Fernando Yates v. Houston Independent School District

Opinion issued November 13, 2025.

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-24-00790-CV
———————————
FERNANDO YATES, Appellant
V.
HOUSTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee

On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1216651

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Fernando Yates is appealing the trial court’s orders granting

Appellee Houston Independent School District’s application for writ of certiorari,

plea to the jurisdiction, and motion for attorneys’ fees. We affirm the trial court’s

judgment.
Background

Appellant Fernando Yates was hired by Appellee Houston Independent

School District as a high school math teacher during the 2019-2020 school year. In

December 2019, Yates filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) claiming the District had discriminated against

him on the basis of his national origin, violated the Americans with Disabilities Act

of 1990, and retaliated against him because he opposed these unlawful acts. After

successfully mediating the matter before the EEOC, Yates and the District signed a

settlement agreement pursuant to which the District agreed to pay Yates “a lump

sum equal to four months’ salary (the remainder of his salary for the 2019-2020

school year, plus two additional months of salary) at his current rate of pay, less any

appropriate deductions.” In exchange, Yates agreed to resign from his employment

with the District effective April 10, 2020, and to release the District from all claims.

Yates signed the settlement agreement on March 27, 2020.

After the District’s Board of Trustees voted to approve the settlement

agreement on April 9, 2020 and the District’s representatives signed the settlement

agreement, Yates emailed the District’s General Counsel, Catosha Woods, inquiring

about the timing of his settlement payment and arguing that the payment had to be

calculated based on the annual salary for teachers with thirty-seven years of

experience because he had submitted service records to the District from prior

2
teaching jobs establishing that he had thirty-seven years of teaching experience.1

Woods informed Yates that any service records he had submitted to the District prior

to April 9, 2020 would be honored and that the settlement payment would be

calculated commensurate with the records the District received prior to that date.

On April 29, 2020, Yates received the settlement check from the District and

deposited the $28,360.44.00 check into his bank account. The next day, Yates

emailed Woods informing her that the check was “short,” because the payment was

based on the $72,109 annual salary for teachers with thirty years of experience and

he had thirty-seven years of teaching experience, meaning his annual salary should

be $80,309.

Application for Writ of Certiorari

On July 8, 2021, Yates filed a handwritten small claims petition against the

District in the Harris County Justice Court, Precinct 1, Place 1. Under the “Cause

of Action” section of his petition, Yates wrote, “Please see Attachment!” The

attachment states in its entirety:

1
The District attached to its plea to the jurisdiction an affidavit from Lisa McManus,
the District’s Compensation Coordinator 2, in which McManus states that during
the 2019-2020 school year, the District “determined a teacher’s salary based on the
teacher’s ‘creditable’ years of prior teaching service, which were determined by,
among other things, the teacher’s official service records from the educational
institutions where the teacher previously worked.” According to McManus,
teachers could submit a “Report of Teaching Experience” form or submit original
copies of service records from previous institutions that include the required
information.

3
My name is Fernando Yates. I am a former employee of the HISD. I
was a math teacher from the 2019-2020 school year. I filed a
discrimination EEOC lawsuit against HISD. They agreed to mediate
before the EEOC and avoid further litigation. I have thirty seven years
of experience. The HISD paid me for only twenty nine years of
experience. I have been asking them to pay me according to my years
of experience, but they refused to pay me several times.

Yates requested $10,000 in damages. On August 24, 2023, the Justice Court issued

a post-answer default judgment against the District after the District failed to appear

for trial.

On November 21, 2023, the District filed an application for writ of certiorari

with the Harris County Civil Court at Law No. 2 arguing (1) the court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction because Yates had not identified any specific claims for which

the District’s immunity had been waived, and (2) the District’s failure to appear for

trial was not due to inexcusable neglect. On this last point, the District argued the

trial notice had been mailed to a District attorney who no longer worked for the

District, and no one in the District’s legal services department received the trial

setting notice or was aware of the trial setting. According to the District, it did not

learn of the trial setting until October 23, 2023, when the District first received a

letter from Harris County, Precinct 1, stating that a writ of execution had been issued

against the District in connection with the Yates’ lawsuit. The District attached an

affidavit from Woods attesting to these facts in support of its application.

4
Yates filed a response in which he argued that Woods’ statement that “no one

in HISD’s Legal Services office received the trial setting notice” was false because

the notice was addressed to the District. He further argued that Woods’ statement

that the District had first learned of the Justice Court’s default judgment on October

23, 2023 was also false because Yates had emailed the District’s superintendent on

August 30, 2023 referencing the default judgment and demanding payment of

$10,000. The County Court granted the District’s application.

