The Remnant, Inc. v. New Life Worship Center, Inc.

Mailed: September 28, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
———
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
———
The Remnant, Inc.
v.
New Life Worship Center, Inc.
______
Cancellation No. 92085610
______
Dustin R. DuFault of DuFault Law Firm, P.C., for
The Remnant, Inc.
Nicholas Matlach of Ioliberum Law Firm, P.C., for
New Life Worship Center, Inc.
———
Before Wellington, Heasley, and English,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Wellington, Administrative Trademark Judge:
New Life Worship Center, Inc. (“Respondent”) owns a registration on the Principal
Register for the standard character mark THE REMNANT for “religious and spiritual
services, namely, providing gatherings to develop and enhance the spiritual lives of
men,” in Class 45.1
1 Registration No. 6959027 issued on January 17, 2023, maturing from an application filed
on October 26, 2021.
THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB

Cancellation No. 92085610
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The Remnant, Inc. (“Petitioner”) seeks to cancel Respondent’s registration on the
ground of likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act (“the Act”) Section 2(d), 15
U.S.C. § 1052(d), based on Petitioner’s alleged prior common law rights in the marks
THE REMNANT and REMNANT TV,2 as well as “a family of service marks featuring
REMNANT for at least, but not limited to: Printed newspapers in the field of
Catholicism; Providing on-line information, news and commentary in the field of
Catholicism and the Catholic Church; and on-line video journals, namely, vlogs
featuring nondownloadable videos in the field of current events in connection with
Catholicism.”3 Petitioner alleges that because it has “an earlier date of use of its
family of REMNANT marks, [Petitioner] has priority of use.”4
Petitioner also pleaded ownership of three applications for the marks THE
REMNANT and REMNANT TV that have been “refused registration under Section
2(d) of the Lanham Act because of a likelihood of confusion with [Respondent’s
registered mark].”5 Specifically, Petitioner pleaded ownership of the following three
Principal Register applications for marks in standard characters:
• THE REMNANT for “printed newspapers; printed newspapers in the field of
Catholicism,” in Class 16;6
• THE REMNANT for “providing on-line information, news and commentary in
the field of Catholicism and the Catholic Church,” in Class 42;7
2 Petition for Cancellation ¶¶ 3-5, 1 TTABVUE 5.
3 Petition for Cancellation ¶ 1, 1 TTABVUE 4-5.
4 Petition for Cancellation ¶ 7, 1 TTABVUE 6.
5 Petition for Cancellation ¶¶ 11-16, 1 TTABVUE 6-7.
6 Ser. No. 98096523, filed on July 21, 2023.
7 Ser. No. 98096575, filed on July 21, 2023.

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• REMNANT TV (with a disclaimer of TV) for “on-line video journals, namely,
vlogs featuring nondownloadable videos in the field of current events in
connection with Catholicism; providing on-line tutorial videos in the field of
Catholicism, not downloadable,” in Class 41.8
Respondent denies most of the salient allegations in the Petition for Cancellation,
but admits that its registration has served as a basis for refusal against the three
pleaded applications.9
The parties have fully briefed this proceeding.
I. The Record
The record includes the pleadings and, by rule, Respondent’s involved registration
file. See Trademark Rule 2.122(b)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b)(1).
Petitioner submitted testimony and notices of reliance during its initial and
rebuttal trial periods.
Respondent filed a notice of reliance during its trial period.
II. Petitioner’s Entitlement to a Statutory Cause of Action
Establishing entitlement to a statutory cause of action is a threshold requirement
in every inter partes case. See Corcamore, LLC v. SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d 1298, 1303
(Fed. Cir. 2020); Australian Therapeutic Supplies Pty. Ltd. v. Naked TM, LLC, 965
F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Thus, Petitioner, as the plaintiff in this cancellation
proceeding, must prove its entitlement to a statutory cause of action by a
8 Ser. No. 98096604, filed on July 21, 2023.
9 Respondent’s Answer ¶¶ 12, 14, and 16, 4 TTABVUE 4.

