Public Utility Commission of Texas v. Rwe Renewables Americas, LLC and Tx Hereford Wind, LLC

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 23-0555
══════════

Public Utility Commission of Texas,
Petitioner,

v.

RWE Renewables Americas, LLC and TX Hereford Wind, LLC,
Respondents

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued March 19, 2024

JUSTICE LEHRMANN delivered the opinion of the Court.

In response to Winter Storm Uri, the Legislature amended the
Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) to provide that protocols adopted
by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, or ERCOT, do not take effect
before they are approved by the Public Utility Commission. ERCOT
then adopted, and the PUC approved, a revision to its protocols
effectively setting the price of electricity at the regulatory maximum
under Energy Emergency Alert Level 3 conditions—the highest level of
emergency that can be declared—even if the standard price-setting
formula yields a different price. Pursuant to PURA’s mechanism for
seeking judicial review of the validity of “competition rules adopted by
the commission [PUC],” TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.001(e), two market
participants initiated a challenge to the PUC’s approval order directly
in the Third Court of Appeals. That court held the order was both
substantively invalid—because the PUC exceeded its statutory
authority by setting the price of electricity—and procedurally invalid—
because the PUC failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure
Act’s rulemaking procedures in issuing the order.
We first consider whether, in light of the amendments to PURA
requiring PUC approval of ERCOT protocols, the approval order
constitutes a “competition rule[] adopted by the commission.” Id. If it
does not, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over the proceeding for
judicial review of the order. If it does, we must then evaluate whether
the court of appeals correctly determined that the order is both
procedurally and substantively invalid.
We hold that the PUC’s approval order is not a “competition rule[]
adopted by the commission” subject to the judicial-review process for
PUC rules. PURA envisions a separate process for ERCOT-adopted
protocols, and the statutory requirement that the PUC approve those
adopted protocols does not transform PUC approval orders into PUC
rules eligible for direct review by a court of appeals. The Third Court of
Appeals therefore lacked jurisdiction over this proceeding. Accordingly,

2
we vacate the court of appeals’ judgment and dismiss the case for lack
of jurisdiction. 1

I
A

PURA Section 39.151 requires the PUC to “certify an independent
organization”—here, ERCOT—“to perform the functions prescribed by
[that] section.” Id. § 39.151(c). 2 Four such functions are listed,
including “ensur[ing] the reliability and adequacy of the regional electric
network” and “ensur[ing] that electricity production and delivery are
accurately accounted for among the generators and wholesale buyers
and sellers in the region.” Id. § 39.151(a)(2), (4). 3 PUC regulations
likewise demand that the “protocols and other rules” adopted by ERCOT
“promote economic efficiency in the production and consumption of
electricity; support wholesale and retail competition; support the

1 In our contemporaneously issued opinion in Public Utility Commission

v. Luminant Energy Co., we hold that the PUC did not exceed its authority in
issuing two emergency orders during Winter Storm Uri that operated to a
similar end by temporarily setting the price of electricity at the regulatory
ceiling. ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (Tex. June 14, 2024) (No. 22-0231).
2 A more detailed explanation of the Texas electricity market appears

in this Court’s opinion in Luminant. See id. at ___. We also recently engaged
in a thorough discussion of ERCOT’s history, and its role in the Texas
electricity market, in CPS Energy v. ERCOT, 671 S.W.3d 605, 611–12 (Tex.
2023).
3 The others are “ensur[ing] access to the transmission and distribution

systems for all buyers and sellers of electricity on nondiscriminatory terms”
and “ensur[ing] that information relating to a customer’s choice of retail
electric provider is conveyed in a timely manner to the persons who need that
information.” TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(a)(1), (3).

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reliability of electric service; and reflect the physical realities of the
ERCOT electric system.” 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.501(a).
ERCOT “is directly responsible and accountable to the
commission,” which “has complete authority to oversee and investigate
[ERCOT’s] finances, budget, and operations as necessary to ensure
[ERCOT]’s accountability and to ensure that [ERCOT] adequately
performs [its] functions and duties.” TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(d). If
ERCOT “does not adequately perform [its] functions or duties or does
not comply with this section,” the PUC may take “appropriate action,”
including decertification. Id.
ERCOT possesses rulemaking authority delegated to it by the
PUC, as authorized by PURA. See id. § 39.151(d), (g-6); 16 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 25.362(c). The “Nodal Protocols” developed and implemented by
ERCOT “provide the framework for the administration of the Texas
electricity market.” Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Constellation Energy
Commodities Grp., Inc., 351 S.W.3d 588, 594–95 (Tex. App.—Austin
2011, pet. denied). Even before recent PURA amendments, ERCOT’s
protocols were “subject to commission oversight and review.” See Act of
May 30, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 797, § 9, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 2728,
2729–30 (codified at TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(d)) (amended 2021, 2023)
(current version at TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(g-6)).
ERCOT is uniquely positioned to manage the electricity market
by virtue of its technical expertise, and ERCOT utilizes a variety of
resources and systems to manage grid conditions. For example, ERCOT
typically relies on a computer system that employs a mathematical
formula to send price-based signals to energy generators regarding

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whether additional power is needed. Luminant, ___ S.W.3d at ___. The
PUC has specifically delegated to ERCOT the task of developing
protocols for how that mathematical formula calculates energy pricing
in times of energy shortage, or “scarcity pricing.” Id.; 16 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 25.509(b).

B

In February 2021, Winter Storm Uri incapacitated the Texas
electric grid and resulted in an Energy Emergency Alert Level 3
“load-shed” event, meaning ERCOT directed operators of the
transmission system to reduce electricity consumption by involuntarily
disconnecting customers from the grid. During the load-shed event,
ERCOT and the PUC took various additional steps to balance supply
and demand in the market to avoid total grid collapse. One such step
was to supersede the standard price-setting system by administratively
setting the wholesale price of electricity at the regulatory ceiling. In the
storm’s aftermath, ERCOT’s Nodal Protocols were amended to codify the
practice in case future load-shed events necessitated a similar response.
That amendment is the subject of this suit.

C

As noted, even before Uri, ERCOT’s protocols were subject to
commission oversight and review. After the storm, the Legislature
amended PURA to additionally provide that “[r]ules adopted by an
independent organization [i.e., ERCOT] . . . may not take effect before
receiving commission approval.” Act of May 30, 2021, 87th Leg., R.S.,
ch. 425, § 3, 2021 Tex. Gen. Laws 830, 830 (codified at TEX. UTIL. CODE

5
§ 39.151(d)) (amended 2023) (current version at TEX. UTIL. CODE
§ 39.151(g-6)). 4 In accordance with that provision, ERCOT’s board of
directors adopted Nodal Protocol Revision Request (NPRR) 1081, which
would amend Nodal Protocol 6.5.7.3.1, and presented it to the PUC for
approval. The revision would set the price of electricity at the regulatory
ceiling during an emergency load-shed event to reflect scarcity of supply,
regardless of whether the standard price-setting formula yields a
different price. ERCOT reported to the PUC that the revision would
“ensure that Real-Time energy prices reflect the VOLL [Value of Lost
Load] when Load is being shed, which is fundamental to an energy-only
market design in order to provide effective economic signals.” The
proposal was accompanied by a report from ERCOT’s board and an

4 As further amended in 2023, Section 39.151(g-6) currently provides:

In this subsection, a reference to a protocol includes a rule.
Protocols adopted by an independent organization and
enforcement actions taken by the organization under delegated
authority from the commission are subject to commission
oversight and review and may not take effect before receiving
commission approval. To maintain certification as an
independent organization under this section, the organization's
governing body must establish and implement a formal process
for adopting new protocols or revisions to existing protocols. The
process must require that new or revised protocols may not take
effect until the commission approves a market impact statement
describing the new or revised protocols. The commission may
approve, reject, or remand with suggested modifications to the
independent organization’s governing body protocols adopted by
the organization.
Act of May 26, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 464, § 4, 2023 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
(West) 1133 (codified at TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(g-6)).

