D.T. and M.B.M.V A/K/A M.V, Children v. Department of Family and Protective Services

Opinion issued November 6, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-25-00394-CV
———————————
IN THE INTEREST OF D.T. AND M.B.M.V. A/K/A M.V., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 313th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2024-01052J

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services sought to terminate

the parental rights of C.V. (Mother) to her daughters D.T. (Diedra) and M.B.M.V.

a/k/a M.V. (Michelle).1 After a bench trial, the trial court found by clear and

1
In this opinion, we use pseudonyms for the minor children and their family members
to protect their privacy. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2). We use the same pseudonyms
for the children that the parties use in their appellate briefs.
convincing evidence that five statutory predicate grounds supported termination of

Mother’s parental rights, and it further found that termination was in the children’s

best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (J), (N), (O), (b)(2). The

trial court signed a final decree terminating Mother’s parental rights to Diedra and

Michelle and appointing the Department as the children’s sole managing

conservator.

In two issues, Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the

evidence to support the trial court’s findings that termination is warranted under

subsections (D) and (E) and its finding that termination of her parental rights is in

the children’s best interest.

We affirm.

Background

A. The Events Leading to this Termination Proceeding

Mother has ten children, seven of whom are adults and three of whom are

minors. Diedra and Michelle, the two children involved in this case, are Mother’s

two youngest children. Diedra was born in 2014 and was eleven years old at the time

of trial. Michelle was born in 2017 and was seven years old at the time of trial.

Although Mother has guardianship over one of her adult children, none of her minor

children currently live with her. The Department had been involved with eight of

2
Mother’s children over the years, but no court had ever terminated her parental

rights.

The Department first became involved with Mother and her family in 2006.

Three of Mother’s children under the age of four were the subjects of this first

referral. The referral reported that Mother did not work, the electricity had been off

at the home for approximately two weeks, concerns existed that the children were

not being fed, the children were “always dirty,” and the children were not dressed

appropriately for cold weather. The removal affidavit for the underlying case, which

the trial court admitted into evidence at trial, reflected that the Department could not

resolve the first referral involving Mother because the family had moved.

Over the next sixteen years, the Department received multiple referrals

concerning Mother’s family. These referrals included allegations that Mother

intentionally tried to hit a police vehicle with her car while her children were in the

car; Mother inappropriately disciplined two of the children; Mother was not

adequately protecting a child from injury; Mother was acting “bizarre” and violent

toward her boyfriend; one of the children “looked dirty” following a medical

procedure; a child might have been locked inside a car overnight; Mother had been

3
using methamphetamine and selling marijuana; and the family residence was filthy

and lacked usable toilets.2

In January 2024, the Department received a referral that ultimately led to the

filing of this proceeding:

On January 17, 2024, [the Department] received a report that [Michelle]
(age 6) is still in diapers for an unknown medical condition. Mother,
[C.V.], has been observed drinking and doing drugs like cocaine,
crystal methamphetamines, and marijuana. There are cars that come
and go to [Mother] all the time and [Mother] gives them stuff that is
suspected to be drugs. Both children, [Michelle] and [Diedra], are
running around without supervision in the dark even at 2:00am. Both
children ride their scooters right on the street with cars coming and
going. The children do not attend school. [Mother] is staying in a tent
and shed of an abandoned home. The owner lets her rent the back side
shed. The shed has no working utilities or running water. There is no
way for the family to stay warm and there is no electricity. There is
trash everywhere and some aluminum thing. [Michelle] takes some
type of medicine and doesn’t eat much. [Michelle] is very skinny. Both
children have dirty hair, wear the same clothes for 2 weeks at a time,
and look like they haven’t bathed in a long time. Both children come
asking neighbors for food and to bathe. Both children say that there is
no food in their home. [Mother] gets SSI benefits for both children and
food stamps but [it is] unclear what she does with it.

The Department began investigating. The day after the referral, an investigator met

Mother and the children, who were living in a “travel trailer” on the property. The

house on the property was locked and abandoned.

