Shanghai Y&A Garment Co., Ltd. v. Mango Republic LLC

Mailed: September 3, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
———
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
———
Shanghai Y&A Garment Co., Ltd.
v.
Mango Republic LLC
______
Cancellation No. 92086279
______
Norman R. Van Treeck of Pasadena Legal Group,
for Shanghai Y&A Garment Co., Ltd.
Gregory Kenyota of Patel IP PC,
for Mango Republic LLC.
———
Before Wellington, Elgin, and Lavache,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Lavache, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Petitioner Shanghai Y&A Garment Co., Ltd. petitions to cancel Respondent
Mango Republic LLC’s registration on the Principal Register for the standard-
character mark ZOCY for “jump ropes,” in International Class 28.1
1 Registration No. 7254997, issued on December 26, 2023. The registration includes the
following translation statement: “The wording ‘ZOCY’ has no meaning in a foreign language.”
THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB

Cancellation No. 92086279
2
The petition for cancellation claims two grounds for cancellation. The first claim
is fraud under Trademark Act Section 14(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3), based on Petitioner’s
allegation that Respondent falsely claimed use of its ZOCY mark in connection with
the identified goods as of the underlying application’s filing date.2 The second claim
is nonuse under Trademark Act Sections 1(a) and 14(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051(a), 1064(1),
based on Petitioner’s allegation that Respondent was not using the mark in
connection with the identified goods as of the underlying application’s filing date.3
Respondent’s answer to the petition for cancellation denies almost all of
Petitioner’s allegations, but admits that:
• Respondent filed Application Serial No. 97726283 on December 21, 2022,
seeking registration of the mark ZOCY and claiming the mark was first
used anywhere, and first used in commerce, at least as early as June 19,
2018; and
• Respondent’s attorney at the time represented in the application that
Respondent was using the applied-for mark in U.S. commerce in connection
with the identified goods and that the submitted specimens showed the
applied-for mark in use in connection with those identified goods.4
The underlying application, Serial No. 97726283, was filed on December 21, 2022, based on
an allegation of use in commerce under Trademark Act Section 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a),
claiming June 19, 2018, as both the date of first use anywhere and the date of first use in
commerce.
2 Petition for Cancellation, 1 TTABVUE 4-5.
Citations to the record refer to TTABVUE, the Board’s online docketing system. The number
preceding “TTABVUE” corresponds to the docket entry number, and any numbers following
“TTABVUE” refer to the page numbers of the docket entry where the cited materials appear.
3 See id. at 6.
4 See Respondent’s Answer, 5 TTABVUE 3; see also Petition for Cancellation, 1 TTABVUE 4
(containing the allegations Respondent admitted to). Respondent’s Answer also included
purported “affirmative defenses,” see 5 TTABVUE 4, but they are more accurately
characterized as amplifications of denials of Petitioner’s allegations concerning its
entitlement to a statutory cause of action, and we have treated them as such. See Mars
Generation, Inc. v. Carson, No. 91224726, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 386, at *4 (indicating that
amplifications of denials are not true affirmative defenses).

Cancellation No. 92086279
3
Petitioner filed a brief,5 but Respondent did not (nor was it required to do so). See
Trademark Rule 2.128(a)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.128(a)(1) (indicating that only the plaintiff
is required to file a brief); Yazhong Investing Ltd. v. Multi-Media Tech. Ventures, Ltd.,
No. 92056548, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 168, at *12 n.13 (“Because Respondent, as
defendant herein, is under no obligation to submit evidence or a brief, we do not
construe Respondent’s failure to do so as a concession of the case.”); see also TBMP
§ 801.02(b) (“The filing of a brief on the case is optional, not mandatory, for a party
in the position of defendant.”).
As explained below, we deny the petition as to both claims because Petitioner has
failed to establish its entitlement to a statutory cause of action.
I. The Record
The record includes the pleadings and, by rule, Respondent’s involved registration
file. See Trademark Rule 2.122(b)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(b)(1).6 Neither party
submitted any evidence or testimony during their respective testimony periods. See
Trademark Rule 2.121(a), 37 C.F.R. § 2.121(a) (“The Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board will issue a trial order . . . assigning to each party its time for taking testimony
and presenting evidence (‘testimony period’). No testimony shall be taken or evidence
5 Petitioner’s Brief, 12 TTABVUE. The text of Petitioner’s brief features 1.5 line spacing, but
Trademark Rule 2.126(a)(1) requires double-spaced text. 37 C.F.R. § 2.126(a)(1); see also
TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (TBMP) § 801.03 (2026).
Nonetheless, we have considered the brief because, if the text were double-spaced, it would
not exceed the 55-page limit for briefs prescribed by Trademark Rule 2.128(b). See L’Oreal
S.A. v. Marcon, No. 91184456, 2012 TTAB LEXIS 77, at *4 n.4 (exercising discretion to
consider a brief that did not technically comply with Board’s rules).
6 Because the registration file for Registration No. 7254997 is automatically part of the record
under Trademark Rule 2.122(b)(1), Petitioner need not have attached exhibits consisting of
documents from the registration file to the petition for cancellation.

