Coachella Music Festival, LLC v. Marjorie Ulysse

WDJ September 22, 2026
Opposition No. 91291853
Coachella Music Festival, LLC
v.
Marjorie Ulysse
Before Wellington, Larkin, and Casagrande,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
By the Board:
This proceeding now comes before the Board for consideration of (1) Opposer’s
motion for partial summary judgment on its claim that Applicant did not have a bona
fide intent to use her SLAYCHELLA mark in commerce as of the filing date of her
application, in violation of Trademark Act Section 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), and for
discovery sanctions;1 (2) Applicant’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment on
Opposer’s claim of likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15
U.S.C. § 1052(d);2 and (3) Opposer’s motion to strike Applicant’s evidence in support
of her opposition to Opposer’s motion for partial summary judgment.3 All three
1 18 TTABVUE.
2 22 TTABVUE.
3 25 TTABVUE.
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
P.O. Box 1451
Alexandria, VA 22313-1451
General Contact Number: 571-272-8500
THIS ORDER IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE
TTAB

Opposition No. 91291853
2
motions are fully briefed.4 Applicant also has filed a motion for leave to amend her
application without consent,5 which Opposer opposes.6
I. Opposer’s Motion for Discovery Sanctions
a. Background and the Parties’ Arguments
Opposer has moved pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) and 37 C.F.R. § 2.120(h)(1) to
preclude Applicant from entering into evidence at trial or on summary judgment
certain documents for which Applicant failed to produce metadata as ordered by the
Board, as well as certain documents Applicant has withheld while asserting she has
produced all documents in her possession, custody, or control. In particular, Opposer
seeks to preclude the following evidence first produced as attachments to Applicant’s
response to Opposer’s motion for summary judgment:7
(1) the Declaration of Marjorie Ulysse;8
(2) Ulysse Declaration Exhibit A (whois data for website);9
(3) Ulysse Declaration Exhibit C (text message screenshots concerning draft
website);10
(4) Ulysse Declaration Exhibit D (brochure for unrelated 2025 event);11 and
(5) the Declaration of Adam Allen, who was not identified in Applicant’s initial
disclosures, which she has not supplemented.12
4 Opposer filed its reply in support of its motion for summary judgment under seal. 24
TTABVUE. An unredacted version of the reply brief appears at 25 TTABVUE.
5 16 TTABVUE.
6 See 29 TTABVUE 3.
7 See 25 TTABVUE 4.
8 21 TTABVUE 19-21, ¶¶ 1-17.
9 Id. at 22-25.
10 Id. at 31-33.
11 Id. at 34-48.
12 Id. at 49-56, ¶¶ 1-9.

Opposition No. 91291853
3
In support of its motion Opposer avers as follows. The day discovery opened,
Opposer served a request for production that sought all documents concerning
Applicant’s bona fide intent to use the SLAYCHELLA mark as of the filing date of
the opposed application.13 Opposer also requested all versions of Applicant’s website,
including any portions that have used the opposed mark.14 In response, Applicant
produced three screenshots of a draft website.15 However, Applicant did not provide
the requested files in their native electronic format as requested by Opposer, an
instruction to which Applicant had not objected.16 In both her discovery responses
and later her opposition to Opposer’s motion to compel, Applicant asserted that she
did not have custody of any metadata, such as the creation and revision dates for the
produced draft website screenshots, or other draft website documents besides the
three screenshots she had produced.17
On December 17, 2024, Opposer filed a motion to compel,18 which the Board
granted on March 31, 2025.19 The Board ordered Applicant to produce certain
metadata concerning her draft website, which would include creation and revision
dates and the content of those revisions, by April 30, 2025, or to produce an affidavit
stating that she does not have that metadata in her possession, custody, or control.20
Applicant subsequently produced an affidavit stating that Applicant “confirm[s] that
13 5 TTABVUE 15.
14 Id.
15 Declaration of Steven Lauridsen, counsel for Opposer, 18 TTABVUE 72, ¶ 6, Ex. 7.
16 See 5 TTABVUE 15-16.
17 9 TTABVUE 16; 5 TTABVUE 234-36 (Request for Production Nos. 49-50); 7 TTABVUE 10.
18 5 TTABVUE.
19 9 TTABVUE.
20 Id. at 16,

Opposition No. 91291853
4
the metadata sought by Opposer Coachella Music Festival, LLC (‘Opposer’) of my
draft website for the SLAYCHELLA mark is not in my possession, custody, or
control.”21 The declaration is silent as to who might have custody or control of the
metadata.22 Applicant’s declaration also states that she has no other responsive
documents and has produced all documents.23
Because Applicant’s declaration was silent on the issue of who had custody or
control over the requested metadata, Opposer’s counsel followed up via email with
Applicant’s counsel on April 30, 2025.24 On May 2, 2025, Applicant’s counsel
responded, stating that “Applicant does not know where and under whose control the
metadata presently is but is actively trying to gain access to her WIX website
account25 to obtain additional information in order to supplement Applicant’s
discovery responses.”26 Applicant’s counsel also stated that “[w]e have further
attached to this email the native JPEG files of the pdfs previously produced as bates
numbers SLAYCHELLA00012-00014. These JPEG screenshots were taken of
Applicant’s WIX website account in response to Opposer’s discovery requests to
identify Applicant’s intended use of the SLAYCHELLA mark.”27 Applicant’s counsel
added that “[w]e are still searching for additional information about when that draft
21 Lauridsen Decl., 18 TTABVUE 73, ¶ 8, Ex. 8, Declaration of Marjorie Ulysse, ¶ 2.
22 See Lauridsen Decl., 18 TTABVUE 73, ¶ 8, Ex. 8, Declaration of Marjorie Ulysse, ¶¶ 1-4.
23 Lauridsen Decl., 18 TTABVUE 73, ¶ 8, Ex. 8, Declaration of Marjorie Ulysse, ¶¶ 3-4.
24 Lauridsen Decl. 18 TTABVUE 73, ¶ 9, Ex. 9.
25 WIX is “a cloud-based platform that allows a person to build professional sites without the
need of coding experience.” Declaration of Marjorie Ulysse, 21 TTABVUE 19, ¶ 5.
26 Lauridsen Decl. 18 TTABVUE 73, ¶ 10, Ex. 10.
27 Id.

