Guavacom, LLC

THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Mailed: August 26, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Guavacom, LLC
_____
Serial No. 99102537
_____
Guavacom, LLC, pro se.1
Benji Paradewelai, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 101,
Zachary Sparer, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Wellington, Allard, Cohen,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Allard, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Guavacom, LLC (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
mark for “Downloadable video game software; Recorded video game
1 Documents were filed by Robert Lipscomb, its Principal. See March 25, 2025 Application at
2.
Page references herein to the application record refer to the online database of the USPTO’s
Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) system. All citations to documents
contained in the TSDR database are to the downloadable .pdf versions of the documents in
the USPTO TSDR Case Viewer.

Serial No. 99102537
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software; Downloadable computer game software; Recorded computer game software;
Compact discs featuring music; Downloadable music files,” in International Class 9.2
Registration is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d), on the ground that Applicant’s mark, when used on or with the goods
identified above, so resembles the mark GUAVA JUICE (in standard characters)
registered on the Principal Register, for “Computer game software, computer game
programs, computer game software that may be downloaded from a global computer
network; downloadable computer and video game software in the nature of mobile
applications for playing games on mobile devices such as tablet computers and mobile
phones,” in International Class 9,3 that it is likely to cause confusion, to cause
mistake, or to deceive.
After the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed and requested
reconsideration.4 The Board suspended the appeal and remanded the application to
2 Application Serial No. 99102537 was filed on March 25, 2025 under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), based on Applicant’s intent to use the mark in
commerce. The mark is described as “consist[ing] of the word, ‘GUAVACOM’, which is
underlined by two curved lines. On the left-hand side, the top curved line is thicker than the
bottom one. Both curved lines gradually become thinner as they reach the right-hand side of
the logo. In the word, ‘GUAVACOM’, the letter ‘A’ is partially disconnected.”
3 Registration No. 6148001 issued on September 8, 2020.
4 1 TTABVUE; December 22, 2025 Request for Reconsideration after Final. The Request for
Reconsideration lists over seventy exhibits (Exhibits A-BU). However, Exhibits AP and AQ
are missing.
References to TTABVUE refer to the Board’s online docketing system. The number preceding
“TTABVUE” corresponds to the docket entry number; the number(s) following “TTABVUE”
refer to the page number(s) of that particular docket entry. Applicant is encouraged to use
this citation format in any subsequent filings. See TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (“TBMP”) § 106.03 (2026) and authorities cited therein.

Serial No. 99102537
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the Examining Attorney to consider the request for reconsideration.5 After the
Examining Attorney denied the request for reconsideration, the appeal resumed.6
The appeal is fully briefed.7 We affirm the refusal.
I. Evidentiary Issue
Applicant attached to its appeal brief over 300 pages of material, all of which
appears to have been previously made of record.8 The Examining Attorney does not
object to this evidence or even address it at all. Regardless, if this material was made
of record during examination, it should not have been refiled with the brief. In re
Black Card LLC, No. 90641690, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 478, at *5-6 (TTAB 2023)
(discouraging attaching evidence to briefs that has been previously made of record);
In re Lorillard Licensing Co., No. 76680117, 2011 TTAB LEXIS 206, at *4 (TTAB
2011) (same). To the extent that any materials were not previously submitted, they
are untimely and will not be considered. Trademark Rule 2.142(d); 37 CFR § 2.142(d).
Accordingly, in this decision we do not cite to the evidence attached to Applicant’s
brief and instead rely solely on evidence timely made of record during examination.
II. Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits the registration of a mark that
“[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent
5 2 TTABVUE.
6 4, 5 TTABVUE; see also January 9, 2026 Denial of Request for Reconsideration.
7 Applicant’s brief appears at 6 TTABVUE, the Examining Attorney’s brief appears at 8
TTABVUE, and Applicant’s reply brief appears at 9 TTABVUE.
8 6 TTABVUE 26-348.

