Home and Human Fashion Pty Ltd

Mailed: June 4, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
————
In re Home and Human Fashion Pty. Ltd.
————
Serial No. 98073221
————
Robert Kleinman of Common Sense Counsel,
for Home and Human Fashion Pty. Ltd.
Octavia Green, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 116,
Elizabeth Jackson, Managing Attorney.
————
Before Goodman, Pologeorgis, and Casagrande,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Pologeorgis, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Home and Human Fashion Pty. Ltd. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the
Principal Register of the standard character mark LA LA LAND for the following
goods:1
Stationery; Coasters made of paper; Coasters made of cardboard;
Coasters of paper; Coasters of paper or cardboard; Coasters of
1 Application Serial No. 98073221, filed on July 6, 2023, based on an allegation of use in
commerce under Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), claiming October 2,
2020 as both the date of first use and the date of first use in commerce as to all identified
classes of goods.
THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB

Serial No. 98073221
2
cardboard; Drink coasters made of cardboard; Drink coasters made of
paper; Drink coasters of cardboard; Drink coasters of paper; Napkins
made of paper; Napkins of paper; Paper coasters; Paper napkins; Paper
notebooks; Paper serviettes; Paper gift wrap; Pocket memorandum
books; Posters made of paper; Printed Christmas cards; Printed diaries;
Printed greeting cards; Printed note books; Printed post cards; Printed
posters; Printed announcement cards; Printed birthday cards; Printed
composition books; Printed desk diaries; Printed invitation cards;
Printed memorandum books; Printed musical greeting cards; Printed
occasion cards; Serviettes of paper; Stationery writing paper and
envelopes; Wrapping paper; Writing or drawing books; Art prints; Blank
note cards; Blank writing journals; Cardboard coasters; Cardboard
drink coasters; Christmas wrapping paper; Decorative wrapping paper;
Disposable paper napkins; Disposable table napkins of paper; Gift
wrapping paper; Paper drink coasters; Paper gift cards; Paper index
cards; Paper stationery; Pen trays; Photographic prints; Printed cards
bearing universal greetings; Printed correspondence cards; Printed
holiday cards; Printed index books; Printed index cards; Printed note
cards; Printed notebooks; Printed picture cards; Printed stationery;
Spiral-bound notebooks; Table napkins of paper; Wire-bound notebooks,
in International Class 16;
Handbags; All-purpose carrying bags; All-purpose reusable carrying
bags; Clutch bags; Mesh shopping bags; Sports bags; Tote bags; Wristlet
bags; Backpacks, book bags, sports bags, bum bags, wallets and
handbags, in International Class 18;
Kitchen towels of textile; Tea towels; Kitchen towels made of textile;
Kitchen towels of cloth, in International Class 24; and
Board games; Card games; Christmas tree ornaments and decorations;
Ornaments for Christmas trees, except lights, candles and
confectionery; Party games; Playing cards; Playing cards and card
games; Puzzle board games; Trading cards for games; Christmas tree
decorations; Christmas tree ornaments; Jigsaw puzzles, in International
Class 25.
The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration of Applicant’s mark
under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground of
likelihood of confusion with the standard character mark LA LA LAND, registered
on the Principal Register, for the following International Class 35 services:

Serial No. 98073221
3
Retail store services featuring souvenirs, gift items, sundries, mugs, key
chains, jewelry, sunglasses, paper goods, books, magazines, greeting
cards, stationery, picture frames, posters, art, lanyards, housewares,
passport wallets, wallets, bags, purses, magnets, pens and pencils,
umbrellas, smokers’ articles, convenience store items, grocery items,
toys, sporting goods; retail store services featuring a wide variety of
consumer goods of others.2
When the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed and requested
reconsideration. When the request for reconsideration was denied, this appeal
resumed. Applicant and the Examining Attorney filed briefs. For the reasons
explained below, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the Section 2(d) refusal.
I. Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that so
resembles a registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the
goods or services of the applicant, to cause confusion, mistake, or deception. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d); see also In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the probative
evidence of record bearing on a likelihood of confusion. In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”), cited in B&B Hardware, Inc. v.
Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 144 (2015); see also In re Majestic Distilling Co.,
315 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
In any likelihood of confusion analysis, different DuPont factors may play a
dominant role and some factors may not be relevant. Naterra Int’l, Inc. v. Bensalem,
92 F.4th 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (quoting Tiger Lily Ventures Ltd. v. Barclays
2 Registration No. 4818492, issued on October 7, 2014; renewed.

