Ralph White, Jr. v. the State of Texas

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-23-00246-CR

RALPH CHRISTOPHER WHITE, JR.,
Appellant
v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee

From the 13th District Court
Navarro County, Texas
Trial Court No. D41517-CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury convicted Ralph Christopher White, Jr. of aggravated sexual assault of a

child, enhanced with a prior felony, and assessed punishment at confinement in prison

for life. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting an extraneous

offense over White’s objections, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

BACKGROUND

In 2018, White moved in with his cousin, Jacqueline English, for about three weeks

because he had no place else to live. Also living in the home was then 13-year-old D.S.
During this stay, White sexually assaulted D.S. D.S. recalled that the offense occurred the

day before White was taken to the hospital by a fire department for an incident occurring

in her mother’s bathroom. D.S. initially told her cousin that White had rubbed her foot,

making her feel uncomfortable. However, she did not outcry in full until years later in

late October of 2021.

EXTRANEOUS OFFENSE EVIDENCE

In two issues, White complains that the trial court abused its discretion when it

admitted extraneous evidence of drug use by White in violation of Texas Rules of

Evidence 403 (Issue 1) and 404(b) (Issue 2). TEX. R. EVID. 403; 404(b). The challenged

extraneous drug use was mentioned in a videotaped interview of White at the jail:

[OFFICER]: There was an outcry of sexual abuse that [D.S.] made against
you. It looks like…do you remember that…do you have any recollection of
anything like that happening?

[WHITE]: No, ma’am.

[OFFICER]: Do you remember back in 2018 when you did ICE a lot?

[WHITE]: Yes.

[OFFICER]: It’s probably going to be right around that time. Could you
envision yourself doing something like that on ICE?

[WHITE]: No, no. I know what she’s talking about. I know what had
happened was I know what had happened was, I wait for everybody to go
sleep and I was watching something on TV. I was watching
HBO/CINEMAX and she walked into the living room. That's it. That is it.

[OFFICER]: That's not what she told me...do you remember when you went
to the hospital?

[WHITE]: Yes.

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[OFFICER]: Right around that time is when she said that you ...

[WHITE]: How did I do? How is that?

[OFFICER]: I don't know. Is there a point that you were on any type of drugs
where you wouldn't remember that day?

[WHITE]: Yes, I remember everything. I stayed with them. Oh my God….
***
[WHITE]: Come on now... I would never do that...I got high. But I never
did that….

(Emphasis added).

The video was admitted into evidence over White’s Rule 404(b) and Rule 403

objections. We review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude extraneous offense

evidence under Rules 404(b) and 403 for an abuse of discretion. Perkins v. State, 664

S.W.3d 209, 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). The trial court does not abuse its discretion

unless its determination lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Martinez v.

State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

Rule 404(b)

We begin our review with White’s second issue: whether the trial court abused its

discretion by allowing the State to use extraneous drug evidence to prove character

conformity. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the

character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. 1 TEX. R. EVID.

404(b)(1). It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,

1
Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion and excludes only that evidence that is offered, or
will be used, solely for the purpose of proving bad character and conduct in conformity with that bad
character. De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

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opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or

accident. Id. (b)(2). These “exceptions” are neither mutually exclusive nor collectively

exhaustive. De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Pondexter v.

State, 942 S.W.2d 577, 583-84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). There are many other uses for

evidence of criminal acts. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 377 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)

(op. on reh’g).

D.S.’s mother, Jacqueline English, was the first State’s witness. English told the

jury D.S. had blurted out that White had “raped” her while English was discussing

another matter with D.S. Later, D.S. told English that the sexual assault occurred the

night before White had gone to the hospital. English remembered when that occurred

because it had been a stressful day: White had been in their bathroom for hours and

English had to call 9-1-1. English related what D.S. eventually told her:

[D.S.] said she got out of bed, went to the living room to watch cartoons.
She said eventually, [White] came in and he spoke to her. He walked to the
kitchen or restroom, came back, and sat down. Said that he touched her
foot, and she kicked him away and said, "Stop." Then after that, he grabbed
her by her ankles and pulled her towards him. And she said that he raped
her. She did not go into detail with me.

D.S. corroborated her mother’s account of when the assault occurred.

The investigating officer, Det. Whitney Hawk, confirmed that White had been

taken to the hospital by the Fire Department on a particular date. When Hawk later spoke

with White about D.S.’s outcry, White initially had no recollection of a sexual assault, or

“anything like that,” happening. Hawk used White’s prior drug use and the concurrent

trip to the hospital to successfully jog White’s memory. White then explained what

White v. State Page 4
happened, using some of the same details as D.S. leading up to the sexual assault yet

denying sexually assaulting D.S.

The State argued, and the trial court agreed, that the evidence was admissible for

the purpose of showing time and place. Based on our review of the record, we agree with

the trial court’s determination and conclude the record supports the admission of White’s

extraneous drug use to prove time and place; not simply to show White’s criminal

character. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and White’s second

issue is overruled.

Rule 403

White also argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the same

extraneous drug evidence because it was more prejudicial than probative. See TEX. R.

EVID. 403. Texas Rule of Evidence 403 allows the trial court to exclude evidence that may

be otherwise relevant "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of

undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id. To determine

whether evidence is admissible under Rule 403, we use the Montgomery factors: (1) the

strength of the evidence's probative value, (2) the potential for the evidence to "impress

the jury in some irrational but nevertheless indelible way," (3) The amount of time

required at trial to develop the evidence, and (4) the proponent's need for the evidence.

Hart v. State, 688 S.W.3d 883, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d

372, 389-90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh’g).

English and D.S. testified as to where and when the sexual assault took place. By

White v. State Page 5
jogging White’s memory with his prior drug use, White corroborated D.S.’s and English’s

testimony. Importantly, White’s corroboration occurred without Hawk giving White any

details of the sexual assault and after White telling Hawk he had no recollection of

“anything like that” happening. Thus, not only was the extraneous evidence probative

because it led to the establishment of time and place, but it was also necessary as support

for the State’s argument that D.S.’s version of the events was credible while White’s

version was not.

Further, the presentation of the evidence did not take much time to present. The

introduction of the video, including publishing it to the jury in segments along with

testimony by Hawk, took only three pages out of Hawk’s 22 pages of testimony.

Likewise, the potential for the evidence to "impress the jury in some irrational but

nevertheless indelible way” was low. After the introduction and publication of the video

to the jury, White’s former drug use, the type of drug he used, or whether he was high,

was not discussed or mentioned again until in the State’s final argument. And then, the

State only mentioned it to show that regardless of doing drugs or possibly being high,

White remembered what had occurred and had access and opportunity to sexually

assault D.S.

Thus, after weighing the Montgomery factors, we conclude that a balance of the

factors shows the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the probative value of

the extraneous drug evidence outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice to White.

White’s first issue is overruled.

White v. State Page 6
CONCLUSION

Having overruled each issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

LEE HARRIS
Justice

Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed February 27, 2025
Do not publish
[CRPM]

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