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4
preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Made in Nature, LLC v. Pharmavite LLC,
No. 91223352, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 228, at *8.
To establish entitlement to a statutory cause of action, Petitioner must
demonstrate that it has: (1) an interest falling within the zone of interests protected
by the statute, and (2) a reasonable belief in damage proximately caused by the
registration of the mark. Curtin v. United Trademark Holdings, Inc., 137 F.4th 1359,
1367 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
572 U.S. 118, 129-134 (2014)); Corcamore, 978 F.3d at 1304-07; see also Made in
Nature, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 228, at *18.
As discussed above, Petitioner pleaded ownership of three applications to register
the marks THE REMNANT and REMNANT TV. Petitioner’s witness, Mr. Matt,
testified that he authorized the filing of these applications and that Petitioner
“provides or performs [the goods and services listed in the applications] in connection
with the mark THE REMNANT or REMNANT.”10 Petitioner introduced copies of
USPTO electronic database records for these applications as well as copies of Office
Actions citing Respondent’s registration as a basis for refusal to register Petitioner’s
applied-for marks.11 As noted, Respondent admitted in its Answer that these
applications have been refused by the Office under Section 2(d) based on
Respondent’s registration. This evidence demonstrates that Petitioner has a real
interest in this proceeding and a reasonable belief that it will be damaged by the
10 Matt Dec. ¶¶ 5-9, 14 TTABVUE 3-4.
11 Petitioner’s Not. Of Reliance Exs. A-C, 15 TTABVUE 8-363.

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continued registration of Respondent’s mark, thus establishing its entitlement to
petition to cancel the involved registration on the Section 2(d) ground asserted. See,
e.g., Rapid Inc. v. Hungry Marketplace, Inc., No. 91236033, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 260,
at *6 (prospective likelihood of confusion refusal of the plaintiff’s application based
on the defendant’s application entitled plaintiff to bring claim based on Section
2(d)); Giersch v. Scripps Networks Inc., No. 92045576, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 72, at *7
(entitlement established by showing of common law rights)
III. Priority and Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Act prohibits the registration of a mark that “[c]onsists of or
comprises … a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another
and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of
the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive[.]” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d). Thus, a party petitioning for cancellation under section 2(d) must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) it has priority and (2) there is a likelihood
of confusion. Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1162 (Fed. Cir.
2002). See also, e.g., Stratus Networks, Inc. v. UBTA-UBET Commc’ns Inc., 955 F.3d
994, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2020); W. Fla. Seafood, Inc. v. Jet Rests., Inc., 31 F.3d 1122, 1128
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
A. Petitioner’s Alleged Family of Marks
As mentioned, Petitioner pleaded ownership of a “family” of marks that feature
the word REMNANT, based on its use of the marks THE REMNANT and REMNANT
TV. We first determine whether this allegation has been proven because, if so, it helps
inform the likelihood of confusion analysis. See, e.g., New Era Cap Co. v. Pro Era,

Cancellation No. 92085610
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LLC, No. 91216455, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 199, at *17-26 (explaining that whether a
mark is part of a “family of marks” may affect other factors). See also In re E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973), 1361 (“DuPont”) (focusing
on “the variety of goods on or in connection with which a mark is or is not used, i.e.,
as a house mark, ‘family’ mark, [or] product mark.”).
To prove the existence of a family of marks, a party must show that the marks
have “a recognizable [and distinctive] common characteristic,” and that the marks
have “been promoted in such a way as to create ‘recognition among the purchasing
public that the common characteristic is indicative of a common origin of the goods or
services.’” In re LC Trademarks, Inc., No. 85890413, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 577, at *23
(“Mere ownership of a series of similar marks does not suffice to establish a family of
marks.”); See also TPI Holdings Inc. v. Trailertrader.com, LLC, No. 92064976, 2018
TTAB LEXIS 121; Hester Indus., Inc. v. Tyson Foods Inc., No. 9170358, 1987 TTAB
LEXIS 79, at *5 (“[I]t is well settled that the mere ownership of a number of marks
sharing a common feature (or even ownership of registrations thereof) is insufficient
to establish a claim of ownership of a ‘family’ of marks[.]”).
We first note that Petitioner is asserting prior use of only two different marks as
opposed to multiple marks. Cf. Am. DJ Supply Inc. v. Am. Lighting Inc., 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 200174, at *9 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2013) (casting doubt but leaving open
the possibility of a family of marks consisting of only two marks). In any event and
more importantly, Petitioner has not established that it owns a family of REMNANT
marks. Petitioner relies on only two marks, and the record does not show that those

