Serena Williams

THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Mailed: August 12, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Serena Williams
_____
Serial No. 90321926
_____
Emily M. Borich of Foster Garvey PC,
for Serena Williams.
Faith Beaudry-Torres, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 126,
Jeffrey Look, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Pologeorgis, Elgin, and Brock, Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Elgin, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant Serena Williams seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
mark SERENA VENTURES in standard characters (“VENTURES” disclaimed) for
Investment of funds; Venture capital financing; Venture
capital funding services to emerging and start-up
companies; Venture capital services, namely, providing
financing to emerging and start-up companies; Capital
investment; Equity capital investment; Providing venture
capital, development capital, private equity and
investment funding, in International Class 36.1
1 Serial No. 90321926 was filed on November 16, 2020 under Trademark Act Section 1(a),
15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), based on Applicant’s claimed first use of the mark as early as
August 18, 2017 and first use of the mark in commerce at least as early as December 3, 2018.

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The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration on the ground that
Applicant’s mark, when used in connection with the identified services, so resembles
the registered mark SERENA in standard characters for
Real estate brokerage; real estate management services;
real estate brokerage of condominiums; real estate
services, namely, condominium management services;
providing information in the field of real estate; providing
real estate listings and real estate information via the
Internet; financing of loans; financing services; mortgage
financing services; real estate financing services; providing
information in the field of finance; real estate funds
investment services; financial investment brokerage
services; real estate investment services; investment
advisory services; capital investment services; real estate
services, namely, renting, brokerage, and managing
property for third parties; real estate services, namely, real
estate agent services featuring the researching and
comparing of property listings, determining competitive
market pricing for properties, interviewing prospective
clients for purposes of assisting clients in selecting
properties, accompanying clients viewing prospective
properties; real estate brokerage services featuring
property sales negotiation; providing real estate
information, namely, information about sale prices,
locations, property descriptions; real estate services,
namely, managing rental properties; real estate services,
namely, monitoring of real estate market conditions and
trends for purposes of real estate investment, in
International Class 362
that it is likely to cause confusion, cause mistake, or deceive. Trademark Act Section
2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
2 Registration No. 7572578 registered on November 19, 2024.

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Applicant appealed. Applicant and the Examining Attorney filed briefs.3 For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm the refusal to register.
I. Likelihood of Confusion Standard
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so
resembles a registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the
goods or services of the applicant, to cause confusion, mistake, or deception. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d); see also In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all probative evidence
of record bearing on a likelihood of confusion. In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”); see also In re Majestic Distilling Co.,
315 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
In any likelihood of confusion analysis, different DuPont factors may play a
dominant role, and some factors may not be relevant. Naterra Int’l, Inc. v. Bensalem,
92 F.4th 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (citing Tiger Lily Ventures Ltd. v. Barclays Cap.
Inc., 35 F.4th 1352, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2022)). In addition, varying weight may be
assigned to each factor depending on the evidence presented, and “any one of the
factors may control a particular case.” Id.; see also Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1381.
3 Applicant’s brief is at 7 TTABVUE. The Examining Attorney’s brief is at 9 TTABVUE. The
Board granted Applicant’s motion to extend its time to file a reply brief by thirty days. See
11 TTABVUE. Applicant, however, chose not to file a reply brief.
Citations to the prosecution record refer to the USPTO Trademark Status and Document
Retrieval system (TSDR) in the downloadable .pdf format by page number. References to the
briefs on appeal refer to the Board’s TTABVUE docket system. In re Integra Biosciences Corp.,
No. 87484450, 2022 TTAB LEXIS 17, at *6.