Opposition No. 91291853
5
webpage was first created, but we have been unable to do so up to this point. We will
produce additional information if it becomes available.”28
According to Opposer, the WIX website explains how a user can readily access
the sought-after metadata in their website account, including creation dates, revision
dates, publication dates, and the content of any revisions.29 Opposer claims that, as
a result, Applicant has always had access to the Board-ordered metadata and to all
versions of her draft website. Opposer further argues that Applicant knew that WIX
had control over the metadata. Opposer asserts that Applicant chose to remain silent
concerning that fact despite the Board’s order to provide in detail in her affidavit
information concerning where and in whose custody the metadata resides. Opposer
contends that Applicant should not be rewarded for disobeying a Board order, and
that she should therefore be precluded as a discovery sanction from relying on the
purported draft website at trial or on summary judgment.
Applicant counters that she has acted in good faith in her efforts to provide
Opposer with the requested information. On August 12, 2024, Opposer served on
Applicant its initial disclosures, and first sets of requests for production,
interrogatories, and requests for admission.30 Applicant served objections and
responses to each request and produced twenty-eight pages of documents comprising
the TSDR status and file history for the involved application, screenshots of what
Applicant asserts is a draft of her website as displayed in a web browser, and the
28 Id.
29 Id. at ¶ 11, Ex. 11.
30 9 TTABUVE 2-3.

Opposition No. 91291853
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notice of opposition in this proceeding. During a discovery conference held on
November 13, 2024, Opposer’s counsel requested that Applicant provide the native
file with metadata intact for the SLAYCHELLA website, of which she had produced
a screenshot.31 Applicant responded that she had produced all documents or
information in her custody, possession, or control, and that she did not have such
metadata. Opposer then filed its motion to compel, which was granted by the Board,
after which Applicant produced the affidavit stating that Applicant “confirm[s] that
the metadata sought by Opposer Coachella Music Festival, LLC (‘Opposer’) of my
draft website for the SLAYCHELLA mark is not in my possession, custody, or
control.”32
Applicant claims that, upon additional investigation conducted by Applicant’s
counsel, it was determined that Lease My Marketing, a professional marketing
company hired by Applicant,33 and not Applicant, was in control of the WIX platform
and had access to the SLAYCHELLA page on Applicant’s website. Applicant’s counsel
requested the metadata concerning the creation the web page, and Lease My Marking
agreed to access the WIX platform and provide any information about the page.34
Lease My Marketing was unable to provide the metadata for the page, but was able
to provide the site history, which shows publication, revisions, and removals of the
31 9 TTABVUE 4.
32 Lauridsen Decl., 18 TTABVUE 73, ¶ 8, Ex. 8, Declaration of Marjorie Ulysse, ¶ 2.
33 See Ulysse Decl., 22 TTABVUE 23, ¶ 14.
34 Declaration of Adam Allen, owner of Lease My Marketing, 21 TTABVUE 50, ¶ 3.

Opposition No. 91291853
7
page.35 That information was made available to Applicant on September 23 and 24,
2025.36
Applicant notes that Opposer did not undertake any independent efforts to obtain
the information from the WIX platform, which Applicant contends Opposer could
have done at any point in this proceeding given it knew the identity of the host
platform. Rather, Applicant claims that Opposer seeks to profit from its lack of
inquiry by preventing truthful, highly relevant information from being introduced in
this proceeding.
b. Analysis
If a party fails to comply with an order of the Board relating to discovery,
including an order compelling discovery, the Board may enter appropriate sanctions
as defined in Trademark Rule 2.120(h)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.120(h)(1), and Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(b)(2), including entry of judgment. Benedict v. Super Bakery Inc., 665 F.3d 1263,
1268-69 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming Board’s entry of judgment as a discovery sanction
for repeated failures to comply with Board’s reasonable orders); MHW Ltd. v. Simex
Aussenhandelsgesellschaft Savelsberg KG, No. 91093359, 2000 WL 33416861, at *2
(TTAB 2000); HighBeam Mktg., LLC v. Highbeam Rsch., LLC, No. 91162372, 2008
WL 219142, at *1 (TTAB 2008); TBMP § 527.01(a). Application of Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(b)(2) is triggered only by the violation of a discovery order. Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(b)(2)(A). The question of the proper sanction is left to the sound discretion of the
Board. See Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. U.S., 857 F.2d 1448, 1450-51 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
35 See id. at 50-52, ¶¶ 5-8.
36 Id. at 52, ¶ 9.

Opposition No. 91291853
8
When considering which sanctions to impose, the Board may consider “(1) the
willfulness of the non-compliant party or the reason for noncompliance; (2) the
efficacy of lesser sanctions; (3) the prejudice to the other party; (4) the duration of the
period of noncompliance; and (5) whether the non-compliant party has been warned
of the consequence of his non-compliance.” Handwerker v. AT & T Corp., 211 F.R.D.
203, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Lee v. Max Int’l, LLC, 638 F.3d 1318, 1323 (10th
Cir. 2011) (listing factors for dismissal as a sanction).
Upon review of Applicant’s responses to Opposer’s inquiries regarding the
website metadata, it is clear that Applicant did not willfully disobey the Board’s
discovery order. Indeed, Applicant’s counsel affirmatively stated that he did not know
where and under whose control the metadata was, and that he was still searching for
the information and would provide it if it became available.37 Also, there is no other
indication of Applicant’s non-compliance with the Board’s discovery order.
Furthermore, it would be unduly harsh to exclude evidence produced for the first time
on summary judgment, given that Applicant did not unequivocally refuse to produce
the requested information during discovery, and that discovery responses may be
supplemented at any time. See Vignette Corp. v. Marino, No. 91158854, 2005 WL
3395186, at *4 (TTAB 2005); see also Weatherford/Lamb, Inc. v. C&J Energy Servs.,
No. 92050101 2010 WL 4502073, at *3 (TTAB 2010) (declining to strike admissible
declarations and attached exhibits, choosing “to evaluate all the declarants’
statements and exhibits for appropriate probative value, and to weigh the evidence
37 18 TTABVUE 154.