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marks were promoted in a manner that would cause consumers to recognize
REMNANT as a common source-identifying element. Without this showing,
Petitioner cannot rely on this asserted “family” of REMNANT marks.
B. Priority – Petitioner’s THE REMNANT and REMNANT TV marks
Despite Petitioner’s failure to prove a family of REMNANT marks, it may rely on
its alleged prior common law rights in its asserted marks THE REMNANT for
“printed newspapers in the field of Catholicism” and “providing on-line information,
news and commentary in the field of Catholicism and the Catholic Church,” and
REMNANT TV for “on-line video journals, namely, vlogs featuring nondownloadable
videos in the field of current events in connection with Catholicism.”12 To support its
prior use of its marks on or in connection with these goods and services, Petitioner’s
President and CEO, Michael Matt, offered the following testimony:
• “In connection with [printed newspapers in the field of Catholicism], beginning
in December of 1967, Petitioner’s bi-monthly nation-wide newspaper bearing
the mark THE REMNANT has been continually circulated through every state
in the United States, as well as United States protectorates such as Puerto
Rico and Guam. Petitioner maintains circulation of this newspaper to this
day.”13
• “In connection with [providing on-line information, news and commentary in
the field of Catholicism and the Catholic Church], for more than the past 25
years, Petitioner’s website … has prominently displayed the mark THE
REMNANT and provided on-line information, news and commentary generally
in the field of Christianity, including Catholicism, and current U.S. events, and
has been accessed by individuals in every state of the United States.”14
12 Petition for Cancellation ¶¶ 3-5, 1 TTABVUE 5.
13 Matt Dec. ¶ 11, 14 TTABVUE 5.
14 Matt Dec. ¶ 14, 14 TTABVUE 5-6.

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• As to its REMNANT TV mark, “since 2013 Petitioner has continuously offered
vlogs featuring nondownloadable videos in the field of current events in
connection with Catholicism, and providing on-line tutorial videos in the field
of Catholicism.”15
Petitioner also submitted exhibits in support of the aforementioned testimony,
including copies of newspapers or newsletters and screenshots from its website.
Respondent, in terms of priority, can rely upon the filing date of the underlying
application for its registration as a constructive first use date, i.e., October 26,
2021. Sabhnani v. Mirage Brands, LLC, No. 92068086, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 464, *19.
Respondent does not argue an earlier date of first use and, indeed, concedes
Petitioner’s priority of use of its marks, acknowledging that it “does not dispute that
[Petitioner] used its marks first” and that “[p]riority is not at issue.”16 The parties
also do not dispute that the marks THE REMNANT and REMNANT TV are
inherently distinctive in connection with the goods and services for which Petitioner
has demonstrated common law rights in the mark.
Accordingly, Petitioner has priority as to the mark THE REMNANT for printed
newspapers and the provision of online information, news and commentary services,
and the mark REMNANT TV for the provision of videos and vlogs, all in the field of
or pertaining to Catholicism.
C. Likelihood of Confusion Analysis
Our analysis of whether confusion is likely involves consideration of all probative
facts relevant to the likelihood of confusion factors set forth in DuPont, 476 F.2d at
15 Matt Dec. ¶ 16, 14 TTABVUE 6.
16 19 TTABVUE 7.