Plea to the Jurisdiction

Subsequently, the District filed a plea to the jurisdiction in which it argued

that Yates had not identified any law or statute allegedly violated by the District that

would waive its governmental immunity. In the alternative, it argued Yates had not

plead jurisdictional facts showing he could meet any element of relief under any

applicable law or statute.2 The County Court granted the District’s plea to the

jurisdiction and dismissed Yates’ claims against the District. This appeal ensued.

After Yates filed his notice of appeal, the District moved for attorneys’ fees

in County Court pursuant to Section 11.161 of the Texas Education Code and

2
Governmental units, including school districts, are immune from suit unless the state
consents. See Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex.
2018). Immunity from suit may be asserted through a plea to the jurisdiction or
other procedural vehicle such as a motion for summary judgment, and the plea may
challenge the sufficiency of the pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts, or
both. See id.

5
Chapter 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.3 The trial court granted

the motion and awarded the District $20,869.35 in attorneys’ fees.4

Discussion

Citing to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1, the District argues that

Yates’ appellate issues are waived due to inadequate briefing. The District argues

that Yates’ brief fails to cite to any relevant legal authorities or the appellate record

and he “relies on his Table of Contents to provide the Court with his entire legal

analysis.” In his reply brief, Yates argues that he “perfected his appeal under the

Texas Rules of Appellant Procedure,” his “appeal supports his contentions,” and the

District “continue[s] reciting cases not related to the truth of this case.”

A. Standard of Review

The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require an appellant’s brief to

contain, among other things, “a clear and concise argument for the contentions made,

with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).

When an appellate issue is unsupported by argument or lacks citation to the record

3
See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 11.161(a) (authorizing recovery of attorneys’ fees in civil
suit brought under state law against independent school district if court finds suit
“frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation” and the suit is “dismissed or
judgment is for the defendant”); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 10.001,
10.003(c), and 10.004(a), (c)(3) (authorizing award of attorneys’ fees as sanctions
against party for filing frivolous pleadings and motions).
4
The trial court granted the District’s motion for attorneys’ fees on July 31, 2024,
and Yates filed his opening appellate brief on August 5, 2024.

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or legal authority, nothing is presented for review. See Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal

Hosp., 462 S.W.3d 496, 500 (Tex. 2015) (“Failure to provide citations or argument

and analysis as to an appellate issue may waive it.”); Walker v. Eubanks, 667 S.W.3d

402, 408 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.) (holding issue waived for

review because appellant’s brief lacked “substantive argument, record references, or

relevant citation to legal authority” with respect to that issue). Appellate courts are

not responsible “for identifying possible trial court error, searching the record for

facts favorable to [the appellant’s] position, or conducting legal research to support

[the appellant’s] contentions.” Walker, 667 S.W.3d at 407. Were they to do so,

courts would be abandoning their role as neutral adjudicators and taking on the role

of advocate for the appellant. Id. at 408 (citing Valadez v. Avitia, 238 S.W.3d 843,

845 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.)); see also Canton-Carter v. Baylor Coll. of

Medicine, 271 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.)

(“It would be inappropriate for this court to speculate as to what appellant may have

intended to raise as an error by the trial court on appeal. To do so would force this

court to stray from our role as a neutral adjudicator and become an advocate for

appellant.”).

Appellate courts liberally construe a pro se litigant’s brief to reach his

appellate issues on the merits when possible. See Harrison v. Reiner, 607 S.W.3d

450, 457 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied). Nevertheless, pro se

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litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with

applicable rules of procedure. Id.; Morris v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 360

S.W.3d 32, 36 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (“To apply a different

set of rules to pro se litigants would be to give them an unfair advantage over litigants

represented by counsel.”).

Appellate courts, however, “should hesitate to resolve cases based on

procedural defects and instead endeavor to resolve cases on the merits.” Bertucci v.

Watkins, 709 S.W.3d 534, 541–42 (Tex. 2025) (quoting Lion Copolymer Holdings,

LLC v. Lion Polymers, LLC, 614 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. 2020); Dudley Constr., Ltd.

v. Act Pipe & Supply, Inc., 545 S.W.3d 532, 538 (Tex. 2018) (“Whenever possible,

we reject form-over-substance requirements that favor procedural machinations over

reaching the merits of a case.”).

