Lingfei Kang

This opinion is not a
precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: February 12, 2026
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Lingfei Kang
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Serial No. 98255168
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Songfong Tommy Wang, of Wang IP Law Group, P.C.,
for Lingfei Kang
Luz Adorno Santos, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 111,
Chris Doninger, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Wellington, Cohen, and Casagrande, Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Casagrande, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Lingfei Kang (Applicant) applied to register the mark PURELUX SCALP SPA
(“SCALP SPA” disclaimed), in standard-character format, on the Principal Register
for services ultimately identified as “Beauty salon services, namely, cosmetic scalp
care; Health spa services for health and wellness of the mind, body and spirit; Health
spa services, namely, minimally and non-invasive cosmetic and scalp care services;
all of the foregoing excluding cosmetic body care and cosmetic and body fitness

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therapies,” in International Class 44.1 The Trademark Examining Attorney refused
registration under Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), due to likelihood of confusion
with two different standard-character marks:
• PÜRLUXE, registered on the Principal Register for “Beauty spa services,
namely, cosmetic body care,” in International Class 44;2 and
• PURE LUXE CONTOUR LAB (“CONTOUR LAB” disclaimed), registered
on the Principal Register for “Medical spa services, namely, minimally and
non-invasive cosmetic and body fitness therapies,” in International Class
44.3
After the Examining Attorney issued a final refusal and denied Applicant’s
request for reconsideration, Applicant appealed.4 Both Applicant and the Examining
Attorney filed appeal briefs.5 The appeal is now ready for decision.
ANALYSIS
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits registration of a mark that “so
resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office … as to be likely,
when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). In this case, two different
registered marks were cited as bars to registration under Section 2(d). We will start
1 Application Serial No. 98255168 was filed under Section 1(b) of the Trademark Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1051(b), based on Applicant’s allegation of a bona fide intent to use the mark in
commerce.
2 Reg. No. 6007449 issued on March 10, 2020.
3 Reg. No. 6824250 issued on August 23, 2022.
4 See 1 TTABVUE. References to the briefs and other Board docket entries cite to the
Board’s TTABVUE electronic docket system. The number preceding “TTABVUE” represents
the docket number assigned to the cited filing in TTABVUE and any number immediately
following “TTABVUE” identifies the specifically-cited page(s), if any.
5 See 4 TTABVUE (Applicant’s brief); 6 TTABVUE (Examining Attorney’s brief).

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with PÜRLUXE. If we find confusion likely in view of that mark, then the application
will stand refused and there will be no need to address whether confusion is likely as
to PURE LUXE CONTOUR LAB. If we determine confusion is unlikely as to
PÜRLUXE, however, we will then turn to whether confusion is likely as to PURE
LUXE CONTOUR LAB.
We determine whether confusion is likely by analyzing all probative facts in
evidence relevant to the likelihood-of-confusion factors set forth in In re E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973). See, e.g., In re Charger Ventures
LLC, 64 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Though du Pont lists thirteen numbered
factors, we generally address only those that are relevant and material to the case
before us. See, e.g., Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel, Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Computer Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 943 (Fed.
Cir. 1990). Typically, those are the factors that the parties address and on which there
is relevant evidence in the record. See, e.g., Dollar Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Brittex Fin., Inc.,
132 F.4th 1363, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 2025); Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d
943, 946-47 (Fed. Cir. 2000). After making findings on the relevant factors, we then
weigh them together to determine if, on balance, they indicate that confusion is likely.
See, e.g., Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1381; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d
1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
In this case, Applicant and the Examining Attorney engage only on the first two
factors listed in du Pont:

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(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their
entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression.
(2) The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or
services as described in an application or registration ….
476 F.2d at 1371. These two factors usually play important roles in whether confusion
is likely and sometimes are dispositive even when other factors play into the mix. See,
e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The likelihood of
confusion analysis considers all DuPont factors for which there is record evidence but
may focus ... on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of
the goods.”) (cleaned up; citations omitted); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard
Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103 (CCPA 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry … goes to
the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and
differences in the marks.”).
A. Comparison of the marks
We start with “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as
to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.” du Pont, 476 F.2d at
1371. Similarity in all four aspects is not required, however, for this factor to support
a refusal. See, e.g., Beacon-Morris Corp. v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 463 F.2d 1097, 1098,
(CCPA 1972) (confusion likely as between DUO-FLO and TWIN FLO because of
similar meaning notwithstanding differences in appearance and sound); Krim-Ko
Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 732 (CCPA 1968) (“It is sufficient if the
similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely to cause confusion.”)
(citation omitted); Hancock v. Am. Steel & Wire Co., 203 F.2d 737, 740 (CCPA 1953)

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(“it is proper to consider [the marks’] appearance, sound and meaning … but a
combination of all three factors need not necessarily exist”) (cleaned up; citations
omitted). We “analyze[ ] likelihood of confusion based on the mark as applied to the
[services] recited” in the application and registration, i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at
1324-25, comparing the marks in their entireties, see, e.g., Oakville Hills Cellar, Inc.
v. Georgallis Holdings, LLC, 826 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016), not side-by-side,
as though in a laboratory. And we keep in mind both that consumers depend on their
recollection of marks to which they’ve previously been exposed and that their
memories are fallible. See, e.g., In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 751 (Fed. Cir.
2014); Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 1007 (CCPA 1981).
“Similarity is not a binary factor but is a matter of degree.” St. Helena Hosp., 774
F.3d at 752 (citation omitted). “The proper test is … whether the marks are
sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that persons who
encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”
i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1323 (citation omitted); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Knox Indus. Corp., 277 F.2d 945, 947 (CCPA 1960) (“This issue is whether the marks
are confusingly similar, not whether they are identical.”) (citation omitted).
Here, the Examining Attorney argues that the first words of Applicant’s mark
“PURELUX” and the mark PÜRLUXE “are comprised of the virtually identical
wording PURE LUX, with variations in spelling of PÜR and LUXE.”6 The Examining
Attorney further contends that these terms “are virtually identical in sound” and
6 6 TTABVUE 3.

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“convey a similar connotation of combining ‘pure’ and ‘luxury’ to suggest services that
are luxurious or leave one feeling luxurious.”7 Applicant does not contend that “PURE
LUX” and PÜRLUXE sound different or have different meanings.
The Examining Attorney points out that “PURE LUX” comprises the first two
words of Applicant’s mark, and that the third and fourth words (“SCALP SPA”) are
descriptive of the services and on that basis Applicant disclaimed them.8 Thus,
according to the Examining Attorney, “PURE LUX” plays a dominant role in creating
the overall commercial impression of Applicant’s mark.9 We agree. See, e.g., Century
21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Board
correctly found that “Century” is the “dominant element of CENTURY LIFE OF
AMERICA due to applicant’s disclaimer of the rest of its mark” and because “upon
encountering each mark, consumers must first notice this identical lead word”). Thus,
the Examining Attorney argues that “applicant’s mark essentially incorporates the
entirety of registrant’s mark, PÜRLUXE, in Reg. No. 6007449 without adding any
distinctive wording that would distinguish it from that mark.”
Applicant protests that “PÜRLUXE” is “a completely different variation” of
“PURELUX.”10 That’s hyperbole. While we agree that “PÜRLUXE” is a “variation” of
“PURE LUX” in the sense that the two component terms are spelled slightly
differently, this slight difference in spelling does not change the meaning or
7 Id. at 4.
8 Id. at 5-6.
9 Id. at 6.
10 4 TTABVUE 7.