2
The Department “ruled out” most of the referrals, but it found “reason to believe”
two referrals: (1) the allegations that Mother tried to strike a law enforcement
vehicle with her car while her children were in the car, and (2) the allegations that
one of Mother’s children was locked in a car overnight.
4
Two months later, in March 2024, the investigator again met with Mother and

the children. Mother informed the investigator that they had a room at a motel, and

the “owner of the motel has been letting them stay there and [Mother] pays as she

can.” Mother anticipated receiving an income tax refund, and she hoped to find more

permanent housing. Approximately one month later, Mother and the children “were

at the property still gathering more of their belongings in order to get out everything

by the deadline provided by the landlord.” The Department required Mother to

complete a drug test on this date, which Mother did. Mother tested positive for

amphetamines and methamphetamine.

The Department received a second referral in April 2024:

On April 13, 2024, the Department received a report that [Mother]
contacted 911 and said someone was stalking her. She was located by
officers in the car with both of her children and a dog. The children
looked dirty and when asked, the children said they had not eaten.
[Mother] stated that they could not go home because “people are doing
stuff over there.” [Mother] also stated the home has no water. [Mother]
was not making sense when asked about who was stalking her and she
also claimed that the police had been shooting at her. She seemed
paranoid, delusional and was possibly having some type of mental
health episode. She was convinced to allow the children to go stay with
their maternal grandmother and they were dropped off there. [Mother]
stated she wanted to check herself into a hospital and said she was going
to but it is unknow[n] if she actually did.

A different Department investigator responded to this referral and, over the next few

days, spoke with Mother, her mother, a neighbor, and the children.

5
During this investigation, the Department learned that Diedra and Michelle

were not enrolled in school. Mother’s mother informed the investigator that the

children could not stay with her because her apartment had flooded. The investigator

had difficulty finding a good address for Mother. Using information from an old

case, the investigator spoke with a neighbor who relayed that Mother had lived

across the street, but she had been “kicked out today due to her not taking care of the

property.”

The investigator located Mother after receiving information that Mother “was

living in tents behind a business.” When the investigator found Mother, Diedra was

with her and Michelle was with another person at the encampment. Diedra was

“covered in dirt” and had insect bite marks on her legs. The encampment had no

running water or electricity. Mother’s mental state was “concerning” because she

“was unable to focus on the questions being asked and she continued to ramble about

things that did not make sense or had to do with the conversation.” Mother requested

that the children not stay at the encampment with her, and Mother’s sister agreed to

take the children for a couple of days.

The following day, the investigator again spoke with Mother, who reported

that Diedra had ADHD and Michelle “was born without a vagina or anus and was

6
taken to a lab where they had to make her a vagina and anus.” 3 She also informed

the investigator that she had three other minor children who did not live with her.

She stated that she was self-employed and “collects scrap for money.” Mother

acknowledged drug use in the past, specifically crack cocaine, but denied any current

drug use aside from taking Adderall for ADHD. She denied having any mental health

conditions, stating that she had been incorrectly diagnosed with schizophrenia.

Mother told the investigator “about someone trying to follow her and steal her

information” and that “there are crooked police officers that are out to get her.” The

investigator attempted to contact the children’s father, but she “was informed that

pre-Covid he was reported [as] a missing person because he just kind of vanished”

and no one had heard from him.

The Department then initiated this termination proceeding. It sought

termination of Mother’s parental rights to Diedra and Michelle on several statutory

predicate grounds, including subsections (D), (E), (J), (N), (O), and (P).

Two months after filing suit, the Department created a family plan of service

for Mother. According to the service plan, ten-year-old Diedra was healthy with no

3
After the children were removed from Mother’s care, Michelle was taken to the
hospital for a health screening. Her medical records reflected that she had a “past
medical history of imperforate anus status post [surgical] repair.” Michelle also had
an “innocent” heart murmur. She was “medically cleared” for discharge by hospital
staff, and the Department was directed to follow up with Michelle’s primary care
physician.
7
physical disabilities, but she “will be retained to the 4th grade due to how far behind

she is in school.” Six-year-old Michelle had received reconstructive surgery on her

anus, which was successful, but she still had lingering problems with incontinence.

