Catholic Questions Corporation DBA Catholic Questions

THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Mailed: March 5, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
In re Catholic Questions Corporation
_____
Serial No. 97646030
_____
Sam Castree III of Sam Castree Law LLC,
for Catholic Questions Corporation.
Catherine Sutton, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 103,
Stacy Wahlberg, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Larkin, Lebow and Elgin,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Lebow, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Applicant, Catholic Questions Corporation, seeks to register the mark
CATHOLIC QUESTIONS, in standard characters with “CATHOLIC” disclaimed,
on the Principal Register for “Charitable education services, namely, providing one-
on-one explanations and commentary via e-mail, telephone, and postal mail in the
field of Catholic apologetics” in International Class 41.1
1 Application Serial No. 97646030 was filed on October 24, 2022 under Section 1(a) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), based on Applicant’s allegation of use of the mark in
commerce and anywhere since at least as early as September 8, 2020.

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The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration of Applicant’s mark on
two grounds: (1) under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the
ground that Applicant’s mark is likely to cause confusion with the composite mark
(“CHRISTIAN QUESTIONS” disclaimed) on the Principal Register for
“Entertainment, namely, a continuing religious education show broadcast over
internet, radio, and via podcast”;2 and (2) under Trademark Rule 2.32(a)(6), 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.32(a)(6), on the ground that the recitation of services is indefinite and must be
clarified.3 After the Examining Attorney made the refusals final,4 Applicant filed a
request for reconsideration, and a notice of appeal.5 The request for reconsideration
was denied, and the appeal resumed.6 Both Applicant and the Examining Attorney
have filed briefs,7 and the appeal is ready for final decision.
For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the refusal based on likelihood of
2 Registration No. 5422840, issued March 13, 2018; maintained.
3 See August 7, 2023 Office Action.
4 See March 19, 2024 Final Office Action.
Citations to the prosecution file refer to the USPTO’s Trademark Status & Document
Retrieval (“TSDR”) system and identify the documents by title, date, and page in the
downloadable .pdf version.
5 See June 18, 2024 Request for Reconsideration; 1 TTABVUE (Notice of Appeal).
Citations to the briefs and other materials in the appeal record refer to the Board’s TTABVUE
online docket system.
6 See 4 TTABVUE (Reconsideration Letter); 5 TTABVUE (Order Resuming Appeal).
7 6 TTABVUE (Applicant’s Brief); 8 TTABVUE (Examining Attorney’s Brief).

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confusion and do not reach the issue of indefiniteness.
I. Likelihood of Confusion
“The Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that ‘so resembles a
registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods … of
the applicant, to cause confusion, mistake, or to deceive.’ 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (also
called Section 2(d)).” In re Charger Ventures LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2023). “To determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists under section 2(d), the
Board considers the so-called DuPont factors in its analysis. In re E. I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (reciting thirteen factors to be
considered, referred to as ‘DuPont factors’).” Id.
We consider each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument, In re
Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2019), but “we focus our analysis on
those factors we find to be relevant.” ProMark Brands, Inc. v. GFA Brands, Inc., No.
91194974, 2015 TTAB LEXIS 67, at *26-27. “The weight given to each factor depends
on the circumstances of each case.” Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1381. “Each case
must be decided on its own facts and the differences are often subtle ones.” Indus.
Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d 1197, 1199 (CCPA 1973).
“In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two key considerations are the
similarities between the marks and the similarities between the services.” Monster
Energy Co. v. Lo, No. 91225050, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 14, at *18 (citing Federated Foods,
Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental
inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential

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characteristics of the goods [and services] and differences in the marks.”).
A. Comparison of the Marks
Under the first DuPont factor, we determine the similarity or dissimilarity of
Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks in their entireties, taking into account their
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. DuPont, 476 F.2d at
1361. “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks
confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, No. 87075988, 2018 TTAB LEXIS
170, at *13 (citing In re Davia, No. 85497617, 2014 TTAB LEXIS 214, at *13)), aff’d
777 Fed. Appx. 516 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
“The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead
whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression
such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection
between the parties.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(quoting Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2012)). “The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who normally
retains a general rather than a specific impression of trademarks.” In re Box Sols.
Corp., No. 76267086, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 176, at *14.
All elements of the respective marks must be considered. See In re Viterra Inc.,
671 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[M]arks must be viewed ‘in their entireties,’
and it is improper to dissect a mark …, including when a mark contains both words
and a design.”); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating
that “marks must be compared in their entireties”). However, “there is nothing
improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to

