Salt Spa LLC

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: September 28, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Salt Spa LLC
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Serial No. 98562425
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Alan F. Feeney and Logan D. Faucher of Feeney IP Law,
for Salt Spa LLC.
Candace W. Hays, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 110,
Loksye Lee Riso, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Lykos, Allard and Lavache,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Lykos, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Salt Spa LLC (“Applicant”) seeks to register on the Supplemental Register the
stylized mark SALT MICRO SPA displayed below with a disclaimer of MICRO SPA:

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Applicant’s services are identified as
Massage; Aromatherapy services; Facial treatment
services, namely, cosmetic peels; Massage and therapeutic
shiatsu massage; Massage services for couples; Massage
therapy services; Massage therapy services for feet, hands,
lips, eyes, neck and décolleté; Massages; Bodywork therapy
services, namely, sea salt exfoliation, marine collagen body
wraps, therapy; Cosmetic skin care services, namely,
facials, chemical peels, microdermabrasion, intravenous
(IV) hydration therapy, Vitamin C therapy treatments;
Deep tissue massage; Foot massage services; Health spa
services for health and wellness of the body and spirit,
namely, providing massage, facial and body treatment
services, cosmetic body care services; Hot stone massage;
Hot stone massage therapy services; Information relating
to massage; Postnatal care services in the nature of
massage therapy; Pregnancy massage services; Shiatsu
massage; Skin treatments, namely, the injection of dermal
filling agents and neuromuscular blocking agents to reduce
the appearance of facial lines and wrinkles; Sports
massage in International Class 44.1
Applicant appeals the Trademark Examining Attorney’s final refusal to register
the mark on the Supplemental Register under Sections 23(c) and 45 of the Trademark
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1091(c) and 1127, on the ground that the proposed mark is generic
1 Application Serial No. 98562425, filed May 21, 2024, under Section 1(a) of the Trademark
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a). The description of the mark is as follows: “The mark consists of the
wording ‘SALT MICRO SPA’ where the wording ‘SALT’ is in stylized cursive letters.” Color
is not claimed as a feature of the mark.
Page references to the application record refer to the online database of the USPTO’s
Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) system in Portable Document Format
(“PDF”). References to the briefs on appeal refer to the Board’s TTABVUE docket system.
This opinion cites decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the U.S.
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals by the pages on which they appear in the Federal
Reporter (e.g., F.2d, F.3d, or F.4th). For Board decisions, this opinion uses citations to the
Lexis® legal database, as well as the TTABVUE proceeding number, where available. See
TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (TBMP) § 101.03(a)(2)
(2026) for acceptable citation options to cases.

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and is thus incapable of distinguishing the identified services. The appeal is fully
briefed.
I. Procedural Posture
The Examining Attorney initially refused registration under Trademark Act
Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1), on the ground that Applicant’s mark is merely
descriptive of the identified services.2 The Examining Attorney also suggested an
amendment to seek registration on the Supplemental Register with the proviso that
a disclaimer of MICRO SPA would be required.3 Applicant complied by amending its
application to the Supplemental Register and submitted a disclaimer of MICRO
SPA.4 Applicant did not propose an amendment in the alternative to the
Supplemental Register.5 As a result, the amendment constitutes an admission by
Applicant that its mark is not inherently distinctive as applied to the identified
services. See, e.g., In re Clorox Co., 578 F.2d 305, 308 (CCPA 1978) (“[T]his court has
referred to an application for Supplemental Registration of a particular term as an
admission of descriptiveness ….”).
The Examining Attorney then issued a non-final Office Action refusing
registration of Applicant’s mark on the Supplemental Register under Trademark Act
Sections 23(c) and 45 on the ground that the mark is generic and therefore incapable
2 December 10, 2024 Office Action.
3 Id.
4 December 19, 2024 Office Action Response.
5 Id.