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Although we consider each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and
argument, In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019), two key
considerations are the similarities between the marks and the similarities between
the services. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing
Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). In
cases where we find some factor or factors relatively more important, we weigh or
balance them more heavily in the final step of assessing the factors to determine
whether confusion is likely. Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1381.
II. Likelihood of Confusion Analysis
We address each of the factors argued by Applicant and the Examining Attorney,
although we start our analysis with the second and third factors based on the facts
in this case.4
A. The Services
The second DuPont factor “considers the similarity or dissimilarity and nature of
the [services] as described in the involved application and cited registration … and
contemplates whether the consuming public may perceive the respective [services] as
4 We note that most of the authorities relied on by Applicant are federal district and circuit
court cases. See 7 TTABVUE 4, 6-10 (citing cases from the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, the Southern District of New York, and the Eastern
District of California). We are not bound by these authorities. Rather, we apply the law set
forth by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, its predecessor, the U.S. Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, and precedential decisions of the Board. Applicant is permitted
to cite to nonprecedential cases, but they have limited persuasive value, and the practice is
not encouraged. In re Tapio GmbH, No. 87941532, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 483, at *26 n.30; see
also TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (TBMP) § 101.03 (2026).
For these reasons, we generally do not discuss such cases in decisions.

Serial No. 90321926
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related enough to cause confusion about their source or origin.” In re Samsung
Display Co., No. 90502617, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 258, at *6 (cleaned up; citations
omitted).
We “begin with the identifications of … services in the registration and application
under consideration.” In re OSF Healthcare Sys., No. 88706809, 2023 TTAB LEXIS
353, at *10 (cleaned up; citation omitted). It is sufficient for a finding of likelihood of
confusion if relatedness is established for any item encompassed by the identification
of services within a particular class in the application or registration. See SquirtCo v.
Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (a single good from among several
may sustain a finding of likelihood of confusion); Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills
Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336 (CCPA 1981) (likelihood of confusion must be found if
there is likely to be confusion with respect to any item that comes within the
identification of goods or services in the application).
The Examining Attorney argues, and we agree, that the services are identical in
part as to namely: “capital investment” services (application) and “capital investment
services” (cited registration). In addition, the application contains services that are
legally identical based on broadly-described services in one which encompass
narrowly described services in the other, such as:
• The broad “capital investment services” (cited registration) encompasses
the narrower “equity capital investment” services (application);
• The broad “financing services” (cited registration) encompasses the
narrower “venture capital financing,” “Venture capital funding services
to emerging and start-up companies,” and “providing financing to
emerging and start-up companies” (application); and

Serial No. 90321926
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• The broad “investment of funds” (application) encompasses the
narrower “real estate funds investment services” (cited registration).5
“Where an applicant identifies its services broadly, we must presume that the
services encompass all services of the type identified.” Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled,
Ltd., No. 94002242, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 176, at *60-61 (citation omitted), aff’d mem.,
652 F. App’x 971 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading
Co., 719 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (applying principle that “registration
encompasses all goods or services of the type described”); In re AC Webconnecting
Holding B.V., No. 85635277, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 428, at *32 (services identified in the
application without limitation must be presumed to include narrower services). Thus,
the above-described services overlap and are legally identical, in part.
Applicant counters that, “[a]lthough both marks operate broadly within the
financial and real estate sectors, the nature, focus, and positioning of the services
they cover are materially different …. Here, Applicant’s services center on investment
services aimed at sophisticated investors and businesses across all industries …. By
5 When an identification such as “real estate fund” is unclear, we may resort to extrinsic
evidence to understand it, and we have done so here. See, e.g., In re Thor Tech, Inc., No.
78634024, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 253, at *12 n.10 (although extrinsic evidence may not be used
to limit or restrict the identified goods or services, it is nonetheless proper to consider
extrinsic evidence in the nature of dictionary entries to define the terminology used to
describe them). This includes government publications. See In re Nieves & Nieves LLC, No.
85179263, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 12, at *7 (taking judicial notice of U.S. government online
publications).
We take judicial notice that a “real estate fund” is defined by the SEC as: “Any private fund
that is not a hedge fund, that does not provide investors with redemption rights in the
ordinary course and that invests primarily in real estate and real estate related assets.”
Securities and Exchange Commission Form PF (www.sec.gov/comments/S7-2026-
13/s7202613-769607-2358794.pdf, accessed August 6, 2026). “A private fund is a pooled
investment vehicle ….” SEC Glossary (www.sec.gov/resources-small-
businesses/glossary#PFund, accessed August 6, 2026).