Serial No. 98073221
4
Cap. Inc., 35 F.4th 1352, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2022)). In addition, varying weight may be
assigned to each factor depending on the evidence presented, and “any one of the
factors may control a particular case.” Id.; see also In re Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th
at 1381. While we consider each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and
argument, In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019), two key
considerations are the similarities between the marks and the similarities between
the goods or services. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017);
Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
A. Similarity of the Marks
Under the first DuPont factor, “we consider the ‘similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression.’” In re Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla, No. 90522364, 2025 WL 2953731,
at *4 (TTAB 2025) (quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). “Similarity in any one of these
elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” Sage Therapeutics,
Inc. v. Sageforth Psych. Servs., LLC, No. 91270181, 2024 WL 1638376, at *5 (TTAB
2024) (quoting In re Inn at St. John’s LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 WL 2734893, at *5
(TTAB 2018) (citation omitted), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019));
accord Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968) (“It
is sufficient if the similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely to cause
confusion.”) (citation omitted).
“The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead
whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression
such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection

Serial No. 98073221
5
between the parties.” Sage Therapeutics, 2024 WL 1638376, at *5 (quoting Coach
Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Here,
Applicant’s standard character LA LA LAND mark is identical to the cited standard
character LA LA LAND mark in terms of sound and appearance. Accordingly, they
are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when
applied to the respective goods and services. See In re i.am.symbolic, LLC, 2015 WL
6746543, at *5 (TTAB 2015) (“Because the marks are identical, we conclude that they
are likely to engender the same overall commercial impression.”), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315
(Fed. Cir. 2017).
Applicant argues, however, that the marks convey very different overall
commercial impressions.3 Specifically, Applicant, relying on extrinsic evidence of how
Registrant assertedly conducts its business at present, contends that the primary
significance of the cited mark LA LA LAND is a nickname for Los Angeles because
Registrant provides its services in Los Angeles.4 In contrast, Applicant maintains
that its proposed LA LA LAND mark generates an impression of goods emanating
from a fantastical place or having some dreamlike quality.5
We are not persuaded by Applicant’s arguments. Applicant’s citation of extrinsic
evidence to imbue the wording LA LA LAND in the cited mark with a particular
geographic location is unavailing. “We compare the applicant’s and registrant’s
3 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, p. 7, 6 TTABVUE 9.
4 Id. at pp. 10-15, 6 TTABVUE 12-17.
5 Id. at p. 16, 6 TTABVUE 18.

Serial No. 98073221
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‘marks themselves.”’ In re Embiid, No. 88202890, 2021 WL 2285576, at *6 (TTAB
2021) (quoting In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2017)); see also
In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, No. 86928469, 2018 WL 1620989, at *4 (TTAB 2018)
(“we do not consider how Applicant and Registrant actually use their marks in the
marketplace, but rather how they appear in the registration and the application. We
must compare the marks as they appear in the drawings, and not [based] on any
[extrinsic materials] that may have additional wording or information.”). Moreover,
the cited registration provides nationwide rights, and “although a registrant’s current
business practices may be quite narrow, they may change at any time … .” CBS Inc.
v. Morrow, 708 F.2d 1579, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citation omitted); see also In re U.S.
Shoe Corp., No. 73518649, 1988 WL 252424, *5 (TTAB 1988) (“[T]hat registrant does
not sell its clothing wholesale or outside of its Colorado stores” is “immaterial”
because “Applicant here is not seeking a geographically restricted registration.”)
Furthermore, there is nothing on the face of either Registrant’s or Applicant’s LA
LA LAND mark, or in Applicant’s identification of goods or Registrant’s recitation of
services, associating either party’s mark with the city of Los Angeles. See Embiid,
2021 WL 2285576, at *6-9 (finding that applied-for mark TRUST THE PROCESS for
shoes was not associated on its face with NBA star Joel Embiid); cf. i.am.symbolic,
866 F.3d at 1323-24 (finding that language in the applicant’s identifications of goods
that they were “all associated with William Adams, professionally known as
‘will.i.am”’ did not distinguish the applicant’s mark I AM from the cited I AM marks
in meaning). In any event, the record includes a definition of the wording LA LA