Opposition No. 91291853
9
in its totality”). There is also no prejudice to Opposer in view of the fact that discovery
responses may be supplemented at any time. Therefore, to the extent Opposer seeks
to exclude Applicant from offering as evidence information or documents produced
subsequent to her April 30, 2025 affidavit in violation of the Board’s discovery order,
Opposer’s motion for sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) is DENIED.
II. Opposer’s Motion to Strike
As Applicant points out, Opposer’s only reference in its motion to strike to such a
motion is the statement “[i]n addition to seeking these self-executing preclusion
sanctions [pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)], Coachella also moves to strike these
materials by way of this brief.”38 The Board construes this as a motion pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1), which provides that a party who fails to provide information
requested during discovery may, upon motion or objection by his adversary, be
precluded from using that information upon a motion for summary judgment, unless
the failure was substantially justified or is harmless. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); Vignette
Corp., 2005 WL 3395186, at *3. Opposer’s motions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)
and Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) are based upon the same set of operative facts.
Parties are required to supplement their respective initial disclosures and
discovery responses “in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material
respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or
corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties
during the discovery process or in writing.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A); Trademark
38 25 TTABVUE 5.

Opposition No. 91291853
10
Rules 2.116(a) and 2.120, 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.116(a) and 2.120. A party may supplement
its discovery responses at any time, even after a summary judgment motion or during
trial. Vignette Corp., 2005 WL 3395186, at *4.
Subsections 37(b)(2) and 37(c)(1) of Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 differ in that 37(c)(1) may
be triggered where the automatic, self-executing discovery provisions of Rule 26(a)
and 26(e) are violated, whereas the imposition of sanctions under Rule 37(b)(2)
requires the violation of a discovery order as a prerequisite. See Ortiz-Lopez v.
Sociedad Espanola de Auxilio Mutuo Y Beneficiencia de Puerto Rico, 248 F.3d 29, 33
(1st Cir. 2001).
The Board in Vignette Corp. held that absent “an outright statement that ...
information would not be provided” in response to a discovery request, the Board need
not exclude consideration of that information with respect to a motion for summary
judgment. Vignette Corp., 2005 WL 3395186, at *4 (finding it would be “unduly harsh”
to exclude evidence produced for the first time on summary judgment, absent an
unequivocal refusal to produce the requested information during discovery,
particularly in light of the fact that discovery responses may be supplemented at any
time). The Board further explained that there is “no practical distinction between
consideration of the information provided as part of a responsive brief to a summary
judgment motion or information provided in supplemental responses to discovery
that are submitted at the same time as a responsive brief.” Id.
Here, in her responses to Opposer’s inquiries regarding the website metadata,
Applicant did not state unequivocally that such information would not be provided.

Opposition No. 91291853
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Rather, Applicant’s counsel affirmatively stated that he did not know where and
under whose control the metadata was, and that he was still searching for the
information and would provide it if it became available.39 Based on the record before
us, Applicant should not be precluded from relying on the website information
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). See Vignette Corp., 2005 WL 3395186, at *4.
Accordingly, to the extent Opposer seeks to strike evidence produced subsequent
to Applicant’s April 30, 2025 affidavit, Opposer’s motion also is DENIED.
III. Background – Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
Applicant Marjorie Ulysse, a United States citizen, is the owner of intent-to-use
application Serial No. 98123640 for the standard character mark SLAYCHELLA for
use in connection with the following goods and services:
Key chains, in International Class 14;
Mugs; Beverage glassware; Drinking cups; Heat-insulated containers for
beverages; Insulated containers for beverage cans for domestic use, in
International Class 21;
Dresses; Pants; Shirts; Shoes; Skirts; Coats; Fashion hats; Men’s and women’s
jackets, coats, trousers, vests; Suits, in International Class 25; and
Arranging and conducting of seminars and workshops in the field of
harassment; Educational and entertainment services, namely, providing
motivational speaking services in the field of harassment; Educational and
entertainment services, namely, providing motivational and educational
speakers in the field of self- and personal improvement; Entertainment
services, namely, providing podcasts in the field of fashion and culture; On-line
journals, namely, blogs featuring fashion and culture; Providing continuing
legal education courses, in International Class 41.
Applicant filed her application on August 9, 2023.
39 18 TTABVUE 154.

Opposition No. 91291853
12
Opposer Coachella Music Festival, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, has
opposed registration, asserting claims of (1) likelihood of confusion under Trademark
Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d); (2) false association under Trademark Act
Section 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a); and (3) no bona fide intent to use the mark in
connection with the goods and services identified in her application as of the
application filing date under Trademark Act Section 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b).40 In
support of its claims Opposer pleads ownership of the following registrations:
Reg. No. Mark Goods/Services
3196119 COACHELLA
(Section 2(f))
Entertainment, namely, organizing and
producing musical events, in International
Class 41
3196128 COACHELLA VALLEY
MUSIC AND ARTS
FESTIVAL
(Section 2(f), “MUSIC
AND ARTS
FESTIVAL”
disclaimed)
Entertainment, namely, organizing and
producing musical events, in International
Class 41
3196129
(Section 2(f))
Entertainment, namely, organizing and
producing musical events, in International
Class 41
3965563 COACHELLA
VALLEY MUSIC AND
ARTS FESTIVAL
(Section 2(f))
Tote bags in International Class 18
4008651 COACHELLA VALLEY
MUSIC AND ARTS
FESTIVAL
(Section 2(f))
Posters in International Class 16; and
Halter tops; Hooded sweat shirts; Long-
sleeved shirts; Scarves; Shirts; T-shirts;
Tank tops, in International Class 25
40 See First Amended Notice of Opposition, 17 TTABVUE.