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1361 (“DuPont factors”). See, e.g., In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2023). Though DuPont lists thirteen numbered factors (some with
subparts), we generally address only those that are relevant and material to the case
before us, see, e.g., Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel, Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Computer Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 943 (Fed.
Cir. 1990)— typically the factors that the parties address and on which there is
relevant evidence in the record. See, e.g., Dollar Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Brittex Fin., Inc.,
132 F.4th 1363, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 2025); Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d
943, 946-47 (Fed. Cir. 2000). We then weigh our findings on these factors to determine
if, on balance, they indicate that confusion is likely. See, e.g., Charger Ventures, 64
F.4th at 1381; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Again, Petitioner has proven prior common law rights in the marks THE
REMNANT and REMNANT TV. We focus our likelihood of confusion analysis on
Petitioner’s THE REMNANT mark for printed newspapers and the provision of
online information, commentary and news services in the field of or pertaining to
Catholicism because it bears more in common with Respondent’s mark. See Heil Co.
v. Tripleye GmbH, No. 91277359, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 494, at *45-46 (focusing the
likelihood of confusion analysis on two of Opposer’s four pleaded registered marks);
In re Max Cap. Grp. Ltd., 2010 TTAB LEXIS 1, at *19-20.
1. The Marks Are Identical
The first likelihood of confusion factor assesses “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity of
the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. This is always an important inquiry. See, e.g.,

Cancellation No. 92085610
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Herbko Int’l, 308 F.3d at 1165; Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544
F.2d 1098, 1103 (CCPA 1976). Here, Petitioner has proven prior common law rights
in THE REMNANT “Since [Respondent’s registered] mark is a standard character
mark, we must consider that the [mark] may be presented in any font style, size or
color, including the same font, size and color as” how Petitioner has been previously
using its mark because “the rights associated with a standard character mark reside
in the wording per se and not in any particular font style, size, or color.” Aquitaine
Wine, No. 86928469, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 108, at *12 (citation omitted). Thus, we must
assume that parties’ use of THE REMNANT may be depicted in the same font style,
size, and color. The marks are therefore identical.
When marks are identical, as is the case here, this fact “weighs heavily” in favor
of a likelihood of confusion. Tiger Lily Ventures Ltd. v. Barclays Cap. Inc., 35 F.4th
1352, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2022); Majestic Distilling, 315 F.3d at 1315.
2. The Weakness of Petitioner’s THE REMNANT Mark
The sixth DuPont factor examines the number and nature of similar marks in use
on similar goods. “There are two prongs of analysis for a mark’s strength under the
sixth factor: conceptual strength and commercial strength.” Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd.,
71 F.4th 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). “Conceptual strength is a
measure of a mark’s distinctiveness … and distinctiveness is often classified in
categories of generally increasing distinctiveness[:] . . . (1) generic; (2) descriptive;
(3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).
“Distinctiveness is relevant to a mark’s overall strength in the likelihood of confusion
analysis.” Id. (citation omitted). “Commercial strength, on the other hand, is ‘the

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marketplace recognition value of the mark. [It] is a question of ‘whether consumers
in fact associate the . . . mark with a unique source[.]’” Id. at 1363 (quoting 2 J.
Thomas McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 11:80 (5th ed. 2023)).
Evidence of third-party use of similar marks on similar goods is “relevant to show
that a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection.” Palm
Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “The purpose of introducing evidence of third-party use is to
show that customers have become so conditioned by a plethora of such similar marks
that customers have been educated to distinguish between different [such] marks on
the bases of minute distinctions.” Omaha Steaks, 908 F.3d at 1324 (cleaned up). Such
evidence tends to indicate a lack of commercial strength and may also be used to show
conceptual weakness. See Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. v.
New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Juice
Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
“[W]here a party uses a weak mark, his competitors may come closer to his mark
than would be the case with a strong mark without violating his rights.” Kenner
Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, at 353 (Fed. Cir. 1992). On
the other hand, a “likelihood of confusion is to be avoided, as much between ‘weak’
marks as between ‘strong’ marks, or as between a ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ mark.” King
Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 1401 (CCPA 1974).