Cancellation No. 92086279
4
presented except during the times assigned, unless [otherwise approved by the
Board].”).
Petitioner attempted to introduce evidence by attaching it to its brief.7 However,
because this evidence was not properly introduced during its assigned testimony
period, we have not considered it. See Hole in 1 Drinks, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 9, at *5
(“The Board will not consider evidence and other evidentiary materials attached to
the briefs unless they were properly made of record during the time assigned for
taking testimony.”); see also TBMP § 704.05(b).
II. Petitioner’s Motion for Default Judgment
Petitioner included a “motion for default judgment” in its brief,8 arguing that
“[t]he well-pleaded factual allegations of the Petition are . . . deemed admitted,”
because, inter alia, Respondent failed to file a timely answer to the notice of
institution of the cancellation proceeding.9 However, this motion is unfounded
because Respondent filed an answer denying the relevant allegations on October 21,
2024—well within the provided 40-day deadline.10 Therefore, contrary to Petitioner’s
contentions, the allegations in the petition to cancel are not deemed admitted for
failure to file an answer, and Petitioner’s “motion for default judgment” is denied.
7 Petitioner’s Brief, 12 TTABVUE 17-26.
8 Id. at 6-8.
9 Id. at 7.
10 Respondent’s Answer, 5 TTABVUE. Petitioner is also mistaken in stating that
Respondent’s attorney “has made no appearance on Respondent’s behalf.” Petitioner’s Brief,
12 TTABVUE 7. Although it was not required, Respondent’s attorney filed an “Entry of
Appearance of Counsel” on the same day Respondent’s Answer was filed. See
Appearance/Power of Attorney, 4 TTABVUE.

Cancellation No. 92086279
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III. Petitioner’s Entitlement to a Statutory Cause of Action
Establishing an entitlement to a statutory cause of action is a threshold
requirement in every inter partes case. See Corcamore, LLC v. SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d
1298, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Australian Therapeutic Supplies Pty. Ltd. v. Naked TM,
LLC, 965 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Thus, Petitioner, as plaintiff in this
cancellation proceeding, must plead and prove its entitlement to a statutory cause of
action under Trademark Act Section 14, 15 U.S.C. § 1064. See, e.g., Meenaxi Enter. v.
Coca-Cola Co., 38 F.4th 1067, 1071-72 (Fed. Cir. 2022); Lipton Indus. v. Ralston
Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 1028 (CCPA 1982) (indicating that “standing,” now
referred to as “statutory entitlement,” must be both properly pleaded and proved);
Philanthropist.com, Inc. v. Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, No. 92065178,
2021 TTAB LEXIS 205, at *4 (“Petitioner must maintain its entitlement to the
statutory cause of action throughout the proceeding and affirmatively prove its
existence at the time of trial by introducing evidence to support the allegations in its
pleading that relate to such entitlement as an element of its case-in-chief.”), aff’d
mem., No. 2021-2208, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 21811 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 8, 2022).
To establish an entitlement to a statutory cause of action, Petitioner must allege
and demonstrate that it has: (1) an interest falling within the zone of interests
protected by the statute, i.e., a direct and personal stake in the outcome of a
cancellation proceeding; and (2) a reasonable belief in damage proximately caused by
the registration of the mark in violation of the statute. Curtin v. United Trademark
Holdings, Inc., 137 F.4th 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.