Serial No. 99102537
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and Trademark Office … as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods
of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ….” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d). We assess the likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) based on the
factors set forth in In re E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA
1973) (“DuPont”). When analyzing these factors, the overriding concerns are not only
to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods or services, but also to protect
the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a
newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
In any likelihood of confusion analysis, we consider each DuPont factor for which
there is evidence and argument. See In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2019). Varying weights may be assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the
evidence presented. See Citigroup Inc. v. Cap. City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344,
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Shell Oil, 992 F.2d at 1206 (“[T]he various evidentiary
factors may play more or less weighty roles in any particular determination.”). “Each
case must be decided on its own facts and the differences are often subtle ones.” Indus.
Nucleonic’s Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d 1197, 1199 (CCPA 1973).
In every Section 2(d) case, two key factors are the similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks and the relatedness of the goods or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, LLC, 866
F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d
1156, 1164-65 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544
F.2d 1098, 1103 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to

Serial No. 99102537
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the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and
differences in the marks.”). These factors and others are addressed below.
A. Similarity or Dissimilarity and Nature of the Goods, Similarity or
Dissimilarity of Established and Likely-to-Continue Channels of
Trade and Classes of Purchasers
We begin with the second DuPont factor, which considers the similarity or
dissimilarity of Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods as they are identified in the
involved application and cited registration. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d
1297, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous. Comput. Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d
937, 942-43 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
The Examining Attorney need not prove, and we need not find, similarity as to
each item listed in the description of goods in the application. “It is sufficient for a
finding of likelihood of confusion if relatedness is established for any item
encompassed in the identification of goods in a particular class in an application.” In
re Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla, No. 90522364, 2025 TTAB LEXIS 412, at *9 (TTAB
2025) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336
(CCPA 1981)).
Applicant’s identified “Downloadable computer game software” is broad enough to
encompass all goods of the type described, including Registrant’s more narrowly
identified “downloadable computer and video game software in the nature of mobile
applications for playing games on mobile devices such as tablet computers and mobile
phones.” Similarly, Applicant’s “Downloadable computer game software” is broad
enough to encompass Registrant’s identified “computer game software that may be

Serial No. 99102537
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downloaded from a global computer network.” Consequently, we find Applicant’s and
Registrant’s goods to be legally identical in-part. See e.g., In re Hughes Furniture
Indus., No. 85627379, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 65, at *10 (TTAB 2015) (Because
Applicant’s broadly worded identification of “furniture” necessarily encompasses
Registrant’s narrowly identified “residential and commercial furniture,” the goods are
legally identical.).
Because we have found Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods to be legally identical
in-part and because there are no restrictions in either identification as to channels of
trade or classes of consumers, we must presume that these goods travel through the
same channels of trade and are offered to the same or overlapping classes of
purchasers. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Board entitled to
rely on this legal presumption in determining likelihood of confusion); see also In re
Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, No. 86490930, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 150, at *26 (TTAB
2016) (“Because the goods at issue are legally identical, we must presume that the
goods of Applicant and Registrant move in the same channels of trade and are offered
to the same classes of consumers.”).
Applicant does not dispute the Examining Attorney’s arguments relating to the
second and third DuPont factors or even address them at all in its brief.
The second and third DuPont factors weigh heavily in favor of a likelihood of
confusion.

Serial No. 99102537
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B. The Strength or Weakness of the Cited Mark
Before we consider the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks, we first consider
the strength of the cited mark. In determining the strength of a cited mark in the
course of an ex parte appeal, we consider its inherent or conceptual strength based
on the nature of the mark itself. In re Chippendales USA, Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 1353-
54 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“A mark’s strength is measured both by its conceptual strength
(distinctiveness) and its marketplace strength (secondary meaning).”); see also
Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 71 F.4th 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (There are “two prongs
of analysis for a mark’s strength under the sixth [DuPont] factor: conceptual strength
and commercial strength.”).
Conceptual strength is a measure of a mark’s distinctiveness and may be placed
“in categories of generally increasing distinctiveness: . . . (1) generic; (2) descriptive;
(3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful.” Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763, 768 (1992). “Marks that are descriptive or highly suggestive are entitled to
a narrower scope of protection, i.e., are less likely to generate confusion over source
identification, than their more fanciful counterparts.” Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS
Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Because the cited mark GUAVA JUICE is registered on the Principal Register
without a claim of acquired distinctiveness, we must presume that it is inherently
distinctive, i.e. that it is at least as distinctive as a suggestive term for its identified
goods. Section 7(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b). See also Tea Bd. of
India v. Republic of Tea, Inc., No. 9118587, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 330, at *62 (TTAB