B. Yates’ Appellate Briefing

The “Argument” section of Yates’ opening brief contains one sentence

referring to the “Argument” section of the table of contents:

The Table of Contents states in its entirety:

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a. The trial Court relied on “perjured sworn testimony” in granting
the writ of Certiorari, and improperly evaluated evidence under
the traditional writ of Certiorari standard.

b. The trial Court erred by ignoring relevant evidence of the
Plaintiff, this error changed the ultimate outcome of the case, and
the case require that the case be reversed or remanded.

c. The trial Court improperly granted the writ of Certiorari, the
evidence clearly shows that the Court relied on perjured sworn
evidence.

And in the “Opening Statement” portion of his opening brief, Yates states:

An attorney cannot win a case based on perjured sworn evidence. On
Page 3, lines 19, 20, 21 and page 4 lines 1, 2. Defendant’s attorney
stated: Ms. Sloan had resigned from HISD when the Justice Court
issued the notice and no one in HISD’s Legal Services received the trial
notice. As a result, no one in HISD’s Legal Services office was aware
of the August 24. 2023 trial setting and no one from HISD’s Legal
Services office attended the trial. (EXHIBIT 1)

PLAINTIFF STATEMENT: Nothing could be further from the truth.
The Notice of Trial Setting was sent to the Houston Independent School
District 4400 West 18th St. Houston TX 77092 also. The Notice of Trial
Setting from the Justice Court Harris County, Precinct 1, Place 1 clearly
prove it. (Exhibit A) Exhibit 1, 2

The “Statement of Facts” and “Statement of the Case” portions of Yates’ brief state

that Yates began working for the District as a math teacher in 2019 and he “provided

the proper documentation of his previous experience since the beginning of the

school year 2019-2020.” According to Yates, he “submitted [proof] of at least thirty-

seven years of experience, and [the District] only paid him for twenty each years of

experience, in retaliation for [Yates] filing an EEOC complaint against [the

District],” and he filed a small claims lawsuit against the District in the justice court
9
that resulted in a post-answer default judgment against the District. In his conclusion

and prayer, Yates “prays for this Court to reverse the trial Court granting [the

District’s] petition for writ of Certiorari and let the post answer default judgement

by the Justice Court stand.”

The brief does not contain any relevant legal authority or citations to the

appellate record. Although the table of authorities lists four state court opinions

from California, none of these opinions involve pleas to the jurisdiction or

applications for writs of certiorari and they are not cited to elsewhere in the brief.5

Instead of citing to the appellate record, Yates cites to the three “exhibits” attached

to his brief: (1) a copy of the District’s application for writ of certiorari that includes

handwritten notes identifying the portions of the application Yates argues are false,

(2) a notice of trial setting addressed to the District with handwritten notes stating,

“This is proof HISD received the notice of trial setting,” and (3) the notice of default

judgment sent to the District.

5
See Gallin v. Poulou, 140 Cal. App. 2d 638, 639–40, 295 P.2d 958, 958–59 (1956)
(suit by tenant against landlord for trespass); Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co. 187 Cal.
App. 3d 1463, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct. App. 1986) (appeal from grant of summary
judgment on claims of trespass, invasion of privacy, and infliction of emotional
distress); Williams v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 159 Cal. App. 2d 527, 528, 323 P.2d
1046, 1047 (1958) (appeal from judgment rendered after jury trial in action for
trespass); Williams v. Wraxall, 33 Cal. App. 4th 120, 129, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 658
(1995) (appeal from summary adjudication of claims for fraud and deceit,
suppression of information, malpractice, and conspiracy).

10
In his reply brief, Yates clarifies that the “perjured” statement he referred to

in his opening brief is Woods’ statement in her affidavit that no one in the District’s

legal services department received the Justice Court’s trial setting notice or was

aware of the August 24, 2023 trial setting and the evidence the trial court failed to

consider is the notice of trial setting sent to the District that he attached to his

appellate brief as Exhibit 2.6 He also responds to the District’s appellate arguments

regarding the plea to the jurisdiction and argues for the first time that the trial court

erred by awarding the District its attorneys’ fees. Yates attached two new exhibits

to his reply brief for which he did not provide record cites. He provides a record cite

for the District’s plea to the jurisdiction, which the District had attached to its motion

for attorneys’ fees. (“Supplemental Court Record, Exhibit 1”). There are multiple

citations to the appellate briefing and other “exhibits” (e.g., “Brief of Appellant

Exhibit 4”).

