Justin Antoine Richardson v. The State of Texas — Memorandum Opinion by Justice McCray

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-25-00437-CR
Justin Antoine RICHARDSON,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 226th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2024CR008997
Honorable Benjamin Robertson, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: 	H. Todd McCray, Justice
Sitting: 	Irene Rios, Justice
Lori Massey Brissette, Justice
H. Todd McCray, Justice
Delivered and Filed: October 21, 2026
AFFIRMED
A jury convicted appellant Justin Antoine Richardson of burglary of a habitation, and the
trial court sentenced him to twenty years’ imprisonment. In a single issue, Richardson contends
the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that he used the complainant’s credit
card. Richardson argues the evidence constituted inadmissible extraneous offense evidence under
Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b) and that its probative value was substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403. We affirm.

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BACKGROUND
Kayla Mountain, testified that she first encountered Richardson when he approached her
apartment in February of 2024. She continued to see him around her apartment complex over the
next several weeks. Mountain did not know Richardson’s name at the time and she denied ever
living with him, having a romantic relationship with him, or being friends with him. She described
him as a “complete stranger.”
During this time, Mountain discovered that several of her debit and credit cards had been
used without her permission. Many of the unauthorized charges were made at a nearby vape shop.
Mountain contacted the vape shop about the charges. She spoke with an employee at the vape shop
and, based on a physical description, Mountain and the employee believed they were discussing
the same person, but Mountain still did not know the person’s name.
Because she believed someone had been entering her apartment, Mountain installed a
security camera before leaving town in April of 2024. While Mountain was away, the camera
recorded Richardson inside the apartment. When Mountain returned, she discovered that property,
including her television, was missing. After reviewing the surveillance footage, Mountain sent the
footage to the vape shop employee she had previously contacted. The employee identified the
person in the video as Justin Richardson. Mountain then gave Richardson’s name to police.
During his opening statement, defense counsel told the jury that Richardson had lived with
Mountain for two weeks, had previously possessed a key to the apartment, and returned to retrieve
his belongings when he was filmed inside the apartment. Counsel specifically relied on Mountain’s
ability to identify Richardson by name and date of birth when she made a later 911 call, asking the
jury, “How would she know that if he was a stranger to her . . . ? It’s impossible.”

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Before trial testimony began, the trial court addressed Richardson’s Rule 404(b) objection
to the State’s proposed evidence concerning the unauthorized credit card use. The State argued
that the evidence was relevant to establish Richardson’s identity and to explain how Mountain
learned his name. Richardson objected that the evidence was “prejudicial” and “cumulative”
because Mountain had identified Richardson by name and date of birth during the 911 call. The
trial court overruled the objections and instructed the State to “keep a light touch on it.”
ANALYSIS
Standard of Review
In his sole issue, Richardson contends that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence
of unauthorized credit card use over his objection. We review a trial court’s decision to admit or
exclude evidence under Rules 404(b) and 403 for an abuse of discretion. Perkins v. State, 664
S.W.3d 209, 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). We will not reverse a trial court’s decision to admit or
exclude such evidence unless that decision lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. De
La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Montgomery v. State, 810
S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Furthermore, we must uphold an evidentiary ruling if it
is correct under any theory of law supported by the record and applicable to the case. De La Paz,
279 S.W.3d at 344.
A. Rule 404(b) Objection
Rule 404(b) prohibits evidence of an extraneous offense when offered solely to prove a
defendant’s character and prove that he acted in conformity with that character. TEX. R. EVID.
404(b); see De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 342–43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). However, extraneous
offense evidence may be admissible when it has relevance apart from character conformity,