Serial No. 99102537
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2006) (“A mark that is registered on the Principal Register is entitled to all Section
7(b) presumptions including the presumption that the mark is distinctive and
moreover, in the absence of a Section 2(f) claim in the registration, that the mark is
inherently distinctive for the goods.”).
Nonetheless, a presumptively distinctive mark can, under some circumstances, be
weak as an indicator of source. See Sock It to Me v. Fan, No. 91230554, 2020 TTAB
LEXIS 201, at *30-35 (TTAB 2020) (SOCK IT TO ME for socks “taken as a whole, is
inherently distinctive, although its strength is somewhat limited by its first word,
SOCK, which is generic for socks.”); In re Fat Boys, 2016 TTAB LEXIS 150, at *23
(“[W]e find that Registrant’s mark, although presumptively distinctive, is
nevertheless weak as a source indicator.”). Indeed, the Federal Circuit has held that
if there is evidence that a mark, or an element of a mark, is commonly adopted by
many different registrants, that may indicate that the mark or a common element of
it has some conceptual weakness as an indicator of a single source. See Jack Wolfskin
Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797
F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[E]vidence of third-party registrations is relevant
to ‘show the sense in which a mark is used in ordinary parlance,’ . . . that is, some
segment that is common to both parties’ marks may have ‘a normally understood and
well-recognized descriptive or suggestive meaning, leading to the conclusion that
segment is relatively weak.’”) (quoting Juice Generation, 794 F.3d at 1339).
Applicant argues, albeit in the context of connotation under the first DuPont
factor, that the GUAVA portion of the cited mark “is descriptive of the game’s

Serial No. 99102537
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characteristics and the content therein.”9 Applicant explains that “‘[t]he term
GUAVA, found within the GUAVA JUICE mark, is descriptive of an actual guava
that can be seen throughout the game’.”10 In support of its argument, Applicant made
of record evidence that the game’s icon consists of a guava with a smiley face and a
screenshot of gameplay footage showing an actual guava, shown below, respectively:
11 12
The Examining Attorney argues that even if there are images of a stylized guava
fruit in the game, this does not make the GUAVA element of the cited mark merely
descriptive.13
Applicant did not make of record any third-party registrations for GUAVA-
formative marks but did make of record evidence of a pending application for GUAVA
PIXEL STUDIOS for “downloadable video game software,”14 which is identical to the
9 6 TTABVUE 8 (emphasis omitted).
10 6 TTABVUE 8 (quoting December 22, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 2). Inasmuch
as we address Applicant’s descriptiveness argument here, we need not address Applicant’s
argument regarding inconsistent examination as to this topic. 6 TTABVUE 25.
11 6 TTABVUE 8; December 22, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 2, 31.
12 6 TTABVUE 8; December 22, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 33.
13 8 TTABVUE 8.
14 December 22, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 37 (partial application); January 9, 2026
Denial of Request for Reconsideration at 29-30 (complete application).

Serial No. 99102537
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goods identified by both Applicant and Registrant. However, third-party applications
are evidence only of the fact that they have been filed and they have no other
probative value. Made in Nature, LLC v. Pharmavite LLC, No. 91223352, 2022 TTAB
LEXIS 251, at *31 (TTAB 2022). Consequently, the application itself has no bearing
on the conceptual strength of the GUAVA element of the cited mark, although
evidence of the mark’s use is relevant and discussed below.
Applicant also argues that “the term GUAVA in relation to video game software,
[is] diluted by the existence of other companies in the same industry.”15 “[T]he
purpose of a defendant introducing third party uses is to show that customers have
become so conditioned by a plethora of such similar marks that customers ‘have been
educated to distinguish between different [such] marks on the bases of minute
distinctions.’” Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En
1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (cleaned up) (quoting Veuve Clicquot
Ponsardin v. Palm Bay Imps. Inc., 91115438, 2003 TTAB LEXIS 388, at *30 (2003).
The record contains the following pertinent evidence of use:
• GUAVA SLICE GAMES for downloadable video games,16 one game having
“over 1,000,000 downloads on Google Play;”17 and
• GUAVA PIXEL STUDIOS for use with video game software and services.18
15 6 TTABVUE 11.
16 6 TTABVUE 11 (citing September 15, 2025 Response to Office Action at 2, 28).
17 6 TTABVUE 11-12 (citing September 15, 2025 Response to Office Action at 28 (Exhibit R);
December 22, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 38 (Exhibit N)).
18 6 TTABVUE 12 (citing December 22, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 37, 57 (Exhibits
M, Z)).