Despite the significant deficiencies in Yates’ appellate briefs, to the extent

possible and without abandoning our role as a neutral adjudicator and becoming

Yates’ legal advocate, we address the merits of Yates’ challenge to the trial court’s

orders granting the District’s application for writ of certiorari and plea to the

jurisdiction and awarding attorneys’ fees. See Salazar v. Sanders, 440 S.W.3d 863,

6
Exhibit 2 was not attached to Yates’ response to the District’s plea to the
jurisdiction.

11
872 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, pet. denied) (“Appellate courts are required to

construe briefs reasonably, yet liberally, so that the right to appellate review is not

lost by waiver, and in so doing, we should reach the merits of an appeal whenever

reasonably possible. At the same time, an appellate court should not make the

appellant’s argument for him because the court would be abandoning its role as a

neutral adjudicator and would become an advocate for the appellant.”) (internal

citation omitted).

Application for Writ of Certiorari

Liberally construing Yates’ briefing, we understand Yates to argue that the

trial court erred by granting the District’s application for writ of certiorari based on

the evidence submitted by the District because Woods committed “perjury” when

she claimed in her affidavit that no one in the District’s legal services department

received notice of the trial setting. Yates also argues the trial court erred by

“ignoring” the notice of trial setting addressed to the District, which according to

Yates, “clearly shows that [the District] was notified by the Justice Court for the

August 24, 2023, Notice of Trial Setting.”

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 506.4 authorizes a party to “apply to the county

court for a writ of certiorari” after the entry of a final judgment in a case tried in

justice court when “the justice court [lacked] jurisdiction” or “the final determination

of the suit worked an injustice to the applicant that was not caused by the applicant’s

12
own inexcusable neglect.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.4(a), (b). When reviewing an order

disposing of an application for a writ of certiorari, “we take the facts alleged in the

application as true and, on this basis, make a de novo determination of the adequacy

of the stated grounds.” See Centro Jurici de Instituto Tecnologico y Estudios

Superiores de Monterrey v. Intertravel, Inc., 2 S.W.3d 446, 450 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 1999, no pet.) (citing Am. Bankers’ Ins. Co. v. Flowers, 64 S.W.2d 806, 807

(Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1933, no writ).

The District argued that it was entitled to a writ of certiorari because (1) the

justice court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in that Yates failed to identify any

specific claims for which the District’s immunity had been waived and (2) the

District’s failure to appear for trial was not due to inexcusable neglect because no

one in the District’s legal department received notice or was aware of the August 14,

2023 trial setting. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.4(a), (b). The District’s general counsel,

Catosha Woods, stated in her affidavit submitted in support of the application that

the attorney who filed the District’s answer in the Justice Court “had resigned from

[the District] when the Justice Court issued the notice and no one in [the District’s]

Legal Services office received the trial setting notice. As a result, no one in [the

District’s] Legal Services office was aware of the August 24, 2023, trial setting, and

no one from [the District’s] Legal Services office attended the trial.” Taking Woods’

sworn statements as true, as we must, we conclude the District submitted sufficient

13
evidence establishing that entry of the challenged default judgment “worked an

injustice to [the District] that was not caused by the [District’s] own inexcusable

neglect.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 506.4(b)(2); Flowers, 64 S.W.2d at 807 (“The allegation

in the application of plaintiff in error for the writ of certiorari to the effect that it was

never cited and never appeared in the case in the justice court, taken alone, was a

showing of sufficient cause for the writ, since no court has jurisdiction to enter

judgment against a party not before it.”).

Although Yates argues that the County Court erred because the August 24,

2023 trial notice addressed to the District contradicts Woods’ statement that no one

in the District’s legal department had notice of the trial setting, the notice was not

attached to Yates’ response to the application for writ of certiorari. And there is no

indication that the notice was before the County Court when the court granted the

District’s application.

We thus overrule Yates’ challenge to the trial court’s order granting the

District’s application for writ of certiorari.

Plea to the Jurisdiction

In his reply brief, Yates argues for the first time that the trial court erred in

granting the District’s plea to the jurisdiction. “An issue raised for the first time in

a reply brief is ordinarily waived and need not be considered by this Court.”

McAlester Fuel Co. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 257 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. App.—Houston

14
[1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); Bich Ngoc Nguyen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 404 S.W.3d

770, 781 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (“[A]n appellant may not include in

a reply brief a new issue in response to some matter pointed out in the appellee’s

brief but not raised in the appellant’s opening brief.”) (citations omitted).