Serial No. 98073221
7
LAND which is defined as (1) a euphoric, dreamlike mental state detached from the
harsher realities of life, or (2) used as a nickname for Los Angeles, California.6
Although there are a couple of meanings that can be associated with the wording LA
LA LAND, given the identity of the marks in appearance and sound, the meaning of
“LA LA LAND” in both marks would be the same, whether viewed as “a euphoric,
dreamlike mental state detached from the harsher realities of life” or “a nickname for
Los Angeles, California.” Thus, the marks would be understood as having the same
meaning and commercial impression.
On this record, we find the marks at issue are identical in in appearance, sound,
connotation, and overall commercial impression. Thus, the first DuPont factor heavily
favors a finding of likelihood of confusion. See Tiger Lily, 35 F.4th at 1362 (where “the
marks are identical . . . this factor weighs heavily in favor of a likelihood of
confusion”).
B. Similarity of the Good and Services
“The second DuPont factor considers ‘[t]he similarity or dissimilarity and nature
of the goods or services as described in an application or registration . . . .” In re Detroit
Athletic Co., 903 F.2d 1297, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2018). “This factor considers whether ‘the
consuming public may perceive [the goods and services] as related enough to cause
confusion about the source or origin of the goods or services.’” In re St. Helena Hosp.,
774 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir 2014) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press,
Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
6 October 8, 2024 Final Office Action, TSDR p. 10.

Serial No. 98073221
8
The goods and services “‘need not be identical or even competitive to find a
likelihood of confusion.’” In re OSF Healthcare Sys, No. 88706809, 2023 WL 6140427,
at *4 (TTAB 2023) (quoting In re Country Oven, Inc., No. 87354443, 2019 WL
6170483, at *2 (TTAB 2019)). “They need only be ‘related in some manner and/or if
the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to
the mistaken belief that [they] emanate from the same source.” Id. (quoting Country
Oven, 2019 WL 6170483, at *2 (internal quotation omitted)).
The relatedness of goods or services may be established based on (1) the language
of the involved identifications of goods or services, which may show, on the face of the
identifications, that the goods or services are literally or legally identical, or otherwise
intrinsically related, and (2) evidence of third-party uses or registrations, which may
show that the identified goods or services are commonly offered by the same entity
under the same mark. Id. at *4 (“Evidence of relatedness may include news articles
or evidence from computer databases showing that the relevant goods [or services]
are used together or used by the same purchasers; advertisements showing that the
relevant goods [or services] are advertised together or sold by the same manufacturer
or dealer; or copies of prior use-based registrations of the same mark for both
applicant’s goods [or services] and the goods [or services] listed in the cited
registration [and] [t]he application and registration themselves may provide evidence
of the relationship between the [goods or] services.”) (quotations and citations
omitted).
Further, where, as here, the marks are identical, the degree of similarity between

Serial No. 98073221
9
the goods and services required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion
declines. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“even when
goods or services are not competitive or intrinsically related, the use of identical
marks can lead to the assumption that there is a common source”); DeVivo v. Ortiz,
Opp. No. 91242863, 2020 WL 1227592, at *13 (TTAB 2020) (“because the marks are
identical, the degree of similarity between the goods or services required for confusion
to be likely declines”). Moreover, registration must be refused if Applicant’s mark for
any of its identified goods is likely to cause confusion with Registrant’s mark for any
of its listed services. See SquirtCo v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(holding that a single good from among several may sustain a finding of likelihood of
confusion); Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336-37
(CCPA 1981) (likelihood of confusion must be found if there is likely to be confusion
with respect to any item in a class that comes within the identification of goods or
services in the application).
To reiterate, Applicant’s goods are identified as follows:
Stationery; Coasters made of paper; Coasters made of cardboard;
Coasters of paper; Coasters of paper or cardboard; Coasters of
cardboard; Drink coasters made of cardboard; Drink coasters made of
paper; Drink coasters of cardboard; Drink coasters of paper; Napkins
made of paper; Napkins of paper; Paper coasters; Paper napkins; Paper
notebooks; Paper serviettes; Paper gift wrap; Pocket memorandum
books; Posters made of paper; Printed Christmas cards; Printed diaries;
Printed greeting cards; Printed note books; Printed post cards; Printed
posters; Printed announcement cards; Printed birthday cards; Printed
composition books; Printed desk diaries; Printed invitation cards;
Printed memorandum books; Printed musical greeting cards; Printed
occasion cards; Serviettes of paper; Stationery writing paper and
envelopes; Wrapping paper; Writing or drawing books; Art prints; Blank
note cards; Blank writing journals; Cardboard coasters; Cardboard