Serial No. 99102537
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However, evidence of two third-party uses is not so great that we can find
commercial weakness. See, e.g., In re I-Coat Co., LLC, No. 86802467, 2018 TTAB
LEXIS 171, at *16 (TTAB 2018) (three third-party uses fall “well short of the volume
of evidence found convincing in Jack Wolfskin and Juice Generation”).
As we noted above, we must treat the GUAVA JUICE mark as inherently
distinctive. Given the evidence of record, we find the GUAVA element of the cited
mark has some slight conceptual weakness because it suggests a characteristic or
feature of Registrant’s identified goods. However, even if the GUAVA element is
characterized as somewhat suggestive and thus having some inherent weakness,
when considered with Applicant’s very limited third-party use evidence, we are not
persuaded that the scope of protection of the cited mark, registered on the Principal
Register without a claim of acquired distinctiveness, has been shown to be
diminished. See Dollar Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Brittex Fin., Inc., 132 F.4th 1363, 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 2025) (internal quotation omitted) (“[T]he fact that a mark may be somewhat
The Examining Attorney made of record evidence that the application to register the GUAVA
PIXEL STUDIOS mark was refused registration based on a likelihood of confusion with the
GUAVA JUICE mark, October 10, 2025 Final Office Action at 13, 20, but we agree with
Applicant that this refusal does not negate any impact that use of the mark in commerce may
have, 6 TTABVUE 13, and that, as a result, evidence of its use is probative of the commercial
weakness of the cited mark. Accordingly, we have considered it.
Applicant argues that the attorney for GUAVA PIXEL STUDIOS would have conducted a
thorough trademark search, would have known of the existence of GUAVA JUICE, GUAVA
SLICE GAMES, and GUAVACOM marks and, having filed the application anyway, “it is
likely” that counsel “found no likelihood of confusion.” 6 TTABVUE 13. As a result, Applicant
concludes, “[t]his goes in line with Applicant’s statement that all of these marks can coexist
in commerce.” Id. Applicant provides no evidence to support this argument and therefore, we
find it unpersuasive, see Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(“Attorney argument is no substitute for evidence.”) (quoting Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe
Inc., 424 F.3d 1276, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2005)), not to mention inapposite as GUAVA PIXEL
STUDIOS counsel’s assessment of likelihood of confusion is irrelevant in this context.

Serial No. 99102537
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suggestive does not mean that it is a ‘weak’ mark entitled to a limited scope of
protection.”). And “even if [Registrant’s] mark[ is] inherently weak, that is not fatal
to a finding of likelihood of confusion because even weak marks are entitled to
protection against confusion.” Made in Nature, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 251, at *43; see 15
U.S.C. § 1057(b) (registration is “prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered
mark[]”).
This factor is neutral.
C. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
Under the first DuPont factor, we consider the similarity or dissimilarity of
Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks in their entireties, considering their appearance,
sound, meaning and commercial impression. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. See also In re
Detroit Athletic, 903 F.3d at 1303. “Similarity in any one of these elements may be
sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, No.
87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 170, at *13 (TTAB 2018), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x
516 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Davia, No. 85497617, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 214, at
*3-4 (TTAB 2014)). “[S]imilarity is not a binary factor but is a matter of degree.” In
re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Coors Brewing
Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
The proper test “is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead
whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression
such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection

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between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, 901 F.3d at 1373 (quoting Coach Servs.
v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
When considering the marks, we keep in mind that, where, as here, some of the
goods are legally identical, the degree of similarity necessary to support a conclusion
of likely confusion declines. Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1368; Century 21 Real Estate
Corp. v. Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Because the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks is determined based on the
marks in their entireties, the analysis cannot be predicated on dissecting the marks
into their various components; that is, the decision must be based on the entirety of
the marks, not just part of the marks. Nonetheless, there is nothing improper in
stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular
feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on a consideration of the
marks in their entireties. Stone Lion Cap. Partners, LP v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d
1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (“[T]here is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less
weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate
conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties.”). The focus is on
the recollection of the average purchaser, who normally “retains a general rather
than a specific impression of marks.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, No. 85916778, 2018
TTAB LEXIS 281, at *11-12 (TTAB 2018). Here, the average purchaser is a member
of the general public who has an interest in computer video games.