Opposition No. 91291853
13
4266400
(Section 2(f))
Posters in International Class 16; and
Hooded sweat shirts; Long-sleeved shirts;
Scarves; Shirts; T-shirts; Tank tops, in
International Class 25
4270482 COACHELLA
(Section 2(f))
Posters in International Class 16;
Bottles, sold empty; Plastic water bottles
sold empty, in International Class 21; and
Hooded sweat shirts; Long-sleeved shirts;
Scarves; Shirts; T-shirts; Tank tops, in
International Class 25
5075233 CHELLA Long-sleeved shirts; Shirts; T-shirts, in
International Class 25
5235903
(Section 2(f))
Hotel accommodation services; Providing
campground facilities, in International Class
43
5235905 COACHELLA
(Section 2(f))
Hotel accommodation services; Providing
campground facilities, in International Class
43
5520063 CHELLA Arranging, organizing, conducting, and
hosting social entertainment events;
Entertainment, namely, production of
musical events; Organizing cultural and arts
events, in International Class 41
5557242 COACHELLA Jewelry; Jewelry charms, in International
Class 14
Opposer also claims common law rights in the marks COACHELLA,
COACHELLA (stylized), COACHELLA VALLEY MUSIC AND ARTS FESTIVAL,
and CHELLA in connection with its Coachella Music Festival, related music and arts
events, and related goods and services.41
41 See First Amended Notice of Opposition, 17 TTABVUE 2-4, ¶¶ 1-7; Declaration of Jason
Bernstein, 18 TTABVUE 20, ¶ 7.

Opposition No. 91291853
14
IV. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is an appropriate method of disposing of cases in which there
are no genuine disputes as to material facts, thus allowing resolution as a matter of
law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The burden is on the party moving for summary
judgment to demonstrate the absence of any genuine dispute of material fact and that
it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In
considering the propriety of summary judgment, all evidence must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the non-movant, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn
in the non-movant’s favor. See Lloyd’s Food Prods., Inc. v. Eli’s, Inc., 987 F.2d 766,
767 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The Board does not resolve disputes of material fact when
determining a motion for summary judgment but rather only ascertains whether
disputes of material fact exist. See Univ. Book Store v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis.
Sys., No. 91084223, 1994 WL 747886, at *4 (TTAB 1994); see also Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) (“[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s
function is not … to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”).
When a moving party’s motion for summary judgment is supported by evidence
sufficient to indicate that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the
non-moving party to demonstrate the existence of at least one genuine dispute as to
a material fact that requires resolution at trial. The non-moving party may not rest
on the mere allegations of its pleadings and assertions of counsel, but must designate

Opposition No. 91291853
15
specific portions of the record or produce additional evidence showing the existence
of a genuine dispute of material fact for trial. Consequently, factual assertions
without evidentiary support are insufficient to defend against a motion for summary
judgment. See, e.g., Hornblower & Weeks Inc. v. Hornblower & Weeks Inc., No.
91110043, 2001 WL 1512024, at *8 (TTAB 2001) (“[A]pplicant has produced no
evidence, or raised any expectation that at trial it could produce evidence ....”); see
also Johnston v. Ivac Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“In light of IVAC’s
evidence that limitations of the claims could not be found in its devices at all, AMEC
had the burden of coming forward with sufficient countering evidence. Mere assertion
of similarity in the accused and patented devices is insufficient to create a genuine
factual issue.”).
Nonetheless, the burden of the non-movant to respond arises only if the summary
judgment motion itself is properly supported. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 160-61 (1970). If the summary judgment motion is not properly supported,
“summary judgment must be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is
presented.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes to the 1963
amendments).
A party may submit affidavits or declarations in support of, or in opposition to, a
motion for summary judgment, provided that the declarations are “made on personal
knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the
affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(4); Ava Ruha Corp. v. Mother’s Nutritional Ctr., Inc., No. 92056067, 2015 WL

Opposition No. 91291853
16
496141, at *2 (TTAB 2015). This is so even though affidavits and declarations are
self-serving in nature and there is no opportunity for cross-examination of the affiant
or declarant. See Paris Glove of Can. Ltd. v. SBC/Sporto Corp., No. 92044132, 2007
WL 2422997, at *9 n.8 (TTAB 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Safer, Inc. v. OMS
Invs., Inc., No. 91176445, 2010 WL 985355 (TTAB 2010). Moreover, an affiant or
declarant may testify based on his or her personal knowledge from a review of the
contents of files and records. Ava Ruha Corp., 2015 WL 496141, at *2. Even if not
supported by documentary evidence, an affidavit or declaration may nevertheless be
given consideration if the statements contained therein are clear and uncontradicted.
See, e.g., See Liqwacon Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., No. 91058871, 1979 WL
24857, at *15 (TTAB 1979); GAF Corp. v. Anatox Analytical Servs., Inc., No.
91056180, 1976 WL 21153, at *1 (TTAB 1976). The Board will not presume missing
facts, and conclusory assertions in declarations are not sufficient to support or
undermine a claim. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89 (1990). If the
affidavit or declaration raises a genuine dispute of material fact, the Board must deny
the motion for summary judgment. Olde Tyme Foods, Inc. v. Roundy’s, Inc., 961 F.2d
200, 202 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
V. Opposer’s Motion for Summary Judgment
A. The Parties’ Arguments and Evidence
Opposer asserts that there is no dispute of material fact that no documentary
evidence exists to demonstrate Applicant’s bona fide intent to use the SLAYCHELLA
mark in commerce in association with any of the goods or services identified in her

Opposition No. 91291853
17
application as of the application’s filing date, and Opposer is therefore entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
Opposer first argues that the screenshots of Applicant’s website fail to evidence
Applicant’s bona fide intent to use the mark in association with the goods and services
identified in the application as of the application filing date. The SLAYCHELLA
application claims goods such as clothing, keychains, and coffee mugs, as well as
educational and entertainment services on a wide variety of topics including
harassment, fashion, self improvement, and legal education.42 However, Opposer
asserts that none of these goods or services are described or even alluded to on
Applicant’s draft website.43 Opposer notes that there is no link to or mention of a
store, nor is Applicant or any other featured individual wearing SLAYCHELLA
branded clothing or drinking out of a SLAYCHELLA branded cup.44 Opposer further
argues that there also is no mention of any seminar, class, or speaking event of any
kind, or news alert on the release of a podcast or blog or even where one could be
found.45 Opposer asserts that instead the screenshots use platitudes and buzzwords
to paint an amorphous picture of a state of self. Opposer argues that the screenshots
associate SLAYCHELLA with “a transformative state of…self,” a place “where you
can redefine success on your own terms,” an invitation to “foster an environment
where innovation and individuality thrive,” and “a community bound by shared
42 Declaration of Steven E. Lauridsen, counsel for Opposer, 18 TTABVUE 73, ¶ 5 Ex. 6.
43 See id. at ¶ 6, Ex. 7.
44 Id.
45 Id.