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a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on
consideration of the marks in their entireties.” In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d
1297, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Nat’l Data, 753 F.2d at 1058).
Once again, Applicant’s mark is CATHOLIC QUESTIONS in standard
characters, and the cited mark is .
1. Appearance
“In the case of marks, such as [Registrant’s], consisting of words and a design, the
words are normally accorded greater weight because they are likely to make a greater
impression upon purchasers, to be remembered by them, and to be used by them to
request the goods.” In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, No. 86928469, 2018 TTAB LEXIS
108, at *6, citing Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1366 (“[T]he verbal portion of a word and design
mark likely will be the dominant portion”). We find that to be the case with respect
to the cited registered mark here.
Although Registrant’s mark contains the design of a microphone, “the design is
not so distinctive as to distinguish [the registered] mark from [Applicant’s] mark.” In
re Guild Mortg., No. 86709944, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 17, at *5. It would not be used to
call for the services, and may not be recalled by consumers. And while we compare
the marks in their entireties, we give greater weight to the word portion of the cited
mark, rather than the design, in our analysis. See Viterra, 671 F.3d at 1362, citing
L.C. Licensing, Inc. v. Berman, No. 91162330, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 756, at *9 (“[I]t is
well settled that if a mark comprises both a word and a design, then the word is

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normally accorded greater weight because it would be used by purchasers to request
the [services].”)).
In addition, “it is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed
upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered[.]”Presto Prods. v. Nice-Pak Prods.,
No. 91074797, 1988 TTAB LEXIS 60, at *7-8. Further, the slogan is in substantially
smaller font and subordinate to the term , which is clearly
the dominant element in the cited mark. See e.g., In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d
1340, 1344 (where the “Blue Moon Brewing Co.” appeared “at the bottom of the mark
in significantly smaller font, it was reasonable for the Board to find that those words
do not significantly contribute to distinguishing the two marks”); In re I-Coat Co.,
Nos. 86802467, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 171, at *21 (smaller script at bottom of the mark
did not significantly contribute to distinguishing the marks.”).
For these reasons, we accord greater weight to the
portion of the cited mark in our analysis. See Nat’l Data, 753 F.2d at 1058 (“[T]here
is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been
given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on
consideration of the marks in their entireties.”) And that dominant element,
, is very similar to the entirety of Applicant’s CATHOLIC
QUESTIONS mark.
Moreover, in comparing the marks, we must account for the fact that Applicant
seeks to register its mark CATHOLIC QUESTIONS in standard characters, and
could display it (and enjoy the benefits of registration) in any font, style, size, or color,

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including the same or similar font style to the font used to display
in the cited mark. See In re Well Living Lab Inc., No.
86440401, 2017 TTAB LEXIS 156, at *1 n.1; i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1324, quoting
Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[T]he argument
concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in
no particular display. By presenting its mark merely in a typed drawing, a difference
cannot legally be asserted by that party.”). For example, in In re Melville Corp., No.
73736814, 1991 TTAB LEXIS 18, at *2-3, the Board found similar to
the standard character mark ESSENTIALS, the display of which “may be changed at
any time at the whim of its owner; rights in such a mark reside in the term itself
rather than in any particular form thereof.”
It is important to keep in mind that a side-by-side comparison is improper. Under
actual market conditions, consumers often do not have the luxury of making such a
comparison and must rely instead on their imperfect recollections. See In re St.
Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 751 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (marks should be considered in light
of the fallibility of memory, not through side-by-side comparison). The proper
perspective is on the recollection of the average customer, who retains a general
rather than specific impression of marks. i.am.symbolic, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 281, at
*11.
2. Sound
As far as sound, Applicant asserts that “[e]xcept for the initial hard ‘C’ sound, the