Cancellation No. 92086279
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Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 129-134 (2014)), cert. denied, __ U.S.
__ (Apr. 20, 2026) (No. 25-435); Corcamore, 978 F.3d at 1304-07.
In the petition for cancellation, Petitioner alleges, in relevant part, the following:
Petitioner is in the business of the e-commerce industry. In connection
with this business, Petitioner offers for sale and provides various goods
including jump ropes.
Petitioner is planning to file an application to register the “ZOCY” mark
in connection with the goods of jump ropes.
Because Petitioner is in the business of offering the goods identified in
the . . . Registration, namely jump ropes, and is using the “ZOCY” mark
in connection with these goods, the continued validity of the . . .
Registration interferes with the Petitioner’s current business. Petitioner
therefore has a real interest in seeking cancellation of the . . .
Registration and the entitlement to a statutory cause of action to bring
this action.11
Addressing entitlement in its brief, Petitioner reiterates these allegations, stating:
Petitioner sells jump ropes through e-commerce channels in direct
competition with Respondent’s claimed use, and is planning to file a U.S.
trademark application to register the ZOCY mark for jump ropes,
precisely the mark and goods covered by the . . . Registration. The
continued existence of the . . . Registration directly harms Petitioner by
blocking its ability to register the mark, potentially exposing it to
infringement claims, and impairing its right to use a mark it has
legitimately adopted. Petitioner therefore has both a real interest in this
proceeding and a reasonable basis for believing it has been and will
continue to be damaged.
However, Petitioner has not properly made of record any evidence that would
support these allegations.12 See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 424 F.3d 1276,
11 Petition for Cancellation, 1 TTABVUE 3-4.
12 As discussed in Section I, supra, the evidence attached to Petitioner’s brief is untimely and
improperly submitted; thus, we have not considered it. See Hole in 1 Drinks, 2020 TTAB
LEXIS 9, at *4; see also TBMP § 704.05(b).

Cancellation No. 92086279
7
1284 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Attorney argument is no substitute for evidence.”); In re
Simulations Publ’ns, Inc., 521 F.2d 797, 798 (CCPA 1975) (“Statements in a brief
cannot take the place of evidence.”). Again, the record here consists only of
Respondent’s involved registration file and the parties’ pleadings. And Respondent’s
answer does not contain any admissions that would establish Petitioner’s entitlement
to a statutory cause of action. On the contrary, Respondent specifically denies
Petitioner’s allegations concerning entitlement.13
Generally, the requirement to establish an entitlement to a statutory cause of
action is “a low threshold, intended only to ensure that the plaintiff has a real interest
in the matter, and is not a mere intermeddler.” Univ. of Ky. v. 40-0, LLC, No.
91224310, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 68, at *14. Nonetheless, given Petitioner’s failure to
provide any evidence of its entitlement to a statutory cause of action, let alone
establish a preponderance of the evidence, we find Petitioner unsuccessful in crossing
even that low threshold. See, e.g., Melwani v. Allegiance Corp., No. 91190682, 2010
TTAB LEXIS 443, at *20 (“[O]pposer does not have standing in this proceeding
because there is neither an admission of standing by applicant nor record evidence
that otherwise establishes opposer’s standing.”).
Petitioner’s failure to establish its entitlement to a statutory cause of action is, by
itself, a sufficient basis to deny the petition for cancellation. See Curtin, 137 F.4th at
1371-1372 (affirming Board’s dismissal of an opposition based on lack of entitlement
alone); Lumiere Prods., Inc. v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., No. 91066857, 1985 TTAB
13 Respondent’s Answer, 5 TTABVUE 2, 4.

Cancellation No. 92086279
8
LEXIS 42, at *3 (dismissing opposition based on opposer’s lack of standing). We
therefore do not reach the substance of Petitioner’s fraud and nonuse claims.14
Decision: The petition for cancellation of the mark ZOCY is denied.
14 We note that, even if Petitioner had proved its entitlement to a cause of action, the limited
evidence properly of record does not prove any of the elements of the claims of fraud or
nonuse. Thus, Petitioner’s claims must fail on that basis as well. See Boyds Collection, Ltd.
v. Herrington & Co., No. 92032146, 2003 TTAB LEXIS 11, at *11 (“Because petitioner bears
the burden of proof, it is axiomatic that without admissible evidence, it cannot prevail.”);
Lumiere Prods., 1985 TTAB LEXIS 42, at *3 (noting that opposition would have failed on the
merits even if standing had been proved). The record does include the specimens of use that
Respondent submitted in support of registration, which Petitioner alleges are “mockup
specimens, not genuine evidence of use in U.S. commerce.” Petitioner’s Brief, 12 TTABVUE
10. Petitioner argues that a visual examination of the specimens themselves shows that they
are mockups and lists the reasons it believes that they do not show actual use in commerce.
Id. But the specimens by themselves, without evidence in support of Petitioner’s allegations,
are insufficient to prove that the mark was not in use in commerce or that Respondent
engaged in fraud to obtain registration.