Serial No. 90321926
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contrast, the Cited Registration covers services, all specifically limited to real
estate.”6 The Examining Attorney argues that not all of the services listed in the
registration are limited to the field of real estate.7
We agree with the Examining Attorney’s argument. Only some of Registrant’s
services are restricted to the field of real estate; others (including “capital investment
services” and “financing services”) contain no such restriction. Under standard
examination practice, a semicolon is used to separate distinct categories of goods or
services. In re Midwest Gaming & Entm’t LLC, No. 85111552, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 55,
at *9 and n.4 (semicolons in identification separate services into discrete categories).
We may not read limitations from some parts of Registrant’s identification which are
separated by semicolons into another. That is, a specific limitation in one part of the
services does not limit more broadly described services.
Where the identification of services is broad, the Board “presume[s] that the
services encompass all services of the type identified.” In re Country Oven, Inc., No.
87354443, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 381, at *4 (citing Sw. Mgmt., 2015 TTAB LEXIS 176,
at *60-61). Applicant may not restrict the scope of the services covered in the cited
registration by argument or by extrinsic evidence.8 Stone Lion Cap. Partners, L.P. v.
Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“It was proper, however, for the
Board to focus on the application and registrations rather than on real-world
6 7 TTABVUE 6-7; see also id. at 6 (discussing “SERENA for real estate services”).
7 9 TTABVUE 7.
8 See 7 TTABVUE 7 (arguing that Registrant targets general consumers through the “sale of
boutique residences and condominiums in Clearwater, Florida”); see also February 27, 2025
Response to Office Action at TSDR 7-12 (Exh. A).

Serial No. 90321926
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conditions, because ‘the question of registrability of an applicant’s mark must be
decided on the basis of the identification of goods set forth in the
application.’”) (quoting Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Comp. Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937,
942 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
In view of the overlap in services discussed above, we find that the services are
both identical and legally identical in part.9 The second DuPont factor strongly favors
a finding of likelihood of confusion.
B. The Channels of Trade
The third DuPont factor concerns the “similarity or dissimilarity of established,
likely-to-continue trade channels.” Samsung, 2024 TTAB LEXIS 258, at *17 (quoting
DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). To the extent the services of Applicant and Registrant are
identical and legally identical in part, we presume that these services travel in the
same channels of trade to the same classes of consumers. See In re Viterra, Inc., 671
F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Board was entitled to rely on presumption that,
absent restrictions, legally identical goods travel in the same channels of trade to the
same class of purchasers); In re Yawata Iron & Steel Co., 403 F.2d 752, 754 (CCPA
1968) (where there are legally identical goods, class of purchasers is considered to be
the same). Thus, Applicant’s argument about the real-world sale of the services to
different classes of consumers is not persuasive.10
9 Thus, there is no need also to discuss the relatedness of the services, as argued by the
Examining Attorney. See 9 TTABVUE 9.
10 See 7 TTABVUE 7-8.