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words ‘Christina’ and ‘Catholic’ do not share almost any of the same sounds.”8
Therefore, concludes Applicant, “[i]t would be nearly impossible to mistake one word
for the other when spoken allowed or written.”9 But the issue under Section 2(d) “is
not whether people will necessarily confuse the marks, but whether the marks will
be likely to confuse people into believing that the [services] they are purchasing
emanate from the same source.” Kangol Ltd. v. Kangaroos U.S.A., Inc., 974 F.2d 161,
163 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
We agree that the marks sound different, overall, when viewed in their entireties,
apart for the identical word, “QUESTIONS.” But, as discussed, “QUESTIONS” is one
of just two words comprising the dominant term in the cited
mark. Because consumers tend to focus on and remember the dominant element or
portion of a mark when calling for the services offered under the mark, the
dissimilarity of the remaining wording as to sound is less influential on our
determination of the marks’ overall similarity. Consumers rely on their past
recollections of marks. i.am.symbolic, 2018 TTAB LEXIS 281, at *11. The similarity
in sound between Applicant’s mark and the cited mark “will be greater if consumers
engage in ‘the penchant of consumers to shorten marks,’ and drop the non-source
identifying words[s] … when verbalizing [the cited mark ].” Sabhnani v. Mirage
Brands, LLC, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 464, at *45 (internal citation omitted).
8 6 TTABVUE 8 (Applicant’s Brief).
9 Id.

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3. Connotation
As to connotation, Applicant argues that the marks have materially different
connotations because the ordinary consumer distinguishes “Christian” from
“Catholic”:
[C]onsumer[s] would not necessarily be inclined to see “Christian” and
“Catholic” as meaning the same thing. Moreover, “Christian” and “bible
Christian” is [sic] often used colloquially to mean “Protestant,” and the
ordinary American is likely (whether rightly or wrongly) to see a
distinction between Catholic Questions and Christian Questions,
especially, “Christian Questions Think About The Bible Like You Never
Have Before.”10
Applicant further contends that the cited mark’s slogan reinforces this perceived
distinction by emphasizing a Bible-focused approach allegedly absent from
Catholicism.11 In support, Applicant quotes Protestant-oriented sources to assert that
consumers draw a line between the two:
“[M]uch of Catholicism is not biblically based” and “Catholicism has
many unbiblical practices and teachings, such as purgatory,
sacraments, and the rosary.”12
These arguments are unpersuasive for several reasons. First, a “Christian” is
defined by the MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY as “one who professes belief in the
teachings of Jesus Christ” (noun), “a member of a Christian Church” (noun), “of
relating to Christianity” (adjective), and “professing Christianity” (adjective).13 And
10 Id. at 8-9.
11 Id. at 11-12.
12 Id. at 12.
13 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Christian (accessed February 28, 2026). See
Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J. C. Gourmet Food Imps. Co., No. 91061847, 1982 TTAB
LEXIS 146, at *7 (“[T]he Board may take judicial notice of use of a term in dictionaries.”). See

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ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA explains that “Roman Catholicism is the largest of the
three major branches of Christianity”; that “all Roman Catholics are Christian, but
not all Christians are Roman Catholic”; and that “[o]f the estimated 2.3 billion
Christians in the world, about 1.3 billion of them are Roman Catholics.”14 Catholicism
is plainly encompassed within the broad dictionary definition of “Christian,” and
someone who is a Catholic is by definition a Christian.
Second, Applicant’s own identification of services places its mark squarely within
Christianity. The services are identified as “Charitable education services, namely
providing one-on-one explanations and commentary via e-mail, telephone, and postal
mail in the field of Catholic apologetics” (emphasis added). “Apologetics” is
defined by the ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA as “the intellectual defense of the truth of
the Christian religion….”15 Thus, “Catholic apologetics” is, by definition, a specialized
application of Christian apologetics that defends the Catholic expression of the
Christian faith.
Third, by disclaiming CATHOLIC, Applicant has conceded that the term is merely
descriptive of the identified services. See Detroit Athletic, 903 F.3d at 1305;
TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1213.01(a) (TMEP) (Nov. 2025).
Because the services are expressly identified as being “in the field of Catholic
apologetics,” the disclaimer concedes that CATHOLIC merely narrows the broader
also B.V.D. Licensing Corp. v. Body Action Design Inc., 846 F.2d 727, 728 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(“dictionaries and encyclopedias may be consulted”).
14 March 19, 2023 Final Office Action, at TSDR 12.
15 Id. at TSDR 13.