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of distinguishing the identified services.6 Unconvinced by Applicant’s arguments in
response to the newly issued refusal, the Examining Attorney made that refusal
final.7
II. Evidentiary Objection
As a preliminary matter, we address an evidentiary objection raised by the
Examining Attorney. Applicant referenced a list of third-party registrations in its
July 17, 2025 Office Action Response. The Examining Attorney timely objected to
Applicant’s evidence as not properly of record in the November 3, 2025 Final Office
Action and reiterates this objection in her appeal brief.8
We sustain the objection. The mere submission of a list of registrations does not
make such registrations part of the record. See In re Jump Designs LLC, No.
76393986, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 209, at *6 (merely submitting a list is insufficient to
make third-party registrations of record). To make any third-party registrations of
record, Applicant should have either submitted copies of the paper USPTO records of
each registration, or a printout of each registration showing the URL and access date
from the USPTO’s TSDR database. Id. As a result, we have given no consideration to
the list.
6 April 17, 2025 Office Action.
7 November 3, 2025 Final Office Action.
8 January 21, 2026 Denial of Applicant’s Request for Reconsideration at TSDR 6-7;
Examining Attorney’s Appeal Brief, 8 TTABVUE 9-10.

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III. Genericness Refusal – Supplemental Register
“In order to qualify for registration on the Supplemental Register, a proposed
mark ‘must be capable of distinguishing the applicant’s goods or services.’” In re
Emergency Alert Sols. Grp., LLC, No. 86890565, 2017 TTAB LEXIS 99, at *2 (quoting
15 U.S.C. § 1091(c)). “Generic terms do not so qualify.” Id. See also Clairol, Inc. v.
Roux Distrib. Co., 280 F.2d 863, 864 (CCPA 1960) (“The generic name by which a
product is known is not a mark which can be registered on the Supplemental Register
under [S]ection 23 because such a name is incapable of distinguishing applicant’s
goods from goods of the same name manufactured or sold by others.”). “Because
generic terms ‘are by definition incapable of indicating a particular source of the
goods or services,’ they cannot be registered as trademarks.” Princeton Vanguard,
LLC v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., 786 F.3d 960, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Dial-
A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); see also In re
Cordua Rests., 823 F.3d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
A mark is generic if its primary significance to the relevant public is the class or
category of goods or services on or in connection with which it is used. See USPTO v.
Booking.com B.V., 591 U.S. 549, 556-57 (2020). Any term that the relevant public
uses or understands to refer to the genus of goods or services, or a key aspect or
central focus or subcategory of the genus, is generic. Royal Crown Co., Inc. v. Coca-
Cola Co., 892 F.3d 1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see, e.g., Cordua Rests., 823 F.3d at
599 (finding substantial evidence supported the Board’s conclusion that

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CHURRASCOS was generic because it referred to a key aspect of restaurant services
featuring grilled meat as one of its menu items).
“The critical issue in genericness cases is whether members of the relevant public
primarily use or understand the term sought to be protected to refer to the genus of
goods or services in question.” Princeton Vanguard, 786 F.3d 960 at 965 (quoting H.
Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 992 (Fed. Cir.
1986)). Making this determination involves a two-step inquiry:
First, what is the genus of goods or services at issue?
Second, is the term sought to be registered ... understood
by the relevant public primarily to refer to that genus of
goods or services?
Marvin Ginn, 782 F.2d 987 at 992; accord Bullshine Distillery LLC v. Sazerac Brands,
LLC, 130 F.4th 1025, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2025); Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d at 599.
“Evidence of the public’s understanding of the term may be obtained from any
competent source, such as purchaser testimony, consumer surveys, listings in
dictionaries, trade journals, newspapers and other publications, In re Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1987), as well as third-
party websites. In re Reed Elsevier Props. Inc., 482 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Competitor use also is probative on the issue of genericness. See Booking.com, 591
U.S. at 561 n.6.
The Examining Attorney must “establish a prima facie case that a term is
generic.” In re PT Medisafe Techs., 134 F.4th 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (quoting
TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“TMEP”) § 1209.01(c)(i) (2022)). A
prima facie case is established by providing a reasonable predicate that the relevant