Serial No. 90321926
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Applicant also argues that there is some geographic separation between the uses:
Registrant appears to primarily operate in Clearwater,
Florida where its real estate property is located. By
contrast, Applicant’s mark is used in all geographic regions
in the United States. Geographic distance matters,
particularly in service industries that are often localized or
regional in character. The absence of overlapping customer
exposure due to these geographic differences further
reduces the likelihood that consumers would encounter
both services or assume a connection between them.11
This argument is unclear – Applicant appears to contend (although she states that
her mark is used in “all geographic regions in the United States”) that she does not
offer her services in Clearwater, Florida, and that the uses are thus geographically
distinct. If proven, this might be relevant in an infringement action or concurrent use
proceeding but is not relevant in an ex parte appeal. As the Examining Attorney
points out, Registrant owns an unrestricted registration which gives Registrant
presumptive exclusive rights to nationwide use of its mark in connection with the
identified services under Trademark Act Section 7(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b), regardless
of its actual extent of use.12 It is not relevant to our analysis whether Applicant and
Registrant offer their services in different geographic areas. See Giant Food, Inc. v.
Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Therefore, the
geographical distance between the present locations of the respective businesses of
the two parties has little relevance in this case”).
11 Id. at 10. Applicant did not pin this argument to any particular DuPont factor; we consider
it most relevant to the third factor.
12 9 TTABVUE 10-11.

Serial No. 90321926
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Due to the in-part identity and legal identity of the services, the third DuPont
factor also heavily favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.
C. The Marks
We next turn to the first DuPont factor, the “similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression.” In re Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla, No. 90522364, 2025 TTAB LEXIS
412, at *9 (quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). In comparing the marks, we are
mindful that the identity and legal identity of some of the services and their
overlapping channels of trade and classes of consumers reduce the degree of
similarity between the marks necessary to find a likelihood of confusion. Viterra, 671
F.3d at 1363; In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Applicant’s mark is SERENA VENTURES and the cited mark is SERENA (both
in standard characters). The marks are similar in that the applied-for mark
incorporates the entirety of the cited mark. Although there is no explicit rule that the
marks are automatically similar, “[l]ikelihood of confusion often has been found
where the entirety of one mark is incorporated within another.” Double Coin Holdings
Ltd. v. Tru Dev., No. 92063808, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 347, at *20 (quoting Hunter
Indus., Inc. v. Toro Co., No. 91203612, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 105, at *33).
As the first term in the applied-for mark, SERENA is the dominant term, “further
establishing its prominence.” In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, No. 86928469, 2018
TTAB LEXIS 108, 2018 WL 1620989, at *2 (TTAB 2018). The disclaimed term
VENTURES in Applicant’s mark lacks source identifying significance because it is at

Serial No. 90321926
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least descriptive of Applicant’s listed services. Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot
Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The
presence of this strong distinctive term [VEUVE] as the first word in both parties’
marks renders the marks similar, especially in light of the largely laudatory (and
hence non-source identifying) significance of the word ROYALE”). Disclaimed
descriptive or generic matter is typically less significant or less dominant in relation
to other wording in a mark. See In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (finding DELTA to be the dominant part of the mark THE DELTA CAFE &
design because CAFE was generic and disclaimed).
Both marks also are in standard characters and, as such, each mark “may be
presented in any font style, size or color, including the same font, size and color,”
including “one that minimizes the differences or emphasizes the similarities between
the marks.” Sabhnani v. Mirage Brands, LLC, No. 92068086, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 464,
at *43-44 (cleaned up; citations omitted). Thus, SERENA may be presented in much
larger font than VENTURES in Applicant’s mark, minimizing the differences
between the marks.
We are not convinced by Applicant’s argument that her mark has a “layered
meaning” that “conveys a distinct corporate and institutional identity.”13 Applicant
does not explain this argument or cite to any evidence in the record in support of it.
To the extent that Applicant intimates under the first DuPont factor that consumers
13 7 TTABVUE 6.