Serial No. 98073221
10
drink coasters; Christmas wrapping paper; Decorative wrapping paper;
Disposable paper napkins; Disposable table napkins of paper; Gift
wrapping paper; Paper drink coasters; Paper gift cards; Paper index
cards; Paper stationery; Pen trays; Photographic prints; Printed cards
bearing universal greetings; Printed correspondence cards; Printed
holiday cards; Printed index books; Printed index cards; Printed note
cards; Printed notebooks; Printed picture cards; Printed stationery;
Spiral-bound notebooks; Table napkins of paper; Wire-bound notebooks,
in International Class 16;
Handbags; All-purpose carrying bags; All-purpose reusable carrying
bags; Clutch bags; Mesh shopping bags; Sports bags; Tote bags; Wristlet
bags; Backpacks, book bags, sports bags, bum bags, wallets and
handbags, in International Class 18;
Kitchen towels of textile; Tea towels; Kitchen towels made of textile;
Kitchen towels of cloth, in International Class 24; and
Board games; Card games; Christmas tree ornaments and decorations;
Ornaments for Christmas trees, except lights, candles and
confectionery; Party games; Playing cards; Playing cards and card
games; Puzzle board games; Trading cards for games; Christmas tree
decorations; Christmas tree ornaments; Jigsaw puzzles, in International
Class 28.
Registrant’s services are:
Retail store services featuring souvenirs, gift items, sundries, mugs, key
chains, jewelry, sunglasses, paper goods, books, magazines, greeting
cards, stationery, picture frames, posters, art, lanyards, housewares,
passport wallets, wallets, bags, purses, magnets, pens and pencils,
umbrellas, smokers’ articles, convenience store items, grocery items,
toys, sporting goods; retail store services featuring a wide variety of
consumer goods of others.
Applicant acknowledges that confusion may be likely to occur from the use of the
same or similar marks for goods, on the one hand, and for services involving those
goods, on the other.7 See, e.g., Detroit Athletic, 903 F.3d at 1307 (“It is … well
7 Applicant’s Appeal Brief, p. 16, 6 TTABVUE 18.

Serial No. 98073221
11
established that confusion may be likely to occur from the use of the same or similar
marks for goods, on the one hand, and for services involving those goods, on the other.
Indeed, we have held that confusion is likely where one party engages in retail
services that sell goods of the type produced by the other party, as here.”) (cleaned
up; citations omitted). Additionally, Applicant concedes that Registrant’s retail store
services that includes the sale of “paper goods” is broad enough to cover all of the
Applicant’s identified Class 16 goods.8 Similarly, Applicant admits that Registrant’s
retail store services that includes the sale of “wallets, bags” are broad enough to cover
Applicant’s identified Class 18 goods.9 In light of these concessions, we find that
Applicant’s Class 16 and 18 goods are related to Registrant’s Class 35 retail services
for likelihood of confusion purposes.
Applicant, however, argues that the Examining Attorney has failed to
demonstrate that Applicant’s Class 24 and 28 goods are related to Registrant’s retail
services.10 Specifically, Applicant maintains that the term “housewares,” in
Registrant’s recitation of services is, to be sure, a broad but ambiguous term, which
does not necessarily describe Applicant’s Class 24 goods.11 Likewise, Applicant
contends that the term “toys” in Registrant’s recitation of services does not obviously
describe Applicant’s Class 28 goods, which include board games, puzzles and
8 Id. at p. 17, 6 TTABVUE 19.
9 Id.
10 Id. at p. 18, 6 TTBVUE 20.
11 Id. at p. 17, 6 TTABVUE 19.

Serial No. 98073221
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Christmas ornaments.12
We agree with Applicant. Here, in support of her position that Applicant’s Class
24 goods and Class 28 goods are related to Registrant’s Class 35 retail store services,
the Examining Attorney submitted third-party marketplace evidence consisting of
screenshots from the websites of Dollar General, Target and Walmart.13 While this
evidence demonstrates that Applicant’s Class 24 and 28 goods share common trade
channels with Registrant’s retail store services, these screenshots do not show
relatedness since the goods displayed on the websites are offered under a different
mark than the retail store name. For example, Dollar General sells “microfiber
towels” and “board games” but not under the Dollar General name.14 Similarly,
Target sells board games and towels but not under the Target mark.15 The only other
evidence of record are three third-party registrations, one of which shows that a third-
party provides both “kitchen towels” and retail store services featuring various
housewares such as household linens, tablecloths, aprons, mugs, tumblers, as well as
kitchen towels and tea towels.16 The other two third-party registrations demonstrate
that a third-party provides both games and toys, on the one hand, and retail stores
featuring toys and games on the other, under the same mark.17
12 Id.
13 See October 11, 2025 Denial of Request for Reconsideration, TSDR pp. 4-57.
14 Id. at TSDR pp. 6, 9 and 14.
15 Id. at TSDR, pp. 17 and 31-32, and 36.
16 Id., TSDR pp. 69-70.
17 Id., TSDR pp. 58-60 and 71.