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field of Christian apologetics to its Catholic denomination. In other words, Applicant
itself treats “Catholic” as designating a subset of Christianity rather than a wholly
separate concept.
Fourth, the materials Applicant relies upon—primarily articles from Protestant
apologetic websites such as GotQuestions.org and Christianity.com—reflect intra-
denominational theological debate rather than the perception of the ordinary
American consumer. The existence of such debates does not redefine the term
“Christian” for trademark purposes; it merely illustrates that certain subgroups
emphasize differences in practice or emphasis. The ordinary consumer, however, is
not limited to any single denomination and would perceive both marks as relating to
education or apologetics within the Christian faith.
Finally, as noted above, the cited mark’s slogan—”Think about the Bible like you
never have before”—is subordinate in size and placement and functions merely as a
tagline explaining the manner or purpose of the religious education services. It does
not restrict the services to any particular denomination; the identification recites
“Entertainment, namely, a continuing religious education show … in the field of
religion” generally. Like all Christians, Catholics read, study, and interpret the Bible,
and the slogan therefore does not create a distinct commercial impression that
overcomes the similarity of the dominant elements and
CATHOLIC QUESTIONS.
In sum, the dominant literal elements in both marks convey the same essential
commercial impression: questioning, inquiry, or education within the Christian faith.

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The ordinary consumer who encounters both Applicant’s mark and the cited mark
separately would perceive them as related, with one more specific than the other. In
the context of the services identified in the application, consumers with a general
impression of the cited mark could readily view Applicant’s mark as a variant of the
cited mark reflecting a line extension of the registrant’s services beyond the Internet,
podcast and radio modalities, and into the Catholic faith in particular. See, e.g., Joel
Gott Wines, LLC v. Rehoboth Von Gott, Inc., No. 91197659, 2013 TTAB LEXIS 314,
at *32. We find that the marks are quite similar in meaning. Any nuanced theological
distinctions drawn by certain subgroups do not overcome this overlap for purposes of
the likelihood of confusion analysis. We find the marks similar.
B. Comparison of the Services
The second DuPont factor “considers whether the consuming public may perceive
the respective services of the parties as related enough to cause confusion about the
source or origin of the services.” Naterra Int’l, Inc. v. Bensalem, 92 F.4th 1113, 1117
(Fed. Cir. 2024) (quoting St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir. 2024)). We
compare the services as they are identified in the application and cited registration.
Detroit Athletic, 903 F.3d at 1307, citing i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1325 (“The
relevant inquiry focuses on the goods and services described in the application and
registration, and not real-world conditions.”) (emphasis in original).
The services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of
confusion. On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086 (Fed. Cir.
2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000). They need only be
“related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are

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such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that the services emanate from
the same source.” Coach Servs., 668 F.3d at 1369 (quoting 7-Eleven, Inc. v. Wechsler,
No. 91117739, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 58, at *28 (TTAB 2007)). “[L]ikelihood of confusion
can be found ‘if the respective products [or services] are related in some manner
and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could
give rise to the mistaken belief that they emanate from the same source.’” Id.
Applicant’s services, as currently identified, are
Charitable education services, namely, providing one-on-one
explanations and commentary via e-mail, telephone, and postal mail in
the field of Catholic apologetics[,]
and the cited registration’s services are
Entertainment, namely, a continuing religious education show
broadcast over internet, radio, and via podcast[.]
We are required to determine the issue of likelihood of confusion on the basis of
the goods or services as set forth in the application and the cited registration,
respectively. i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1325. Although we do not reach the question
of whether Applicant’s identification of services in the application is indefinite, we
consider the nature of the services based on the identifications of record in both the
application and the cited registration.
The Examining Attorney made of record Internet evidence consisting of
screenshots from third-party websites including Bible Questions (biblequestions.org),
Catholic Answers (catholic.com) and Christian Questions (christianquestions.com),
which show that the same entities commonly provide both personalized, one-on-one
religious explanations and commentary (including apologetics) and ongoing religious

