(E), and 161.001(b)(1)(O), and found

that termination was in the best interest of each child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§

161.001(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E), (b)(1)(O), (b)(2). Mother’s attorney has now filed an Anders

brief asserting that he diligently reviewed the record and that he believes the appeal to

1The Department also initially sought to terminate the parent-child relationship between both children and
their father; however, at the conclusion of the bench trial, the father was appointed as a joint managing
conservator of A.I.R.R. and A.M.R. along with the children’s aunt. The father did not appeal.
be frivolous. See generally Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493

(1967); In re A.S., 653 S.W.3d 298 (Tex. App.—Waco 2022, no pet.). We agree with counsel’s

assertion that Mother’s appeal is frivolous and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Anders Brief

Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional

evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See

Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Counsel has provided us

with the appropriate facts of the case and its procedural history, and has discussed why,

under controlling authority, there is no reversible error in the trial court’s termination

order. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Further, counsel

informed us that he has examined the record and found no arguable grounds to advance

on appeal, served Mother with a copy of the Anders brief, informed Mother of her right

to file a pro se response to his brief and her right to review the appellate record, provided

Mother with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record lacking only her

signature and the date, and notified Mother of her right to request counsel to file a

petition for review on her behalf with the Texas Supreme Court. See Anders, 386 U.S. at

744; Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319-20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); In re A.S., 653 S.W.3d at

299-300. By letter, we informed Mother of her right to review the appellate record and to

file a response to the Anders brief filed by her appellate counsel. Mother did not file a pro

se response.

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Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of the

proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. See Penson v. Ohio, 488

U.S. 75, 80 (1988). Arguments are frivolous when they “cannot conceivably persuade the

court.” McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 436 (1988). We have reviewed the entire

record and counsel’s brief, and we have found nothing that would arguably support an

appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly,

we affirm the judgment of the trial court terminating Mother’s parental rights to A.I.R.R

and A.M.R.

Motion to Withdraw

Counsel has also filed a motion to withdraw as Mother’s counsel. However, a

parent’s statutory right to counsel under Section 107.013(a)(1) of the Texas Family Code

extends through the exhaustion or waiver of “all appeals,” including the filing of a

petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 107.013(a)(1),

107.016(2)(B); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016). The Texas Supreme Court has

stated that “an Anders motion to withdraw brought in the court of appeals, in the absence

of additional grounds for withdrawal, may be premature.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27.

The filing of the Anders brief is the only ground set forth by counsel in his motion to

withdraw. We therefore deny counsel’s motion, and he remains counsel of record for

Mother. Consequently, if Mother, after consulting with counsel, desires to file a petition

In the Interest of A.I.R.R. and A.M.R., Children Page 3
for review to the Texas Supreme Court, counsel’s obligations can be satisfied by filing “a

petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” Id. at 27-28.

Conclusion

Having found that Mother’s appeal is frivolous, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court. We deny Mother’s counsel’s motion to withdraw.

STEVE SMITH
Justice

Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Affirmed; motion denied
Opinion delivered and filed February 27, 2025
[CV06]

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