Serial No. 98073221
13
We find that the foregoing scant amount of third-party registration evidence is
insufficient for us to find that the Examining Attorney has made a prima facie
showing that Applicant’s Class 24 and Class 28 goods are related to Registrant’s Class
35 retail store services. See, e.g., In re Donnay Int’l, Societe Anonyme, No. 741602268,
1994 WL 515456, at *2 (TTAB 1994) (two third-party registrations submitted by the
Examining Attorney not sufficient to establish relatedness between the services).
Because the record does not show that Applicant’s Class 24 and 28 goods are
commonly offered under the same mark as a retail store featuring those goods, and
there is no other probative evidence of relatedness (including whether Registrant’s
retail sale of “housewares” encompasses Applicant’s kitchen towels or tea towels, or
whether Registrant’s retail sale of “toys” encompasses Applicant’s “Board games;
Card games; Party games; Playing cards; Playing cards and card games; Puzzle board
games; Trading cards for games; Jigsaw puzzles”), we find that the second DuPont
factor does not support a conclusion that confusion is likely with respect to Applicant’s
Class 24 and Class 28 goods.
In sum, based on Applicant’s concessions and the language of the involved
identifications of goods and services, we find that Applicant’s Class 16 and Class 18
goods are related to Registrant’s Class 35 retail store services and, therefore, the
second DuPont factor supports a finding of likelihood of confusion as to these classes
of goods. However, we do not find that the record establishes that Applicant’s Class
24 and Class 28 goods are related to Registrant’s Class 35 retail store services.
Accordingly, the second DuPont factor does not support a finding that confusion is

Serial No. 98073221
14
likely as to Applicant’s Class 24 and Class 28 goods.
C. Similarity of Trade Channels and Classes of Purchasers
We next consider established, likely-to-continue channels of trade, the third
DuPont factor. Because there are no limitations as to channels of trade or classes of
purchasers in either Applicant’s application or the cited registration and the
identified goods and services are related, we must presume that Applicant’s goods
and Registrant’s services travel through all normal and usual trade channels for such
goods and services, and that they are sold or provided to all classes of prospective
purchasers for those goods and services.18 Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1322-23; see also
Coach Servs., 668 F.2d at 1370 (absent limitation “goods are presumed to travel in all
normal channels ... for the relevant goods [or services]”).
The only probative evidence relating to the trade channels through which the
goods and services at issue travel is the third-party website evidence submitted by
the Examining Attorney discussed above. This evidence shows that Applicant’s goods
and Registrant’s services are the type of goods and services that may be offered and
provided in the same online marketplace to similar or overlapping purchasers. We
additionally note that the third parties featured in the online marketplace evidence
provide their services and goods at their brick-and-mortar establishments and are
18 The Examining Attorney contends that “the record clearly establishes that the good [sic]
and services of Applicant and Registrant are highly related, and because neither Applicant
nor Registrant has limited or restricted their goods or services, it is presumed that these
services are marketed through the same channels of trade, to the same class of purchasers.”
See Examining Attorney’s Appeal Brief, 8 TTABVUE 15. This is an incorrect statement of
the law. The cited presumption is applicable only where the goods or services are identical,
see In re Viterra, 671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012), which is not the case in this appeal.

Serial No. 98073221
15
available to the general public. Therefore, the third DuPont factor also weighs in favor
of finding a likelihood of confusion.
III. Balancing the DuPont Factors
We have considered all of the arguments and evidence of record and all relevant
DuPont factors. We find that (1) the marks at issue are identical, (2) Applicant’s Class
16 and 18 goods and Registrant’s Class 35 retail store services are related, (3) the
record does not establish that Applicant’s Class 24 and Class 28 goods are related to
Registrant’s Class 35 services, and (4) the parties’ goods and services are offered, at
a minimum, in overlapping trade channels and offered to overlapping classes of
purchasers.
As such, we conclude that Applicant’s LA LA LAND mark, as used in connection
with the identified Class 16 and 18 goods, so resembles the cited mark LA LA LAND
for the services listed in the cited registration, as to be likely to cause confusion or
mistake, or to deceive under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act. We do not find,
however, based on the record before us, that Applicant’s LA LA LAND mark, as used
in connection with the identified Class 24 and Class 28 goods, will likely cause
confusion with Registrant’s LA LA LAND mark for the services listed in the cited
registration, due to the lack of evidence of relatedness of the identified Class 24 and
28 goods with the services in the cited registration.
Decision: The refusal to register Applicant’s LA LA LAND mark under Section
2(d) of the Trademark Act is affirmed as to Classes 16 and 18 only. The refusal,
however, is reversed with regard to Applicant’s Class 24 and 28 goods and, therefore,

Serial No. 98073221
16
the application will proceed solely in connection with the goods identified in Classes
24 and 28.