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Recall that Applicant seeks to register the mark while the cited
mark is GUAVA JUICE in standard characters. The literal elements of Applicant’s
mark consist of one word, which combines the elements GUAVA and COM into a term
that has no established meaning. The cited mark, on the other hand, has a commonly
understood meaning, i.e., that of a beverage made from the juice of a guava.
Applicant and the Examining Attorney agree that an element of a mark can be
dominant but disagree as to which element of each mark is dominant. Applicant
argues that because the term GUAVA of the cited mark “is descriptive of the game’s
characteristics and the content therein,” inasmuch as an actual guava can be seen
throughout the game, for example, this causes the term JUICE to be the dominant
element of the cited mark.19 In this regard, Applicant asserts that GUAVA is
descriptive when used by Registrant but arbitrary when used by Applicant.20
In contrast, the Examining Attorney argues that the GUAVA element of both
Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks is dominant because it is the first element of each
mark and because it is the most distinctive.21 Because the cited mark is registered on
the Principal Register without a disclaimer of the term GUAVA, the Examining
Attorney maintains that the term GUAVA cannot be viewed as merely descriptive,
contrary to Applicant’s argument.22
19 6 TTABVUE 8, 9; 9 TTABVUE 3-4.
20 6 TTABVUE 9.
21 8 TTABVUE 5.
22 8 TTABVUE 8.

Serial No. 99102537
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No disclaimer of GUAVA is required, Applicant counters, because GUAVA JUICE
is a double entendre, referring both to a beverage and the YouTuber known as Guava
Juice (as shown below):23
24
Because a double entendre is unitary by definition, Applicant continues, no
disclaimer would have been required.25
With regard to the COM element of Applicant’s mark, the Examining Attorney
argues that because COM means “commercial organization,” it is highly descriptive
and reinforces the notion that GUAVA is the dominant element.26
23 6 TTABVUE 9; 9 TTABVUE 3.
24 December 22, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 35.
25 9 TTABVUE 3.
26 August 27, 2025 Office Action at 3, 9 (MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY).

Serial No. 99102537
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Applicant counters that COM does not mean “commercial organization” but rather
“computer” and, to support its argument, it made of record five third-party
registrations that end in “COM” and that identify “computer game software.”27
As an initial matter, we are not persuaded by Applicant’s argument that the cited
mark is a double entendre. There is no evidence that Registrant, as then-applicant,
argued that the cited mark was a double entendre nor do we find GUAVA JUICE to
be a double entendre. A double entendre is a word or expression capable of more than
one interpretation. “For trademark purposes, a double entendre is an expression that
has a double connotation or significance as applied to the goods or services.”28 The
multiple interpretations that make an expression a double entendre must be
associations that the public would make fairly readily and must be readily apparent
from the mark itself. See, e.g., In re Yarnell Ice Cream, LLC, No. 86824279, 2019
TTAB LEXIS 208, at *24-25 (TTAB 2019) (finding SCOOP for ice cream, which
merely describes the serving size of the goods, does not present a double entendre
because the applicant made no showing that the interpretation of SCOOP in this
context was that of a ‘news scoop’); In re Ethnic Home Lifestyles Corp., No. 75943763,
2003 TTAB LEXIS 655, at *7-8 (TTAB 2003). While it is true GUAVA JUICE means
a beverage made from the juice of guava, its other meaning, i.e., that of the name of
27 6 TTABVUE 14. This evidence includes CAPCOM (Reg. No. 3618490); FALCOM (Reg. No.
4848535); SOCOM (Reg. No. 3807513); FUNCOM (Reg. No. 3245104); and STARCOM (Reg.
No. 6792308). December 22, 2025 Request for Reconsideration at 25-27, 43-52.
28 TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE (TMEP) § 1213.05(c) (2026) (emphasis
omitted).