Serial No. 90321926
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view SERENA VENTURES as referring to herself as a well-known tennis player,14
this could have been relevant had it been proven by evidence. Surprisingly, Applicant
did not make of record any evidence to support her identity or claim of fame
(especially as to her first name without her surname, as appears in the mark), and
nevertheless, attorney argument is not evidence. Gasparilla, 2025 TTAB LEXIS 412,
at *13-14 n.15. Nonetheless, the Examining Attorney acknowledged that “Serena
Williams [is] a noted female professional tennis player.”15 We take judicial notice, as
a commonly known fact not subject to dispute, that Applicant is a well-known tennis
player. See TBMP § 1208.04 and authorities cited therein. We do so solely for the
limited purpose of evaluating whether the term SERENA carries a particular
connotation relevant to the first DuPont factor.16
However, even accepting this connotation, Applicant failed to provide evidence
that consumers of financial and investment services would make this association —
i.e., Applicant’s renown in tennis, or even sports more generally, does not
automatically transfer to a different commercial field. Indeed, the only evidence of
14 See id. at 9 (“[C]onsumers associate SERENA VENTURES with the famous public figure,
Serena Williams.”). As we discuss below, this argument was made erroneously under the fifth
DuPont factor, fame of the mark. But we address it here as well.
15 9 TTABVUE 5.
16 We emphasize that this limited judicial notice of public recognition does not equate to a
finding of fame of the mark for purposes of the fifth or any other DuPont factor in our analysis;
this is discussed further below.

Serial No. 90321926
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record that shows Applicant’s association with the services is on the application
specimen of use, where a picture of Applicant – but not her name– appears:17
17 November 16, 2020 Specimen of Use at TSDR 2. Applicant’s name appears in the webpage
HTML header along with the date printed, id. at TSDR 1-3, but this is visible only when the
website is printed and would rarely be seen by the consumer.

Serial No. 90321926
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But even if, as Applicant claims, her renown is such that consumers would
associate SERENA VENTURES with Applicant for the identified financial services,
the same connotation would be applied to the cited mark SERENA in connection with
the same services. In short, there is nothing inherent in the marks or the financial
services at issue that would portray different meanings to consumers – as it might,
for example, for services related to tennis or sports in general.
We find that the marks are quite similar, and the first DuPont factor favors a
finding of likelihood of confusion.
D. Purchaser Sophistication
Applicant contends that “when goods or services are expensive, specialized, or
marketed to expert or discerning buyers, the likelihood of confusion significantly
decreases.”18 She asserts, without citation to any evidence, that her services are
“marketed to institutional investors, high-net-worth individuals, and sophisticated
clients through specialized, high-level advisory networks, professional referrals, and
targeted investment channels. These are highly selective markets where
relationships are built on reputation, expertise, and strategic fit.”19 She further
argues that “[c]onsumers of Applicant’s services exercise a high degree of care in
selecting financial and investment partners” and “Applicant’s clientele are expected
to exercise considerable caution, conduct due diligence, and have industry knowledge
18 7 TTABVUE 9.
19 Id. at 7.

Serial No. 90321926
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….”20 Applicant did not prove these arguments through evidence. Gasparilla, 2025
TTAB LEXIS 412, at *13-14 n.15. Nonetheless, by their nature, we can infer that
Applicant’s customers seeking and providing venture capital investment services
exercise somewhat greater than ordinary care.
As to the various services identified in the cited registration, Applicant argues
that “the Cited Registration targets general consumers through the sale of boutique
residences and condominiums in Clearwater, Florida. These services are designed for
broad public access, transactional ease, and wide visibility.”21 As discussed above, the
only evidence of record regarding services purportedly offered under the cited
registration is a website print out for a “boutique” residential development called
“Serena by the Sea” by “Valor Capital.”22 Even if this website is related to the
Registrant, we have no evidence regarding the sophistication of consumers for the
real estate services identified in the cited registration. Nonetheless, we can infer (as
we did for the identical and legally identical services in the application) that
consumers of the investment and financial services in the cited registration exercise
somewhat greater than ordinary care.
On balance, we find that the fourth DuPont factor tips slightly against likelihood
of confusion.
20 Id. at 9.
21 Id. at 7.
22 See February 27, 2025 Response to Office Action at TSDR 8-12. The owner of the
registration is listed as “Edgewater Valor Capital LLC.” November 27, 2024 Office Action at
TSDR 7.