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education shows or podcasts under unified branding.16 This evidence is probative of
relatedness because it shows that consumers are accustomed to encountering these
complementary forms of religious education from a single source. See, e.g., In re Davey
Prods. Pty, No. 77029776, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 524, at *14-16; In re Toshiba Med. Sys.
Corp., No. 79046106, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 447, at *17-18. In addition, the identification
of services in the cited registration is broad, encompassing “religious education”
delivered in an entertainment format. The field of “religious education” readily
encompasses Applicant’s more specific services in the field of “Catholic apologetics,”
which, as discussed above, constitutes a specialized form of Christian religious
education.
Applicant nonetheless contends that the services are not sufficiently similar
because:
To access Applicant’s services, individuals (internally referred to as
“clients”) contact Applicant directly – typically by email, although
Applicant also accepts correspondence by phone and by postal mail. …
This is markedly different from the services offered under the [cited]
registration, which are entertainment services in the nature of an
ongoing show. Applicant’s services are not a show. There is no broadcast,
and there is explicitly not meant to be a broadcast.17
Applicant further emphasizes that its services are personalized, confidential, one-on-
one interactions of limited length, whereas the cited marks services are public, non-
personalized broadcasts intended for broad audiences.18
16 November 3, 2023 Office Action, at TSDR 18-23.
17 6 TTABVUE 14-15 (Applicant’s Brief).
18 Id. at 15.

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These distinctions in format, delivery method, and degree of personalization are
not dispositive. The relevant inquiry is not whether the services are identical in every
respect, but whether the consuming public may perceive them as related enough to
cause confusion as to source when provided under similar marks. In re Majestic
Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The evidence of record establishes
precisely such relatedness in the religious education field. Moreover, the differences
Applicant highlights do not overcome the fact that the cited mark’s broad “religious
education” identification is capable of encompassing Catholic apologetics content, and
third-party use evidence shows that entities routinely offer both personalized and
broadcast formats under the same mark. We find that the services similar.
C. Comparison of the Trade Channels
Under the third DuPont factor, we assess the similarity or dissimilarity of
established, likely-to-continue channels of trade in which the respective services are
offered. Dupont, 476 F.2d at 1361. Where, as here, the identifications of services
contain no restrictions as to trade channels, we presume that the services travel
through all normal channels for such services and are offered through overlapping
trade channels, particular the Internet, and Applicant’s arguments to the contrary
are unpersuasive.
Applicant contends that the respective services travel through distinct channels:
[T]he fact that parties may utilize multiple different channels of trade
does not show a likelihood of confusion when the channels that each one
uses are different. The [cited registrant] does not offer an entertainment
show via phone call or postal mail (the former of which would be largely
impractical, while the latter is simply not possible). Applicant, for its
part, does not provide its one-on-one apologetics via radio or podcast

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(and, given the nature of Applicant’s services, the former is necessarily
excluded, and the latter is simply not possible).19
Applicant emphasizes that its services are delivered via e-mail, telephone, and postal
mail, which it argues are “markedly different” from the cited mark’s broadcast
methods, and that email only “technically … requires use of the Internet.”20
The Examining Attorney counters that Applicant’s amendment to its services
during prosecution—specifying delivery “via e-mail, telephone, and postal mail”—
does not obviate the overlap:
[A]s the examining attorney has shown, through the previously provided
evidence from the Registrant’s website the registrant also provides an
email contact method for consumers to submit questions. See June 18,
2024, Request for Reconsideration. Indeed, that is the nature of both
parties[‘] services — the parties accept questions on the nature of
religion and provide answers. Then the answers are provided with the
registrant providing answers via a broadcast services [sic] and the
applicant (according to their narrowed although still indefinite
identification of services) via e-mail, telephone, and postal mail.21
The Examining Attorney further argues that restrictions in the identification do not
control public perception, citing cases such as In re Dolce Vita Footwear, Inc., No.
88554722, 2021 TTAB LEXIS 120, at *13 and Aquitaine Wine, 2018 TTAB LEXIS
108, at *19, for the proposition that consumers are unaware of such limitations, which
“quietly reside” in Office records.
The evidence of record, including Applicant’s specimen (showing a website via
19 6 TTABVUE 14 (Applicant’s Brief).
20 Id. at 14-15.
21 8 TTABVUE 11 (Examining Attorney’s Brief).