Opposition No. 91291853
18
values, aspirations, and experiences” rather than goods or educational and
entertainment services.46
Opposer argues that, because the screenshots merely evidence an intent to reserve
a right in the mark, they do not evidence Applicant’s bona fide intent to use the mark
in commerce in connection with the goods and services identified in the
SLAYCHELLA application. Opposer further argues that, by demonstrating a lack of
documentary evidence concerning intent, it has shown that there is no genuine
dispute of material fact concerning intent, and as a result Opposer is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. In support of its motion Opposer has submitted the
declarations of Jason Bernstein, Vice President and Assistant General Counsel for
AEG Presents, LLC, the parent company of Opposer,47 and Steven E. Lauridsen,
counsel for Opposer.48
In response, Applicant has submitted her declaration49 and avers as follows.
Applicant is an employment law litigator with over 20 years of experience with a
particular focus on sexual harassment cases.50 Over the course of her career, she has
earned the nickname “the harassment slayer.”51 In May 2023, Applicant decided to
leave her law firm to join another.52
46 See id.
47 18 TTABVUE 19.
48 Id. at 72.
49 21 TTABVUE 19.
50 Id. at ¶ 2.
51 Id. at ¶ 3.
52 Id. at ¶ 4.

Opposition No. 91291853
19
In May of 2023, Applicant secured the domain name marjoriemesidor.com to
create a landing page for her media posts and general information about her.
Applicant hired a personal assistant to help her build a website.53 The initial
templates of the website were built by her assistant using WIX, a cloud-based
platform that allows a person to build professional websites without the need for
coding experience.54 Applicant avers that, at the outset, the plan was to build a
website that promoted Applicant as a subject matter expert, but Applicant also
wanted to develop her brand name that highlighted other services that were more
tangential to her legal professional services.55
Applicant decided on the name “Slaychella” for her brand that would promote her
other, non-legal services, including setting up workshops, speakers, and seminars
that focus on issues of harassment, as well as self-empowerment, since that is often
part of the healing process for a survivor of harassment.56 Applicant claims that the
reasons she selected the name are two-fold. First, Applicant wanted to build off her
original professional nickname, “the harassment slayer,” hence the name “slay.”
Second, Applicant wanted the brand to have a personal meaning as well, so she
selected “chella,” which was a nickname given to her by her childhood friends.57
Under this brand name, Applicant anticipated offering seminars and workshops
in the field of harassment, along with motivational speaking, podcasts, and
53 Id. at ¶ 4, Ex. A.
54 Id. at ¶ 5.
55 Id. at ¶ 6.
56 Id. at ¶ 7.
57 Id. at 20, ¶ 8.

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20
continuing legal education courses in the field of harassment.58 Applicant asserts that
the goods that she intended to offer under the SLAYCHELLA Mark are typical
merchandise products sold to promote and advertise the primary services offered
under a trademark.59
To protect her developing brand, Applicant filed an intent-to-use application on
August 9, 2023 seeking to register the SLAYCHELLA mark.60 At or around the same
time, Applicant’s assistant put together an initial draft of the website that would be
launched on marjoriemesidor.com. The website included a single page dedicated to
SLAYCHELLA for promoting self-empowerment, uniqueness, and community.61 This
subpage had a unique URL address of: www.marjoriemesidor.com/projects-8.
Applicant asserts that the term “Projects” serves as a clear indication of the
development of the webpage.62 The “Site History” from WIX associated with the
SLAYCHELLA page shows that the page was published on August 13, 2023.63
On August 28, 2023, as part of her rebranding process, Applicant sent her
colleagues, Susan Crumiller and Carrie Goldberg, a link to the website in progress,
www.marjoriemesidor.com, which displayed the SLAYCHELLA tab.64 Ms. Goldberg
gave specific feedback regarding the SLAYCHELLA page, and Applicant
acknowledged that SLAYCHELLA was related more to her cultural coaching than to
58 Id. at ¶ 9, Ex. B.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at ¶ 10.
62 Id.
63 Declaration of Adam Allen, owner of Lease My Marketing, 21 TTABVUE 50, ¶ 5.
64 Ulysse Decl., 21 TTABVUE 20, ¶ 11, Ex. C.

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21
legal services.65 After reviewing the website and considering feedback from Ms.
Goldberg, Applicant decided that the SLAYCHELLA portion was out of place and
needed its own website that would be separate and apart from the website dedicated
to her professional legal services.66 Accordingly, Applicant planned to build a separate
website focused on SLAYCHELLA, but her assistant was terminated in August 2023,
and Applicant had very little time to devote to the project given her then-current role
as a partner at her new firm.67 However, Applicant maintained the intent to develop
the SLAYCHELLA brand.68
In April 2024, Applicant decided to leave her firm and pursue her own practice.69
Shortly thereafter, Applicant hired the marketing company Lease My Marketing to
evaluate the existing draft website and to make necessary improvements, including
removing the SLAYCHELLA subpage and focusing on remaking the portions of the
website to better promote Applicant’s legal services.70 The official website,
www.marjoriemesidor.com, was launched around May of 2024, and at that time,
Applicant fully expected to shift focus to developing the SLAYCHELLA website and
brand.71
However, on June 3, 2024, Opposer commenced an opposition proceeding seeking
to prevent her from obtaining a registration for her mark, thereby derailing the plans
65 Id. at ¶ 11.
66 Id. at ¶ 12.
67 Id. at ¶ 13.
68 Id.
69 Id. at ¶ 14.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 21, ¶ 15.