Serial No. 90321926
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E. Actual Confusion
Applicant asserts that there is no evidence of actual confusion.23 The question of
actual confusion is addressed in the seventh and eighth DuPont factors regarding the
“nature and extent of any actual confusion” and the “length of time during and
conditions under which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual
confusion.” DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361.
There are no declarations in the record; and even if there were, uncorroborated
statements of no known instances of actual confusion are of little evidentiary value.
Majestic Distilling, 315 F.3d at 1317; see also In re Bissett-Berman Corp., 476 F.2d
640, 642 (CCPA 1973) (self-serving testimony of appellant’s corporate president’s
unawareness of instances of actual confusion was not conclusive that actual confusion
did not exist or that there was no likelihood of confusion). There is no opportunity to
hear from Registrant about whether it is aware of any reported instances of confusion
in the context of this ex parte appeal. “The fact that an applicant in an ex parte case
is unaware of any instances of actual confusion is generally entitled to little probative
weight in the likelihood of confusion analysis, inasmuch as the Board in such cases
generally has no way to know whether the registrant likewise is unaware of any
instances of actual confusion, nor is it usually possible to determine that there has
been any significant opportunity for actual confusion to have occurred.” In re Opus
One, Inc., No. 75722593, 2001 TTAB LEXIS 707, at *19-20 (citations omitted).
23 7 TTABVUE 9-10.

Serial No. 90321926
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Moreover, the seventh and eighth DuPont factors are interrelated; the absence of
evidence of actual confusion under the seventh DuPont factor is entitled to little
weight in our likelihood of confusion analysis unless there also is evidence, under the
eighth factor, that there has been a significant opportunity for actual confusion to
have occurred. We must look at actual market conditions to the extent there is
evidence of such conditions of record. In re Guild Mortg. Co., No. 86709944, 2020
TTAB LEXIS 17, at *19. Here, there is no evidence that, in the actual marketplace,
the same consumers have been exposed to both marks for the respective services,
such that we could make a finding as to the “length of time during and conditions
under which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion.”
DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361.
The seventh and eighth DuPont factors are neutral.
F. Other DuPont Factors
Applicant argues, again without citation to evidence:
Another important du Pont factor is the fame or renown of
the prior marks. Famous marks enjoy a broader scope of
protection because they are more likely to be remembered
and associated by consumers – here, consumers associate
SERENA VENTURES with the famous public figure,
Serena Williams. There is no evidence of … marketplace
interaction, bad faith, or expansion plans that would
increase the potential for confusion. The extent of potential
confusion is minimal, especially given the specific market
segments, consumer care levels, and branding distinctions
outlined above.24
We briefly address these factors for completeness.
24 Id.

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First, to the extent Applicant is arguing that her applied-for mark is famous under
the fifth DuPont factor, the “prior mark” under this factor means the prior
registration cited by the Examining Attorney. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361 (“fame of the
prior mark”).25 Any fame enjoyed by Applicant’s mark is irrelevant. Moreover, as is
the case here, in an ex parte appeal, the fifth DuPont factor is treated as neutral when
no evidence as to fame has been made of record. See In re Thomas, No. 78334625,
2006 TTAB LEXIS 135, at *18 n.11 (“Because this is an ex parte proceeding, we would
not expect the examining attorney to submit evidence of fame of the cited mark.”).26
The fifth DuPont factor is neutral.
We presume Applicant’s argument relating to “marketplace interaction,” concerns
the tenth DuPont factor, “market interface” between Applicant and the owner of the
cited registration. We must consider actual marketplace interface if we are provided
with probative evidence of the same, such as a consent to register or use, an
agreement designed to preclude confusion, an assignment of the mark, or laches and
estoppel. In re Opus One, Inc., No. 75722593, 2001 TTAB LEXIS 707, at *31. There
is no relevant evidence in this case. The tenth DuPont factor is neutral.
25 That Applicant may be able to prove fame relating to her name or actual common law
priority is irrelevant in this ex parte proceeding. Section 2(d) requires refusal of registration
if the applicant’s mark so resembles “a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office”
as to be likely to cause confusion, and the mark cited by the Examining Attorney is a
registered mark. In re Calgon Corp., 435 F.2d 596, 598 (CCPA 1971) (“‘[T]he question of
priority of use is not germane to applicant’s right to register’ in this ex parte proceeding.”).
Such arguments could be entertained only in the context of a cancellation proceeding.
Trademark Act Section 14, 15 U.S.C. § 1064.
26 Nonetheless, as we acknowledge above, the renown of Applicant’s mark (i.e., her name)
could bear on our analysis of likelihood of confusion under the similarity of the marks factor,
but it does not in this case. See supra Section II(C) (“The Marks”).

