RODRIGUEZ, ERIK v. the State of Texas

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS

NOS. PD-0377-24 & PD-0378-24

THE STATE OF TEXAS

v.

ERIK RODRIGUEZ, Appellee

ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
FROM THE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS
BEXAR COUNTY

FINLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion.

CONCURRING OPINION

This is a plain view case. Law enforcement seized Appellee’s cell phone,

which led to his prosecution for child pornography. The trial court suppressed

the evidence obtained from law enforcement’s subsequent search of the phone.

On appeal, the court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its
RODRIGUEZ CONCURRENCE — 2

discretion in its ruling. In doing so, the court of appeals erred twice. First, by

applying the wrong standard of review. Second, in the conclusion it reached. I

agree with the Court’s decision to reverse the court of appeals. However, I

disagree with the Court’s reasoning. Consequently, I respectfully concur.

I. Analysis

a. Motions to Suppress

I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the court of appeals applied the

wrong standard of review. Maj. Op. at 5. A trial court’s ruling on a motion to

suppress is reviewed for abuse of discretion standard. Villarreal v. State, 935

S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). While we afford “almost total

deference” to a trial court’s ruling on “application of law to fact questions”—

also known as “mixed questions of law and fact”—when resolving those

questions turns on the evaluation of credibility and demeanor, Guzman v.

State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997), we review de novo those

questions that do not, id. Here, because resolving the trial court’s ruling does

not turn on questions of credibility and demeanor, the court of appeals should

have applied de novo review. The Court concludes the same and, therefore,

reaches the correct conclusion on the threshold issue regarding the appropriate

standard of review in this case.
RODRIGUEZ CONCURRENCE — 3

b. Plain View Doctrine

However, the Court errs in its plain view analysis. The question is not

whether Detective Jackson “only needed probable cause to associate Appellee’s

personal cell phone with criminal activity,” Maj. Op. at 7; the proper question

is whether the “incriminating nature” of the cell phone in Appellee’s hand was

“immediately apparent” when Detective Jackson made contact with him,

Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990) (quoting Coolidge v. New

Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971)). It was.

At the time Detective Jackson seized the cell phone, she knew the

following information: (1) there was only one personal cell phone number listed

in San Antonio Police Department’s records for Appellee; (2) that cell phone

number received text messages and CashApp transactions from Gonzalez; (3)

the text messages and corresponding payments reflected that Appellee had

sent Gonzalez confidential information in exchange for payment; (4) Appellee

was holding a cell phone in his hand when he encountered Detective Jackson,

at his police station, while he was on the way to morning roll call.

The court of appeals’ opinion, in essence, would require Detective

Jackson to know that the phone Appellee had on him was the same phone he

used to communicate with Gonzalez. This level of certainty is not required for

probable cause. Detective Jackson knew that Appellee’s phone would likely
RODRIGUEZ CONCURRENCE — 4

contain incriminating information—in the form of text messages and

payments—and she encountered him at his police station, on the way to roll

call, with a phone in his hand. A person “of reasonable caution” in Detective

Jackson’s position would believe that the phone Appellee was holding

contained incriminating information. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983).

On this record, Detective Jackson had sufficient probable cause to meet the

“nondemanding” requirements of the plain view doctrine. Foreman v. State,

613 S.W.3d 160, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). Accordingly, Detective Jackson’s

seizure of the cell phone was lawful.

II. Conclusion

Applying the proper de novo standard of review, the incriminating

nature of Appellee’s cell phone was “immediately apparent” at the time of its

seizure. I agree with the Court’s judgment to reverse the court of appeals and

remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. I do not join the

Court’s reasoning. Therefore, I respectfully concur.

Filed: May 14, 2025
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