She had unspecified developmental delays but would begin first grade in the next

school year.

With respect to Mother, the service plan identified two primary areas of

concern: her substance use (which included two prior convictions for possession of

a controlled substance) and her inability to maintain stable housing. The service plan

required Mother to maintain employment and “a safe and stable home for her

children, free of drugs, abuse, neglect, and anything that would pose a danger of

abuse or neglect to the children.” The service plan also required Mother to complete

a substance abuse assessment and complete drug testing when requested by the

Department. The plan mentioned that Mother “has a history of mental health

instability,” including paranoia and delusions, and required her to undergo

psychosocial, psychiatric, and psychological evaluations plus begin counseling.

Finally, the service plan required Mother to complete parenting classes, specifically

classes that “address age-appropriate behaviors, developmental stages, and child

nutrition.”

8
B. The Trial Evidence

A bench trial occurred before the associate judge. The documentary evidence

included the removal affidavit; a January 2025 complaint from Harris County

charging Mother with possession of between 4 and 200 grams of methamphetamine;

a March 2025 “Bond Condition Violation Report” stating that Mother had violated

a condition of her pretrial release by testing positive for amphetamines and

methamphetamine; a March 2025 report from Child Advocates recommending that

the trial court terminate Mother’s parental rights; a March 2025 permanency report

completed by the Department that described the children’s progress in their foster

placement; and Michelle’s hospital records from April 2024.

Three witnesses testified at the bench trial: the Department caseworker,

Mother, and the Child Advocates representative. The caseworker testified that at the

time the children were removed from Mother’s care, the family home was

“unlivable,” the girls “were ungroomed and unkept,” and they had been living in

“bugs and other infestations,” including lice, for “a long period of time.” The

caseworker agreed that the children “were essentially living in squalor,” with no

electricity or running water, and they often roamed around without supervision, even

in the early morning hours. At the time of removal, neither of the girls knew the

alphabet or the names of colors.

9
Diedra was “doing well” in the foster placement. Although the Department

had some unspecified “concerns regarding her medical,”4 she was developmentally

“on target.” Diedra had learned to read and had made great progress academically

with some extra help from her foster mother.5 She participated in swimming and

other extracurricular activities. She also attended therapy sessions and had become

“more open and more communicative since being placed.” The caseworker agreed

that Diedra was “thriving” in the foster placement.

Michelle had “more extensive” medical complications than Diedra which

affected her daily living. Specifically, she continued to have incontinence problems

which affected her ability to take swimming lessons with Diedra. The Department

had recommended that Michelle see a gastroenterologist for a possible additional

surgery, but Mother had not provided information about Michelle’s prior medical

4
The caseworker later testified that Diedra had a problem with bed-wetting, and she
indicated that Diedra, like Michelle, had had surgery before entering the
Department’s care. It is unclear from the testimony whether the bed-wetting was the
“concern regarding [Diedra’s] medical” that the caseworker had alluded to in her
earlier testimony, but the Department’s permanency report and the Child Advocates
report both stated that Diedra had this issue.
5
The Child Advocates representative testified that Diedra receives some special
academic accommodations, including extra time on assignments. She had not yet
caught up on the grades she had missed, but she had no identified intellectual or
academic disabilities. Her school’s “understanding is she is capable of completing
the work, it’s just that she’s kind of catching up to it.”
10
history. Aside from her ongoing medical concerns, Michelle was “doing very well”

and she had good grades.6

During questioning by the children’s ad litem attorney, the caseworker

elaborated on the girls’ progress in therapy. When they first began therapy sessions,

they were both “very timid and shy,” they did not speak much, and they did not make

much eye contact. The girls “were not very socialized.” By the time of trial, they

were talking and expressing themselves in full sentences. The Department’s

concerns about their socialization “ha[d] been decreasing.”

The caseworker testified that Mother had not been involved with the

Department during the pendency of the case. Her whereabouts had been unknown,

and Mother had only recently spoken with the caseworker. The caseworker had

difficulty establishing regular communication with Mother. The caseworker later

learned that Mother was incarcerated on a drug-related charge. Mother had not

completed any of the tasks required in her service plan, nor had she regularly visited

with the children.