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pronunciation of the terms and thus does not play much of a role in creating different
commercial impressions. See, e.g., Contour Chair-Lounge Co. v. Englander Co., 324
F.2d 186, 189 (CCPA 1963) (finding that “‘Contur’ but a slight misspelling of
‘Contour,’” Court held that confusion was likely as between CONTURFOAM for
mattresses and box springs and CONTOUR for chairs); Nat’l Mineral Co. v. Norwich
Pharmacal Co., 183 F.2d 119, 120 (CCPA 1950) (“That the marks are similar in sound
is beyond question. ‘Swav’ is the pronunciation of ‘suave’, as shown by the
dictionaries. That the marks are alike in meaning we think is clear, both indicating
smoothness, sleekness and good grooming. Therefore, as far as the similarity between
the marks is concerned, we deem that in sound and meaning they are not, in a trade-
mark registration sense, legally distinguishable.”); Black & Decker Corp. v. Emerson
Elec. Co., No. 91158891, 2007 WL 894416, at *7 (TTAB 2007) (where HOG and
HAWG are pronounced the same and have the same meaning, consumers “[u]nder
actual marketing conditions” in which they would not “have the luxury of making
side-by-side comparisons between marks, and must rely upon their imperfect
recollections,” and perhaps had heard of the senior user only by “word-of-mouth
recommendations,” would likely be confused).
Applicant argues that the Examining Attorney ignored the wording “SCALP
SPA.”11 We don’t see it that way. The Examining Attorney acknowledges that this
wording is a difference between the marks, but argues that, because SCALP SPA
comes after the words PURELUX and is not source-identifying, but rather is
11 Id.

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descriptive of the services, it does too little to differentiate the marks and render
confusion unlikely.12 In addition, the application and the PÜRLUXE registration both
identify spa services.
We agree with the Examining Attorney. We are concerned with the overall
commercial impressions of the marks, and descriptive wording that comes after
PURELUX, which is nearly identical to the registered mark, does little to distinguish
them. See, e.g., Frostie Co. v. Sun-Glo Packers, Inc., 315 F.2d 932, 933-34 (CCPA 1963)
(“In practical effect [FROSTY INN] incorporates [FROSTIE] in its entirety. The
additional work ‘INN’ is short and forms the terminal part of Sun-Glo’s mark, thereby
minimizing any effect it might have in distinguishing from the single word mark,
‘FROSTIE,’ in either sound or appearance.”); King-Kup Candies, Inc. v. King Candy
Co., 288 F.2d 944, 945 (CCPA 1961) (“If all that a newcomer in the field need do in
order to avoid the charge of confusing similarity is to select a word descriptive of his
goods and combine it with a word which is the dominant feature of a registered trade-
mark so that the borrowed word becomes the dominant feature of his mark, the
registered trade-mark soon becomes of little value.”) (citation omitted); see also In re
Bay State Brewing Co., No. 85826258, 2016 WL 1045677, at *3 (TTAB 2016) (noting
“the penchant of consumers to shorten marks”) (citation omitted).
In sum, we find PURELUX SCALP SPA very similar to PÜRLUXE. This factor
will count in favor of a conclusion that confusion is likely when we do our final
weighing of the relevant confusion factors.
12 6 TTABVUE 6-7.

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B. Comparison of the services
The second likelihood-of-confusion factor looks at “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity
and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or registration.” du
Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361. This is a factor of “considerable importance” when weighing
whether confusion is likely or not. See, e.g., Pink Lady Corp. v. L.N. Renault & Sons,
Inc., 265 F.2d 951, 953 (CCPA 1959); Pep Boys-Manny, Moe and Jack v. Edwin F.
Guth Co., 197 F.2d 527, 528-29 (CCPA 1952). “It is … not necessary that the goods
[or services] of the parties be identical in order to sustain a finding of likelihood of
confusion.” In re Rsch. & Trading Corp., 793 F.2d 1276, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(citations omitted). But when they are, “the appearance of a mark of similar sound,
appearance, or connotation is more likely to cause confusion than if the goods [or
services] are significantly different.” Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, LLC v. Fed.
Corp., 673 F.3d 1330, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
Here, the services identified in the PÜRLUXE registration are “Beauty spa
services, namely, cosmetic body care.” The application, as amended in Applicant’s
Request for Reconsideration, identifies “Beauty salon services, namely, cosmetic
scalp care” and “Health spa services, namely, minimally and non-invasive cosmetic
and scalp care services.” Obviously, the scalp is part of the body, so “cosmetic body
care” is a relatively broader term that encompasses Applicant’s narrower “cosmetic
scalp care.” Where one party’s goods or services are recited in a relatively broader
way and the other’s are recited in a narrower way that falls within the broader
recitation, it is well settled that the parties’ services are considered “legally identical”