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Respondent argues that the term REMNANT is both conceptually and
commercially weak. Respondent asserts that it is inherently weak in the context of
Petitioner’s religious-based goods and services because the term is “used 92 times in
the Bible in the Old Testament and the New Testament, primarily referring to small,
faithful groups.”17 Respondent also points out that the parties acknowledge that they
adopted THE REMNANT as a mark due to the term’s religious significance.18
Respondent further argues that the term REMNANT is commercially weak based
on third-party use, asserting that “[t]he record confirms what the word’s biblical
origin would predict: the field is crowded.”19 In support, Respondent submitted
Internet screenshots from various websites showing numerous third-party uses of the
term REMNANT in connection with the provision of religious services, as well as
instruction and information in connection with Christianity.20 These include: “The
Remnant Church” in Colombia City, Indiana; “Remnant Fellowship” in Brentwood,
Tennessee; and “The Remnant US” in Tumwater, Washington.21 Some of these
17 19 TTABVUE 13, citing testimony at 16 TTABVUE (Ex. D, Boyce Dep. 59:13-16).
18 Petitioner’s witness testified that its founder “based [its adoption of THE REMNANT mark]
on the biblical idea, the biblical remnant, in 1967….”16 TTABVUE, Ex. C, Matt Dep. 61:2-5.
19 19 TTABVUE 14.
20 16 TTABVUE 261-Printouts of Internet screenshots attached as Ex. H to Respondent’s
Notice of Reliance.
21 Others third-party users include: Remnant Ministries (in Las Vegas, NV); The Remnant
Church (in Midwest City, OK); The Remnant Church (in Kings Mountain, NC); The Remnant
(in Missoula, MT); The Remnant Church (in Longview, TX); The Remnant (in Lumberton,
NC); Remnant Church (in Richmond, VA); “The ReMENant Episodes” a “Carolina Catholic
Media Network”; Remnant Bible College and Training Institute (in Horseheads, NY); “The
Remnant Radio” offering a “show…school…events…newsletter”; “The Remnant News”
articles; “The Heartbeat of the Remnant,” quarterly Christian newsletter published online
and by mail.

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websites tout their newsletters, online activities, recordings, and YouTube videos, all
in the field of Christian services, information, events, and instruction. For example,
the following are some excerpts from “The Remnant Church” in Kings Mountain,
North Carolina:

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Respondent is careful not to attack the validity of its own registration, arguing
“the weakness of the mark in the religious marketplace does not render it
unregistrable” and that THE REMNANT “does not directly describe what the
[Respondent] does, who it serves, or how it is structured.”22 Rather, Respondent
argues that it is “suggestive” and that the “crowded-field evidence that limits
[Petitioner’s] scope of protection does not convert [Respondent’s] registration into an
22 19 TTABVUE 16.

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invalid one; it simply confirms that the term operates as a biblical allusion across the
religious landscape, which is precisely the suggestive function the mark performs.”23
Indeed, neither party argues that the THE REMNANT mark is not inherently
distinctive in connection with the involved goods and services.
In response, Petitioner argues that the third-party use evidence has less probative
value because it “catalogs organizations across many denominations—Evangelical,
Seventh-day Adventist, non-denominational Protestant—providing many different
types of services” and thus does not “diminish” the “distinctiveness [of Petitioner’s
mark] within the overlap between Catholic media content and men’s spiritual-
development ministry.”24 Petitioner also points to the lack of third-party registrations
for similar marks, arguing that the Federal Circuit in its Juice Generation decision
set forth a “standard” that “requires consideration of not only third-party use, but
also ‘registrations.’”25
The record before us demonstrates that the term REMNANT is not only
conceptually weak but also has some commercial weakness. The parties adopted the
term due to its biblical significance and as a show of faith, and so too apparently have
23 19 TTABVUE 16.
24 20 TTABVUE 12-13.
25 20 TTABVUE 13, citing Juice Generation, 794 F.3d at 1339. Petitioner’s reliance on the
absence of third-party registrations and argument based thereon is not persuasive. There
also appears to be a disconnect in Petitioner’s rationale based on the Federal Circuit’s
decision in Juice Generation. To be clear, the Federal Circuit did not require evidence of third-
party registrations for similar marks to demonstrate that a term is weak, but only instructed
the Board to not “overlook[ ]” such evidence when present for purposes of determining if the
involved term “carries a suggestive or descriptive connotation” in the relevant field “and is
weak for that reason.” Juice Generation, 794 F.3d at 1339.