The Department believed that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in

Diedra and Michelle’s best interest. Its goal was for the girls’ current foster

6
The Child Advocates representative testified that Michelle was writing and
“attempting to spell sight words.”
11
placement to adopt them. Diedra and Michelle had been in that placement for almost

a full year.

Mother testified about Michelle’s medical needs and care. She stated that

Michelle had had eleven doctors, but “[i]t wasn’t like normal doctors. It was medical

science.” On questioning from the trial court, Mother agreed that “medical science

doctors” was “sort of a group of doctors” that had helped Michelle. Her

understanding of Michelle’s medical condition was that she was “the first baby in

50,000 years that was born without an identity,” meaning no genitals, urethra, or

anus. Michelle needed specialized treatment immediately after her birth, and she

stayed in the hospital for around four months. Mother received special training on

how to care for Michelle “[w]ith the medical science people in the hospital.” She

testified that she took Michelle to all her medical appointments.

Mother acknowledged that she was presently incarcerated and that she tested

positive for methamphetamine, which led to revocation of her bond. She testified

that she should be released from jail later in the month “when [she] go[es] to court,”

and she had a possible place to live following her release: a trailer home owned by

a friend.7 She agreed that her criminal history dated back to 1997, when she had a

conviction for possession of crack cocaine. Between 1998 and 2005, Mother

7
Mother testified that one of her adult children—a son she had guardianship over due
to a disability—lived at this address, and Diedra and Michelle would be able to live
there as well.
12
received an unlawful carrying of a weapon charge, three possession of crack cocaine

charges, and two theft charges. She had a federal conviction in 2010 for conspiracy

to transport undocumented persons within the United States, and she served around

two years in custody for that offense. She also had two recent charges for possession

of methamphetamine: one in 2022 and one in 2025, which was the pending charge

at the time of the termination trial. Mother testified that she regularly used

prescription drugs while the children were in her care, and she had “always used”

methamphetamine “because it’s [her] prescription.”

Mother did not agree that she had not cooperated with the Department. She

testified that she had called her caseworkers and inquired about services, but she did

not have any money. She also testified that she had completed a parenting class, but

she did not provide any information about this class. She further testified that it was

not correct that the girls had never been enrolled in school: they had attended a

school in Matamoros, Mexico around 2022. The children did not attend school in

Houston because Mother “had fear for their life.” Specifically, she was afraid of the

Houston Police Department because a police officer shot at her in front of the

children five years earlier after she “stole something from them.”

The trial court questioned Mother about whether she had ever been under the

care of a psychiatrist. Mother stated that she had in 1999 in connection with one of

her criminal cases, and she also completed a therapeutic program for addiction at

13
that time. She also had a psychiatric evaluation done during a prior conservatorship

case involving three of her older children. The evaluator recommended medication,

specifically, “[a] lot of medications that I wasn’t really going to be able to focus.

Medication I couldn’t talk or wake up.” She took eight or nine medications,

including Zoloft, Haldol, and Risperdal. She was still taking some medication at the

time of trial, including Trazodone, Gabapentin, and Risperdal. She did not know

what conditions those medications were used to treat.

Mother acknowledged that she had not seen the girls since May or June 2024,8

but she requested that the trial court maintain her parental rights. She wanted to be

reunited with Diedra and Michelle upon her release from incarceration, and she

believed she could “offer them a better mom, a better me, progress in life.” She

intended for them to attend trauma classes together. She also testified that she could

take care of Michelle’s medical needs. Mother testified that she received disability

benefits, and she also had been employed as recently as the month before trial,

working at an auto body shop.

The Child Advocates representative recommended termination of Mother’s

parental rights. She had witnessed one visit between Mother and the children in June

2024, and Mother was “engaged and attentive,” and they enjoyed each other’s

8
Mother testified that she tried to visit the girls four times at the Department offices
at times when a caseworker told her to visit, but the girls were not present.
14
company. The children had not seen Mother since that visit. The representative

visited the girls monthly, and the girls stopped asking about Mother around

September 2024. The girls did not ask about any of their older siblings, and the

representative was not sure if the girls knew about their siblings. The girls’ foster

mother wished for them to remain in her home and was open to adopting them.