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purchasing public would primarily use or understand the matter sought to be
registered to refer to the genus of goods or services in question. TMEP § 1209.01(c)(i).
Thereafter, “the burden shifts to the applicant to come forward with evidence to rebut
the prima facie case.” PT Medisafe Techs., 134 F.4th at 1373 (quoting In re Pacer
Tech., 338 F.3d 1348, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). Whether a particular term is generic is
a question of fact. See Royal Crown, 892 F.3d at 1364.
A. What is the genus?
We begin by agreeing with the Examining Attorney that the genus is adequately
defined by Applicant’s identification of services. See Magic Wand Inc. v. RDB Inc.,
940 F.2d 638, 640 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[A] proper genericness inquiry focuses on the
description of services set forth in the [application or] certificate of registration.”); see
also Cordua Rests., 823 F.3d at 599. Applicant does not contest this determination.
B. Who is the relevant public?
Next, we determine the relevant public. In the context of a genericness inquiry,
the relevant public is “the actual [and] potential purchasers of … the services.” Loglan
Inst. Inc. v. Logical Language Grp., Inc., 962 F.2d 1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting
Magic Wand, 940 F.2d at 641).
We concur with the Examining Attorney’s finding that because there are no
restrictions on or limitations to the channels of trade or classes of consumers in the
application on appeal, the relevant public comprises ordinary members of the public
seeking Applicant’s various massage, aromatherapy services, facial treatment and
bodywork services. See In re Mecca Grade Growers, LLC, No. 86358219, 2018 TTAB

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LEXIS 64, at *21-22 (Board took into account that the identification contained no
restrictions as to trade channels or end users in determining the relevant public).
Applicant does not contest this determination.
C. Does the relevant public understand the wording SALT MICRO SPA
primarily to refer to the genus or subgenus of spa services?
We now discuss whether Applicant’s mark is understood by the relevant
purchasing public as primarily referring to Applicant’s services or as a source-
identifier for Applicant’s services as Applicant contends.
Applicant’s disclaimer of MICRO SPA constitutes a concession that these terms
are incapable of functioning as source indicators because Applicant seeks registration
on the Supplemental Register. That is, if an applicant disclaims a term while seeking
registration on the Supplemental Register, it is a concession that the disclaimed
matter is not capable. See, e.g., In re Carolyn’s Candies, Inc., 1980 TTAB LEXIS 8, at
*8 (Board affirmed disclaimer requirement of the “unregistrable matter” YOGURT
BAR on the Supplemental Register); see also, In re Water Gremlin Co., 635 F.2d 841,
845 n.6 (CCPA 1980) (“Section 6 is equally applicable to the Supplemental Register.”).
Nonetheless, we look to the mark as a whole, including not only the words
themselves but also the stylization of Applicant’s mark. Both Applicant and the
Examining Attorney focused on the issue of whether the wording SALT MICRO SPA
as a whole is generic in connection with Applicant’s services. We therefore begin our
analysis with that inquiry.
If a term is generic for one or more of the services listed in an application, it is
treated as being generic for the entire class for which registration is sought. See In re