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including to prove identity or rebut a defensive theory. Dabney v. State, 492 S.W.3d 309, 318 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2016); Devoe v. State, 354 S.W.3d 457, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
Richardson argues that the evidence regarding his use of Mountain’s credit cards is
inadmissible under Rule 404(b) because it constitutes evidence of an extraneous offense that was
not relevant to any permissible non-character purpose. In response, the State contends that the
evidence was admissible to establish Richardson’s identity and to rebut his defensive theory that
he had lived with Mountain and had permission to enter her apartment.
When identity is established by comparing an extraneous offense to the charged offense, the
offenses must be sufficiently similar to mark them as the defendant’s handiwork. See Page v. State,
213 S.W.3d 332, 336 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In that circumstance, the similarities between the
offenses provide the basis for inferring that the same person committed both. Id. But here, the
credit card evidence served a different identifying purpose. The State did not seek to identify
Richardson as the burglar by comparing the unauthorized credit card use to the burglary. Instead,
the evidence explained how Mountain learned Richardson’s identity—a fact Richardson placed
directly at issue in support of his defensive theory.
During his opening statement, defense counsel told the jury that Richardson had lived with
Mountain and had permission to enter the apartment. As support, counsel emphasized that
Mountain knew Richardson’s name and date of birth and asserted it was “impossible” for her to
possess that information if Richardson were truly a stranger. The challenged evidence rebutted this
theory by explaining how Mountain learned Richardson’s identity despite having no prior
relationship with him. It directly rebutted the defense’s contention that her knowledge of his
identity demonstrated that Richardson had permission to be in the apartment.

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Once the door was opened, the trial court acted within its discretion to admit rebuttal proof.
See Dabney, 492 S.W.3d at 317 (noting State may rebut defensive theory using extraneous offense
evidence); De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 344–45 (stating defense’s opening statement may open the
door to the admission of extraneous offenses to rebut defensive theories); Bass v. State, 270 S.W.3d
557, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (holding defensive theory raised in defense’s opening statement
opened the door to extraneous offense evidence). Accordingly, we find the evidence was relevant
for a non-character conformity purpose, and its admission did not violate Rule 404(b).
B. Rule 403 Objection
Once the trial court determines that the evidence has relevance apart from character conformity
and upon proper objection, it must then determine whether the evidence is subject to exclusion
based upon unfair prejudice pursuant to Rule 403. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 388. Rule 403
permits a trial court to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice or the needless presentation of cumulative evidence. T EX. R.
EVID. 403; see Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
In conducting a Rule 403 analysis, courts consider: (1) the probative force of the challenged
evidence; (2) its potential to impress the jury in an irrational but indelible way; (3) the time required
to develop the evidence; and (4) the proponent’s need for the evidence. Inthalangsy v. State, 634
S.W.3d 749, 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 349.
Richardson argues the State did not need the credit card evidence to identify him because it
possessed other evidence of his identity, including the surveillance footage from Mountain’s
apartment. This argument understates both the probative force of the evidence and the State’s need
for it. The credit card evidence did more than merely identify Richardson as the person depicted
in the surveillance footage; it explained how Mountain learned his name. Again, that distinction is

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significant because Richardson relied on Mountain’s knowledge of his name and date of birth to
challenge her testimony that he was a stranger and to support his defensive theory that he had lived
with her and had permission to enter her apartment. The State’s other identification evidence did
not explain how Mountain acquired that information. Thus, although the State had other evidence
identifying Richardson, the challenged evidence had substantial probative force and served a
purpose that the other evidence did not.
While the evidence carried some potential for unfair prejudice because it informed the jury that
Richardson had allegedly committed additional criminal offenses against Mountain, the potential
was limited. The State did not offer the evidence to suggest Richardson was a thief and therefore
he committed the charged burglary. Rather, its presentation was focused on Mountain’s
investigation of the unauthorized charges and how that investigation led her to learn Richardson’s
identity. The State did not devote an inordinate amount of time developing the evidence. Nor was
the evidence of unauthorized credit card use substantially more inflammatory than the charged
offense of burglarizing Mountain’s habitation.
The trial court further reduced the risk of the jury’s improper use of the evidence by instructing
the jury that it could not consider evidence of an extraneous offense unless it first found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Richardson committed the act and, even then, could consider the evidence
only for specified purposes, including identity or rebuttal of a defensive theory.
Additionally, the credit card evidence was straight forward and closely connected to the
parties’ dispute over how Mountain knew Richardson’s identity, making it unlikely to confuse or
distract the jury. Consistent with the trial court’s instruction to the prosecutor to “keep a light touch
on it,” the State’s presentation was relatively brief and did not amount to a separate mini-trial of
unauthorized credit card use.

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Considering the record as a whole, we cannot say the probative value of the evidence was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence. The trial court’s decision to admit the evidence therefore fell within the zone of
reasonable disagreement. See Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
Richardson’s sole issue is overruled.
CONCLUSION
Because the complained of evidence was admissible under both Rule 404(b) and Rule
403, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
H. Todd McCray, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH