In the Estate of Perry Lyn Kopecki, Deceased — Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-26-00646-CV
IN THE ESTATE OF Perry Lyn KOPECKI, Deceased
From the Probate Court No. 2, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2021-PC-0918
Honorable Veronica Vasquez, Judge Presiding
PER CURIAM
Sitting: 	Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
H. Todd McCray, Justice
Velia J. Meza, Justice
Delivered and Filed: October 21, 2026
DISMISSED
In the underlying probate proceeding, Perry Lyn Kopecki died intestate, and Tracy Marie
Thayer Kopecki, Perry’s widow, was appointed independent administrator of his estate. Joshua
Ryan Kopecki, Perry’s son, filed a petition seeking Tracy’s removal as administrator and various
relief concerning alleged estate assets. Joshua later joined Perry’s sister, Paulette Allen, in the suit,
alleging that she participated in concealing or diverting property and interests belonging to Perry’s
estate. The probate court granted Paulette’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss and dismissed Joshua’s
claims against her with prejudice. Joshua appeals that order.
On September 24, 2026, questioning whether the order granting Paulette’s Rule 91a motion
to dismiss was final and appealable, we ordered Joshua to show cause why this appeal should not

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be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In his response, Joshua contends the dismissal order is final
and appealable because it disposes of all claims against Paulette. Alternatively, he requests that we
abate the appeal for thirty days under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.2 to permit him to
seek a severance order.
Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments. De Ayala v. Mackie, 193
S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. 2006); Matter of Estate of Ruiz, No. 04-22-00650-CV, 2023 WL 242735,
at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 18, 2023, no pet.). Probate proceedings are an exception to
the “one final judgment rule” because multiple judgments may be final and appealable when they
dispose of discrete phases of the proceeding. Id. Nevertheless, not every interlocutory order in a
probate case is appealable. Id. Absent a statute authorizing an interlocutory appeal, an order must
dispose of all parties and issues in a particular phase of the probate proceeding to be final and
appealable. Id. In determining whether an order concludes a particular phase, we examine the
pleadings to identify the proceeding of which the order is logically a part. See Riddick v.
Marmolejo, No. 04-13-00157-CV, 2014 WL 953464, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 12,
2014, no pet.).
Joshua argues that the dismissal of all claims against Paulette concludes a distinct
proceeding, relying on In re Estate of Savana, 529 S.W.3d 587, 591 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2017, no pet.). But unlike the separate litigation at issue in Savana, Joshua’s claims against
Paulette are intertwined with his remaining claims against the administrator. His amended petition
alleges that both Paulette and Tracy participated in conduct affecting the ownership and disposition
of estate assets and identifies Paulette as a necessary party to claims seeking a constructive trust,
accounting, and cancellation of an affidavit of heirship. Thus, although the challenged order
disposes of Joshua’s claims against Paulette, it does not resolve the broader dispute concerning

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those assets or conclude the phase of the probate proceeding of which those claims are a part. See
Kostas v. Kostas, No. 14-18-00721-CV, 2021 WL 4957065, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] Oct. 26, 2021, no pet.); Riddick, 2014 WL 953464, at *2–3. Because the order does not
dispose of all parties and issues in that phase, we conclude that it is interlocutory.
We also deny Joshua’s alternative request to abate the appeal. Although Rule 27.2 permits
an appellate court to abate in order to allow a non-final order to be made final, abatement is
discretionary. See T EX. R. APP . P. 27.2; McNally v. Guevara, 52 S.W.3d 195, 196 (Tex. 2001).
Here, Joshua does not seek merely to clarify or correct an otherwise final judgment. Rather, he
requests additional time to pursue a discretionary severance of claims that arise from the same
underlying dispute and remain intertwined with the pending litigation. Under these circumstances,
we decline to abate the appeal to permit Joshua to seek an order creating a separate, appealable
proceeding. See Leniek v. Evolution Well Services, LLC, No. 14-18-00954-CV, 2019 WL 438825,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 2, 2019, no pet.).
Because Joshua has not demonstrated that the challenged order is final or otherwise
appealable, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP . P. 42.3(a).
PER CURIAM