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impact-analysis report. The PUC ultimately issued an order approving
NPRR 1081.
It is undisputed that load shedding is not driven by market forces
but is instead an important regulatory tool designed to protect the grid
from long-term damage during an emergency. Load shedding
accomplishes this by limiting the amount of demand that may enter the
market so as not to exceed available supply. Of course, when that
happens, demand in the market no longer accurately reflects demand to
enter the market, and additional supply can only be “accurately” priced
by considering the value of replacing that lost load. See Hearing of Sen.
Comm. Bus. & Com., 87th Leg., R.S. (Feb. 25, 2021), 79–80 (discussing
incentives for production at the cap). As supply decreases, the value of
lost load increases until it is effectively at the regulatory cap. Luminant,
___ S.W.3d at ___.

D

On July 30, 2021, respondents RWE Renewables Americas, LLC
and TX Hereford Wind, LLC (collectively, RWE) sought judicial review
of the PUC’s order by the Third Court of Appeals. RWE asserted that
the court of appeals had jurisdiction under PURA Section 39.001(e) and
alleged that the PUC both exceeded its statutory authority under PURA
and failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act in issuing
the order. The PUC responded that the order was not a PUC rule subject
to direct review by the court of appeals or the APA’s rulemaking
requirements, and that the PUC properly issued the order in
furtherance of its statutory authority to oversee ERCOT and ensure the
reliability of the Texas electric grid.

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The court of appeals held that the PUC’s order constituted a
“competition rule adopted by the commission” under Section 39.001(e),
giving the court jurisdiction over the proceedings. 669 S.W.3d 566, 575
(Tex. App.—Austin 2023). The court of appeals then held that the PUC’s
order was invalid because (1) the PUC lacked the authority to approve
NPRR 1081 under PURA and (2) the PUC had failed to substantially
comply with the APA’s rulemaking procedures. Id. at 576–77. 5 We
granted the PUC’s petition for review.

II

We necessarily begin by considering jurisdiction. The PUC
challenges the court of appeals’ subject matter jurisdiction over what is
essentially a direct appeal of the PUC’s order.

A

PURA specifically provides for judicial review of “competition
rules adopted by the commission.” TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.001(e)
(“Judicial review of competition rules adopted by the commission shall
be conducted under [the APA], except as otherwise provided by this
chapter.”). Unlike most suits for judicial review of an agency rule,
review of a PUC competition rule begins in the court of appeals. Id.; see
also id. § 39.001(f) (“A person who challenges the validity of a

5 In support of its first holding, the court relied on its own decision in

Luminant, which we also review today. 669 S.W.3d at 576.

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competition rule must file a notice of appeal with the court of
appeals . . . .”). 6
The PUC argues that its order approving NPRR 1081 is not a rule
at all, much less a “competition rule,” and that PURA thus does not
authorize direct review of the order by the court of appeals. The APA
defines “rule” as “a state agency statement of general applicability” that
“implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy” or “describes the
procedure or practice requirements of a state agency.” TEX. GOV’T CODE
§ 2001.003(6)(A)(i)–(ii). The definition “includes the amendment or
repeal of a prior rule” but “does not include a statement regarding only
the internal management or organization of a state agency and not
affecting private rights or procedures.” Id. § 2001.003(6)(B)–(C).

B

PURA empowers the PUC to “adopt and enforce rules relating to
the reliability of the regional electrical network and accounting for the
production and delivery of electricity among generators and all other
market participants.” TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(d). However, as noted,
it also allows the PUC to “delegate these responsibilities to an
independent organization,” which the PUC has done by delegating
rulemaking authority to ERCOT. Id.; CPS Energy, 671 S.W.3d at 616;
see 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.362(c) (requiring ERCOT to “adopt and
comply with procedures [subject to certain parameters] concerning the

6 When RWE instituted this proceeding, Section 39.001(e) provided for

review in the Third Court of Appeals. In 2023, the Legislature amended
Section 39.001(e) to provide for review by the Fifteenth Court of Appeals going
forward. Act of May 22, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 459, § 1.13, 2023 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. (West) 1119.