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Analog Devices Inc., No. 543943, 1988 TTAB LEXIS 20, at *19, aff’d, 871 F.2d 1097
(Fed. Cir. 1989). We focus on the following services identified in the application as
most relevant:
Massage; … Massage services for couples; Massage therapy services;
Massage therapy services for feet, hands, lips, eyes, neck and décolleté;
Massages; Bodywork therapy services, namely, sea salt exfoliation … ,
Foot massage services; Health spa services for health and wellness of the
body and spirit, namely, providing massage, facial and body treatment
services.
The dictionary entries from THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2022) made of record show that “salt”, when used as an adjective,
is defined as “containing or filled with salt;” the adjective “micro” is defined as “basic
or small-scale;” and the noun “spa” is defined as a “resort providing therapeutic
baths;” and “health spa.”9 The record further shows that a “micro spa” is a “spa that
is quaint or personal in size” or a “small, intimate spa,”10 and that “Himalayan salt”
is used in spa treatments.11 By way of illustration, a spa bearing a similar trade
name, Salt Micro Spa Bristol, extols the virtues of using Himalayan salt in massages
to “improve circulation, ease muscle tension, and help detoxify your body.”12 Another
spa, Capital Blossom, explains that “[s]alt spa sessions can help to exfoliate dead skin
9 December 10, 2024 Office Action at TSDR 7, 10, and 12 (printouts from
www.ahdictionary.com accessed on 12/10/2024).
10 April 17, 2025 Office Action at TSDR 33 and 37 (printouts from the Linkedin page for Gaia
Micro Spa and the Yelp Business Directory listing for Reveal Micro Spa accessed 4/15/2025).
We have disregarded the printout from Bonjour Quebec advertising Au Snooze Micro Spa
because it is from a foreign website.
11 July 17, 2025 Office Action Response at TSDR 41 (Wikipedia entry for “Himalayan salt”
from search result on Wikipedia for “salt spa” accessed 7/17/2025).
12 July 17, 2025 Office Action Response at TSDR 33 (Facebook post accessed 7/16/2025).

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cells, promote circulation, and improve the overall texture and tone of your skin,
leaving you with a radiant and youthful glow.”13
Collectively, this evidence shows that the combination of the wording SALT
MICRO SPA is a designation that identifies a key aspect of massage, massage
therapy and bodywork sea salt exfoliation services offered at a small-scale spa that
integrate the use of salt.14 See, e.g., Analog Devices, 1988 TTAB LEXIS 20, at *19
(Board found proposed mark ANALOG DEVICES for the identified goods generic
based on dictionary evidence alone). The relevant public therefore views the wording
SALT MICRO SPA as referring to a subgenus of Applicant’s services. As further
explained in Cordua Restaurants:
13 November 3, 2025 Office Action at TSDR 72 (printout from capitalblossomdayspa.com
accessed 11/1/2025).
14 In reaching this finding, we have not relied on any evidence discussing “salt spa” as a type
of halotherapy because halotherapy does not appear to be a service listed in the application.

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[A] term is generic if the relevant public understands the
term to refer to part of the claimed genus of goods or
services, even if the public does not understand the term to
refer to the broad genus as a whole. Thus, the term
“pizzeria” would be generic for restaurant services, even
though the public understands the term to refer to a
particular sub-group or type of restaurant rather than to
all restaurants. [citations omitted].
823 F.3d 594 at 599.
We caution that our determination is based on the broad, unrestricted
identification of services that forms the basis for the overall genus. As the Court said
in Cordua Restaurants:
We do not, of course, suggest that the term “churrascos” is
necessarily generic as to any and all restaurant services.
Had another applicant applied for registration of the mark
CHURRASCOS in connection not with the entire broad
genus of restaurant services but instead with a narrower
sub-genre of restaurant at which grilled meat is not a key
aspect of the service provided (for example, vegetarian or
sushi restaurants) the result could well have been
different.
Cordua Rests., 823 F.3d at 599 (cleaned up).
Relying primarily Princeton Vanguard, supra, and In re Am. Fertility Soc’y, 188
F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999), Applicant argues that none of the Examining
Attorney’s evidence uses the exact term “salt micro spa” as a generic designation for
spa services. Applicant characterizes the Examining Attorney’s evidence as a “short-
cut analysis” prohibited under Princeton Vanguard.
The case law states otherwise. The Board considered and rejected this precise
argument in Mecca Grade Growers, supra. Here, as in Mecca Grade Growers,
Applicant misapprehends the holding of Princeton Vanguard. “The fact that there is