Serial No. 99102537
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a YouTuber, is not readily apparent from the face of the mark itself but rather
requires additional information to arrive at that understanding.
Focusing on Applicant’s mark, and consistent with Applicant’s arguments, we find
the literal elements to be dominant, as is typically the case, notwithstanding the
accompanying design. See In re Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1366 (“[T]he verbal portion of a
word and design mark likely will be the dominant portion.”). Here, the lines below
the literal element GUAVACOM function to underline and emphasize the literal
element.
Considering the literal elements of Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks, we find
the GUAVA element of both marks to be dominant because it is the first element of
each mark. See Sage Therapeutics, Inc. v. SageForth Psychological Servs., LLC, No.
91270181, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 139, at *14-15 (TTAB 2024) (finding “sage” the
dominant element in the marks SAGEFORTH and SAGE CENTRAL). Moreover, we
agree with Applicant that the COM element of Applicant’s mark means “computer,”
however, this does not help Applicant as it still supports a finding that the term
GUAVA is the dominant element of the mark. We find the GUAVA element of the
GUAVA JUICE mark to be dominant despite the conceptual weakness associated
with it, as previously discussed.29
There are obvious visual differences in the marks, namely, that Applicant’s mark
incorporates a design element and they differ in their ending components (“com”
versus “juice”), and the different ending components cause the marks to differ in
29 See discussion supra Section II(B).

Serial No. 99102537
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pronunciation. Nonetheless, we find that the marks are similar in sound and
appearance due to the shared first element GUAVA from the standpoint of a
consumer who retains a general rather than specific recollection of the cited mark
who separately sees Applicant’s mark used for legally identical goods.
With regard to connotation and commercial impression, Applicant argues that the
cited mark has a known meaning, i.e., juice of a guava and also that of a YouTuber,
but GUAVACOM has no known meaning, and “has nothing to do with a beverage, or
YouTube personalit[y].”30
We find that the marks present similar commercial impressions and connotations.
As discussed, the goods recited in Applicant’s application and the cited registration
are, in part, legally identical. In that context, the shared lead term “guava” in
Applicant’s mark and in the cited mark produce a comparable commercial impression.
In the context of the legally identical goods, i.e., downloadable computer games,
Applicant’s addition of the descriptive term “com” does not materially alter the marks’
shared commercial impression. We acknowledge that the cited mark may connote the
YouTuber to those consumers familiar with him; however, this meaning is not
apparent from the mark itself, and Applicant’s addition of the descriptive element
COM does little to distinguish its mark from the cited mark.
Applicant’s argument that the marks are dissimilar due to their differences in
word count and letter count31 is not persuasive. A determination of likelihood of
30 6 TTABVUE 8-10.
31 6 TTABVUE 7.

Serial No. 99102537
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confusion is not made on a purely mechanical basis, counting the number of words,
letters, or even syllables that are similar or different. See In re Sela Prods., LLC, No.
77629624, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 175, at *12 (TTAB 2013) (“We agree that the marks
have a different number of words and syllables .... However, these distinctions
between the marks that applicant points out do not serve to distinguish them.”); Fuji
Jyukogyo K.K. v. Toyota Jidosha K.K., No. 91063523, 1985 TTAB LEXIS 31, at *8
(TTAB 1985) (“Purchasers do not count letters when reacting to trademarks in the
marketplace.”); In re John Scarne Games, Inc., 1959 TTAB LEXIS 31, at *1 (TTAB
1959) (“Purchasers of game boards do not engage in trademark syllable counting[;]
they are governed by general impressions made by appearance or sound, or both.”).
Instead, the overall general impression of a mark is more important. Fuji Jyukogyo
K.K., 1985 TTAB LEXIS 31, at *8-9.
Similarly, Applicant’s argument that the marks appear different as used in
commerce is inapposite.32 Because the cited mark is registered in standard character
format, it is not limited to any particular lettering style, color, or font; therefore,
Registrant could display its mark in a manner identical or substantially similar to
the stylized literal element GUAVACOM, further heightening the similarity between
the marks. See, e.g., In re Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1363-64; Cunningham v. Laser Golf
Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 949-50 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Registrations with typed drawings are
not limited to any particular rendition of the mark and, in particular, are not limited
to the mark as it is used in commerce.”).
32 6 TTABVUE 7.