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22
to move forward with the brand development.72 After the opposition was filed,
Applicant decided to delay spending any more money on developing the brand since
Applicant would now have to pay legal fees to respond to the opposition proceeding
and did not want to commit substantial sums of money to the brand until knowing
the outcome of the opposition proceeding.73
Outside of the website, Applicant has also utilized the mark SLAYCHELLA in
connection with her law firm retreat, which was held in Garden City, New York on
August 26-29, 2025.74 The name of the retreat was “Slaychella: Deliberate and
Unafraid,” and included a retreat program with the branding prominently
displayed.75
Subsequent to the filing of the Opposition, Applicant contacted Zavier Dinwiddie
and Adam Allen with Lease My Marketing, with whom Applicant had been working
on developing the www.marjariemesidor.com website and had control over and access
to the WIX account. Mr. Allen was asked to determine the dates of publication of the
SLAYCHELLA page published on www.marjoriemesidor.com. Mr. Allen accessed the
Site History of WIX, which indicated the SLAYCHELLA page was published on
August 13, 2023, and removed from the menu options on August 29, 2023.76
In its reply brief, Opposer argues that none of Applicant’s evidence establishes
bona fide intent. First, Opposer argues that Applicant’s declaration consists of mere
72 Id.
73 Id. at ¶ 16.
74 Id. at ¶ 17, Ex. D.
75 See id.
76 Allen Decl., 21 TTABVUE 50-51, ¶¶ 5-7.

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23
statements of subjective intention that, without more, are insufficient to establish
applicant’s bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce. Second, Opposer
contends that Applicant’s assertion that the screenshots of her draft SLAYCHELLA
subpage “clearly evidence an intent to use her Mark” is void of substantive argument.
Rather, Opposer argues that the draft webpage depicts nothing more than a vague
plan for, or conception of, how Applicant would actually use the SLAYCHELLA mark
in commerce. Opposer contends that Applicant has provided no arguments as to how
those screenshots depict her intent to use her mark in connection with the goods or
services listed in her application, and Opposer notes that Applicant testifies via
declaration that the website was built for her legal services. Finally, Opposer
contends that Applicant’s proffered “retreat booklet” for a firm retreat she allegedly
organized as evidence of her bona fide intent to use the SLAYCHELLA mark in
commerce is collateral at best because it is not contemporaneous with the filing of the
application.
Opposer further argues that the record does not sufficiently demonstrate
Applicant’s capacity to market or manufacture her claimed goods or services. Opposer
asserts that there is no evidence showing that Applicant has ever marketed or
manufactured drinkware, clothing, or keychains bearing the SLAYCHELLA mark or
any other mark. Regarding Applicant’s claimed services, Opposer argues that her “20-
years of experience as an employment law litigator,” her involvement in
“presentations and marketing to her client base and buil[ding] her own practice,” and
her internal firm retreat detailed in the retreat booklet do not demonstrate capacity

Opposition No. 91291853
24
because general statements of experience in an adjacent field do not suffice. Opposer
contends that Applicant’s reliance on her alleged legal experience, without more,
provides no explanation how Applicant’s experience demonstrates her ability to
market her services in commerce. Opposer argues that Applicant’s vague and unclear
statements of her experience in the legal profession, as opposed to a history of
providing educational and speaking services, producing podcasts and online-journals,
or selling branded products, do not sufficiently show marketing capacity.
B. Analysis
1. Entitlement to a Statutory Cause of Action
In every Board inter partes case, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that it is
entitled to a statutory cause of action under Sections 13 or 14 of the Trademark Act.
To establish such entitlement, a plaintiff must plead, and later prove, a real interest
in the proceeding where the opposition or cancellation is within the zone of interests
protected by statute, and a reasonable belief in damage that is proximately caused by
continued registration of the mark. Corcamore, LLC v. SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d 1298.
1303-04 (Fed. Cir. 2020); see also Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753
F.3d 1270, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The purpose of the requirement to show entitlement
in Board proceedings is “to prevent litigation where there is no real controversy
between the parties, where a plaintiff, petitioner or opposer, is no more than an
intermeddler.” Lipton Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 1028-29
(CCPA 1982).

Opposition No. 91291853
25
Opposer has submitted eleven registrations for the marks COACHELLA,
COACHELLA VALLEY MUSIC AND ARTS FESTIVAL, and CHELLA,77 and these
pleaded registrations form the basis of Opposer’s likelihood of confusion claim, thus
establishing entitlement to oppose the SLAYCHELLA application. Cunningham v.
Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 945 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Specifically, ownership of these
registrations establishes both an interest in similar marks, such as that which
Applicant seeks to register, and a reasonable belief in damage should the
SLAYCHELLA mark be registered. See Corcamore, 978 F.3d at 1304-07. Accordingly,
Opposer has standing to bring this opposition. Applicant does not challenge Opposer’s
entitlement to a statutory cause of action.78
Having found that Opposer is entitled to oppose, we must determine if there are
genuine disputes of material fact regarding Opposer’s claim of no bona fide intent to
use her applied-for mark in commerce.79
77 Bernstein Decl., 18 TTABVUE 20, ¶ 8, Ex. 3 (TSDR pages and registration certificates for
Opposer’s asserted registrations).
78 Once a plaintiff has shown entitlement to a statutory cause of action on one ground, it has
the right to assert any other ground in a cancellation proceeding. Hole In 1 Drinks, Inc. v.
Lajtay, No. 92065860, 2020 WL 859853, at *4 (TTAB 2020). Because Opposer has
demonstrated its entitlement to its statutory cause of action on its likelihood of confusion
claim, it may therefore assert its claim of no bona fide intent to use.
79 Proof of entitlement to a statutory cause of action is an element of Opposer’s case-in-chief
and is required at trial. See Lipton Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 1028
(CCPA 1982). A plaintiff must prove entitlement to a statutory cause of action for the entirety
of the proceeding, from commencement until the end. El Roblar Inv. Prop. LLC v. Roe, No.
91272200, 2025 WL 2718983, at *22 (TTAB 2025) (citing Philanthropist.com, Inc. v. Gen.
Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, No. 92065178, 2021 WL 2472776, at *4 (TTAB 2021)).