The trial court ultimately found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother

had violated five statutory predicate grounds for termination and that termination of

her parental rights was in Diedra and Michelle’s best interest.9 See id. The court

appointed the Department as the girls’ sole managing conservator. This appeal

followed.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Mother raises two issues on appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence

to support the trial court’s termination findings. She first argues that the Department

presented legally and factually insufficient evidence to support the endangerment

findings under subsections (D) and (E). She then argues that the Department did not

present legally and factually sufficient evidence that termination of her parental

rights was in Diedra and Michelle’s best interest.

9
The trial court’s final decree also terminated the parental rights of the children’s
alleged biological father, Mother’s legal husband (who was not the children’s
biological father), and an “unknown” alleged father. Only Mother appealed from
the trial court’s final decree.
15
A. Standard of Review

To terminate a parent’s rights to her minor children, the factfinder must find

by clear and convincing evidence that (1) at least one statutory predicate ground for

termination exists, and (2) termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the

children. In re C.E., 687 S.W.3d 304, 308 (Tex. 2024) (per curiam). Clear and

convincing evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind

of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought

to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007.

When conducting a legal sufficiency review of termination findings, we

consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine

whether a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction about

the truth of the Department’s allegations. In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 276 (Tex.

2024); In re C.E., 687 S.W.3d at 308 (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex.

2002)). The factfinder resolves conflicts in the testimony, weighs evidence, and

draws reasonable inferences from the evidence that it chooses to believe. In re C.E.,

687 S.W.3d at 308–09; see In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021) (stating

that factfinder is “sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor,” and

therefore we must defer to factfinder’s factual determinations) (quotation omitted).

We must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if

a reasonable factfinder could do so, but we should disregard all evidence that a

16
reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible. In re

C.E., 687 S.W.3d at 308 (quotations omitted). We may not substitute our judgment

for that of the factfinder. Id. at 309.

When conducting a factual sufficiency review, we weigh disputed evidence

contrary to the finding against all evidence favoring the finding. In re A.C., 560

S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We must determine whether the disputed evidence is

such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved it in favor of the finding.

Id. Evidence is factually insufficient if, in light of the entire record, the disputed

evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved in favor of the finding

is so significant that the factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction

that the finding was true. Id.

B. Endangerment Findings

Only one statutory predicate ground and a best interest finding are necessary

to support a judgment for termination of parental rights. In re M.P., 639 S.W.3d 700,

702 (Tex. 2022) (per curiam). But termination based on subsections (D) and (E) can

form the basis to terminate a parent’s rights to another child. TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 161.001(b)(1)(M); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 234 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam).

Even if sufficient evidence supports another predicate ground, we must review

findings under subsections (D) and (E) when challenged by a parent. In re N.G., 577

S.W.3d at 235 (stating that appellate court’s failure to review challenged findings

17
under subsections (D) and (E) “deprives the parent of a meaningful appeal and

eliminates the parent’s only chance for review of a finding that will be binding as to

parental rights to other children”).

Here, the trial court found that Mother violated five statutory predicate

grounds: subsections (D), (E), (J), (N), and (O). On appeal, Mother concedes that

sufficient evidence exists to support all five findings, but she nevertheless challenges

the findings under subsections (D) and (E) due to the implications relating to her

rights to her other minor child. We review the evidence concerning the subsection

(D) and (E) findings and agree with Mother that sufficient evidence supports both

findings. We therefore need not address the trial court’s findings under subsections

(J), (N), and (O). See In re M.P., 639 S.W.3d at 702.

A trial court may terminate a parent’s rights under subsection (D) if it finds

by clear and convincing evidence that the parent knowingly placed or knowingly

allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the

physical or emotional well-being of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D).

Subsection (E) authorizes termination if the court finds by clear and convincing

evidence that the parent engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with

persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-

being of the child. Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).