Serial No. 99102537
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We emphasize that our determination as to the similarity of the marks is based
on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general, rather
than specific, impression of marks. In re Cynosure, Inc., No. 76653359, 2009 TTAB
LEXIS 379, at *4 (TTAB 2009). A consumer relies on the recollection of the various
marks that he has previously seen in the marketplace and, given the fallibility of
memory, recollection is based on an overall general impression and not minute details
or specific characteristics of the marks. While we acknowledge that there are some
differences in the marks, we find these differences are outweighed by their
similarities. See, e.g., Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 531
F.2d 561, 562 (CCPA 1976) (holding that RAINFRESH is confusingly similar to RAIN
BARREL given the close relationship of the goods and “similarity of commercial
impressions”); Sage Therapeutics, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 139, at *14-15 (finding a
likelihood of confusion as to the SAGEFORTH and SAGE CENTRAL marks).
The first DuPont factor weighs in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion.
D. Applicant’s Concerns of Inconsistency
Applicant submits a number of concerns of inconsistency. We consider Applicant’s
arguments under the thirteenth DuPont factor, which “relates ‘to any other
established fact probative of the effect of use.’” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361.

Serial No. 99102537
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1. The Consistency Initiative
First, Applicant argues that there was an “inconsistency in reasoning during the
examination, and mentioned that the USPTO has shown value in examination
consistency, as seen with the USPTO Consistency Initiative.”33
In short, Applicant’s reliance on the USPTO’s “Consistency Initiative” is
misplaced. As the Examining Attorney correctly observes, the Consistency Initiative
only addresses inconsistent treatment of an applicant’s co-pending applications and
recently-issued registrations, not perceived inconsistencies with third-party
applications or registrations.34 Because Applicant does not own a registration for its
mark, the Consistency Initiative does not apply to this appeal.
2. Perceived Inconsistencies in Light of the Simultaneous
Registration of Two Third-Party Marks for Identical Goods
One of Applicant’s concerns of inconsistency involves an argument it made during
examination, which Applicant recounts in its brief:
In the [Response to the Non Final Office Action
(“NFOAR”)], the Applicant provided third-party
registrations that showed registered marks containing
GUAVA with identical goods. See NFOAR (Page 1;
Addressing the Term GUAVA). This showed that such
marks were registered under similar circumstances. When
the Applicant mentioned that GUAVA IGUANA
(Registration No. 6194609, also found in RFR: See Exhibit
X) and GUAVA DREAMS (Registration No. 6340503, also
found in RFR: See Exhibit Y); were registered with
identical goods, the Examiner’s justification for this was as
follows: “As to the other two GUAVA marks for
clothing, the marks in those registrations are not as
similar in format or commercial impression are to
33 6 TTABVUE 23.
34 January 9, 2026 Denial of Request for Reconsideration at 35-36.

Serial No. 99102537
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each other”. No other explanation or objective analysis
was provided in relation to these marks. See Final Action
(Page 5, Paragraph 5). The Applicant disagreed with
Examiner’s statement, and provided a full analysis of the
marks to disprove the statement. See RFR, pages 2-5
(Argument Consistency - Analysis of the Marks - and
all subsections therein).35
Specifically, Applicant denoted the specific ways that Applicant’s mark is more
dissimilar to the cited mark than the two third-party marks in terms of the number
of words and number of letters.36 This argument, Applicant contends, was not
rebutted by the Examining Attorney.37
In short, analysis of the similarity of the marks was unnecessary because the
third-party marks GUAVA DREAMS and GUAVA IGUANA are not probative of the
strength or weakness of the cited mark because they are registered for clothing and
there is no evidence or argument that clothing is similar or related to the goods
identified by the cited mark, i.e., downloadable video games. This was adequately
explained by the Examining Attorney when he originally addressed the two third-
party marks:
The registrations provided by applicant appear to be for
goods that are predominantly different from or unrelated
to those identified in the cited registration and applicant’s
application. Here these goods are for unrelated goods
comprising … clothing. Thus, these third-party
registrations submitted by applicant are not probative on
35 6 TTABVUE 24-25 (italics in original, bold here).
36 Request for Reconsideration after Final at 2.
37 6 TTABVUE 24.