Opposition No. 91291853
26
2. No Bona Fide Intent to Use in Commerce
Trademark Act Section 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), states that “a person who has a
bona fide intention, under circumstances showing the good faith of such person, to
use a trademark in commerce” may apply for registration of the mark. A
determination of whether an applicant has a bona fide intention to use the mark in
commerce is an objective determination based on all the circumstances. L’Oreal S.A.
v. Marcon, No. 91184456, 2012 WL 1267956, at *11 (TTAB 2012). Where there is no
evidence of an applicant’s bona fide intent to use the mark at issue on the claimed
goods or services as of the filing date of the application, entry of summary judgment
on a claim that the applicant had no bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce
when it filed its involved application may be warranted. See Honda Motor Co. v.
Winkelmann, No. 91170552, 2009 WL 962810, at *2 (TTAB 2009). “To raise a genuine
issue of material fact, applicant must rely on specific facts that establish the existence
of an ability and willingness to use the mark in the United States to identify its
claimed [goods and services] at the time of the filing of the application.” Id. at *4.
The evidentiary bar for showing bona fide intent to use is not high, but more is
required than “a mere subjective belief.” M.Z. Berger & Co. v. Swatch AG, 787 F.3d
1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The objective evidence must indicate an intention to use
the mark that is “firm” and “demonstrable.” Id. at 1375-76. In other words,
Applicant’s evidence bearing on her bona fide intent must be “objective” in the sense
that it is evidence in the form of real-life facts and by the actions of Applicant, not
solely by Applicant’s uncorroborated testimony as to her subjective state of mind.

Opposition No. 91291853
27
Applicant’s “mere statement of subjective intention, without more, would be
insufficient to establish [her] bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce.” Lane
Ltd. v. Jackson Int’l Trading Co., No. 91092025, 1994 WL 740491, at *6 (TTAB 1994).
Further, as the Board has held, the mere act of filing an intent-to-use application is
insufficient to establish an applicant’s bona fide intention to use its mark in
commerce for the identified goods or services. Rsch. in Motion Ltd. v. NBOR Corp.,
No. 91179284, 2009 WL 4694941, at *5 (TTAB 2009).
An applicant’s ability, capacity, resources, and knowledge with respect to
producing or providing the goods and services claimed in its application is an
important consideration in determining its bona fide intent to use a mark. See Swatch
AG v. M. Z. Berger & Co., No. 91187092, 2013 WL 5655834, at *15 (TTAB 2013) (“[W]e
have previously stated, and hereby reaffirm, that an applicant’s capacity to market
and/or manufacture the identified goods is evidence that weighs against a finding
that an applicant lacked bona fide intent to use.”), aff’d, 787 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2015); cf. Lincoln Nat’l Corp. v. Anderson, No. 91192939, 2014 WL 879506, at *9
(TTAB 2014) (applicant found not to have the ability, resources, or knowledge to
provide his broadly identified services and thus lacked bona fide intent to use).
Based upon our review of the parties’ arguments and the evidence of record, and
drawing all justifiable inferences in favor of Applicant, the non-movant, we find that
there exists a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Applicant had a bona
fide intent to use the applied-for mark in commerce in connection with the services
identified in Class 41 on the date she filed her application. As a general rule, the

Opposition No. 91291853
28
factual question of intent regarding the filing an intent-to-use application is unsuited
to disposition on summary judgment. See Commodore Elecs. Ltd. v. CBM K.K., No.
91086336, 1993 WL 156479, at *5 (TTAB 1993) (citing Copelands’ Enters., Inc. v.
CNV, Inc., 945 F.2d 1563, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). Moreover, the standard of proof for
summary judgment, i.e., the absence of a genuine dispute of any material fact, is more
stringent than the preponderance of evidence standard for trial. See Anheuser-Busch,
LLC v. Innvopak Sys. Pty Ltd., No. 91194148, 2015 WL 5316485, at *6 n.6 (TTAB
2015).
Here, Applicant has provided testimony by way of her declaration and depictions
of her website which evidence a dispute of material fact regarding her intent to use
her mark in connection with her identified services in Class 41. While the record does
not show that Applicant took concrete steps to launch all of the services in her
application, it does not necessarily indicate the absence of a genuine dispute of
material fact that Applicant lacked a bona fide intent to use her mark in commerce
in connection with the identified services as of the application filing date. See Monster
Energy Co. v. Tom & Martha LLC, No. 91250710, 2021 WL 5822294, at *8 (TTAB
2021). Applicant’s affidavit therefore is sufficient to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether Applicant possessed the requisite bona fide intent to use
the subject mark in commerce in connection with her Class 41 services when she filed
the involved application. Opposer’s motion for summary judgment with regard to
Applicant’s services in Class 41 therefore is DENIED.

Opposition No. 91291853
29
In contrast, with regard to Applicant’s identified goods in Classes 14, 21 and 25,
Applicant has failed to provide any evidence at all of an intent to use her mark in
connection with these goods. Applicant asserts that “[t]he goods that Applicant
intended to offer under the SLAYCHELLA Mark are typical merchandise products
sold to promote and advertise the primary services offered under a trademark.”80
Although Applicant references Paragraph 9 of her declaration in support of this
assertion, her declaration makes no mention of these goods,81 and Applicant has not
otherwise provided any evidence supporting her bona fide intent to use her mark in
connection with the identified goods in Classes 14, 21 and 25. See Cai v. Diamond
Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Attorney argument is no substitute
for evidence.”) (citation omitted). As a result, Opposer’s motion for summary
judgment on its claim of no bona fide intent to use Applicant’s mark in connection
with the identified goods in Classes 14, 21 and 25 is GRANTED.
To summarize, Opposer’s motion for summary judgment on its claim of lack of
bona fide intent to use the mark is GRANTED in connection with Applicant’s goods
in Classes 14, 21 and 25, and is DENIED with regard to Applicant’s services in Class
41.
VI. Applicant’s Cross-motion for Summary Judgment
A. The Parties’ Arguments and Evidence
Applicant asserts that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to likelihood
of confusion in this case. Applicant argues that, under the likelihood of confusion
80 21 TTABVUE 4.
81 See Ulysse Decl., 21 TTABVUE 20, ¶ 9.