Even if Yates had raised the issue in this opening brief and even if we could

get past the significant briefing deficiencies in his appellate brief, he would not

prevail. Governmental units, including school districts, are immune from suit unless

the state consents. See Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755,

770 (Tex. 2018). Immunity from suit may be asserted through a plea to the

jurisdiction and “may challenge the pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts,

or both.” See id. When the jurisdictional plea challenges the pleadings, we must

determine if the pleader has alleged facts affirmatively demonstrating subject-matter

jurisdiction. Id.; Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226

(Tex. 2004). In doing so, we construe the pleadings liberally, taking them as true,

and we consider the plaintiff’s intent. Id. Only if the pleadings affirmatively negate

jurisdiction should the plea to the jurisdiction be granted without affording the

plaintiff an opportunity to replead. Id. at 226–27. We review rulings on

jurisdictional pleas de novo. Clark, 544 S.W.3d at 805; Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at

228.

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The District argues the trial court did not err in granting its plea to the

jurisdiction because Yates failed to identify any waiver of the District’s

governmental immunity or plead jurisdictional facts establishing he could meet any

element of relief under any applicable law or statute. In neither his response to the

District’s plea to the jurisdiction nor his appellate briefing does Yates identify any

authority or legal grounds he contends waive the District’s immunity from suit,

much less argue that he pled facts sufficient to establish the District waived its

immunity. Yates, who does not meaningfully address the District’s immunity from

suit in his appellate briefing, does not appear to dispute that he did not plead a basis

demonstrating a waiver of immunity.7

We thus overrule Yates’ challenge to the court’s order granting the District’s

plea to the jurisdiction.

Attorneys’ Fees

In his reply brief, Yates argues for the first time that the trial court erred in

awarding the District its attorneys’ fees. According to Yates, “It would be an

injustice to ask Yates to pay attorney fees, when the attorney used perjured evidence

7
Yates did not ask the trial court to allow him an opportunity to amend his pleadings
to cure any defects, nor does he argue on appeal that the trial court erred by not
allowing him an opportunity to amend his pleadings. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a);
Gray v. City of Galveston, No. 14–03–00298–CV, 2003 WL 22908145, at *2 (Tex.
App.–Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 11, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[A]ppellant did not
request an opportunity to amend in the trial court, so she has waived any complaint
that she has been denied this opportunity.”).

16
and the trial Court erred by ignoring relevant evidence. That order will prejudice

Yates, and his family.”

An issue raised for the first time in a reply brief is ordinarily waived. See

McAlester Fuel Co., 257 S.W.3d at 737. In addition, Yates does not identify the

legal basis on which his challenge for the award of attorneys’ fees is based.8 While

he argues there was “perjured” and “ignored” evidence, those references concern the

affidavit from Woods and the notice of trial setting relevant to the trial court’s ruling

on the District’s application for writ of certiorari. Yates does not identify any

evidence offered in support of the District’s motion for attorneys’ fees which he

challenges on appeal. He also fails to cite to any legal authority or provide a

substantive analysis of the legal issues raised by his challenge to the award of fees.

See Walker, 667 S.W.3d at 408 (holding issue waived for review because appellant’s

brief lacked “substantive argument, record references, or relevant citation to legal

authority” with respect to that issue); see also Velasquez v. Waste Connections, Inc.,

169 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.) (“Because Velasquez’s

8
It appears from the record that the District moved for attorneys’ fees pursuant to
Section 11.161 of the Texas Education Code and Chapter 10 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code. See TEX. EDUC. CODE § 11.161(a) (authorizing
recovery of attorneys’ fees in “civil suit . . . brought under state law . . . against an
independent school district . . . if: (1) the court . . . finds that the suit . . . is frivolous,
unreasonable, and without foundation; and (2) the suit . . . is dismissed or judgment
is for the defendant”); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 10.001(2),10.002(a)
(authorizing award of attorneys’ fees as sanctions against party for filing frivolous
pleadings and motions).

17
argument does not contain a single reference to a relevant case or legal principle, the

issues are not adequately briefed and are considered waived.”) (citing TEX. R. APP.

P. 38.1(i)). Given these substantial briefing deficiencies, it is not possible for the

court to address the merits of Yates’ argument without making argument on his

behalf and abandoning our role as a neutral adjudicator. Indeed, the grounds upon

which the District moved for its attorneys’ fees and the bases on which Yates appeals

are impossible to discern from Yates’ reply brief alone.9 Compare Oramas v. Univ.

of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston, No. 01-24-00399-CV, 2025 WL 2446013, at *2

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 26, 2025, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (declining to

find briefing waiver when pro se appellant “laid out her position clearly, and she has

done so in a way that allows us to reach the legal arguments with no serious

difficulty”).

We conclude that Yates waived this issue due to inadequate briefing. See

Walker, 667 S.W.3d at 408; Velasquez, 169 S.W.3d at 436.

We overrule Yates’ challenge to the award of attorneys’ fees.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Veronica Rivas-Molloy
Justice

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Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Gunn, and Caughey.

19