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no evidence of third-party use of the precise term [SALT MICRO SPA] is not, by itself,
necessarily fatal to a finding of genericness.” Mecca Grade Growers, 2018 TTAB
LEXIS 64, at *24. Princton Vanguard made clear that “there is only one legal
standard for genericness: the two-part test set forth in Marvin Ginn., supra” and “the
test for genericness is the same, regardless of whether the mark is a compound term
or a phrase.” Princton Vanguard, 786 F.3d at 966. The record consists of dictionary
and industry specific evidence demonstrating how the words “salt” and term “micro
spa” may be used together. The evidence shows the meanings that relevant
consumers would attribute to SALT MICRO SPA when encountering massage and
sea salt exfoliation bodywork services using salt as part of those services at a small
scale spa.
Considering the record as a whole, we find that the wording SALT MICRO SPA is
generic for the identified services.
D. Is the stylization in Applicant’s mark capable of functioning as a source
indicator?
Our analysis does not stop here. The next step is determining whether Applicant’s
mark is nonetheless capable of functioning as a source indicator because of the style
in which the words SALT MICRO SPA are displayed.
Applicant’s amendment to the Supplemental Register constitutes a concession
that the stylization is not inherently distinctive. However, “[i]f generic wording is
stylized to create a display or design that is not inherently distinctive, but is
nonetheless capable of functioning as a mark, the mark may be registered on the
Supplemental Register with a disclaimer of the generic wording.” TMEP § 1209.03(w)

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(May 2026) (citing In re The Wella Corp., 565 F.2d 143, 144 (CCPA 1977); In re Sadoru
Group, Ltd., No. 77941164, 2012 TTAB LEXIS 325; Carolyn’s Candies, 1980 TTAB
LEXIS 8). “The critical issue here is not whether at the present time [A]pplicant’s
mark distinguishes applicant’s services, but rather whether it possesses the
capability to do so at some time in the future.” In re School Book Fairs, Inc., No.
398903, 1986 TTAB LEXIS 100, at *3. Since inquiries of this type are subjective and
fact specific, we look to precedents as a guide.
The following marks were deemed registrable on the Supplemental Register with
a disclaimer of the generic wording based on a finding that the stylization was capable
of functioning as a source indicator:
Wella, 565 F.2d 143 (hair conditioner and hair shampoo, BALSAM disclaimed).
Carolyn’s Candies, 1980 TTAB LEXIS 8 (candy bars with YOGURT BAR disclaimed).

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School Book Fairs, 1986 TTAB LEXIS 100 (for providing children’s books to schools
and school related organizations for use in school fundraising programs, SCHOOL
BOOK FAIRS, INC. disclaimed).
Based on this comparison, we find that the level of stylization in Applicant’s mark
equals, if not exceeds, the level of stylization in each of these marks. Although the
words “micro spa” appear in relatively small and ordinary typeface, the word SALT
does not. The oversized letter “S” is written in a broad, looping flourish that extends
above and around the smaller cursive letters “-alt.” The cursive elongated and curved
portions of the letters “l” and “t” further contribute to the overall design. The
stylization, viewed as a whole, displays a “modicum of variation from the ordinary,”
School Book Fairs, at *4, such that Applicant’s mark is capable of functioning as a
source indicator.
Decision: The refusal to register Applicant’s mark under Sections 23(c) and 45
with a disclaimer of only the wording MICRO SPA is affirmed. However, this decision
will be set aside if, within thirty (30) days of the mailing date of this decision,
Applicant submits an amended disclaimer to include the word SALT. See Trademark
Rule 2.142(g); 37 C.F.R. § 2.142(g). The disclaimer must be made in the

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following format: “No claim is made to the exclusive right to use SALT MICRO SPA
apart from the mark as shown.”15
15 In the event Applicant submits a disclaimer and the mark is registered on the
Supplemental Register, Applicant’s rights will be “extremely narrow” insofar as they will be
limited to Applicant’s particular stylization of the words, not the words themselves. See, e.g.,
Carolyn’s Candies, 1980 TTAB LEXIS 8, at *9 and *15 (Board affirmed disclaimer
requirement of the stylized mark YOGURT BAR on the Supplemental Register “in order to
make it absolutely clear that whatever registrable rights applicant may have insofar as the
words ‘YOGURT BAR’ are concerned reside solely in applicant's particular style of display of
the words.”).