Opposition No. 91291853
30
factors set forth in In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA
1973) (“DuPont”), no likelihood of confusion can be found as a matter of law, as
Opposer’s COACHELLA registrations are weak, the parties’ marks are vastly
dissimilar, and the parties’ goods and services are marketed to completely different
consumers.
Applicant first argues that Opposer’s COACHELLA marks are weak
geographically descriptive marks entitled to a narrow scope of protection and that
Opposer has admitted that the relative fame of its marks stems almost entirely from
the associations with its music festival. Applicant further asserts that differences
exist in sound, appearance, and commercial impression between the respective
marks. Finally, Applicant argues that several other parties are using the “Coachella”
mark to emphasize the source of its goods and services as emanating from the
Coachella Valley in California, further underscoring that “Coachella” is a weak term
and that Opposer’s Coachella Registrations are entitled only to a narrow scope of
protection. Applicant also provides fourteen third party registrations in support of
this assertion.82 Applicant further contends that the respective services of the parties
are not related and marketed to different consumers.
In support of her assertions Applicant has submitted her declaration,83 the
declaration of Adam Allen, owner of Lease My Marketing,84 and the declaration of
Adriano Pacifici, counsel for Applicant.85
82 See Pacifici decl., 22 TTABVUE 56, ¶ 4, Exs. C and D.
83 Declaration of Marjorie Ulysse, 22 TTABVUE 22.
84 22 TTABVUE 53.
85 Id. at 56.

Opposition No. 91291853
31
In response, Opposer argues that its COACHELLA marks are strong and famous,
as Opposer has extensively advertised and promoted its COACHELLA marks over
the past twenty-five years, and Opposer’s music festival has enjoyed extensive third-
party media coverage.86 Opposer further argues that its COACHELLA marks and
Applicant’s SLAYCHELLA mark are similar in appearance, sound and meaning, and
that Applicant has failed to show there is no dispute of material fact concerning the
relatedness of the services. In support of its assertions Opposer has submitted the
declaration of Jason Bernstein, Vice President and Assistant General Counsel for
AEG Presents, LLC, parent company of Opposer,87 and the declaration of Steven E.
Lauridsen, counsel for Opposer.88
B. Analysis
In determining the issue of likelihood of confusion and whether there is any
genuine dispute of material fact, we consider all of the DuPont factors for which there
is evidence and argument. See DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361; see also In re Mighty Leaf
Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Not all of the DuPont factors are relevant
to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be
considered.”); Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 946 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(same).
On this record, drawing all justifiable inferences in favor of Opposer, the non-
moving party, we find that Applicant has not carried her burden of establishing that
86 See Bernstein Decl., 25 TTABVUE 29-33, ¶¶ 5-25.
87 25 TTABVUE 29.
88 Id. at 288.

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32
no genuine disputes of material fact exist regarding this claim. Upon careful
consideration of the parties’ declarations, evidence, and arguments, we find, at a
minimum, that there are at least genuine disputes of material fact regarding the
similarity or dissimilarity of the parties’ respective marks; the relatedness of the
services as described in the applications and registrations; and the conditions under
which and buyers to whom sales are made. Thus, Applicant’s motion for summary
judgment on the claim of likelihood of confusion is DENIED.89
VII. Applicant’s Motion to Amend Application
Applicant’s opposed motion for leave to amend her application without consent is
DENIED AS MOOT with regard to deletion of the goods in Classes 14, 21, and 25,
and DEFERRED with regard to amendment of the services in Class 41 until final
decision. See Heil Co. v. Tripleye GmbH, No. 91277359, 2024 WL 4925901, at *39
(TTAB 2024) (unconsented motion to amend identification of goods and services
deferred until trial), appeal dismissed, 2025 WL 401210 (Fed. Cir. 2025); TBMP
§ 514.03.
VIII. Proceedings Resumed
Proceedings are resumed. Discovery and trial dates are reset as follows:
Expert Disclosures Due 11/21/2026
Discovery Closes 12/21/2026
89 The fact that we have identified in this order only a few material facts that are genuinely
in dispute should not be construed as a finding that these are necessarily the only issues that
remain for trial. The parties are also reminded that evidence submitted in support of or in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment is of record only for consideration of that
motion. To be considered at final hearing, any such evidence must be properly introduced
during the appropriate trial period. See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. R. Joseph Sportswear Inc.,
No. 91081072, 1993 WL 444262, at *1 n.2 (TTAB 1993); TBMP § 528.05(a).

Opposition No. 91291853
33
Plaintiff’s Pretrial Disclosures Due 2/4/2027
Plaintiff’s 30-day Trial Period Ends 3/21/2027
Defendant’s Pretrial Disclosures Due 4/5/2027
Defendant’s 30-day Trial Period Ends 5/20/2027
Plaintiff’s Rebuttal Disclosures Due 6/4/2027
Plaintiff’s 15-day Rebuttal Period Ends 7/4/2027
Plaintiff’s Opening Brief Due 9/2/2027
Defendant’s Brief Due 10/2/2027
Plaintiff’s Reply Brief Due 10/17/2027
Request for Oral Hearing (optional) Due 10/27/2027
Generally, the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to Board trials. Trial testimony is
taken and introduced out of the presence of the Board during the assigned testimony
periods. The parties may stipulate to a wide variety of matters, and many
requirements relevant to the trial phase of Board proceedings are set forth in
Trademark Rules 2.121 through 2.125. These include pretrial disclosures, matters in
evidence, the manner and timing of taking testimony, and the procedures for
submitting and serving testimony and other evidence, including affidavits,
declarations, deposition transcripts and stipulated evidence. Trial briefs shall be
submitted in accordance with Trademark Rules 2.128(a) and (b). Oral argument at
final hearing will be scheduled only upon the timely submission of a separate notice
as allowed by Trademark Rule 2.129(a).