18
As used in subsections (D) and (E), “endanger” means to expose a child to

loss or injury or to jeopardize the child. In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 277 (quoting

Tex. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)); In re J.W.,

645 S.W.3d 726, 748 (Tex. 2022) (quotation omitted). Endanger means more than a

“threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a less-than-ideal family

environment,” but a parent’s conduct can be endangering even if it is not directed at

the child and the child does not suffer injury. In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 277

(quotation omitted). The factfinder may infer endangerment from a course of

conduct that presents substantial risks to the child’s physical or emotional well-

being. Id.; In re C.E., 687 S.W.3d at 310.

Subsection (D) focuses on the child’s environment. In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at

749. Relevant considerations include the suitability of the child’s living conditions

and the conduct of the parent or others in the home. Id.; see In re R.R., 711 S.W.3d

126, 139 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, no pet.) (“[I]nappropriate, abusive,

or unlawful conduct by a parent or other persons who live in the children’s home

can create an environment that endangers the physical and emotional well-being of

children as required for termination under subsection (D).”) Typically, the relevant

time frame for evaluating subsection (D) is before the child’s removal from the

home. In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 749. A single act or omission may support

termination under this subsection. In re R.R., 711 S.W.3d at 139.

19
Termination under subsection (E) requires more than a single act or omission;

instead, this subsection requires a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of

conduct by the parent. Id. We may consider the parent’s actions before the child’s

birth “while the parent had custody of older children.” In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336,

345 (Tex. 2009). We may also consider conduct that occurred after the Department

removed the child from the parent’s care. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).

“[A] pattern of parental behavior that presents a substantial risk of harm to the

child permits a factfinder to reasonably find endangerment.” In re R.R.A., 687

S.W.3d at 278. This behavior can include substance abuse and its effect on a parent’s

life and ability to parent. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345. Although we should not

evaluate evidence of drug use in isolation, “a pattern of drug use accompanied by

circumstances that indicate related dangers to the child can establish a substantial

risk of harm.” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278.

A parent’s criminal history may also support a finding of endangerment. In re

J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 313. Incarceration, standing alone, does not constitute

conduct that endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being, but it may support

an endangerment finding “if the evidence, including the imprisonment, shows a

course of conduct which has the effect of endangering the physical or emotional

well-being of the child.” Id. at 312–13 (quotation omitted).

20
Here, the Department presented evidence that supported the trial court’s

findings that Mother placed the children in circumstances or surroundings that

endangered their well-being and that Mother engaged in conduct that endangered

their well-being. The evidence before the trial court included the removal affidavit

that the Department completed when it filed its original petition seeking termination

of Mother’s rights. This affidavit detailed the referrals that led to the Department’s

involvement with Mother, Diedra, and Michelle, as well as the investigation that

occurred after receipt of the referrals. The removal affidavit reported that Mother did

not have stable housing but was instead living in a tent in an encampment at the time

the children were removed from her care. The tent was infested with bugs and lice,

and both children were dirty. The encampment did not have electricity or running

water.

Mother acknowledged that her criminal history and her history with substance

abuse dated back to the 1990s. She had several drug-related criminal charges and

convictions, including a pending charge for possession of methamphetamine that

had not been resolved at the time of the termination trial. She agreed that her “drug

of choice” was crack cocaine when she was younger, but in recent years she tended

to use methamphetamine. She claimed that she had a prescription to use this drug.

Mother agreed that she used methamphetamine during the pendency of this case and

her criminal case, which led to revocation of her bond and her incarceration at the

21
time of trial. The Department had been involved with eight of Mother’s ten children,

and none of her minor children lived with her.

It is further undisputed that neither Diedra nor Michelle—who were ten and

six years old, respectively, at the time of removal—were enrolled in school. The

girls did not know the alphabet, and they had difficulty naming numbers and colors.

The removal affidavit also reported that the girls roamed around unsupervised, even

at nighttime.

In light of this evidence, Mother acknowledges that “there is no non-frivolous

argument to challenge the court’s finding that the evidence is legally and factually

sufficient to support the endangerment findings pursuant to subsections (D) and (E).”