9
adoption and revision of ERCOT rules”). ERCOT has utilized this
delegated rulemaking authority to establish operational rules known as
the Nodal Protocols. Under those protocols, generators make offers in
advance on how much electricity they are willing to sell and at what
price. ERCOT, NODAL PROTOCOLS § 4.4.9 (May 1, 2024). 7 ERCOT uses
those prices to match demand to the lowest-price provider. Id. § 4.5.
ERCOT serves as “the central counterparty for all transactions” that it
settles and “is deemed to be the sole buyer to each seller” (typically, an
energy generator) “and the sole seller to each buyer” (typically, a retail
user) “of all energy.” Id. § 1.2(4). Operating as a sort of clearinghouse,
it is ERCOT that generates settlement statements providing the terms
under which market participants must make payments for energy
transactions. Id. §§ 9.2.4(1), 9.5.4(1), 9.5.5.
In accordance with the PUC’s direction, ERCOT has implemented
detailed procedures for adopting and revising its protocols. “A request
to make additions, edits, deletions, revisions, or clarifications to these
Protocols . . . is called a Nodal Protocol Revision Request (NPRR).” Id.
§ 21.1(1) (June 1, 2023). A variety of entities may use the NPRR process,
including market participants, the PUC, the independent market
monitor, and ERCOT itself. Id. § 21.2(1)(a), (c), (f), (g). NPRRs are
posted on ERCOT’s website and reviewed by ERCOT’s Protocol Revision
Subcommittee. Id. §§ 21.4.1(4), 21.3(1). Market participants and other

7 We cite the current version of the protocols unless substantive
differences require citing the version in effect when the relevant events
occurred. ERCOT’s current protocols and a library of past versions of the
protocols, with summaries of revisions, are available on ERCOT’s website.
Protocols - Nodal, https://www.ercot.com/mktrules/nprotocols.

10
entities may comment on an NPRR. Id. § 21.4.4(1). In fact, RWE
participated in this process with respect to NPRR 1081 by submitting
comments in opposition to it. 8
After considering the NPRR, the revision subcommittee may take
one of several actions, including recommending approval of the revision
or rejecting it. Id. § 21.4.4(3). ERCOT then posts a report describing
the subcommittee’s action. Id. § 21.4.4(5). Again, market participants
and others may comment on the subcommittee report. Id. § 21.4.5(1). If
the subcommittee recommends approval, ERCOT prepares an impact
analysis, id. § 21.4.6(1), which is reviewed by the subcommittee, id.
§ 21.4.7(1). The NPRR then moves to the Technical Advisory
Committee, which considers the subcommittee report and the impact
analysis. Id. § 21.4.8(1). If the advisory committee recommends
approval of an NPRR, the committee forwards its report to the ERCOT
board of directors, id. § 21.4.8(5), and the report is also posted online, id.
§ 21.4.8(4). ERCOT’s board then has the opportunity to approve the
NPRR or take other action.
Before PURA was amended to require PUC approval for protocol
revisions to become effective, ERCOT would implement them on the first
day of the month following approval by ERCOT’s board. Id. § 21.6(1)
(Jan. 1, 2021). Now that protocols “may not take effect before receiving
commission approval,” TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(g-6), they are
implemented on the first day of the month following receipt of that

8 RWE, Comment Letter on Nodal Protocol Request 1081 (June 23,
2021), https://www.ercot.com/mktrules/issues/NPRR1081#keydocs.

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approval, ERCOT, NODAL PROTOCOLS §§ 21.4.11(1), 21.6(1) (June 1,
2023).
A market participant, among others, may appeal a decision of the
ERCOT board regarding an NPRR to the PUC. Id. § 21.4.12.3(1). The
PUC’s rules outline the procedure for review of ERCOT protocols.
16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 22.251, 25.362(c)(5). Those rules generally
require that a complainant exhaust the process outlined in Section 21 of
the protocols before challenging the protocol with the PUC. Id.
§ 22.251(c). Exceptions exist when, for example, “the complainant seeks
emergency relief necessary to resolve health or safety issues.” Id.
§ 22.251(c)(1)(C). Generally, the complaint must be filed within
thirty-five days of “the ERCOT conduct complained of.” Id. § 22.251(d);
ERCOT, NODAL PROTOCOLS § 21.4.12.3(1) (June 1, 2023). In response to
the complaint, the PUC may, among other things, provide ERCOT with
“guidance on the development and implementation of protocol revisions”
and order ERCOT “to promptly develop protocol[] revisions for
commission approval.” 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 22.251(o)(3), (4). If the
complainant is dissatisfied with the result of the PUC proceedings, it
can then seek judicial review. TEX. UTIL. CODE § 15.001.
This painstaking procedure serves to leverage the expertise of
ERCOT members and industry stakeholders while maintaining
transparency and affording interested parties plentiful opportunities to
weigh in. Moreover, we recognize that ERCOT and the PUC are
uniquely situated as legislatively endorsed joint participants in a
complex regulatory scheme—each serving its own distinct and essential
purpose. As we recognized in CPS Energy, “ERCOT do[es] not fall neatly

12
into any camp. It is a unique entity serving a role that is not clearly
analogous to a public entity like a police department or a public school.
Yet, it provides an essential governmental service.” 671 S.W.3d at 623
(alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
While the PUC has broad administrative responsibilities, it
simultaneously lacks “the expertise and staff resources” to make
informed regulatory decisions independent of ERCOT. SUNSET
ADVISORY COMM., STAFF REPORT WITH COMMISSION DECISIONS: PUBLIC
UTILITY COMMISSION OF TEXAS, ELECTRIC RELIABILITY COUNCIL OF
TEXAS, OFFICE OF PUBLIC UTILITY COUNSEL 37 (Jan. 2023). 9

C

A substantially similar version of the above-described process for
adopting and revising ERCOT protocols has long been in effect. See
ERCOT, NODAL PROTOCOLS § 21 (Mar. 1, 2005) (rev. Feb. 2010, Apr.
2011, May 2011, Oct. 2011, May 2012, Aug. 2012, Apr. 2013, Dec. 2013,
May 2014, July 2016, Nov. 2016, Nov. 2017, Jan. 2021, Apr. 2023, June
2023). The legislative and regulatory schemes have in turn envisioned
separate, complementary purposes of and procedures for PUC rules and
ERCOT protocols, notwithstanding the fact that ERCOT and its
protocols have consistently been subject to PUC oversight and review.
TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(d). RWE nevertheless suggests that, by
amending PURA to require formal PUC approval of ERCOT-adopted
protocols at the tail end of the process, the Legislature intended to

Available at https://www.ercot.com/files/docs/2023/01/20/PUC-
9

ERCOT-OPUC-Staff-Report-with-Commission-Decisions_1-19-23.pdf).

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overhaul that process entirely and effectively convert ERCOT protocols
into PUC rules subject to the same review procedures. We do not discern
such a sweeping intent from the language the Legislature chose.
For one thing, PURA makes clear that ERCOT, not the PUC, is
the entity “adopting” new or revised ERCOT protocols. See id.
§ 39.151(g-6). The PUC then “approves” the protocols. See id. This
distinction is deceptively significant because the APA’s requirements,
which RWE insists must be satisfied, are exclusively and repeatedly
directed at rules “adopted” by a “state agency.” See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T
CODE § 2001.033(a) (“A state agency order finally adopting a rule must
include: . . . .”). Indeed, the Legislature deliberately uses the term
“adopt” throughout the APA—no reference is made to an agency’s
“approval” of a rule. See, e.g., id. § 2001.004(1) (requiring a state agency
to “adopt rules of practice stating the nature and requirements of all
available formal and informal procedures”). 10 By contrast, the APA uses
the term “approve” to describe the governor’s action on legislation that
allows it to become the law. Id. § 2001.006(a)(2).
PURA reinforces this distinction. For example, in a suit for
judicial review of a competition rule under Section 39.001, the

10 See also TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2001.006 (describing when a rule
“adopted” under Section 2001.006(b) may take effect); id. § 2001.021(a) (“An
interested person by petition to a state agency may request the adoption of a
rule.”); id. § 2001.023(a) (“A state agency shall give at least 30 days’ notice of
its intention to adopt a rule before it adopts the rule.”); id. § 2001.030 (“On
adoption of a rule, a state agency, if requested to do so by an interested person
either before adoption or not later than the 30th day after the date of adoption,
shall issue a concise statement of the principal reasons for and against its
adoption.”).

14
rulemaking record includes “the order adopting the rule.” TEX. UTIL.
CODE § 39.001(e)(4) (emphasis added). The PUC issues no such order
with respect to ERCOT protocols. We cannot ignore the Legislature’s
deliberate decision not to designate the PUC as the entity that “adopts”
ERCOT protocols given the comprehensive statutory use of that term.
RWE and the court of appeals highlight that, under PURA as
amended, an ERCOT protocol does not take effect until it receives PUC
approval. 669 S.W.3d at 574; TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(g-6). True, but
even in requiring PUC approval, the Legislature distinguished between
ERCOT’s role in adopting a protocol and the PUC’s role in approving it.
TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(g-6) (“Protocols adopted by [ERCOT] . . . may
not take effect before receiving commission approval.” (emphasis
added)). Again, the Legislature deliberately employed these terms to
communicate two distinct administrative actions that have distinct legal
consequences. See Galveston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jaco, 331 S.W.3d 182,
185–86 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied)
(highlighting the Legislature’s distinct use of “adopt” and “approve” in
statutes describing the duties of the commissioner of education); TEX.
EDUC. CODE § 7.055(b)(41) (“The commissioner shall adopt rules relating
to extracurricular activities under Section 33.081 and approve or
disapprove University Interscholastic League rules and procedures
under Section 33.083.” (emphases added)).
Finally, we cannot ignore that when the Legislature amended
PURA in 2021 to require PUC approval of the independent
organization’s (ERCOT’s) protocols, it simultaneously added the
requirement that the organization “establish and implement a formal

15
process for adopting new protocols or revisions to existing protocols.”
Act of May 30, 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., ch. 425, § 3, 2021 Tex. Gen. Laws
830, 832 (amended 2023) (codified at TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.151(g-6)). As
discussed above, ERCOT already had such a process in place;
nevertheless, the requirement signals legislative recognition that
ERCOT rulemaking and PUC rulemaking are independent endeavors.
In sum, consistent with the well-established regulatory scheme
and the legislation governing it, we hold that the PUC’s order approving
NPRR 1081 was a ratification decision that simply allowed protocol
revisions, already developed and adopted by ERCOT in accordance with
its own detailed procedures, to take effect. Consequently, the PUC’s
order was not an agency-adopted “rule” under the Administrative
Procedure Act. In turn, because the court of appeals’ jurisdiction under
Utilities Code Section 39.001(e) is limited to review of “competition rules
adopted by the commission,” the court lacked jurisdiction over RWE’s
challenge to the PUC’s approval order. 11

III

Having concluded that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction
over RWE’s appeal of the PUC’s approval order, we need not address
RWE’s remaining arguments. We note, however, that this Court
contemporaneously holds in Luminant that the PUC did not exceed its

11 As noted, PUC regulations provide a process for review of ERCOT

protocols, 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 22.251, 25.362(c)(5), which culminates in a
suit for judicial review in district court, TEX. UTIL. CODE § 15.001. RWE did
not engage in that process, choosing instead to utilize the inapplicable
procedure for reviewing PUC competition rules.

16
authority under PURA in issuing temporary emergency orders that, like
NPRR 1081, set the price of electricity at the regulatory ceiling during a
period of emergency load-shed. ___ S.W.3d at ___.

****

Because the PUC’s order was not a “competition rule adopted by
the commission” under PURA, Section 39.151 did not confer
direct-review jurisdiction on the court of appeals. We therefore vacate
the court of appeals’ judgment and dismiss the suit for lack of
jurisdiction.

Debra H. Lehrmann
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: June 14, 2024

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