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to that extent. See, e.g., In re Medline Indus., Inc., No. 87680078, 2020 WL 1485709,
at *5 (TTAB 2020); In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, No. 86490930, 2016 WL
3915986, at *10 (TTAB 2016); In re Hughes Furniture Indus., Inc., No. 85627379,
2015 WL 1734918, at *3 (TTAB 2015); In re RiseSmart, Inc., No. 85050089, 2012 WL
6137597, at *4 (TTAB 2012).
Applicant’s only argument as to this overlap in services appears in the section of
Applicant’s brief discussing the alleged dissimilarities in the marks, where Applicant
states: “Applicant’s mark is … for spa services relating to the scalp. In contrast …
‘PÜRLUXE’ … is for spa services relating to cosmetic body care.”13 But as we
explained, the scalp is part of the body, so this distinction does not matter: the “spa
services” overlap to that extent.14 That is also why Applicant’s amendment to exclude
“cosmetic body care” except for the scalp does not insulate the application from this
likelihood of confusion refusal: because the registered mark identifies cosmetic body
care without a restriction, and thus includes cosmetic scalp care.
Because the services overlap and thus are identical-in-part, this important factor
will weigh in favor of a conclusion that confusion is likely at the final weighing.15
13 4 TTABVUE 7 (bold in original; underlining omitted). Curiously, the heading and lead
sentence in the section of Applicant’s brief concerning the comparison of the services read:
“Applicant’s Goods are Distinct from Registrant’s Services. It is irrelevant that the goods may
be tangentially related by their loose connection to the food industry.” See id.
14 Applicant does not argue that its identification of “salon” services somehow differentiates
its “cosmetic scalp care” or “scalp care services” from the “cosmetic body care” identified in
the PÜRLUXE registration. Indeed, Applicant’s brief broadly characterizes its services as
“spa services.” See, e.g., 4 TTABVUE 7 (“Applicant’s Mark is for ‘PURELUX’ as a single word,
followed by “SCALP SPA” for spa services relating to the scalp.”) (emphasis added).
15 The Examining Attorney’s brief also helpfully included a table summarizing evidence in
the record (as well as identifying where, in the record, that evidence may be found) that
several third parties offer one or more of the services identified in the application together

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C. Weighing the findings on the relevant factors together
Having made findings on the two likelihood-of-confusion factors that Applicant
and the Examining Attorney addressed, our final step is to assess together these two
findings together to determine whether, on balance, they indicate that confusion is
likely as to the marks before us. See, e.g., Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1384.
Here, both factors rest on the “confusion is likely” side of the scale. No factors
weigh against them. We therefore have no difficulty in concluding that confusion is
likely with the registered mark PÜRLUXE.
Decision: We affirm the refusal on the basis of a likelihood of confusion with the
registered mark PÜRLUXE. We need not reach the question whether the application
also must be refused due to a likelihood of confusion with the registered mark PURE
LUXE CONTOUR LAB.
with one or more of the services listed in the PÜRLUXE and PURE LUXE CONTOUR LAB
registrations. See 6 TTABVUE 8-9. This evidence is relevant to show—even in the absence of
the partial overlap we have found here—that the respective services are related. See, e.g.,
Hewlett-Packard, 281 F.3d at 1267 (evidence that “a single company sells the goods and
services of both parties, if presented, is relevant to a relatedness analysis”). We need not,
however, rely on this evidence of relatedness due to our finding of a partial overlap.