In Re: The State of Texas, Ex Rel. Bill D. Hicks

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
NO. WR-95,092-01

IN RE STATE OF TEXAS EX REL. BILL D. HICKS, Relator

ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
AND PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
IN CAUSE NO. 20020D00230
IN THE 327TH CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT
EL PASO COUNTY

Per curiam. NEWELL, J., filed a concurring and dissenting opinion in which
WALKER, J., joined.

OPINION

Before us are (1) the State’s Motion for Leave to File a Petition for Writ of

Mandamus and (2) the accompanying Petition. Because this case involves a death

sentence, it was proper for the State to file the motion and petition in this Court. Cf.

Padilla v. McDaniel, 122 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

Real-Party-in-Interest David Renteria was convicted of capital murder and

sentenced to death in September 2003. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the judgment

of guilt but reversed Renteria’s death sentence and remanded the case for a new
IN RE STATE OF TEXAS EX REL. BILL D. HICKS—2

punishment hearing. Renteria v. State, 206 S.W.3d 689, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In

May 2008, following a second punishment hearing, Renteria was again sentenced to

death. On direct appeal from this resentencing, this Court affirmed Renteria’s death

sentence. Renteria v. State, No. AP-74,829, slip op. at 100 (Tex. Crim. App. May 4,

2011) (not designated for publication). Mandate issued on September 26, 2011.

Meanwhile, Renteria filed multiple postconviction habeas applications under

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.071. He filed his first 11.071 application,

challenging his initial conviction and sentence, in August 2006. He then filed his second

and third 11.071 applications, following his resentencing, in August 2014.

This Court disposed of all of Renteria’s 11.071 applications on the same date:

December 17, 2014. On the first application, we denied the claims challenging the

judgment of guilt and dismissed as moot the claims challenging Renteria’s death

sentence. Ex parte Renteria, No. WR-65,627-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 17, 2014) (not

designated for publication). On the second application, we denied the claims challenging

Renteria’s death sentence. Ex parte Renteria, No. WR-65,627-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec.

17, 2014) (not designated for publication). Finally, we dismissed Renteria’s third 11.071

application as an abuse of the writ for failing to satisfy Article 11.071, Section 5. Ex

parte Renteria, No. WR-65,627-03 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 17, 2014). As of the date of

this opinion, Renteria has not filed a fourth 11.071 application.
IN RE STATE OF TEXAS EX REL. BILL D. HICKS—3

On July 6, 2023, 1 Respondent, Judge Monique Velarde Reyes of the 327th District

Court of El Paso County, Texas, entered an order (Execution Order) scheduling

Renteria’s execution for November 16. On July 10, in compliance with the Execution

Order, the District Clerk of El Paso County issued a warrant for Renteria’s execution.

On July 12, Renteria filed in the district court a “Motion to Reconsider the Court’s

Execution Order and Request for a Hearing” (italics in original) (Motion to Reconsider).

In brief, the Motion to Reconsider argued that Renteria was entitled to “reasonable notice

and an adversarial process” before Respondent set an execution date. Initially,

Respondent took no action on Renteria’s Motion to Reconsider. On August 14, Renteria

filed in the district court a “Motion to Compel Access to District Attorney’s File”

(Motion to Compel). In brief, the Motion to Compel urged Respondent to order the El

Paso County District Attorney “to provide Mr. Renteria’s counsel access to all files

related to Mr. Renteria’s capital murder case.” In support, the Motion to Compel invoked

Article 39.14(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and the Due Process and Equal

Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Respondent ultimately held a hearing on Renteria’s motions. The State opposed the

motions, but at the hearing’s conclusion, Respondent indicated she would grant them. To

that effect, Respondent issued two orders.

1
Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent dates in this opinion refer to the year 2023.
IN RE STATE OF TEXAS EX REL. BILL D. HICKS—4

In an order dated August 28, Respondent commanded the State to “make available

for inspection and copying all files and materials in its possession, custody, or control

that is listed in Section (a) of Article 39.14,” giving the State ten days to comply. Then, in

an order dated August 29, Respondent (1) gave the State twenty days to “make its files

available to Defendant’s counsel for inspection and copying subject to such claims of

work-product or other privilege as the State substantiates in a privilege log”; (2)

purported to “VACATE[]” the Execution Order; and (3) and directed “[t]he Clerk”

(presumably, the District Clerk of El Paso County) to “withdraw the warrant for

Defendant’s execution.” For ease of use, we will refer to items (2) and (3) of

Respondent’s August 29 order as the “Withdrawal Orders,” and we will refer to

Respondent’s August 28 order and item (1) of Respondent’s August 29 order as the

“Discovery Orders.”

Relator Bill D. Hicks, the District Attorney for El Paso County, promptly brought

this mandamus action challenging the Withdrawal and Discovery Orders. 2 First, Relator

claims that the Withdrawal Orders conflict with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure

Article 43.141, see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 43.141(d) (specifying when a convicting

court can “modify or withdraw the order of the court setting a date for execution”), and

this Court’s application of the same. Second, Relator claims that the Discovery Orders

are unlawful because (A) a district court has no jurisdiction to consider discovery

2
Relator also brought a “Motion for Emergency Stay of Proceedings … in order to
suspend compliance with these orders.” We granted the State’s Motion for Emergency Stay on
September 8. Consequently, that motion is no longer before us.
IN RE STATE OF TEXAS EX REL. BILL D. HICKS—5

requests under these circumstances and (B) Respondent had no authority under Texas law

to grant them.