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several other religious organizations. The third-party use evidence discussed above
is also probative to demonstrate some commercial weakness of THE REMNANT
mark in connection with various services rendered by Christian organizations,
including instruction and providing information through audio and video recordings
and newsletters. Brooklyn Brewery Corp. v. Brooklyn Brew Shop, LLC, No. 91223982,
2020 TTAB LEXIS 269, aff’d in relevant part, vacated in part, and remanded, 17 F.4th
129 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
Because we find that the term REMNANT is conceptually weak and has some
commercial weakness for Petitioner’s goods and services, this factor weighs against a
finding of a likelihood of confusion.
3. Comparison of the Parties’ Goods and Services; Their Trade
Channels and Classes of Consumers
The second DuPont factor assesses the “similarity or dissimilarity and nature of
the goods or services as described in an application or registration.” DuPont, 476 F.2d
at 1361. “The relevant inquiry considers if the respective products [or services] are
related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are
such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that they emanate from the same
source.’” Tiger Lily Ventures, 35 F.4th at 1363 (cleaned up; citation omitted).
Generally, the more similar the goods or services, the less similar the marks need to
be to make confusion likely, and vice versa. See, e.g., ECI Div. of E-Sys., Inc. v.
Environ. Commc’ns Inc., No. 91058951, 1980 TTAB LEXIS 16; Century 21 Real Estate
Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (similarity of the
marks should be assessed “through the lens of other du Pont factors,” including the

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parties’ goods/services). When goods and services overlap, that tends to support a
conclusion that confusion is likely. See, e.g., In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297,
1306 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“while the goods and services are not identical, they
substantially overlap, which weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.”)
(citation omitted).
The goods and services need not be identical or even competitive to find a
likelihood of confusion. On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000). They need
only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their
marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that they emanate
from the same source.” Coach Servs. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, No. 91117739, 2007 TTAB LEXIS
58, at *28-29).
Here, Respondent’s registration for THE REMNANT covers “religious and
spiritual services, namely, providing gatherings to develop and enhance the spiritual
lives of men.” And Petitioner has demonstrated prior common law rights in the same
mark for printed newspapers and the provision of information, news and
commentary, all in the field of Catholicism.
The third-party use evidence that Respondent submitted demonstrates that it is
common for religious organizations to offer, under the same mark, the same services
as Respondent as well as the same or very similar goods and services to those of
Petitioner. It is common for these religious groups to assemble religious gatherings,

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18
as well as provide religious information online or in newsletters. For example, The
Remnant Church in Longview, Texas, allows one to “watch or listen to the latest
sermon … [and] also take the Remnant Church’s messages with you wherever you go
by downloading our app.”26 And Remnant Fellowship invites others to “Meet our
Families … Meet our Youth and Young Adults” and touts the “result of learning to
truly put the words from the Bible into practice.”27 This type of evidence helps
establish that the relevant consuming public, namely persons interested in attending
religion-based gatherings and consuming related newsletters and commentary, are
accustomed to encountering the parties’ goods and services from a single
organization. Indeed, Respondent’s witness testified that Respondent offers podcasts
through a “Remnant app” containing religious instruction material.28
Respondent argues against any possible confusion by asserting that “[a] Catholic
newspaper and a Protestant men’s spiritual gathering are not self-evidently
related.”29 However, Respondent’s broadly worded identification does not limit its
gatherings to any particular denomination. Accordingly, for purposes of our analysis,
the identification encompasses religious and spiritual gatherings directed to men of
any denomination, including Catholic men. New Era Cap Co. v. Pro Era, LLC, No.
91216455, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 199, at *39-40 (“caps” is broad enough to encompass all
types, including “athletic caps”); In re Hughes Furniture Indus., Inc., No. 85627379,
26 16 TTABVUE 260.
27 16 TTABVUE 263.
28 16 TTABVUE 169-171, Boyce Dep. 17:24-19:6.
29 19 TTABVUE 19.