We agree that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction

that Mother knowingly placed or allowed the children to remain in conditions or

surroundings that endangered their physical and emotional well-being and that

Mother engaged in conduct that endangered the children’s physical or emotional

well-being. We hold that legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial

court’s findings under subsections (D) and (E).

We overrule Mother’s first issue.

C. Best Interest Finding

In addition to proving at least one predicate ground for termination, the

Department must also prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of

22
the parent’s rights is in the children’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(2).

A “strong presumption” exists that keeping the children with a parent serves the best

interests of the children. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).

But this presumption is not absolute. A presumption also exists that “the prompt and

permanent placement of the child[ren] in a safe environment” is in the children’s

best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(a).

This inquiry is “child-centered and focuses on the child’s well-being, safety,

and development.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 746 (quotation omitted). We consider

several non-exclusive factors in determining whether termination is in a child’s best

interest, including:

(1) the desires of the child;
(2) the child’s emotional and physical needs now and in the future;
(3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the
future;
(4) the parenting abilities of the individuals seeking custody;
(5) the programs available to assist those individuals to promote the
child’s best interest;
(6) the plans for the child by those individuals or by the agency
seeking custody;
(7) the stability of the home or proposed placement;
(8) the parent’s acts or omissions that may indicate the existing
parent-child relationship is improper; and
(9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions.

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Id. (citing Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976)). We may also

consider the statutory factors set out in Family Code section 263.307, which the

court should consider “in determining whether the child’s parents are willing and

able to provide the child with a safe environment.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b)

(listing thirteen factors including “child’s age and physical and mental

vulnerabilities” and “willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive

environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time”); In re A.C.,

560 S.W.3d at 631 n.29.

Proving acts or omissions related to a predicate ground for termination does

not relieve the Department of its burden to prove that termination is in the child’s

best interest, “but the same evidence may be probative of both” inquiries. In re A.C.,

560 S.W.3d at 631–32. The Department is not required to prove all the Holley factors

as a condition precedent to termination of a parent’s rights. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d

17, 27 (Tex. 2002); In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 822 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (stating that Holley factors “are not exhaustive, no one factor is

controlling, and a single factor may be adequate to support a finding that termination

of the parent-child relationship is in a child’s best interest on a particular record”).

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Neither Diedra nor Michelle testified at trial, so there was no direct evidence

about their desires.10 The Child Advocates report included a note that the

representative attended a visitation with the girls and Mother in June 2024, Mother

was “engaged and attentive,” and everyone appeared excited and like they enjoyed

each other’s company. Mother did not visit the children after that visit, and by

September 2024, the children no longer asked about Mother.

As discussed above, the children were living in filthy conditions at the time

of their removal. They were not enrolled in school, they did not know the alphabet

or colors, and the Department had concerns about their socialization levels. Michelle

had a medical condition that had required significant care when she was younger,

and although she had had reconstructive surgery, she still struggled with

incontinence and frequently wore diapers or Pull-Ups. A possibility existed that

Michelle might need an additional surgery, but the Department and Michelle’s foster

mother had been unable to explore this avenue because Mother had not provided all

Michelle’s medical records.

Following their removal from Mother’s care, both girls had engaged in

therapy, and their communication skills had markedly improved. Both girls were

10
During closing arguments, the trial court asked the children’s attorney ad litem
whether he had discussed termination of Mother’s parental rights with the children.
Counsel stated that the children “don’t ask about their mother at all,” they are
“happy where they are,” they “want to remain there,” they “love this foster mother,”
and they “love the house that they’re in.”
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“able to speak in full sentences and express themselves,” and the Department’s

concerns about their socialization had decreased. They had also made substantial

progress academically. Although Diedra had not yet caught up to where she should

be for her age level, she had made progress, and she did not have any intellectual or

learning disabilities. The understanding of her school officials was “she is capable

of completing the work, it’s just that she’s kind of catching up to it.”

Michelle had continuing difficulties with incontinence, which made it difficult

for her to participate in swimming lessons with Diedra. But it did not affect her

ability to go to school. She participated in class and had good grades. She had learned

colors, she was “attempting to spell sight words,” and she was learning to write.