Leave to file is granted. On the portion of Relator’s mandamus petition

challenging the Withdrawal Orders, relief is granted. With no Article 11.071 or Chapter

64 pleadings before her, Respondent had no authority to vacate the Execution Order or

order the District Clerk to withdraw the execution warrant. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

art. 43.141(d); In re State of Texas ex rel. Risinger, No. WR-84,212-01 (Tex. Crim. App.

Nov. 18, 2015) (not designated for publication); In re Roach, No. WR-41,168-08 (Tex.

Crim. App. Jun. 17, 2008) (not designated for publication).

Relief is also granted on the portion of Relator’s mandamus petition challenging

the Discovery Orders. It is well settled that a trial court must derive its jurisdiction from

either the Texas Constitution or legislative enactments. See, e.g., Staley v. State, 420

S.W.3d 785, 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). When a conviction has been affirmed on

appeal and mandate has issued, general jurisdiction is not restored in the trial court. Id. A

trial court can obtain postconviction jurisdiction over a matter statutorily—for example,

to set an execution date, conduct DNA testing, or determine whether an inmate is

competent to be executed. Id. But the statutes bestowing jurisdiction over these matters

also define the scope of that jurisdiction. Id. And even when a trial court has jurisdiction

over a matter, it may lack authority to take a certain action. Id.

By the time Respondent issued the Discovery Orders, Renteria’s conviction and

sentence had been affirmed on direct appeal, and this Court’s mandate had issued.

Therefore, the trial court did not have general jurisdiction over Renteria’s case. Further,
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all of Renteria’s prior 11.071 applications had been disposed of, and Respondent had no

11.071 or Chapter 64 pleadings before her. Therefore, the trial court did not have

jurisdiction stemming from postconviction habeas proceedings or proceedings relating to

forensic DNA testing.

Respondent’s August 28 order mentions Article 39.14(a), and specifically, the

“Michael Morton Act.” See Acts 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., Ch. 49 (S.B. 1611) (Michael

Morton Act), §§ 1, 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2014. But the Michael Morton Act’s saving clause states

that “[t]he change in law made by this Act applies to the prosecution of an offense

committed on or after the effective date of this Act”—January 1, 2014. See id. §§ 3, 4. In

Renteria’s case, the offense was committed in November 2001. Further, even if some

portions of Article 39.14 apply to Renteria’s case at this stage, we have never construed

Article 39.14(a) to give district courts continuing jurisdiction to entertain discovery

requests in the absence of an active case or pleading. Indeed, on its face, Article 39.14(a)

presupposes some “action.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 39.14(a) (referring to

“evidence material to any matter involved in the action”) (emphasis added).

Respondent’s August 29 order suggests that, in Respondent’s view, issuing the

Discovery Orders was necessary to safeguard Renteria’s Fourteenth Amendment rights to

equal protection and due process. But the Fourteenth Amendment is a source of

individual rights, not a source of state-court jurisdiction. See, e.g., Staley, 420 S.W.3d at

795 (“A trial court must derive its jurisdiction from either the Texas Constitution or

legislative enactments.”) (emphasis added); State v. Holloway, 360 S.W.3d 480, 485

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (same). Without a pleading before her invoking a legitimate
IN RE STATE OF TEXAS EX REL. BILL D. HICKS—7

source of district-court jurisdiction, Respondent had no freewheeling jurisdiction to seek

to safeguard Renteria’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Ultimately, our review of the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions

persuades us that, when Respondent issued the Discovery Orders, the only jurisdiction

the trial court might have had over matters pertaining to Renteria’s pending execution is

that bestowed by Article 43.141—to “modify or withdraw” the execution date. But, as

mentioned, Article 43.141 itself defines the scope of that jurisdiction. And that statute

expressly states that a trial court may modify or withdraw an execution date if the court

determines that additional proceedings are necessary on a “filed” 11.071 application or a

“submitted” Chapter 64 motion. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 43.141(d). Neither such

pleading was before Respondent when she issued the Discovery Orders. That being the

case, Article 43.141 did not give the trial court general jurisdiction over matters

pertaining to Renteria’s pending execution. At most, it gave the court jurisdiction to

entertain Renteria’s motion to reconsider the execution date. By issuing a discovery order

in a matter over which she had no jurisdiction, Respondent violated a ministerial duty.

See In re Medina, 475 S.W.3d 291, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (“If a trial judge lacks

authority or jurisdiction to take particular action, the judge has a ministerial duty to

refrain from taking that action, to reject or overrule requests that he take such action, and

to undo the action if he has already taken it.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

State v. Patrick, 86 S.W.3d 592, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (plurality op.) (“Without

jurisdiction, the trial court has no power to act.”).
IN RE STATE OF TEXAS EX REL. BILL D. HICKS—8

Accordingly, Respondent shall immediately rescind the portion of her August 29

order purporting to “VACATE[]” her earlier Execution Order and directing “[t]he Clerk”

to withdraw the execution warrant. Respondent shall also immediately rescind the

portions of her August 28 and 29 orders commanding the State to make its files available

to Renteria’s counsel.

Delivered: September 18, 2023
Do Not Publish