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2015 TTAB LEXIS 65, at *10 (broadly worded “furniture” necessarily encompasses
narrowly identified “residential and commercial furniture”). Put simply,
Respondent’s religious gatherings for men, as identified in its registration, may
involve gatherings that are of interest to those of the Catholic faith and thus may
appeal to some of the same consumers of Petitioner’s newspapers or information
services in the field of Catholicism.
In sum, the goods and services are related inasmuch as they are the type that the
relevant consumers--namely those interested in receiving religious instruction and
information--may expect to emanate from a common source. Accordingly, the second
DuPont factor favors likelihood of confusion.
Moreover, the evidentiary record shows that the same class of consumers may also
encounter the parties’ goods and services being advertised together on the same
website.30 Accordingly, the third DuPont factor, involving the “similarity or
dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels,” DuPont, 476 F.2d at
1361, also weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.
4. Sophistication of Consumers
We now consider the conditions under which the goods and services are likely to
be offered and purchased, e.g., whether on impulse or after careful consideration, as
well as the degree, if any, of sophistication of the consumers, under the fourth DuPont
30 Specifically, we refer to the third-party use evidence demonstrating religious organizations
advertising on the same website the same services as Respondent as well as the same or very
similar goods and services to those of Petitioner. See 16 TTABVUE 261-Printouts of Internet
screenshots attached as Ex. H to Respondent’s Notice of Reliance.

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factor. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. Consumer sophistication or degree of care may tend
to minimize likelihood of confusion. Conversely, impulse purchases of goods or
services may have the opposite effect. Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1376.
Respondent argues:31
Religious affiliation is among the most considered decisions a person
makes. A man who attends a non-denominational [Respondent’s]
Protestant men’s gathering at New Life Worship Center in Smithfield,
Rhode Island, is not the same man who subscribes to a traditionalist
Catholic biweekly newspaper. Neither would confuse the other’s
organization for his own.
While we agree that a person’s choice of religion is often carefully decided,
Respondent’s arguments, whether factually correct or not, are not persuasive. As
already discussed, Respondent’s services are not limited to Protestant teachings but
are so broadly described that we must construe them to include the organization of
men’s religious groups based on Catholicism. Similarly, Respondent’s registration is
also unrestricted geographically and establishes nationwide rights to the mark. See
In re Appetito Provisions Co., No. 73423405, 1987 TTAB LEXIS 47, at *2 n.4 (a
geographically unrestricted registration under Section 7(b) of the Act “accords a
registrant prima facie exclusive rights in the registered mark for the goods or services
recited in the registration throughout the United States regardless of its actual extent
of use.”). Thus, it is irrelevant that Respondent currently bases its operations in one
part of the country because we must assume that Respondent may expand to offer
31 19 TTABVUE 24.

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21
and advertise its services in the same geographic region where Petitioner offers its
goods and services.
Accordingly, the fourth DuPont factor is neutral in our analysis.
5. Coexistence of Parties’ Marks Without Actual Confusion
The seventh and eighth DuPont factors are interrelated; the absence of evidence
of actual confusion under the seventh DuPont factor by itself is entitled to little
weight in our likelihood of confusion analysis unless there also is evidence under the
eighth DuPont factor that there has been a significant opportunity for actual
confusion to have occurred. Keystone Consol. Indus. v. Franklin Inv. Corp., No.
92066927, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 290, at *75-76 (citing cases).
Importantly, and in contrast to other DuPont factors, the Board must consider
“only evidence of real-world, marketplace use,” including geographic distance, under
the eighth DuPont factor. In re Guild Mortg. Co., 2020 TTAB LEXIS 17, at *18-19
(Under the second, third, and fourth DuPont factors the Board must “consider the
wording of the identifications as set forth” in the registration. “As such, we may not
consider, in assessing these du Pont factors, evidence of how [the parties] are actually
rendering their services in the marketplace” whereas “the eighth du Pont factor …
requires us to look at actual market conditions, to the extent there is evidence of such
conditions of record. In this regard, we consider all of the evidence of record that may
be relevant to the eighth du Pont factor.”) (emphasis omitted).
Here, Respondent relies on admissions made by Petitioner’s witness that
Petitioner is unaware of any instances of actual confusion between the parties’ marks.
However, Respondent goes on to add:

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22
… the opportunity for confusion has been limited by the parties’ completely
non-overlapping goods, services, and trade channels. But that cuts in
[Respondent’s] favor: it confirms that [the parties] operate in separate
markets. If confusion has not occurred even in the age of internet search,
where both parties’ names are a keystroke apart, it is because consumers
understand that a Catholic newspaper and a Protestant men’s ministry are
not the same thing. [Petitioner] has been publishing for nearly 60 years.
[Respondent] has operated its men’s ministry since January 2022. In over
four years of concurrent marketplace existence, not a single person can be
shown to have confused the two.
Respondent also acknowledges that its services are offered to relatively few
persons in one geographic region. Specifically, Respondent admits that it is “a non-
denominational Protestant church in Smithfield, Rhode Island, with a weekly
attendance of approximately 3,000” and its services involve “quarterly gatherings of
two to three hundred men at the church … annual retreats of 125 men in upstate
New York, and … ten mentoring groups of fewer than twelve men each.”32 According
to Respondent, its services are offered to “members resid[ing] in Rhode Island,
Connecticut, and Massachusetts” and it “has no plans to expand beyond New
England.”33
Respondent essentially acknowledges that there has not been a “meaningful
opportunity for actual confusion” during the few years of concurrent use of the parties’
marks. Nike, Inc. v. WNBA Enters., LLC, No. 91160755, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 39, at *44
(“In addition to the relatively brief period of contemporaneous use ... there is no
specific evidence regarding the nature and extent of public exposure to this particular
mark during the period of contemporaneous use.”). Respondent also concedes that its
32 19 TTABVUE 6.
33 19 TTABVUE 6.

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23
operations have been offered mainly in one geographic region, Smithfield, Rhode
Island, and thus any reasonable opportunity for confusion to have occurred is further
limited.
In sum, the evidence establishes an absence of known actual confusion. However,
because the parties’ actual concurrent use has been geographically limited and
relatively brief, the record does not establish a meaningful opportunity for confusion
to have occurred. We therefore treat both the seventh and eighth factors as neutral.
6. Weighing the Likelihood of Confusion Factors
The final step in analyzing likelihood of confusion is to weigh the DuPont factors
for which there has been evidence and argument, while providing an explanation as
to the weight given to each relevant factor. Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1384. In
this regard, each proceeding is different and there is “no mechanical rule”; “each case
requires weighing of the facts and circumstances of the particular mark.” In re Mighty
Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Stratus Networks, 955 F.3d
at 998 (“[T]he weight afforded to each factor depends on the circumstances” and “[a]ny
single factor may control a particular case.”).
Here, the parties are using an identical mark, THE REMNANT, and this weighs
heavily in favor of a likelihood of confusion. The parties’ goods and services are closely
related, and the record supports overlapping trade channels and classes of
consumers.34 These factors outweigh our finding that the term REMNANT is
34 As discussed, the factors concerning actual confusion and consumer sophistication are
neutral.

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24
conceptually weak and has some commercial weakness in connection with religious
goods and services. We ultimately conclude that confusion is likely in this case.
Anthony’s Pizza & Pasta Int’l, Inc. v. Anthony’s Pizza Holding Co., 2009 TTAB LEXIS
718, at *43-44 (“The evidence of third-party registration and use of ANTHONY'S,
although one factor (and a significant one under the facts in this case) to be
considered, does not persuade us of a different result, because we believe that this
factor is outweighed by the other factors.”).
To the extent there is any doubt as to our conclusion that confusion is likely, we
resolve such doubt in favor of Petitioner as the prior user. See, e.g., Sunkist Growers,
Inc. v. Intrastate Distribs., Inc., 144 F.4th 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2025).
Decision: The Petition for Cancellation is granted.