Serial No. 99102537
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whether a portion or all of the mark is inherently or
conceptually weak.38
The Examining Attorney on appeal maintained this position: “A case involving
clothing is not relevant as to whether GUAVA is diluted for a game software.”39 Thus,
the Examining Attorney adequately addressed these two third-party marks and
considered them as irrelevant under the sixth DuPont factor, a determination with
which we agree,40 although we acknowledge the analysis was based on the
identification of the goods and had nothing to do with the similarity or dissimilarity
of the third-party marks relative to the cited mark.
As to the general concept of consistency in examination, we agree it is important
and, indeed, the USPTO and the Board seek consistency throughout the entire
trademark registration process. And, we can understand Applicant’s frustration that
its mark has been refused registration based on the cited mark for legally identical
goods and that such a refusal may seem inconsistent in light of the simultaneous
registration of the GUAVA IGUANA and GUAVA DREAMS marks for identical goods
(albeit clothing). Such a comparison on its face, however, cannot be made. The
application files of the third-party registrations for GUAVA IGUANA and GUAVA
DREAMS are not of record. Accordingly, while we have no evidence before us that
explains the rationale whereby the mark of the later-filed application was allowed to
register or facts different from those before us now that may have been of record and
38 October 10, 2025 Final Office Action at 5.
39 8 TTABVUE 10.
40 See discussion supra Section II(B).

Serial No. 99102537
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considered by the involved examining attorney (such as a consent provided by the
earlier registrant), that does not mean such evidence or facts were not properly of
record and relied upon by the assigned examining attorney. Accordingly, a refusal to
register Applicant’s mark in light of the simultaneous registration of the marks of the
two third-party registrations cannot be considered “a concern for inconsistency” as
Applicant suggests. In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594, 600 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (the
USPTO must “examine all trademark applications for compliance with each and
every eligibility requirement” regardless of the prior treatment of applications
involving similar marks); In re Nett Designs Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(“The Board must decide each case on its own merits. ... Even if some prior
registrations had some characteristics similar to [applicant’s] application, the PTO’s
allowance of such prior registrations does not bind the Board or this court.”); In re
Ala. Tourism Dep’t., No. 87599292, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 191, at *36 (TTAB 2020)
(“While we recognize that consistency is highly desirable, consistency in examination
is not itself a substantive rule of trademark law, and a desire for consistency with the
decisions of prior examining attorneys must yield to proper determinations under the
Trademark Act and rules.”) (cleaned up; citations omitted).
3. Applicant’s Remaining Arguments
In its reply brief, Applicant makes a number of additional arguments, including
that the Examining Attorney provided (a) an incomplete, and (b) incorrect,
summarization of Applicant’s arguments.41 We have carefully considered these
41 9 TTABVUE 2, 7-10.

Serial No. 99102537
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arguments and have addressed some of them earlier but do not address all of the
remaining arguments here. Suffice it to say, we do not find the remaining arguments
persuasive or outcome determinative.
Thus, we find the thirteenth Dupont factor neutral.
E. Balancing the DuPont Factors
Having carefully considered all of the evidence of record, including any evidence
not specifically discussed herein, as well as all of the arguments related thereto, we
now turn to the task of weighing the DuPont factors for which there is evidence and
argument. In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
The goods are legally identical in-part and their channels of trade and classes of
consumers are presumed to overlap; as a result, the second and third DuPont factors
weigh heavily in favor of a likelihood of confusion. Applicant was not successful in
diminishing the scope of protection of the cited mark. Considering the similarity or
dissimilarity of the marks under the first DuPont factor, the legal identity of the goods
reduces the degree of similarity between the marks necessary to conclude that there
is a likelihood of confusion. Here, the marks are similar due to the shared lead term
GUAVA so the first factor also weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion. The sixth
and thirteenth factors are neutral. Because the first, second and third factors weigh
in favor of a likelihood of confusion and none weigh against it, we conclude that
confusion is likely.

Serial No. 99102537
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Decision
The refusal to register Applicant’s mark under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), is affirmed.