As we have already discussed, Mother had a lengthy history with substance

abuse, the criminal justice system, and the Department. Eight of Mother’s ten

children had been involved with the Department. She acknowledged using

methamphetamine as recently as two months before trial, and she had a pending

criminal charge for methamphetamine possession. Although Mother believed that

she would be released from incarceration later that month, that was speculative, and

there was no indication of how that pending case might be resolved. She testified

that upon her release, she planned to live in a trailer on a friend’s property with the

girls and one of her adult sons, but there was no evidence of when she would be

released.

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Mother testified that she completed a parenting class, but there was no

evidence that she completed any of the other requirements of her service plan. The

service plan identified Mother’s ongoing substance abuse as an area of concern, and

it required her to complete a substance abuse assessment and counseling. The record

contains no evidence that Mother did so or that she had recently participated in

substance abuse treatment. Mother acknowledged that she participated in such a

program in 1999 in connection with a criminal case, but it is undisputed that Mother

has continued to use illegal drugs. Mother also testified that she received training

related to Michelle’s care after her reconstructive surgery, but there is no evidence

that Mother has received any training on any current medical issues either child

might have or training related to their educational and therapeutic needs.

The removal affidavit contained several references to bizarre behavior on

Mother’s part, including a statement by a Department investigator that Mother “was

unable to focus on the questions being asked and she continued to ramble about

things that did not make sense or had to do with the conversation.” As an additional

example, Mother testified that she did not enroll the children in school because she

was afraid of HPD. She explained that HPD officers shot at her five years before

trial, while her daughters were present, because she had stolen something from the

officers. She acknowledged that she had been under psychiatric care in the past and

that she took numerous psychoactive medications. The Department, concerned about

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Mother’s mental state, required her to undergo a psychosocial, psychiatric, and

psychological evaluation and participate in individual counseling. The record

contains no evidence that Mother completed these service plan requirements.

In arguing that the Department did not prove that termination of her rights was

in the children’s best interest, Mother focuses on the fact that the children were not

placed in an adoptive home. Instead, the foster parents were “undecided” about

whether they wanted to adopt the children, and the Child Advocates representative

believed it was worthwhile to look into a relative placement for the children.

Evidence about the Department’s placement plans and adoption are relevant

to best interest. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. But “the lack of evidence about

definitive plans for permanent placement and adoption” is not a dispositive factor in

the inquiry. Id. “[O]therwise, determinations regarding best interest would regularly

be subject to reversal on the sole ground that an adoptive family has yet to be

located.” Id.

The Child Advocates representative testified that the children’s foster mother

was considering adoption and was “open” to that possibility. Even if she did not

adopt, the foster mother “wants the children to remain in her home” on a permanent

basis. The children were “thriving” in this placement, and the placement was

acceptable to the Department. The trial court therefore heard evidence that although

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adoption plans were not definitive, the foster mother wanted the children to remain

in her home, which would give them permanence and stability.

We conclude that “the lack of evidence about definitive plans for permanent

placement and adoption” of the children does not outweigh the evidence that

terminating Mother’s parental rights is in Diedra and Michelle’s best interest. See id.

Mother loves her children and desires to be reunited with them. But she has a lengthy

history of substance abuse, and there is no evidence that she has engaged in services

or programs to treat that substance abuse. At the time of trial, she also had a pending

felony drug charge and had not demonstrated an ability to maintain stable living

conditions. Although Diedra and Michelle are not very young children, Michelle has

ongoing medical needs, and both girls require therapy and effort to ensure that their

educational and socialization progress continues. The trial court could have

concluded from the evidence before it that Mother could not provide the stability

that the girls needed.

Considering all the evidence, including disputed evidence that a reasonable

factfinder could not have credited in favor of its best interest finding, we conclude

that the trial court reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that

termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Diedra and Michelle’s best interest.

We hold that legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s best

interest finding.

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We overrule Mother’s second issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s decree terminating Mother’s parental rights to

Diedra and Michelle.

David Gunn
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Gunn, and Caughey.

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