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which questions are solicited)22 and the cited registrant’s website (soliciting questions
and podcasts),23 establishes that both parties utilize the internet as a primary
channel for initial consumer contact and service delivery. But that is an insufficient
basis upon which to find an overlap in the channels of trade. See Parfums de Couer
Ltd. v. Lazarus, No. 91161331, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 36, at *30 (“[T]he mere fact that
goods and services may both be advertised and offered through the Internet is not a
sufficient basis to find that they are sold through the same channels of trade.”).
We acknowledge that the third-party evidence of record (e.g., websites like Bible
Questions, Catholic Answers, and Got Questions)24 shows providers of religious
education and apologetics offering their services through a combination of
personalized correspondence (e.g., email) and broadcast formats (e.g., podcasts) under
the same marks. But as specified in the application and cited registration, the
modalities by which the services are provided—email, telephone and postal mail
versus Internet, radio and podcast mediums—are different. This factor therefore
weighs slightly against a finding of likelihood of confusion.
D. Alleged Lack of Actual Confusion
The eighth DuPont factor considers the “the length of time during and conditions
under which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion.”
DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. Applicant argues that “the marks have been in use at the
22 October 16, 2023 Response to Office Action, at TSDR 18-19.
23 November 3, 2023 Office Action, at TSDR 20-23.
24 Id. at 18-21, 24-26.

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same time for nearly 5 years” because “Applicant has alleged a first use date of Sept.
8, 2020, and the [cited] registration admittedly registered before then”; that
Applicant’s services “are not hidden under a bushel basket,” as Applicant advertises
nationally; that the owner of the cited mark “has had ample opportunity to learn
about Applicant and its services”; and that “Applicant has never heard any semblance
of confusion from any of Applicant’s clients or another third party … [nor] has
Applicant ever had contact with the owner of the cited mark.”25 Thus, concludes
Applicant, “under DuPont, this factor … must weigh in Applicant’s favor.”26
But Applicant provides no evidence to support its contentions, as a statement in
a brief is not itself evidence. See, e.g., In re Simulations Publ’ns, Inc., 521 F.2d 797,
798 (CCPA 1975) (“Statements in a brief cannot take the place of evidence”) (citation
omitted); In re Burndy Corp., 300 F.2d 938, 940 (CCPA 1962) (“A brief cannot take
the place of proof and in its absence we disregard all such factual assertions where
they are not matters of such common knowledge that we can take judicial notice of
them.”). In addition, “[t]he allegation in an application for registration, or in a
registration, of a date of use is not evidence of use … a date of use of a mark must be
established by competent evidence.” Trademark Rule 2.122(b)(2), 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.122(b)(2).
Further, “[l]ack of evidence of actual confusion or mistake, of course, does not
preclude a finding of likelihood of confusion.” In re Calgon Corp., 435 F.2d 596, 597
25 6 TTABVUE 16 (Applicant’s Brief).
26 Id.

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(CCPA 1971). Thus, even if there were a probative declaration in the record, we would
still be getting only half of the story because the registrant is not a party to this case.
See, e.g., In re Guild Mortg., No. 86709944, 2020 TTAB LEXIS 17, at *23-25; In re
Inspection Tech. Inc., No. 73287613, 1984 TTAB LEXIS 88, at *5-6. “Moreover, for
the Examining Attorney to attempt to show actual confusion ... would be an
impossible undertaking.” Inspection Tech., 1984 TTAB LEXIS 88, at *5-6; see
generally In re Pacer Tech., 338 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (the USPTO “is an
agency of limited resources” and “cannot be expected to shoulder the burden of
conducting market research”) (citations omitted).
This eight DuPont factor is neutral.
E. Conclusion
We have found that the first and second DuPont factors concerning the similarities
of the respective marks and services weigh in favor of a likelihood of confusion.
Although the trade channels are different because the cited mark is provided by
Internet, radio or podcast, and Applicant’s has limited its services to e-mail, telephone
and postal mail, making the third DuPont factor of trade channels weigh against a
finding of likelihood of confusion, it does not negate the weight of the similarity of the
marks and services. As we have explained, consumers encountering one of the marks
may simply view the difference channel as an extension of the services provided by
the same source as the other. The eighth DuPont factor concerning an alleged lack of
actual confusion is neutral.
Accordingly, we conclude that Applicant’s mark CATHOLIC QUESTIONS for
“Charitable education services, namely, providing one-on-one explanations and

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commentary via e-mail, telephone, and postal mail in the field of Catholic apologetics”
in Application Serial No. 97646030 is likely be confused with the cited mark
for “Entertainment, namely, a
continuing religious education show broadcast over internet, radio, and via podcast.”
We thus do not reach the Examining Attorney’s additional refusal alleging that
Applicant’s identification of services is indefinite.
Decision: The refusal to register under Section 2(d) is affirmed.