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Applicant’s argument, applicable to the twelfth DuPont factor, that the “potential
for confusion is minimal” (including, as Applicant alleged, “planned expansion”), is
unsupported. We found that the marks at issue are similar, the respective services
are identical and legally identical in part and are provided in the same or overlapping
trade channels to the same or overlapping consumers, and there is no evidence
suggesting that potential confusion is minimal. We presume Applicant is referring to
her own notoriety in mentioning “branding distinctions.” As discussed above, there is
no evidence that purchasers of the financial services identified in the application and
cited registration would readily associate the mark SERENA VENTURES solely with
Applicant and not with Registrant. In short, the evidence of record does not
demonstrate that the potential for confusion is de minimis. The twelfth DuPont factor
is neutral.
Finally, with regard to Applicant’s assertion that “there is no evidence of … bad
faith,” we read this as an argument that Applicant did not adopt her mark in bad
faith.27 A “party’s bad faith in adopting a mark is relevant to the thirteenth DuPont
factor, which includes any other established fact probative of the effect of use.”
QuikTrip West, Inc. v. Weigel Stores, Inc., 984 F.3d 1031, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
Although bad faith – i.e., intent to trade on a senior user’s goodwill – tends to show
that confusion is likely, see, e.g., Jewelers Vigilance Committee, Inc. v. Ullenberg
Corp., 853 F.2d 888, 891 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the converse is not true: evidence that a
27 If Applicant intended to argue that Registrant, as the junior user, adopted its mark in bad
faith, there is no evidence to support this argument either.

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party acted in good faith in adopting a mark has little probative value. See, e.g., Leb.
Seaboard Corp. v. R & R Turf Supply, No. 91197241, 2012 TTAB LEXIS 29, at
*29 (“Good faith adoption of a mark will not prevent a finding of likelihood of
confusion.”); Mag Instrument, Inc. v. Brinkmann Corp., No. 91163534, 2010 TTAB
LEXIS 322, at *33 (evidence that a party is seeking to register a mark in good faith
does very little to obviate a finding of a likelihood of confusion and is not a significant
factor in our likelihood of confusion analysis). The thirteenth DuPont factor also is
neutral.
G. Weighing the Likelihood of Confusion Factors
As discussed earlier, the last step in analyzing a claim under Section 2(d) is to
“weigh the DuPont factors used in [our] analysis and explain the results of that
weighing.” Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1384 (emphasis in original). The first,
second, and third DuPont factors weigh heavily in favor of likelihood of confusion,
given the substantial similarity of the marks, the in-part identity and legal identity
of the services and overlap in channels of trade and consumers as to these services.
These factors outweigh the fourth DuPont factor, which weighs slightly against
likelihood of confusion. The fifth, seventh, eighth, tenth, twelfth, and thirteenth
DuPont factors are neutral.
Accordingly, we find Applicant’s standard-character mark SERENA VENTURES
as used in connection with the identified services so resembles the cited mark
SERENA (also in standard characters) for the services listed in the cited registration

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as to be likely to cause confusion under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act,
notwithstanding any purchaser sophistication.
Decision
The refusal to register Applicant’s SERENA VENTURES mark under Section 2(d)
of the Trademark Act is affirmed.